[Plaintiffs, Appellants] As indicated in the list of plaintiffs in the attached sheet. (Litigation representatives: Yoon & Yang LLC, Attorney Lee Jeong-woo and 1 other)
[Defendant, Appellee] Republic of Korea (Litigation representatives: Law Firm City & People, Attorney Kim Il-hee and 5 others)
[Judgment Below] Seoul High Court Decision 2016Na2030683, decided August 31, 2016
[Order]
All appeals are dismissed. The costs of the appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiffs. The address "Pyeongchang-gun, Gangwon-do (Address 1 omitted)" of "146. Co-plaintiff 146 in the court below" in Attachment 1, List of Plaintiffs, of the judgment below is corrected to read "Donghae-si (Address 2 omitted)."
[Reasoning] The grounds of appeal are examined.
1. Overview of the Case
A. The Plaintiffs are non-civil-service persons who entered into employment contracts without a fixed term with the heads of the respective Regional Construction and Management Administrations under the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport (국토교통부) under the Defendant, and who work as road maintenance workers performing road maintenance and repair duties, or as overload control workers performing duties such as inspection of overloaded vehicles, at the relevant National Land Management Offices under the respective Regional Construction and Management Administrations (road maintenance workers and overload control workers are hereinafter collectively referred to as "National Road Management Workers").
B. The Plaintiffs asserted the following: (1) that the Defendant's failure to pay to the Plaintiffs the diligence allowance (정근수당), position-grade subsidy (직급보조비), performance bonus (성과상여금), and family allowance (가족수당) (hereinafter collectively referred to as "the allowances at issue") that are paid to driving-position civil servants and overload-control-position civil servants (hereinafter referred to as "the civil servants at issue") who perform the same or similar work as the Plaintiffs, constitutes discriminatory treatment in violation of the constitutional principle of equality and Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법), and accordingly claimed payment of amounts equivalent to the allowances at issue for the period from January 2011 to December 2014 (with respect to the position-grade subsidy and family allowance, from January 2014) as damages for tort; and (2) on the premise that the Plaintiffs' work of going out to road sites constituted business trips, claimed, in the alternative, either payment of the travel expenses themselves or damages equivalent to travel expenses arising from the aforementioned discriminatory treatment.
C. The first instance court dismissed all of the Plaintiffs' claims, and although the Plaintiffs appealed, the court below also dismissed all of the Plaintiffs' appeals.
2. Regarding the Claim for Payment of Travel Expenses (Second Ground of Appeal)
The court below determined that the Plaintiffs' work of going to road sites to repair roads and inspect overloaded vehicles did not constitute temporary work performed at a place other than the ordinary place of work, and thus could not be regarded as a business trip, and that it could not be found that a practice had been established between the Plaintiffs and the Defendant of treating such work as a business trip and paying travel expenses therefor, nor that the Defendant had recognized such work as a business trip; accordingly, the court below rejected the Plaintiffs' claim for payment of travel expenses.
Upon examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the relevant legal principles and the record, the judgment of the court below is justified, and there is no error therein, as alleged in the grounds of appeal, of misunderstanding the legal principles concerning business-trip work or of failing to conduct necessary deliberation, which affected the judgment.
3. Regarding the Claim for Damages (First Ground of Appeal)
A. Facts
According to the reasoning of the judgment below and the record, the following facts may be found.
1) The Plaintiffs worked in the following manner: they reported to the office of their respective National Land Management Office, received safety training and that day's work instructions, then rode in official vehicles to move to or patrol the relevant sites of roads within the jurisdiction of their National Land Management Office, where they performed road maintenance and repair work such as repairing damaged road surfaces and facilities and removing fallen objects (in the case of road maintenance workers) or overloaded vehicle inspection duties (in the case of overload control workers), and then returned to the office of their National Land Management Office, prepared that day's work log, and finished work. Road maintenance workers and overload control workers sometimes rotated duties with each other.
2) Driving-position civil servants working at the National Land Management Offices drove the official vehicles when road maintenance workers departed for the site to perform road maintenance and repair work or returned after completing the work, and performed safety management duties such as signal guidance at the site while the road maintenance workers were working, but did not participate in the road repair work itself.
3) Overload-control-position civil servants were operated either divided into indoor and outdoor duty positions, or on a rotating basis, depending on the operational circumstances of the relevant National Land Management Office; those on indoor duty performed administrative work at the office of the National Land Management Office, while those on outdoor duty, as team leaders or squad leaders overseeing and supervising the overloaded vehicle inspection work at the site, performed duties such as vehicle guidance and measurement, preparation of violation reports, and driving of overload-inspection vehicles together with the overload control workers. In the case of overload control workers, most performed inspection duties at the site, but at some National Land Management Offices, overload control workers were also assigned indoor administrative assistance duties for civil servants.
4) The civil servants at issue, being civil servants belonging to the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport under the State Public Officials Act (국가공무원법), may, upon the instructions of the Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport or others, perform other duties belonging to the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport in addition to road maintenance and overload control duties, and their assigned duties may be changed to duties unrelated to road maintenance and overload control. By contrast, National Road Management Workers such as the Plaintiffs were hired solely for road maintenance and repair and overload control duties, and there is no possibility of their duties being changed.
5) The employment and working conditions of National Road Management Workers are set forth in the "National Road Management Worker Management Regulation" (국도관리원 관리규정), a directive of the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport (before the amendment of August 1, 2013, the directive was titled the "Road Management Open-Term Contract Worker Management Regulation"), and Article 25 of the said Regulation provides that the salary and allowances of National Road Management Workers shall be paid in accordance with the "Current Business Expense Execution Guidelines" and other matters determined annually by the Minister. Pursuant to the said Guidelines, the Defendant paid to the Plaintiffs, from 2011 to 2013, in addition to a fixed basic salary, a family allowance, a position-grade subsidy, a supervisor's allowance, a fixed meal allowance, a holiday bonus, a hazard allowance, an overtime allowance, and an annual leave compensation allowance.
6) The National Land Management Labor Union (국토교통부 국토관리노동조합) (hereinafter "the Union at issue"), to which the Plaintiffs belong, has, from 2012, as the negotiation-representative labor union, concluded annual wage agreements with the Defendant. In the wage agreements concluded in 2012 and 2013, respectively, the diligence allowance was incorporated into the determination of the basic salary amount of National Road Management Workers. The Union at issue continuously demanded a change from the fixed-rate wage system to a seniority-based wage system, and the Defendant accordingly proposed to the Union at issue an introduction plan for a seniority-based wage system with the following content: "the basic salary shall be applied identically to the seniority pay table for administrative assistants (open-term contract workers) of the headquarters of the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport (in the case of administrative assistants, the diligence allowance, the diligence allowance bonus, and the position-grade subsidy are included in and paid as part of the basic salary, and the family allowance is not paid separately), provided that the maximum pay grade shall be limited to Grade 20, and that a meal subsidy, holiday bonus, hazard allowance, overtime allowance, and annual leave compensation allowance shall be paid as allowances." Following a vote of the union members, the Union at issue agreed with the Defendant on December 19, 2013 to implement the seniority-based wage system with the above content, and pursuant to that agreement, the Defendant ceased paying the family allowance, position-grade subsidy, and supervisor's allowance that it had previously paid.
7) The civil servants at issue received, in addition to their basic salary (seniority-based) under the Public Officials Remuneration Regulation (공무원보수규정), a diligence allowance, performance bonus, family allowance, position-grade subsidy, fixed meal allowance, and holiday bonus pursuant to the "Regulation on Public Officials' Allowances, etc." (공무원수당 등에 관한 규정, hereinafter "the Public Officials Allowance Regulation"), and, when on a business trip, received travel expenses pursuant to the "Public Officials Travel Expense Regulation" (공무원 여비 규정). Meanwhile, the civil servants at issue did not receive the hazard allowance that the Defendant paid to National Road Management Workers until 2013, nor the supervisor's allowance paid when acting as a team leader or squad leader.
B. Whether the Treatment Constitutes Discriminatory Treatment under Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act
Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act provides that "an employer shall not discriminate against a worker on the basis of sex, and shall not discriminate in working conditions on the basis of nationality, religion, or social status," thereby establishing the "principle of equal treatment" or the "principle of prohibition of discriminatory treatment," while also providing, in Article 114, Item 1, for criminal punishment for violations thereof. This provision is designed to prohibit employers from treating multiple workers differently without reasonable grounds, thereby implementing, in individual employment relationships, the principle of equality set forth in Article 11 of the Constitution (헌법). Discriminatory treatment can be established only where multiple workers, who are premised on belonging to essentially the same group of workers, are nevertheless treated differently from one another without reasonable grounds.
In this case, in order to find that the treatment of the Plaintiffs constitutes discriminatory treatment on the ground of social status, the status of the Plaintiffs that constitutes the ground for discrimination must fall under "social status," and the civil servants designated by the Plaintiffs as the comparators must belong to essentially the same group of workers.
Although the "social status" referred to in Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act is not necessarily limited to a social status that is fixed by birth, nor does it require that the status be incapable of change, the employment status arising from an individual employment contract cannot be regarded, in relation to civil servants, as "social status" as a ground of discriminatory treatment under Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act, and civil servants are difficult to regard as belonging to the same group of workers in relation to such workers, and thus cannot serve as a comparison group. The reasons are as follows.
1) The Special Nature of the Status of Civil Servants
A civil servant is a servant of the entire people and is responsible to the people (Article 7 of the Constitution). Although a civil servant, in that he or she depends for his or her livelihood on income earned as the price of labor, has the character of a worker, a civil servant, as a servant of the entire people, is in a special employment relationship different from that of an ordinary worker because publicness, fairness, sincerity, neutrality, and the like are required of him or her (see Constitutional Court en banc Decision 2016Hun-Ma404, decided August 31, 2017). The employment relationship between a civil servant and the State or a local government is not a relationship formed by a private-law employment contract, but a status relationship under public law established by an act of appointment, which is an administrative disposition by the appointing authority.
Unlike an ordinary worker, who bears, vis-à-vis the employer, the duty to obey directives concerning duties in accordance with the code of conduct prescribed by the rules of employment, a civil servant bears, pursuant to the provisions of the State Public Officials Act and the Local Public Officials Act (지방공무원법), the duty to obey the directives of his or her superior concerning duties, as well as various duties prescribed by the Constitution and statutes, such as the duty, as a servant of the entire people, to perform his or her duties kindly and fairly, the duty of integrity, and the duty of religious neutrality; a civil servant may not engage in for-profit business even outside working hours, and is prohibited from political activities and, in principle, from collective action (Articles 56 through 66 of the State Public Officials Act; Articles 48 through 58 of the Local Public Officials Act). As such, a civil servant is in a position where heavier responsibility and higher ethical standards are required, both within and outside the scope of duties, than in the case of an ordinary worker.
2) The Manner in Which Working Conditions Are Determined
A) With respect to the remuneration of civil servants, the State Public Officials Act and the Local Public Officials Act provide for the so-called "principle of statutory determination of working conditions" (Article 46(5) of the State Public Officials Act; Article 44(4) of the Local Public Officials Act). This is because, since a civil servant has the special status of a servant of the entire people pursuant to the career civil service system prescribed by Article 7 of the Constitution, it is appropriate for the National Assembly (국회), which represents the will of the entire people, to determine his or her working conditions, and moreover, since the remuneration of civil servants is paid out of the State budget, it is necessary for the National Assembly, which has the authority under Article 54 of the Constitution to deliberate on and finalize the budget bill, to determine the working conditions of civil servants by statute reflecting budgetary considerations (see Supreme Court Decision 2013Du14610, decided August 25, 2016; Supreme Court Decision 2017Du64606, decided February 28, 2018, etc.).
B) Article 33(1) of the Constitution guarantees the independent exercise of the three labor rights of workers; nevertheless, in consideration of the status of civil servants as servants of the entire people and the publicness of their duties, in order to guarantee a reasonable career civil service system and to integrate and adjust, for the purpose of public welfare, the rights and interests of the sovereign people related thereto, paragraph (2) of the same Article allows the said rights of civil-servant workers to be restricted by statute (see Constitutional Court en banc Decision 2005Hun-Ma971, 1193, 2006Hun-Ma198, decided December 26, 2008). Accordingly, the "Act on the Establishment and Operation, etc. of Trade Unions for Public Officials" (공무원의 노동조합 설립 및 운영 등에 관한 법률) provides that a collective agreement concluded with content different from statutes, ordinances, budgets, and subordinate regulations shall not become effective (Article 10(1)), and prohibits all forms of industrial action by civil servants (Article 11). Due to these provisions, even in the case of civil servants who may join a labor union, there is little scope for improving working conditions through the exercise of the three labor rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
C) By contrast, workers who have entered into private-law employment contracts with the State or a local government have their treatment determined in accordance with their employment contracts and collective agreements, within the scope of protection afforded by the mandatory provisions of the Labor Standards Act, and are, in principle, not subject to special legal restrictions on the exercise of the three labor rights. In this case as well, unlike the civil servants at issue, National Road Management Workers may conclude collective agreements even with respect to remuneration, and have in fact improved their wages and other working conditions through collective agreements, including by introducing the seniority-based pay system.
3) The Nature of Civil Servants' Remuneration
The remuneration paid to civil servants does not have solely the character of consideration for labor, but also includes the purpose of maintaining a stable career civil service system. Among the allowances at issue, the position-grade subsidy is an allowance paid for the purpose of compensating for the various expenses attendant upon the performance of duties according to the position grade of the civil servant who is the recipient (see Constitutional Court en banc Decision 2012Hun-Ma494, decided June 25, 2015), and the performance bonus was introduced for the purpose of motivating civil servants with excellent achievements and performance, thereby stimulating civil servants' motivation to work, inducing the continuous improvement of job performance ability, and enhancing the competitiveness and productivity of the public service (see Supreme Court Decision 2013Da205778, decided February 9, 2017). The family allowance was likewise introduced to improve civil servants' treatment and to subsidize living expenses. As such, the various allowances paid to civil servants also carry policy purposes, such as reflecting the special nature of the organization of civil servants or guaranteeing the livelihood of civil servants.
4) The Possibility of Change of Duties and the Remuneration System
A transfer or reassignment disposition against a worker may constitute a disposition disadvantageous to the worker, and is thus subject to the restriction that it may not be made without just cause (Article 23(1) of the Labor Standards Act), and where an employment contract has specifically limited the content of the work or the place of work, the worker's consent is required for a transfer that departs from such limitation (see Supreme Court Decision 97Da18165, 18172, decided July 22, 1997). By contrast, a personnel reassignment of a civil servant is based on the State Public Officials Act, the Local Public Officials Act, and other statutes relating to civil servants, and within the limits of such statutes, the appointing authority has considerable discretion; a personnel reassignment made by the appointing authority is lawful unless there are special circumstances such as a violation of the standards and principles prescribed by statute constituting an abuse or deviation from personnel discretion (see Supreme Court Decision 2006Da16215, decided May 28, 2009). The civil servants at issue, as national civil servants belonging to the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, are likewise subject to the possibility that they may be moved to a different place of work or assigned to a position and duties unrelated to road maintenance and overload control by a personnel reassignment made by the Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, whereas National Road Management Workers, in principle, perform only road maintenance and overload control duties at the place of work (the National Land Management Office) designated in their employment contracts, such that the scope of personnel authority held by the hiring authority is narrow.
The salary of civil servants is basically determined according to the type of civil servant (general service, research service, police/fire service, etc.), grade or job class, and pay step, and does not vary according to the particular position or duties that the civil servant is assigned to at a given time. Most of the allowances prescribed by the Public Officials Allowance Regulation, including the allowances at issue raised by the Plaintiffs, are paid uniformly to national civil servants in general, and are not paid solely to the civil servants at issue or to civil servants performing similar duties. As such, since the remuneration system for civil servants is not established on the basis of the duties performed by the civil servant, the mere fact that there are similarities in the content of the duties between civil servants and non-civil-servant workers cannot, absent special statutory provisions, serve as a basis for guaranteeing the same treatment as civil servants, notwithstanding the differences noted above in status and in the manner of determining working conditions. Meanwhile, the Plaintiffs may, at any time during the term of their employment contract, undergo the civil servant hiring procedure and be appointed as civil servants, thereby receiving treatment identical to that of civil servants with respect to duties and remuneration, and there exists no legal or institutional obstacle to this.
C. Sub-conclusion
1) Whether the Status of the Plaintiffs as Open-Term Contract Workers Constitutes "Social Status," and Whether Civil Servants May Serve as the Comparison Group
As discussed above, in light of the fact that civil servants form a status relationship under public law with the State or a local government pursuant to the career civil service system prescribed by the Constitution and bear various statutory duties; that the working conditions of civil servants are determined in accordance with statutory regulation and are not subject to improvement through collective agreements; and the circumstances concerning the possibility of change of position and duties of civil servants through personnel reassignment and the remuneration system, etc., the Plaintiffs' employment status as open-term contract workers cannot be regarded, in relation to civil servants, as constituting "social status" as prescribed by Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act, and civil servants cannot be treated as an essentially identical comparison group.
2) Determination in This Case
Given that, as discussed above, the Plaintiffs' employment status does not constitute "social status" in relation to civil servants, and that the civil servants at issue cannot serve as the comparators for the Plaintiffs, it cannot be said that the Defendant engaged in discriminatory treatment against the Plaintiffs with respect to working conditions, without any need to further determine whether there is a reasonable basis for the disadvantageous treatment.
Accordingly, although the judgment below, which rejected the Plaintiffs' claim for damages, contains some inappropriate points in the reasoning presented, its conclusion, in rejecting this portion of the Plaintiffs' claim on the ground that discrimination against the Plaintiffs is not established, is justified, and there is no error therein, as alleged in the grounds of appeal, of misapprehension of the legal principles regarding the comparator and reasonable grounds in discrimination, insufficient deliberation, or violation of the rules of evidence, which affected the judgment.
4. Conclusion
Therefore, the Plaintiffs' appeal is without merit and is hereby dismissed in its entirety, and the costs of the appeal shall be borne by the losing parties. As there is an obvious clerical error in the indication of the parties in the judgment below, this is corrected ex officio, and it is so decided as set forth in the Order. Aside from the separate opinion of Justice Kwon Yeong-jun and the dissenting opinions of Justices Min Yu-sook, Kim Seon-su, Ro Jeong-hee, Lee Heung-gu, and Oh Kyung-mi, the opinions of the participating Justices are unanimous, and there are supplementary opinions to the majority opinion by Justices An Cheol-sang, Ro Tae-ak, and Cheon Dae-yeop, supplementary opinions to the dissenting opinion by Justices Min Yu-sook and Oh Kyung-mi, and a supplementary opinion by Justice Kim Seon-su.
5. Separate Opinion of Justice Kwon Yeong-jun
A. Summary of the Separate Opinion
The status of the Plaintiffs as open-term contract workers in the public sector (hereinafter "public-service contract workers") constitutes "social status" under Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act. Furthermore, civil servants performing the same type of work as, or work similar to, that of the Plaintiffs may be taken as comparators in determining whether the Plaintiffs suffered discriminatory treatment. However, since there existed a reasonable basis justifying the Defendant's failure to pay the Plaintiffs the allowances at issue and travel expenses, it is difficult to find that the Defendant bears liability for damages arising from tort. In sum, I cannot agree with the reasoning of the majority opinion denying the comparability of civil servants and denying that the Plaintiffs' employment status constitutes "social status" in relation to civil servants, but I agree with the majority opinion's conclusion denying the Defendant's liability for damages to the Plaintiffs.
B. The Comparability of Civil Servants
1) The Significance of the Determination of Comparability
A) Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act declares the principle of equal treatment by providing that "an employer shall not discriminate against a worker on the basis of sex, and shall not discriminate in working conditions on the basis of nationality, religion, or social status." This is a principle for substantively implementing, in labor relations, the principle of equality under Article 11(1) of the Constitution (see Supreme Court Decision 2015Du46321, decided March 14, 2019). In order to constitute discriminatory treatment prohibited by Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act, it is a precondition that the person claiming to have been discriminated against (hereinafter "the relevant worker") and the person designated by that person as the comparator (hereinafter "the comparator worker") belong to an essentially identical comparison group (see Supreme Court Decision 2013Da1051, decided October 29, 2015). However, where the relevant worker and the comparator worker present a mixture of similar and dissimilar aspects, whether they belong to an essentially identical comparison group, i.e., whether comparability is recognized, is determined by which aspect is emphasized and by what standard and at what level they are compared. In this respect, the determination of comparability takes on a fluid character depending on the approach adopted.
B) In addition, comparability may vary depending on the content of the treatment alleged to be discriminatory. For example, in determining discriminatory treatment with respect to allowances of a welfare nature paid irrespective of duties, comparability may be broadened, whereas in determining discriminatory treatment with respect to allowances closely related to the content or value of the duties, comparability may be narrowed. Where such allowances are at issue together, whether the requirement of comparability is satisfied may be determined differently for each allowance at issue. In this respect, the determination of comparability takes on a relative character depending on the content of the alleged discriminatory treatment.
C) Comparability is not a requirement expressly set forth in Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act, but merely a logical premise for the determination of discriminatory treatment. However, since the determination of comparability is fluid and relative in character, the discretion of the deciding body is substantially involved at that stage of determination. If comparability is denied at this stage, the relevant worker is denied the opportunity to receive a final substantive determination on the issue of discrimination. On the other hand, many of the factors considered in the determination of comparability can be fully considered at the stage of the final determination of discriminatory treatment. Therefore, rather than raising the threshold of comparability too high and thereby narrowing the path to the final determination of discriminatory treatment, it is appropriate, insofar as the principal criteria for the determination of comparability discussed below are satisfied, to place these matters on the scales of comparison as generously as possible and determine the existence of discriminatory treatment on that final basis.
2) The Principal Criteria for the Determination of Comparability
A) Since comparability is a fluid and relative concept, it is difficult to present a uniform standard of determination. However, since a determination of comparability must be made as a preliminary matter in order to determine the existence of discriminatory treatment, a criterion to serve as the principle of comparison is required. Since Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act does not expressly present such a criterion of determination, it must be established through interpretation.
B) Meanwhile, Article 8(1) of the Act on the Protection, etc. of Fixed-Term and Part-Time Employees (기간제 및 단시간근로자 보호 등에 관한 법률, hereinafter "the Fixed-Term Employees Act") defines the comparator of a fixed-term worker as "a worker who has entered into an employment contract without a fixed term and who is engaged in the same or similar work at the relevant business or workplace." The Supreme Court has held that "a worker who has entered into an employment contract without a fixed term" includes not only an open-term contract worker but also a civil servant who is a regular worker (see Supreme Court Decision 2011Du5391, decided November 27, 2014). Consequently, where a fixed-term worker, an open-term contract worker, and a regular worker who perform the same or similar type of work coexist at the same workplace, the prohibition of discrimination between the fixed-term worker and the open-term contract worker, and between the fixed-term worker and the regular worker, is governed by the Fixed-Term Employees Act. This raises the question of whether the prohibition of discrimination between an open-term contract worker and a regular worker, which is not addressed by the Fixed-Term Employees Act, should be left in a regulatory vacuum.
C) Article 8(1) of the Fixed-Term Employees Act embodies the spirit that, where the same or similar type of work is performed at the same workplace, the workers should receive the same or equivalent treatment in working conditions regardless of employment form. This spirit is shared with what is pursued by the principle of equality under Article 11(1) of the Constitution or the principle of equal treatment under Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act. Moreover, as is apparent from the principle of equal pay for equal work declared in Article 23(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, this spirit is also one of universal character. Accordingly, the criterion of "the same or similar type of work" for determining comparability presented in Article 8(1) of the Fixed-Term Employees Act may be applied by analogy in determining discriminatory treatment between a public-service contract worker who is an open-term contract worker and a civil servant who is a regular worker, under Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act. Whether the work in question falls under "the same or similar type of work" should be determined based on the work actually performed by the worker, but even if the work performed by these workers does not entirely coincide and there are some differences in the scope of duties or in responsibilities and authority, if there is no essential difference in the content of the principal duties, then, absent special circumstances, they should be regarded as engaged in the same or similar type of work (see Supreme Court Decision 2011Du7045, decided October 25, 2012).
3) This Case
The Plaintiffs worked as overload control workers or road maintenance workers at the same workplace as the civil servants at issue. First, overload control workers and overload-control-position civil servants engage in essentially the same or similar type of work, in that they mainly perform investigation, measurement, action, and related administrative work for restriction of operation on account of overloading (Article 77(4) of the Road Act (도로법); Article 40-2(2) of the Enforcement Regulations of the Road Act). For this reason, overload control workers are also deemed to be public officials for the purpose of the application of the bribery offenses (Articles 129 through 132 of the Criminal Act) (Article 109, Item 1 of the Road Act). Meanwhile, in the case of road maintenance workers and driving-position civil servants, there is room to view their work as differing, in that the former mainly perform road maintenance and repair work, while the latter mainly perform movement to the site and safety management work at the site. However, since these tasks are organically interconnected to constitute a single road management operation, the above difference may also be seen as arising from a detailed division of roles within the same or similar type of work. There is also mutual substitutability of roles, such as road maintenance workers taking over driving duties in place of driving-position civil servants. Furthermore, with respect to allowances such as the family allowance among the allowances at issue, which have a stronger welfare character than a work-related character, there is a greater need to ultimately determine the existence of discriminatory treatment even where there are some differences in duties between the two groups. As noted above, care must also be taken not to raise the threshold of comparability too high. Therefore, it should be held that the civil servants at issue may be taken as comparators in determining whether discriminatory treatment against National Road Management Workers exists.
C. Whether "Social Status" Is Constituted
1) The Significance of "Social Status"
A) Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act prohibits discriminatory treatment on the ground of social status. What constitutes "social status" here must be interpreted in light of the purpose of this provision, which is to protect workers vulnerable to discrimination, and the social reality to which this provision is applied.
B) "Social status" under Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act means a continuing status, other than sex, nationality, or religion, that has a social force such that, due to social systems, culture, practices, and the like, it standardizes and fixes the determination of working conditions within a certain range, irrespective of the content or value of the work. Such status need not necessarily be permanent or fixed for a long period; it suffices that it has the attribute of being capable of continuing for a considerable period. Moreover, in consideration of the fact that legal liability is imposed for discriminatory treatment based on social status, the status constituting social status must be one that can be clearly distinguished from other social statuses.
C) Historically, social status was recognized primarily on the basis of innately conferred social statuses such as race, biological sex, and feudal class. However, as the socioeconomic environment has changed and awareness of the principle of equality has expanded, the concept of social status has developed to include acquired statuses as well. Such acquired statuses include statuses in which individual choice is involved, such as attorney, civil servant, or corporate officer (see Constitutional Court en banc Decision 89Hun-Ma120, 212, decided September 3, 1990; Constitutional Court en banc Decision 90Hun-Ba27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 44, 45, 46, 92Hun-Ba15, decided April 28, 1992; Supreme Court Decision 96Chu213, decided February 25, 1997, etc.). Therefore, the mere fact that individual choice, mediated through an employment contract, was involved in the acquisition or loss of a status in a labor relationship does not preclude that status from constituting a social status. Contract and status are compatible.
2) The Status of Workers According to Employment Form and Social Status
A) Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act does not expressly set forth employment form as a ground for prohibition of discrimination. At the time the Labor Standards Act was first enacted in 1953, there did not exist the diverse employment forms that exist today. However, from then until the present, diverse employment forms have emerged, and issues of discrimination arising therefrom have come to the fore. Accordingly, provisions prohibiting discrimination based on specific employment forms, such as fixed-term workers or dispatched workers, were established, such as Article 8 of the Fixed-Term Employees Act and Article 21 of the Act on the Protection, etc. of Dispatched Workers (파견근로자 보호 등에 관한 법률, hereinafter "the Dispatched Workers Act").
B) The status of a public-service contract worker, who is an open-term contract worker, is likewise a status based on employment form. From a legislative standpoint, a new provision prohibiting discrimination based on such employment form could be enacted, as with the Fixed-Term Employees Act or the Dispatched Workers Act. However, it is not necessary to enact a new statute or amend Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act in order to regulate such prohibition of discrimination. The discrimination-prohibition provisions of the Fixed-Term Employees Act and the Dispatched Workers Act are not so much establishing new grounds for prohibition of discrimination outside the scope of regulation of Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act, as they are concretizing, in the form of individual statutory provisions, the meaning of "social status," which is only abstractly provided for in Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act, in order to respond to the issue of discrimination arising from the emergence of diverse employment forms. Such changes should also be reflected back into the interpretation of "social status." Through such contemporary interpretation, the concept should be enabled to maintain its vitality in our society as a marker for the prohibition of discrimination.
3) This Case
The Plaintiffs are public-service contract workers hired under employment contracts without a fixed term to perform the public duties of road maintenance and repair work and overloaded vehicle inspection work. Such status as a public-service contract worker has the attribute of continuing for a considerable period, and is also clearly distinguishable from other statuses such as civil servant or fixed-term worker. Public-service contract workers, irrespective of the content or value of the labor they provide, generally perform public duties under working conditions less favorable than those of civil servants, simply because of that status itself. It is true that these workers voluntarily entered into employment contracts, thereby acquiring that status, while being aware of these working conditions. However, the overall framework of working conditions attendant on the specific employment form of public-service contract worker has, in some respects, been formed in accordance with statutes and policies, such as the enforcement of the Fixed-Term Employees Act and the Government's Comprehensive Measures for Non-Regular Workers in the Public Sector, irrespective of these workers' intentions. It is not easy for these workers, while providing labor as public-service contract workers, to escape from such a system of working conditions through their own intention or ability. Moreover, the controversy over discrimination arising from the status-based characteristics of public-service contract workers demonstrates that this status may be vulnerable to structural and continuing discrimination in our society. "Social status" under Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act is a marker established to respond to the risk of discrimination arising from such particular social status. Considering these points, the status of the Plaintiffs as public-service contract workers constitutes "social status" under Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act.
D. Determination of Discriminatory Treatment
1) The Criteria for Determining Discriminatory Treatment
Since the equality pursued by Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act is not absolute or formal equality but relative and substantive equality, "discriminatory treatment" here means an employer's treatment of a worker disadvantageously, without reasonable grounds, with respect to wages and other working conditions. "A case where there is no reasonable ground" means a case where the necessity for differential treatment is not recognized upon comprehensive consideration of the content of the labor provided by the worker, or a case where, even if differential treatment is warranted, the method or degree thereof is not appropriate (see Supreme Court Decision 2011Du2132, decided March 29, 2012; the above Supreme Court Decision 2015Du46321). Whether there is a reasonable ground must be determined by comprehensively considering, on the basis of the content of the disadvantageous treatment at issue in the individual case and the circumstances relied upon by the employer as the ground for the disadvantageous treatment, the actual purpose of the benefit, the conditions and standards of hiring, the attributes of the employment form, the content and scope of the duties, authority and responsibility, the intensity, quantity, and quality of the labor, wages and other determinative factors of working conditions, etc. (see Supreme Court Decision 2014Du43288, decided December 1, 2016; the above Supreme Court Decision 2015Du46321).
2) Consideration of the Special Nature of Comparator Civil Servants
In determining whether treating a public-service contract worker differently from a comparator civil servant constitutes unlawful, unreasonably disadvantageous treatment, the following matters should be considered.
First, the relationship between a civil servant and the State or a local government has a strong character as a public-law relationship formed by an act of appointment, which is an administrative disposition by the appointing authority, whereas the relationship between a public-service contract worker and the State or a local government has a strong character as a private-law relationship formed by an employment contract.
Second, the method of hiring, qualifications, or working conditions of civil servants are determined to a large extent by statute (Articles 26, 28, 33, 46, and 47, etc. of the State Public Officials Act), whereas the method of hiring, qualifications, or working conditions of public-service contract workers are determined to a large extent by the employment contract or rules of employment, and collective agreements.
Third, unlike public-service contract workers, civil servants have their fundamental rights, such as freedom of assembly and association and the three labor rights, restricted, and bear heavy duties and responsibilities as servants of the entire people; in exchange, their remuneration system is determined in correspondence with these status-based characteristics, and they are also granted the stable status of career civil servants.
Fourth, the working conditions of civil servants, particularly their remuneration system, are determined by statute enacted by the National Assembly or by the budget deliberated and finalized by the National Assembly, and the working conditions of public-service contract workers, even though initially determined by collective agreement, are, in practical terms, also constrained by the budget deliberated and finalized by the National Assembly. As such, the determination of the remuneration systems of these two groups occurs under external circumstances that are difficult for labor and management to change, and there is also the difficulty of having to determine the remuneration conditions of public-service contract workers while simultaneously satisfying the statutory remuneration conditions of civil servants within a limited budget; there are, therefore, inevitably certain practical limits on aligning or improving the remuneration conditions of public-service contract workers with those of civil servants.
3) Discriminatory Treatment and Collective Agreements
A) In order for discriminatory treatment to constitute a tort, the "unlawfulness" of the discriminatory treatment must be established. However, where the act alleged to be discriminatory treatment is not a unilateral act of the employer but is the result of labor-management agreement embodied in a collective agreement concluded through collective bargaining with a labor union, the existence of that collective agreement must also be considered in determining unlawfulness. Since a collective agreement is also denied effect where it violates mandatory provisions, including Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act, or good morals or other social order, the mere fact that a collective agreement was concluded does not automatically justify discriminatory treatment. However, the mere fact that the working conditions determined by a collective agreement are less favorable than the working conditions of the comparator worker does not automatically establish discriminatory treatment either. Meanwhile, since the principle of equal treatment under Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act is extremely abstract, whether the content of a collective agreement constitutes discriminatory treatment and is thus void must be determined on a case-by-case basis by comprehensively considering the specific circumstances surrounding the collective agreement, such as the course of the collective bargaining process, the relative bargaining power of labor and management, the characteristics of the matter alleged to be discriminatory treatment, the content of the collective agreement with respect to that matter, the size and nature of the disadvantage suffered by the relevant worker in relation to the comparator worker, and relevant statutes or practices.
B) A collective agreement is the product of the exercise of the right to collective bargaining, a fundamental right directly guaranteed by the Constitution, and of the institutionally guaranteed autonomy of labor-management agreement (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 2016Da248998, decided August 27, 2020), and performs the function of granting predictability to the legal relationship between labor and management and of reducing disputes between them. Therefore, where labor and management have determined the type and scope of allowances to be paid through a collective agreement concluded following collective bargaining that took into account the working conditions of the comparator worker, and the employer has failed to pay a specific allowance in accordance with that agreement, such failure to pay should not be immediately evaluated as a tort. In order to evaluate this as a tort, there must be a separate circumstance sufficient to find that the failure to pay the allowance, notwithstanding the existence of the collective agreement, is unlawful in that it violates the overall legal order—such as where, during the collective bargaining process, the employer used its superior bargaining power to unjustly reject a reasonable request by the labor union to include the allowance among the items to be paid, or where the content of the collective agreement excluding the allowance from the items to be paid, in light of the purpose and necessity of paying the allowance and the relationship between the relevant worker and the comparator worker, is grossly unreasonable in violation of the social order.
4) This Case
A) There are various differences between the civil servants at issue and the National Road Management Workers. Civil servants are hired according to stricter standards and methods, bear heavier duties or responsibilities than ordinary workers with respect to the duties they perform, and, because of the status-based characteristics of civil servants, are also subject to restrictions on the exercise of fundamental rights relating to labor relations. Since, unlike public-service contract workers, civil servants are open to the possibility of transfer to a different position, the civil servants at issue do not always perform the same or similar type of work as the National Road Management Workers. Civil servants and public-service contract workers are statuses that arose at different times based on different legal and social backgrounds, and the grounds for determining their remuneration systems differ. Accordingly, since the items constituting the remuneration systems of the two groups differ, their allowance systems cannot be identical either. In fact, there were allowance items paid only to civil servants, while there were also allowance items paid only to National Road Management Workers. For example, National Road Management Workers were paid a hazard allowance that was not paid to the civil servants at issue, and, until 2013, a supervisor's allowance was also paid when acting as a team leader or squad leader.
[Reasoning] (continued)
b) Each of the allowances at issue in this case has, in addition to the character of consideration for labor, a purpose of maintaining a stable career civil service system. The diligence allowance (정근수당) is an additional payment made as compensation and encouragement for the faithful service of public officials (see Constitutional Court en banc Decision 2020Hun-Ma211, decided March 31, 2022). The performance bonus (성과상여금) is an allowance introduced for the purpose of motivating public officials with excellent performance and achievements to a greater degree, thereby inspiring public officials' motivation to work, inducing continuous improvement of work performance capability, and enhancing the competitiveness and productivity of the public service (see Supreme Court Decision 2013Da205778, cited above). The position-based allowance (직급보조비) also has the purpose of compensating for various costs incurred in the performance of duties according to the rank of the public official who is the recipient (see Constitutional Court en banc Decision 2012Hun-Ma494, cited above). The family allowance (가족수당) is an allowance with a strong welfare character, but it is also an allowance introduced to improve the treatment of public officials and to subsidize living expenses from the standpoint of maintaining a stable career civil service system. As such, each of the allowances at issue in this case, although to differing degrees, has a certain relevance to the special nature of civil servant status.
c) The non-payment of each of the allowances at issue in this case does not appear to result from the Defendant's unilateral decision, but rather, for the most part, from the collective agreements concluded between the Defendant and the labor union in this case. As for the diligence allowance, in the respective wage agreements concluded between the Defendant and the labor union in this case in 2012 and 2013, it was incorporated into the basic pay of the national highway management workers (국도관리원) and was not paid as a separate allowance. The family allowance and the position-based allowance had originally been paid to the national highway management workers but ceased to be paid from 2014, which was the result of a partial adjustment of the allowance system upon the introduction, by labor-management agreement, of the seniority-based pay system that the national highway management workers had continuously demanded. Meanwhile, the performance bonus was omitted from the types of allowances to be paid under the above plan for introducing the seniority-based pay system; however, considering the process by which the labor union in this case, after a vote for and against, reached the collective agreement based on that plan, it appears that there was mutual understanding between labor and management regarding the fact that the performance bonus would not be separately paid. In the course of introducing this seniority-based pay system, an additional budget of approximately KRW 3.76 billion was allocated for the improvement of the compensation system of the national highway management workers, and as a result, the salaries of many national highway management workers increased, and the overall working conditions of the national highway management workers appear to have improved.
d) There is also no separate circumstance that would warrant evaluating as unlawful the Defendant's act of not paying each of the allowances at issue in this case pursuant to such collective agreement. That is, in the process leading to this collective agreement, no circumstance is found in which the labor union in this case requested that it should receive each of the allowances at issue in this case, and the Defendant unjustly refused this by using its superior bargaining power. Furthermore, considering the differences in status between the public officials in this case and the national highway management workers, the process of concluding the collective agreement, and the purposes of payment of each of the allowances at issue in this case, there is no circumstance found such that the relevant content of the collective agreement lost reasonableness significantly in violation of social order.
e) As set forth above, considering the difference in status between the public officials in this case and the national highway management workers, the difference in the grounds for determining their respective compensation systems and the resulting difference in compensation systems, the process of change in the compensation system of the national highway management workers, and the process and content of the conclusion of the collective agreement, there is a reasonable basis for the Defendant's non-payment of each of the allowances at issue in this case to the Plaintiffs, and therefore this cannot be deemed unlawful discriminatory treatment. As for travel expenses, as noted above, the lower court's determination that the Plaintiffs' work of going to road sites to repair roads and to enforce regulations against overloaded vehicles cannot be regarded as a "business trip" is justified, and therefore there is a reasonable basis for not paying the travel expense item to the Plaintiffs. Accordingly, the Defendant is not liable to the Plaintiffs for damages arising from a tort.
e. Conclusion
As set forth above, while I concur with the position of the majority opinion as to the conclusion of this case, since my reasoning differs, I set this forth as a separate opinion.
6. Dissenting Opinion of Justices Min Yu-suk, Kim Seon-su, Noh Jeong-hee, Lee Heung-gu, and Oh Kyung-mi on the Claim for Damages Due to Discrimination
a. The gist of the majority opinion on the first ground for appeal is that the employment status under an individual employment contract cannot be deemed to constitute "social status," which is a ground for discriminatory treatment under Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법), in relation to public officials, and that public officials cannot become a comparison group in relation to such workers; therefore, without any need to further determine whether there is a reasonable ground for the disadvantageous treatment, it cannot be said that the Defendant engaged in discriminatory treatment of the Plaintiffs with respect to working conditions.
However, we cannot agree with the grounds and part of the conclusion of the majority opinion on the first ground for appeal, and we shall set forth in detail the gist and grounds of the dissenting opinion and rebut the majority opinion and the separate opinion to the extent necessary. The gist of the dissenting opinion is as follows.
First, the comparison worker should be determined based on whether the worker is engaged in the same or similar type of work at the relevant business or workplace. Excluding public officials from the pool of comparison workers, which serves as the premise for determining discrimination under Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act, in relation to indefinite-term contract workers who are gong-mu-jik (공무직) workers, is difficult to accept in light of the meaning of Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act, its systematic interpretation together with related statutes, and the concept of fairness, and does not accord with the purport of precedent. The public officials in this case fall within the category of comparison workers for the Plaintiffs, who are gong-mu-jik workers performing essentially the same or similar work at the same workplace.
Second, "social status," which Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act sets forth as a ground for prohibition of discrimination, is not limited to a status fixed by birth congenitally, but includes a status acquired subsequently and occupied for a long period in society. Considering that the Plaintiffs' employment status as gong-mu-jik workers is of such a nature that it cannot easily be avoided by one's own will or exercise of ability, and once acquired, is occupied for a long period, as well as the reality of our society in which inferior working conditions and low social evaluation for gong-mu-jik workers have become entrenched, this can be deemed to constitute a social status.
Third, there is no reasonable ground for the Defendant's non-payment to the Plaintiffs of the family allowance and the performance bonus among each of the allowances at issue in this case, and therefore the Defendant is liable to compensate the Plaintiffs for damages equivalent to each of the above allowances.
b. Whether public officials qualify as a comparison group
1) Significance of Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act
Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act provides: "An employer shall not discriminate against a worker on the basis of gender, and shall not engage in discriminatory treatment with respect to working conditions on the basis of nationality, religion, or social status." This is a provision intended to substantively realize the principle of equality under Article 11, Paragraph 1 of the Constitution (헌법) in labor relations.
The constitutional principle of equality is the supreme principle of our Constitution concerning the guarantee of the fundamental rights of citizens, and is the standard that the State must follow in legislating, and in interpreting and enforcing law, and the right to equality is a fundamental right among fundamental rights of all citizens, entitling them to demand that the State not engage in unequal treatment without reasonable grounds and to demand equal treatment (see Constitutional Court en banc Decision 88Hun-Ga7, decided January 25, 1989, among others). In determining whether the constitutional right to equality has been infringed, one must examine whether the unequal treatment has a reasonable basis, based on the criterion of whether it is necessary and appropriate to achieve a legitimate legislative purpose without violating the constitutional principle of respect for human dignity (see Constitutional Court en banc Decision 92Hun-Ba43, decided February 24, 1994, among others). Likewise, in determining whether differential treatment with respect to working conditions, an area in which discrimination is prohibited under Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act, has a reasonable basis, one must closely examine whether the differential treatment of working conditions is necessary and appropriate, based on the constitutional principle of respect for human dignity and the legislative purpose of Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act, which seeks to substantively realize the constitutional principle of equality in labor relations. Since the workplace where a worker provides labor is both a means of livelihood and a place for self-realization through labor, it is an essential part of the realization of personal rights for a worker to receive, without discrimination, treatment commensurate with his or her labor at the workplace. Realizing the principle of equality in the area of labor is a necessary precondition for all citizens to be recognized as having dignity and worth as human beings, and this is the raison d'être of Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act as well as the basic principle for its interpretation and application.
2) Criteria for positing and recognizing a comparison worker
a) Although Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act does not explicitly provide for positing a comparison worker or the criteria therefor, since discriminatory treatment as referred to in Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act essentially means treating that which is essentially the same differently, or treating that which is different the same, in order to constitute discriminatory treatment, the relevant worker and the comparison worker must belong to essentially the same comparison group (see Supreme Court Decision 2013Da1051, cited above). Under the above legal doctrine, which applies the principles for determining infringement of the constitutional principle of equality and the right to equality to the determination of discrimination under the Labor Standards Act, positing a comparison worker becomes a conceptual premise for determining whether discriminatory treatment with respect to working conditions is reasonable. The question here is by what criteria one is to posit a worker belonging to essentially the same comparison group as the relevant worker. As will be seen below, reasonable criteria must be derived in light of the meaning of Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act and the content and structure of related statutory provisions; since positing a comparison worker is merely a conceptual premise for the central determination of the reasonableness of discriminatory treatment, and if the requirements for recognizing it are set excessively strictly, there is a risk that even where extremely unreasonable discrimination exists, comparison itself would not be permitted, thereby potentially undermining the raison d'être of Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act—this point must be borne in mind when determining a comparison worker.
b) The essence of the labor relationship addressed by Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act is that a worker provides labor to an employer and receives wages and other remuneration in return. Therefore, where a worker alleges wages or other remuneration as the area subject to discrimination, whether the relevant worker belongs to essentially the same comparison group as the comparison worker must be determined based on whether they provided "essentially the same labor." Whether the labor is essentially the same must start from comparing the content of the work performed by the relevant worker and the comparison worker, and this should be the most basic and important criterion for determination. It is reasonable to view that workers engaged in the same or similar work at the same business or workplace belong to essentially the same comparison group.
This point becomes even clearer in light of the content and purport of the provisions of the individual statutes applicable to specific labor relations. The Act on the Protection, etc. of Fixed-Term and Part-Time Employees (기간제 및 단시간근로자 보호 등에 관한 법률, hereinafter "Fixed-Term Act") designates, in the case of fixed-term workers, workers who have concluded employment contracts without a fixed term who are engaged in the same or similar work at the relevant business or workplace (Article 8, Paragraph 1), and in the case of part-time workers, ordinary workers engaged in the same or similar work at the relevant business or workplace (Article 8, Paragraph 2), respectively, as comparison workers, while the Labor Standards Act provides that the working conditions of part-time workers must be determined according to a ratio calculated based on the working hours of ordinary workers engaged in the same type of work at that workplace (Article 18, Paragraph 1), thereby more clearly making the criterion whether the work is of the same type or similar, while setting forth the principle of time-proportional equal treatment. The Act on Equal Employment and Support for Work-Family Reconciliation (남녀고용평등과 일·가정 양립 지원에 관한 법률) provides that an employer must pay equal wages for work of equal value within the same business (Article 8, Paragraph 1), thereby specifying work of equal value as the criterion for determining wage discrimination, and also provides that there must be no discrimination between men and women with respect to welfare benefits, such as the payment of money or goods to assist a worker's livelihood or the provision of financial loans (Article 9), while the Act on the Protection, etc. of Dispatched Workers (파견근로자 보호 등에 관한 법률, hereinafter "Dispatch Act") designates workers performing the same or similar type of work within the business of the user company (Article 21, Paragraph 1) as the comparison worker. In addition, statutes such as the Act on the Employment, etc. of Foreign Workers (외국인근로자의 고용 등에 관한 법률) and the Act on Prohibition of Age Discrimination in Employment and Promotion of the Aged Employment (고용상 연령차별금지 및 고령자고용촉진에 관한 법률) contain explicit provisions prohibiting discrimination in labor relations and establish various measures to ensure the effectiveness of remedies; these provisions embody the premise that the content of the work or the value of the labor should be the most important criterion in selecting a comparison worker as the premise for determining discrimination in the field of labor relations.
The Supreme Court has already held that, although the text of Article 8, Paragraph 1 of the Fixed-Term Act only prohibits discriminatory treatment against fixed-term workers, considering the purport of the provision together with the concept of fairness, the working conditions of a worker who is deemed, pursuant to Article 4, Paragraph 2 of the Fixed-Term Act, to have concluded an employment contract without a fixed term should not, absent other special circumstances, be inferior to the working conditions applied to a worker who has concluded an employment contract without a fixed term and who is engaged in the same or similar type of work, and determined that the working conditions set forth in the rules of employment applicable to regular workers who perform the same type of work while holding the same position in the same department are directly applicable to indefinite-term contract workers (Supreme Court Decision 2015Da254873, decided December 24, 2019). Considering these circumstances, together with the fact that the principle of equal pay for work of equal value, which prohibits unreasonable discrimination against workers engaged in labor evaluated to be of equal value, is a basic principle of labor law universally adopted, there is a need to grasp uniformly the premise for determining discrimination under Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act and the above individual statutes; the common criterion is to recognize comparability where the two worker groups' modes of work at the workplace and the degree of effort involved in the work are the same or similar, and where this is satisfied, one must proceed to examine whether there is a reasonable reason for the difference in treatment.
3) Whether the public officials in this case qualify as a comparison group
a) The majority opinion remains silent on the criteria for recognizing a comparison worker, and merely states that public officials are excluded from the comparison workers under Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act, citing the career civil service system or the status-based characteristics of public officials; it is difficult to agree with this conclusion, and moreover the grounds are insufficient and cannot be said to accord with the purport of Supreme Court precedent. Meanwhile, the majority's supplementary opinion states that comparability is not something to be grasped uniformly, and that whether workers belong to essentially the same worker group must be comprehensively considered based not only on the content or nature of the work but also on status-based restrictions, responsibilities, and obligations accompanying the relevant work; this confuses comparability with the determination of the reasonableness of discriminatory treatment, and it is difficult to view status-based restrictions, responsibilities, and obligations accompanying the work as valid grounds for denying comparability, even though they may be a consideration in determining whether discriminatory treatment is reasonable. Furthermore, even if the determination of comparability may vary depending on the area of discriminatory treatment, the majority opinion's attempt to relatively grasp comparability by citing the specificity and individuality of the work is subject to the criticism that it makes predictable discrimination determinations that accord with the concept of fairness difficult.
b) The Labor Standards Act applies to the State and local governments as well (Article 12), and public officials also fall under workers under the Labor Standards Act who provide labor for the purpose of wages. Unless there are special provisions in statutes related to public officials, Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act also applies to the public-law employment relationship between State agencies and public officials (see Supreme Court Decision 2013Du20011, decided October 31, 2019, among others), and therefore public officials cannot be excluded from the comparison workers under Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act. The Supreme Court, by determining that public officials are also included in "workers who have concluded employment contracts without a fixed term," which is listed as the comparison worker under the discrimination prohibition provision (Article 8, Paragraph 1) of the Fixed-Term Act, has made clear that public officials can become comparison workers for fixed-term workers (see Supreme Court Decision 2011Du5391, cited above). Therefore, the majority opinion's view that public officials cannot be made comparison workers for indefinite-term contract gong-mu-jik workers cannot be said to accord with the purport of the above precedent. It is common knowledge that in the so-called public service sector, there exist workers with various employment statuses, including not only public officials but also indefinite-term contract workers and fixed-term workers. Fixed-term workers who perform the same type or similar type of work in the same workplace or department can assert the prohibition of arbitrary discrimination by taking public officials as comparison workers, whereas the conclusion that indefinite-term contract workers cannot take public officials as a comparison, even without invoking the content and systematic interpretation of the Labor Standards Act and the Fixed-Term Act and the purport of precedent, is difficult to accept readily, and there is a risk that this may act contrary to the resolution of discrimination against fixed-term workers.
c) As pointed out by the majority opinion, gong-mu-jik workers, unlike public officials, are not subject to legal restrictions in concluding collective agreements; however, when gong-mu-jik workers conclude collective agreements with government agencies, etc., they are in reality subject to constraints of the national budget just as public officials are, and such constraints are firmly established as administrative rules having substantive binding force within State agencies, as is also confirmed by the facts of this case. The "Regulations on Management of National Highway Management Workers" (국도관리원 관리규정) (called the "Regulations on Management of Indefinite-Term Contract Workers in Road Management" (도로관리 무기계약근로자 관리규정) prior to August 1, 2013), which sets forth the recruitment and working conditions of national highway management workers, provides that the pay and allowances of national highway management workers are to be paid in accordance with the "Guidelines for the Execution of Ordinary Business Expenses" (경상적사업비 집행지침) and other guidelines set annually by the Minister, which means that the head of the Regional Construction and Management Administration, who concludes collective agreements with the labor union to which the national highway management workers belong, has no choice but to conclude collective agreements under budgetary constraints. Therefore, it is difficult to view the formal circumstance that there is no legal impediment for gong-mu-jik workers to improve their working conditions through collective agreements as a ground for denying the comparability of public officials. Whereas in Germany the principle of equal treatment in labor law was formed by case law, in our country this is explicitly set forth in the statutory law of Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act. Japan provides that the Labor Standards Act does not apply in full to non-field-work public officials (regular-service public officials) (Supplementary Provisions Article 16 of the Japanese National Public Service Act), and the United States legal system does not include social status as a ground for prohibition of discrimination. Considering these differences in legal systems, it is difficult to attach great significance to the examples of a few foreign countries.
d) Meanwhile, whether the work of a comparison worker constitutes the same type of work or similar work to that of the relevant worker must be determined based on the work actually performed by the worker, but even if the work performed by them does not completely coincide and there are some differences in the scope of work or in responsibilities and authority, if there is no essential difference in the content of the main work, absent special circumstances, they should be deemed to be engaged in the same type of work or similar work (see Supreme Court Decision 2011Du2132, cited above). Examining the facts of this case as recognized by the majority opinion based on the above legal doctrine, as reviewed in detail in the separate opinion, there is no substantial difference such that the Plaintiffs, who are gong-mu-jik workers, and the public officials in this case perform essentially the same type of work or similar work and are mutually substitutable; therefore, the public officials in this case, being workers who perform the same or similar work as the Plaintiffs who are gong-mu-jik workers, should be deemed to fall under the comparison workers under Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act.
e) To add further, the majority opinion states that public officials cannot become the comparison group of "that worker," and although the meaning of "that worker" in this context is not entirely clear, in light of the facts, issues, and purport of the majority opinion in this case, "that worker" here refers to a worker who is not a public official, that is, the indefinite-term contract gong-mu-jik workers at issue in this case, and with respect to the grounds for prohibition of discrimination as well, it should be understood to be limited to cases based on employment status. As noted above, fixed-term workers may assert public officials as comparison workers, and even under the majority opinion's reasoning, it cannot be said that when the State or a local government engages in unreasonable discrimination on the basis of gender, nationality, or religion, a claim for a determination of discrimination cannot be sought merely because the comparison worker is a public official.
c. Whether gong-mu-jik workers' status constitutes a social status
It is reasonable to interpret the Plaintiffs' employment status as gong-mu-jik workers as constituting a "social status," which is a ground for prohibition of discrimination under Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act. The reasons are as follows.
1) The so-called "indefinite-term contract" employment form emerged as a result of the implementation of the Fixed-Term Act in 2007 and the government's comprehensive measures for irregular workers in the public sector implemented around the time of its enforcement. When the Fixed-Term Act deemed fixed-term workers who worked in excess of two years to be "workers who have concluded employment contracts without a fixed term" but made no provision whatsoever regarding the working conditions applicable at the time of such deemed conversion, the State and public institutions converted fixed-term workers into "workers whose employment contract has no fixed term" (some institutions also converted contract-for-service workers together), but applied working conditions that, while somewhat improved from when they were irregular workers, were very inferior compared to those of public officials or regular workers, citing budgetary reasons and the like. Although "indefinite-term contract" is merely an abbreviation for "worker whose employment contract has no fixed term," at some point our society came to perceive it as referring to a group of workers who receive very low treatment in wage level or welfare as compared with regular workers, and the gap in working conditions has become entrenched without narrowing.
2) The "social status" that Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act sets forth as a ground for prohibition of discrimination means a status occupied for a long period in society that accompanies a certain social evaluation. It is not limited to a social status fixed by birth congenitally, but includes a status acquired subsequently and continuing for a long period, and it is not required that there be no possibility of change in that status.
An indefinite-term contract worker cannot be converted to regular employee status absent the employer's consent, and cannot easily avoid this by one's own will or exercise of ability. Since one only has the freedom to choose either to give up one's job at the risk of a threat to one's livelihood, or to accept unjust discrimination, the status of an indefinite-term contract worker has the character that, once acquired, it is occupied for a long period. "Social status" under Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act must be interpreted and applied flexibly in keeping with the times, and considering the background of the emergence of such indefinite-term contract workers and the social reality, the Plaintiffs' employment status as gong-mu-jik workers should be deemed to constitute a social status.
3) The majority opinion states that the Plaintiffs' employment status does not constitute a social status in relation to public officials, but this cannot be accepted for the following reasons.
a) Social status cannot be said to be a relative concept that varies depending on who the comparison object is. Social status, like gender, nationality, and religion, is an attribute possessed by the worker asserting discrimination, which becomes the reason or ground for discriminatory treatment against the relevant worker, and thus is difficult to say it varies depending on who the comparison object is. For example, regardless of which worker a female worker alleging discrimination on the basis of gender asserts as the comparison object, the attribute of "female" possessed by that female worker does not change or become relatively evaluated.
b) The majority opinion excludes public officials from the comparison group while emphasizing the "status" characteristics of public officials. If this is applied consistently, gong-mu-jik workers who are not public officials must, in correspondence, be deemed to have a social status "as indefinite-term contract workers who are not public officials." The majority opinion cannot be said to be an internally consistent determination in itself, since it denies comparability on the basis of the status of public officials while simultaneously holding that the status of gong-mu-jik workers, which differs greatly from that of public officials in terms of status, does not constitute a social status.
c) Meanwhile, as examined above in connection with comparability, in light of the facts, issues of this case, and the fact that the majority opinion determines that the Plaintiffs' status as gong-mu-jik workers does not constitute a social status in relation to public officials, it should be pointed out that the purport of the majority opinion cannot be generalized when determining whether employment status constitutes a social status in a case where public officials are not the comparison object.
d. Whether there is a reasonable reason for the discriminatory treatment
1) "Discriminatory treatment" under Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act means that an employer treats a worker disadvantageously without reasonable reason with respect to wages and other working conditions, and "case where there is no reasonable reason" refers to a case where, comprehensively considering the content of the labor provided by the relevant worker, the necessity for different treatment is not recognized, or, even where the necessity for different treatment is recognized, the method, degree, etc. thereof are not appropriate (see Supreme Court Decision 2011Du2132, cited above; Supreme Court Decision 2015Du46321, cited above, among others). Whether there is a reasonable reason must be determined by comprehensively considering the content of the disadvantageous treatment at issue in the individual case and the circumstances that the employer relied on as the reason for the disadvantageous treatment, together with determinative factors such as the worker's employment form, the content and scope of work, authority and responsibility, wages, and other working conditions (see Supreme Court Decision 2011Du7045, cited above, among others). Where it is recognized that the employer engaged in disadvantageous treatment of the relevant worker, the employer must assert and prove that there is a reasonable reason for such disadvantageous treatment.
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court has held that where a fixed-term worker files an application for correction of discrimination, alleging that he or she received discriminatory treatment in wages compared to a comparison worker on the ground of being a fixed-term worker, in principle, whether disadvantageous treatment exists must be determined by comparing each detailed wage item that the fixed-term worker alleges to be disadvantageous treatment with the comparison worker; however, where there are special circumstances making item-by-item comparison difficult or inappropriate, such as where the wages of the fixed-term worker and the comparison worker are composed of different items, or where the fixed-term worker received disadvantageous treatment in a specific item but advantageous treatment in another specific item, the interrelated items must be classified by category, and for each category, the amount of wages received by the fixed-term worker must be compared with the amount received by the comparison worker to determine whether disadvantageous treatment against the fixed-term worker exists, and in that case, whether there is a reasonable reason must also be determined by category (see Supreme Court Decision 2016Du47857, decided September 26, 2019). The above precedent's legal doctrine of setting a comparison category when determining whether discriminatory treatment is reasonable can equally be invoked in this case, where gong-mu-jik workers such as the Plaintiffs allege that they received discriminatory treatment in wages compared to comparison workers on the ground of being indefinite-term contract workers.
2) As the separate opinion points out, the special characteristics of the comparison public officials and the fact that working conditions were determined by collective agreement must be considered in determining whether there is reasonableness in the disadvantageous treatment. However, since the purport of the principle of equal treatment under Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act is to prohibit discrimination on grounds unrelated to the content or value of the labor, when determining whether there is a reasonable reason for not paying a specific allowance, it cannot be said that the status-based factors of the comparison public official should be given more weight than factors related to the content or value of the labor. Furthermore, since Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act, which prohibits discriminatory treatment with respect to working conditions, is a mandatory provision, it is also difficult to say that the mere circumstance that the discriminatory working conditions applicable to the relevant worker were determined by collective agreement causes such discriminatory treatment to acquire reasonableness. As set forth in the separate opinion, even where disadvantageous working conditions were determined by collective agreement, whether the difference in working conditions is based on a ground for prohibition of discrimination, or whether it has reasonableness, must be determined by comprehensively considering the specific circumstances surrounding the collective agreement, such as the process of collective bargaining, the content of the collective agreement on the relevant matter, the nature and degree of the disadvantageous treatment, and relevant statutes or practices. Therefore, where there are circumstances such as the labor union, in concluding the collective agreement, recognizing the disadvantageous treatment and expressly or implicitly agreeing to receive other benefits in substitution therefor, the reasonableness of the disadvantageous treatment may be affirmed. However, the specific circumstances surrounding the collective agreement also include the responsibilities and authority of the parties to the collective bargaining and the conclusion of the agreement, and whether there exist statutory, budgetary, and policy constraints affecting them, and such circumstances constitute important considerations to be taken into account where, as in this case, a government agency is a party to the bargaining and the agreement. Although, as noted above, gong-mu-jik workers such as the Plaintiffs are, in reality, subject to constraints of the national budget, just as public officials, when concluding collective agreements with government agencies, etc., and such constraints are established as administrative rules having substantive binding force within State agencies, the separate opinion's view that there is a reasonable basis for the non-payment of each of the allowances at issue in this case, notwithstanding the above legal doctrine set forth by the separate opinion itself, ultimately attaches excessive legitimacy to the mere conclusion of the collective agreement itself in determining the reasonableness of discriminatory treatment, and this is difficult to agree with.
3) Examining the facts of this case in light of the legal doctrine set forth above, in this case, since there are circumstances such as the Plaintiffs receiving a hazard allowance, unlike public officials, and having overtime allowances calculated pursuant to the Labor Standards Act, it is appropriate to compare basic pay and various allowances by category, and in that case, as seen below, there is no reasonable reason for the non-payment of the family allowance and performance bonus, which belong to separate categories.
a) The family allowance is an allowance paid, pursuant to Article 10, Paragraph 1 of the Public Officials' Allowance Regulations (공무원수당규정), to public officials who have dependent family members, and is a welfare-oriented benefit paid regardless of the content of the work actually performed, authority and responsibility, length of service, or the quality or quantity of labor provided, and thus has a different character from the salary, diligence allowance, and position-based allowance, which are the pay items for public officials corresponding to the basic pay of national highway management workers. The family allowance is determined for payment and amount solely according to the number of dependent family members such as spouse or children, regardless of the type or rank of the public official, and includes a special additional amount from the second child onward, reflecting the policy purpose of overcoming low birth rates and encouraging childbirth; there is no basis whatsoever for viewing this policy purpose as applying only to public officials and not to the Plaintiffs, who have concluded employment contracts with the State. Since the family allowance is uniformly paid according to the existence and number of dependent family members regardless of the type, rank, or work of the public official, non-payment of the family allowance solely to national highway management workers is disadvantageous treatment that cannot be explained merely by the fact that the compensation system differs from that of public officials or that the degree of authority or responsibility differs, and reasonableness is difficult to recognize.
As noted above, the Defendant paid the family allowance to the Plaintiffs until 2013, and then excluded the family allowance from the items of payment upon introducing, through the 2014 collective agreement, the seniority-based pay system that the labor union had continuously demanded. It is true that the overall working conditions of national highway management workers were somewhat improved through the introduction of the seniority-based pay system and the adjustment of allowances under the 2014 collective agreement, but this circumstance alone does not justify the disadvantageous treatment of not paying a specific allowance. The wage level according to the seniority grade of national highway management workers is still lower than that of the public officials in this case, and moreover the maximum seniority grade was limited to grade 20. There is also no special circumstance showing that the labor union in this case, in concluding the 2014 collective agreement, recognized that not receiving the family allowance was disadvantageous treatment and nevertheless expressly or implicitly agreed to receive other benefits in substitution therefor, such that the disadvantage was compensated for. Therefore, it is difficult to recognize reasonableness merely because the Defendant's non-payment of the family allowance to the Plaintiffs resulted from the 2014 collective agreement.
b) The performance bonus for public officials is money paid, pursuant to Article 7-2 of the Public Officials' Allowance Regulations, to public officials with excellent performance evaluation, work performance, etc., and is paid differentially after review by the Performance Bonus Review Committee. The performance bonus is a pay item introduced to provide motivation to inspire public officials' work motivation, and there is no reason not to apply the policy purpose of this performance bonus to workers employed by the State other than public officials. Even if it is not necessary to pay the performance bonus to the Plaintiffs at the same grade or standard as public officials, at the very least, failing to give the Plaintiffs even the opportunity to receive compensation according to work performance and achievement is disadvantageous treatment without reasonable reason, and this conclusion cannot be altered merely because the compensation system for national highway management workers has been determined annually by collective agreement.
e. Sub-conclusion
In sum, the Defendant's non-payment of the family allowance and performance bonus to the Plaintiffs, unlike the public officials in this case, constitutes discriminatory treatment without reasonable reason and is a tort in violation of Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act; therefore, the Defendant is liable to compensate the Plaintiffs for the resulting damages. The part of the lower court's judgment dismissing the Plaintiffs' claims for damages corresponding to the family allowance and performance bonus should be reversed.
The accumulation of inequality and discrimination can cause social conflict and bring about a crisis of isolation and disconnection in society. Accordingly, legislative measures have been taken, such as the establishment of discrimination prohibition provisions in individual statutes to resolve discrimination based on employment status, such as for fixed-term and part-time workers and dispatched workers; however, since there is no individual statute concerning discrimination between regular employees and indefinite-term contract workers, numerous lawsuits are being filed with courts relying on Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act. It may be viewed as more desirable that the issue of discriminatory treatment based on the employment status of indefinite-term contracts also be resolved through legislative measures that clarify the categories and concretize the criteria for determining discrimination, or through policy measures sought and implemented by comprehensively considering various circumstances such as the cause, nature, and degree of the discriminatory treatment and the socioeconomic resources that can be mobilized. However, even before such legislative and policy measures are taken, it is the duty entrusted to the courts to declare, based on a proper interpretation of Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act, that unreasonable discrimination is unlawful conduct in individual cases where it is clear.
For the foregoing reasons, we state that we cannot agree with the majority opinion.
7. Supplementary Opinion of Justices Ahn Cheol-sang, Noh Tae-ak, and Cheon Dae-yeop Concerning the Majority Opinion
In light of the circumstances set forth by the majority opinion as grounds, including that public officials, as servants of the entire people, are required to have fairness, integrity, and neutrality while bearing a heavy responsibility to faithfully perform public duties with their whole personality and conscience; that working conditions are determined by statute; and the possibility of change in duties due to public necessity and the compensation system reflecting this, it is clear that public officials cannot be made a comparison object for gong-mu-jik workers, and we do not think there is a need for further argumentation on this point. The dissenting opinion, in its concluding portion, also emphasizes concerns about inequality and discrimination and the isolation, disconnection, and social conflict of society. However, we find it difficult to agree with the dissenting opinion's approach of attempting to determine comparability by focusing mainly on wages, a single working condition, and moreover, such dissenting opinion overlooks the fact that the issue in this case is not a non-legal, policy matter such as sociological evaluation and cause analysis of the various differences or discriminatory phenomena existing between classes, occupational sectors, and employment forms and devising measures to resolve them, but rather a matter of statutory interpretation concerning the confirmation and application of the scope of application of Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act, and is therefore not persuasive. Below, we shall supplement the grounds of the majority opinion, limited to the portions among the matters pointed out by the dissenting opinion that need to be clarified so as to avoid misunderstanding of the purport of the majority opinion.
a. The relationship between social status and comparability
1) As the dissenting opinion points out, in determining whether treatment constitutes discriminatory treatment on the ground of social status prohibited under Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act, it is necessary to examine both whether the requirement of social status is met and whether the comparison worker is comparable, and where both requirements are recognized, to further examine whether there is reasonableness in the disadvantageous treatment.
2) The majority opinion likewise, in this case where the issue is whether discriminatory treatment against gong-mu-jik workers exists by taking public officials as the comparison object, examined both whether the gong-mu-jik workers' status constitutes a social status and whether they are comparable to public officials, and determined that neither requirement is satisfied.
Furthermore, the majority opinion, noting that whether the requirement of social status under Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act is satisfied, and the comparability premised thereon, are not matters that can be uniformly affirmed or denied, holds that one must reasonably interpret and apply the meaning of "social status" and the comparability under Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act by examining, in the specific field of labor and individual case, whom the party is comparing itself to and what treatment is being asserted as discriminatory. This approach can prevent the interpretation and application of Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act from falling into abstract discourse or the fallacy of generalization. In light of the responsibilities and obligations to the public accompanying the status of public officials, the manner of determining working conditions, and the compensation system, even if a general worker who is not a public official receives relatively lower treatment than public officials only with respect to wages, one of the overall working conditions, this cannot be deemed attributable to the relevant worker's social status, and public officials cannot be readily made a comparison group on this premise. Therefore, in this case as well, where the Plaintiffs, who are gong-mu-jik workers, allege that they received discriminatory treatment in compensation as compared to specific public officials with whom similarity exists only in the content of the labor provided, neither the requirement of social status nor comparability can be recognized.
3) The majority opinion does not understand social status as a relative concept without substance; rather, while considering the function of social status as a ground or marker for prohibiting discrimination in the specific area and situation where discrimination in working conditions is at issue, it comprehensively determines whether something falls under social status, while also determining comparability. Therefore, the dissenting opinion's criticism that the majority opinion lacks consistency regarding the determination of social status is incorrect. Conversely, to grasp the concept of social status in an absolute and uniform manner, and to treat workers as comparison subjects merely because the content of the labor they provide is similar, thereby viewing differences in working conditions as discriminatory treatment based on social status, would disregard not only the substantive elements of the labor but also the specificity and individuality of the work provided in each area of society where diverse values and characteristics are mixed, and would focus solely on the aspect of working conditions, thereby creating the risk of expanding and reproducing social conflict through endless comparisons between groups. Whether something falls under social status, and the comparability premised thereon, are not matters to be grasped uniformly; rather, based on the inherent purpose and value of the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법), which aims to guarantee and improve the basic livelihood of workers and to achieve balanced development of the national economy, they must be determined by comprehensively considering all relevant factors, using as the standard whether the two groups of workers can be compared on essentially the same footing in the specific area of work and case at issue.
나. The Significance of Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act and the Determination of Comparability
1) The anti-discrimination provisions of the individual statutes cited in the dissenting opinion are not provisions that cumulatively prohibit discrimination on the premise that those subject to each statute are already receiving discrimination under Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act; rather, they are provisions specially established to achieve the enactment purpose and objective of each respective statute. Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act has existed since the Labor Standards Act was first enacted in 1953, and the above individual statutes were enacted thereafter according to the needs of the times and society, prohibiting discrimination in each respective area. In light of the enactment periods and history of the Labor Standards Act and the individual statutes, Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act cannot be viewed as a comprehensive and supplementary provision intended to apply to labor relations in general that cannot be regulated by individual statutes; therefore, it is difficult to view the purpose that individual statutes seek to achieve in each specific area as being directly applicable to the interpretation of Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act.
2) Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act is a provision intended to remedy unreasonable discrimination among multiple workers on the premise that they belong to essentially the same group of workers. In determining whether workers belong to essentially the same group, not only the content or nature of the work but also the status-based restrictions, responsibilities, and duties accompanying the relevant work must be comprehensively considered. However, the dissenting opinion focuses only on the aspect of providing labor for the purpose of wages, among the various characteristics of the status of public officials and the labor they provide, and fails to consider the essential aspect that public officials provide labor under various statutory duties and status-based restrictions in a position of responsibility to the entire citizenry. Looking at the legislative examples of major foreign countries such as Germany, Japan, and the United States, a general principle of equal treatment such as that under Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act is not applied between non-public-official workers and public officials, and public officials are not treated as a comparison group for general workers. This shows that the dissenting opinion's position, which seeks to view public officials primarily as wage laborers, does not conform to the global trend or universal standard.
3) The Labor Standards Act is explicitly stated to apply to the State and local governments as well (Article 12). However, the scope and dimension in which the Labor Standards Act applies to general workers belonging to the State or local governments differ entirely from that for public officials. That is, general workers belonging to the State or local governments are fully subject to the Labor Standards Act unless they are excluded from application under Article 11, etc. of the Labor Standards Act, whereas for public officials, where other statutes such as the State Public Officials Act (국가공무원법) provide otherwise, such statutes apply in principle with priority, and individual provisions of the Labor Standards Act apply only where there is no special provision in other statutes; there is thus a considerable difference in the scope and dimension of application. The precedents holding that, in principle, the Labor Standards Act applies to public officials unless there is a special provision in other statutes and unless it is contrary to the nature of the matter (Supreme Court Decision 94Da446 delivered on April 23, 1996; Supreme Court Decision 98Du9714 delivered on August 21, 1998, etc.) are all cases that determined whether specific provisions of the Labor Standards Act apply in the relationship between a public official and the State or local government to which he or she belongs. These examined whether a public official could be subject to specific provisions of the Labor Standards Act and thereby receive protection or remedy of rights in relation to the institution to which he or she belongs, which can ultimately be viewed as a legal determination as to whether the Labor Standards Act applies in a vertical, subordinate relationship. In contrast, whether public officials are included in the comparison group with respect to discriminatory treatment as defined in Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act, in relation to general workers, is a legal determination as to the application of the Labor Standards Act in a horizontal, independent relationship, and thus the dimension of discussion is entirely different. In particular, since matters that are major working conditions for public officials—such as appointment, promotion, remuneration, training, performance evaluation, service, status security, and disciplinary action—are determined by other statutes such as the State Public Officials Act, the individual provisions of the Labor Standards Act related thereto do not apply, and thus the scope to which the Labor Standards Act directly applies cannot be compared with that for general workers. Nevertheless, to include public officials in principle in the comparison group under Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act, which is a provision prohibiting discriminatory treatment against general workers, on the ground that public officials are not excluded from the subjects of specific provisions of the Labor Standards Act, is difficult to escape criticism as failing to properly understand the above distinction.
4) The majority opinion respects the fact that public officials have inherent characteristics such as their status, responsibility to the entire citizenry, duties, political neutrality, and integrity, and seeks to have them fulfill strict responsibilities correspondingly, thereby harmoniously realizing the values of the public sphere with the private sphere; it is not, as the dissenting opinion points out, entrenching or deepening social inequality and discrimination. Rather, it is the dissenting opinion that is difficult to accept, as it views public-service workers (공무직 근로자) and public officials only in terms of remuneration, focusing solely on the fact that there are differences in the items of allowances paid, thereby seeking to deny the reasonable differences between the public sphere and the private sphere.
다. Relationship with Precedent
1) Despite the existence of Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act, which provides the principle of equal treatment in labor relations, the Act on the Protection, etc. of Fixed-term and Part-time Employees (기간제법) established provisions prohibiting discrimination against fixed-term workers from the time of its enactment in 2006, and provided that the Labor Relations Commission may issue corrective orders regarding discriminatory treatment. This was intended to specially protect fixed-term workers, whose working conditions were inevitably vulnerable due to the nature of fixed-term employment contracts under the labor market structure at that time. Unlike workers with indefinite-term contracts, fixed-term workers are in an unstable employment position because the employment relationship terminates upon expiration of the fixed term, and since it is practically impossible to organize a labor union and conclude a collective agreement during a short contract period, fixed-term workers have no bargaining power to seek improvement of working conditions and are thus forced to accept inferior working conditions. As previously noted, the legislative intent of the Act on the Protection, etc. of Fixed-term and Part-time Employees, an individual statute enacted for the purpose of correcting discrimination against fixed-term workers in such a situation and protecting their working conditions, cannot be equally considered when applying Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act, which provides the general principle of equal treatment based on grounds of discrimination such as sex, nationality, religion, or social status.
2) The Supreme Court Decision 2011Du5391 cited as a basis by the separate opinion and the dissenting opinion is a case in which, in a case where discrimination against fixed-term workers was at issue, it was determined that public officials could also be a comparison subject when applying the anti-discrimination provision of Article 8(1) of the Act on the Protection, etc. of Fixed-term and Part-time Employees, giving priority consideration to the above-mentioned legislative intent of that Act. In light of the circumstances set forth in the majority opinion, such as the status-based characteristics and responsibilities of public officials, there may be room for future reconsideration of the above Supreme Court decision's position regarding fixed-term workers; however, what is clear is that the above Supreme Court decision does not intend to broadly recognize the comparability of public officials extending to general discrimination cases applying Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act, as opposed to the dimension of applying the Act on the Protection, etc. of Fixed-term and Part-time Employees, and it is also difficult to interpret it in that way. Therefore, the majority opinion cannot be viewed as contrary to the purport of the above Supreme Court decision, and the criticism that it conflicts with precedent is likewise incorrect.
The foregoing sets forth the supplementary opinion to the majority opinion.
8. Supplementary Opinion of Justice Min Yu-sook and Justice Oh Kyung-mi to the Dissenting Opinion
가. Whether Public-Service Workers with Indefinite-Term Contracts Fall Under Social Status, and the Comparability of Public Officials
The majority opinion, focusing on the inherent value and characteristics of the career public official system, denies that national road managers (국도관리원) in this case fall under social status under Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act and denies the comparability of public officials. Although the career public official system, which defines the identity and characteristics of public officials who are the subjects performing work in the public sphere, is an important institutional pillar supporting our society, the status of public officials established thereby is not absolute or inviolable; therefore, interpreting Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act by evaluating, from the standpoint of non-public-official workers, as if there exists an insurmountable wall called the career public official system between them and public officials, cannot be said to be an interpretation consistent with the Constitution that balances other values guaranteed by the Constitution (헌법), such as human dignity, the right to equality, and the right to work.
Unlike the past, when the career public official system was first created and only public officials performed state functions, today, as the scope of state activity has expanded and the areas of welfare and provision for existence have diversified and expanded, it has become difficult for public officials alone to meet the demand for state functions, leading to the creation of a system in which non-public officials perform public duties, transforming the traditional public official relationship. This is the so-called area of "public service positions" (공무직). Currently, "public service" workers are mixed together with public officials performing public duties in various public sphere areas. The national road managers in this case are also such "public service" workers. These workers, who perform public duties under employment contracts with the State, are not public officials but are also not traditional general workers—they are an intermediate existence. Their labor is performed and their working conditions are determined in the gray zone that is neither the area of the career public official system nor the private sphere. Since, in terms of the content of the work, both public officials and public-service workers alike perform public duties and thus both serve equally in "the role of service to the entire citizenry," the "public service" workers placed in this intermediate gray zone may, in terms of working conditions, enjoy neither the advantages of the career public official system nor those of the private sphere, silently bearing only the disadvantages of both areas. This dual structure of the public service society is a phenomenon not anticipated by the traditional career public official system, and thus, focusing solely on the nature and purpose of the career public official system cannot resolve the problems arising in the actual operation of the system. Rather, interpreting Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act with a flexible perspective that allows the career public official system to coexist harmoniously with other values guaranteed by the Constitution can achieve balanced protection of rights and work efficiency among those engaged in the public sphere.
As argued in the separate opinion, comparability is a fluid and relative concept, and it is desirable not to set the threshold for comparability too high in interpreting Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act. In the reality where public-service workers perform the same or similar public duties together with public officials in the same space, it cannot be said that there exists an essential difference between them that makes comparison even impossible, merely because statutes establish the status of "public official." Denying the comparability of public officials results in ignoring the social situation in which the boundary between the work of public officials and non-public officials has become blurred, and rigidly operating the career public official system, thereby making discrimination against public-service workers alienated in the gray zone into a matter of course. Furthermore, it must be squarely recognized that the reality in which fixed-term workers and indefinite-term contract workers, who are rapidly increasing due to today's trend of labor flexibility, are placed in discriminatory treatment markedly different from "regular workers" under unstable and relatively inferior working conditions, is precisely what Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act seeks to remedy. In this respect, it is incorrect for the majority opinion to deny the comparability of public officials by holding that employment status under an individual labor contract does not fall under "social status" as defined in Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act in relation to public officials; and it is appropriate that the separate opinion views indefinite-term contract public-service workers as falling under a status based on employment form, and holds that the purport and content of the anti-discrimination provisions of the Act on the Protection, etc. of Fixed-term and Part-time Employees and the Act on the Protection, etc. of Dispatched Workers (파견법), which concretize the meaning of "social status" under Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act, should be reflected back into the interpretation of Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act.
However, since the issue in this case and the majority opinion are limited to "the comparability of public officials," the majority opinion has not expressed a view on whether "employment status under an individual labor contract" itself—that is, whether the status based on employment form, such as fixed-term workers, indefinite-term contract workers, and regular workers—falls under "social status," or on the comparability among them, and there is no determination regarding areas other than public officials as described above. The lawsuits currently pending before the courts concerning discriminatory treatment related to Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act concern disputes arising in various employment forms and work areas. Among them are cases asserting discriminatory treatment of fixed-term workers or indefinite-term contract workers performing the same or similar work as regular workers of private companies or public institutions. It should be pointed out that, even under the majority opinion, the comparability of regular workers or whether indefinite-term contract workers fall under social status may be determined differently in such cases.
나. How to View the Reasonableness of Discriminatory Treatment
The separate opinion holds that the non-payment of each allowance in this case does not constitute discriminatory treatment, citing as grounds, among others, that it resulted from a collective agreement. This attitude contains the error of equating the determination of the validity of a collective agreement concluded between labor and management with the determination of "discriminatory treatment" under Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act. While it is naturally necessary, in determining "discriminatory treatment" under Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act, to fully consider the circumstances and context in which working conditions were determined pursuant to a collective agreement concluded between the employer and the labor union, it cannot be said that, merely because such agreement is lawful and valid and there are no grounds such as its content violating good morals or other social order, it is therefore not "discriminatory treatment" under Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act. Even working conditions determined by a collective agreement may separately be determined to constitute "discriminatory treatment" under Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act, through comparison of their content with that of other workers performing the same or similar work.
For example, suppose that, as a working condition, an indoor temperature of 25°C is appropriate for a workplace performing a specific task, and while regular workers work in a workplace maintained at 25°C, fixed-term workers or indefinite-term contract workers performing the same or similar work work in a workplace with an indoor temperature exceeding 30°C. If the latter demanded that the temperature not exceed at least 28°C, and, in an effort to lower the workplace temperature even slightly, reached an agreement through collective bargaining to maintain it at 29°C, how should the difference between the appropriate indoor temperature of 25°C and 29°C be viewed? Does this not constitute "discriminatory treatment" under Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act because it is a working condition agreed upon through a valid collective agreement? The magnitude of the personal and social pain caused by discrimination varies greatly, subjectively, between those who directly experience it and those who merely observe it. The position that finds a reasonable reason for the discrimination is likely to be the perspective of a person working in a workplace close to the appropriate indoor temperature of 25°C.
Even results derived through collective bargaining often cannot be viewed as reasonable in terms of the resulting difference in working conditions. Around the time the collective agreement was concluded, the national road managers were under a flat-rate wage system rather than a seniority-based pay scale system (호봉제), and despite the increase in years of service, they did not receive proper evaluation therefor, being subject only to a wage increase rate linked to the price level applied to public officials. There were no particularly favorable conditions in terms of other allowances either. At the time, considering the situation of implementation of the seniority-based pay scale system among public-service workers working under other agencies, and the fact that indefinite-term contract administrative assistants (사무보조원) at the headquarters, also belonging to the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport (국토교통부), were implementing a seniority-based pay scale system, the seniority-based pay scale system for national road managers was adopted with content and level nearly identical to that of the above administrative assistants. The above administrative assistants were not being paid family allowances, and in line with this, when the seniority-based pay scale system was applied to national road managers, the existing family allowance was eliminated. Performance bonuses had not been paid to either the above administrative assistants or the national road managers even before that, and no particular change was made in the collective agreement in this regard. In light of this process, it appears that the national road managers, who were in a very inferior wage condition, did not actively raise objections to the elimination of the family allowance, in line with the above administrative assistants who had already been incorporated into the seniority-based pay scale system, in order to obtain the seniority-based pay scale system, which was the most urgent matter in creating a wage condition even slightly closer to that of public officials performing the same work. Although it takes the form of a collective agreement, to regard their limited choice to correct even a small part of unjust discrimination as a fully voluntary and reasonable choice is to view the labor law issue from the perspective of the principle of freedom of contract. The "individual and relative circumstances of discrimination," in which the national road managers had no choice but to accept the addition of the small discrimination of "elimination of the family allowance" in order to correct the large discrimination of "flat-rate wages" in collective bargaining with the enormous power of the State, must not be disregarded. From the perspective of the principle of freedom of contract, the plaintiffs' assertion in this case may appear to be a self-contradictory attitude of "right then, wrong now," as it effectively denies the validity of the collective agreement they themselves concluded. However, from a labor law perspective, it can be said that the plaintiffs, who sought to improve, even slightly, the inferior working conditions given to their non-regular employment form, made a limited choice within the scope of the limited improvement plan presented by the State as the employer, and can say, regarding the discrimination that still remains, "it was wrong then too, and it is wrong now too." Considering all the circumstances, including the specific process of the collective agreement in which the national road managers gave up the family allowance in order to obtain the seniority-based pay scale system, the purpose of paying the family allowance and the performance bonus, and the additional budgetary burden expected from such payment, it cannot be said that there is a reasonable reason for the discrimination merely because the non-payment of the family allowance and performance bonus resulted from a collective agreement.
The grounds on which the separate opinion, after recognizing the comparability of public-service workers and public officials and finding that there exists disadvantageous treatment on the ground of social status, determined that such disadvantageous treatment has a reasonable reason, are the various particularities of the national public official system. Ultimately, the separate opinion takes an attitude not significantly different from the majority opinion, in that it presents the particularities of the national public official system as an important ground for rejecting the plaintiffs' claims in this case. It is very regrettable that, despite the beautiful and meticulous argumentation presented by the separate opinion on the issues of comparability and social status, it ultimately remains within the solid framework of the principle of freedom of contract and the national public official system, thereby revealing a poverty of labor law consciousness.
In this case, the plaintiffs are claiming, as damages, the unpaid amount of the family allowance for the year 2014, and the unpaid amount of the performance bonus from January 2011 to December 2014. The plaintiffs filed this lawsuit on June 19, 2014, immediately after the conclusion of the above collective agreement, asserting that the non-payment of each allowance in this case constitutes discriminatory treatment under Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act. The fact that the unpaid amounts for the period thereafter were not included in the damages claim appears to be not because the discrimination was corrected thereafter, but because the plaintiffs found it burdensome to further expand the claims during the course of the litigation. The defendant has still not paid the plaintiffs the family allowance and performance bonus from 2014 to the present. In the meantime, awareness of the need to improve discrimination based on employment form has increased and the system has been improving, and the gap between the public sphere and the private sphere has also been narrowing. The evaluation of the importance of welfare based on social indicators, including the birth rate, and family relationships is also changing. Even if, as the separate opinion argues, there is a reasonable reason for the non-payment of the family allowance and performance bonus claimed by the plaintiffs up to 2014, in light of the circumstances of the conclusion of the collective agreement at that time and the particularities of the national public official system, one would like to ask how the defendant's continued failure to pay the plaintiffs each allowance in this case, even at the present point in time when much has changed since then, should be evaluated. Could it not be that what was right then is wrong now?
Even conceding that the fact that the family allowance ceased to be paid in exchange for the introduction of the seniority-based pay scale system upon concluding the 2014 collective agreement may be a circumstance that lends temporary reasonableness to the disadvantageous treatment at that point in time, it is difficult to say that there is reasonableness to the discrimination in the same treatment that has continued up to the present, a long period having passed since then during which many circumstances have changed. Although the plaintiffs are not claiming the unpaid amounts of each allowance in this case from 2015 onward, insofar as the plaintiffs' claims are being determined at the present point in time when the same treatment continues, it is appropriate to consider the course of events up to the present and the current values and direction of society in making this determination.
다. Conclusion
The feelings evoked by looking at the legal evaluation, under Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act, of the national public official system and the status and reality of public-service workers as presented by the majority opinion and the separate opinion in this case are complex. While sympathizing with the need to protect the national public official system, which is an important system supporting our society, when one looks at how the majority opinion, invoking the particularities of the national public official system in this case, denies the comparability of public-service workers who perform the same or similar public duties together with public officials in the same space, and develops a legal doctrine holding that this does not constitute discrimination, it seems as though Article 7(1) of the Constitution (헌법), which states that public officials are servants of the entire citizenry and are responsible to the people, is being interpreted as expressly establishing the superiority of the status of public officials over public-service workers. The above provision merely emphasizes the responsibility and duty of public officials to the State, and cannot be used as a basis for denying the comparability of public officials to public-service workers.
It must be coolly acknowledged that, with any system, including the national public official system, along with its positive functions, some points may emerge where, with changes in social circumstances, a negative function manifests itself in distinguishing and discriminating between those protected within the system and those left out and alienated outside it. Acknowledging this and striving to correct the negative function can further promote the original positive function. It must be guarded against that if the existence of the negative function is ignored and the protection of the positive function is excessively emphasized, this will result in rationalizing and entrenching the discrimination and alienation caused by the system, and may actually weaken the system's original positive function. This is equally true when the courts, in interpreting and applying Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act, view the discriminatory treatment of the national public official system and public-service workers. Recognizing, in this case, that public officials are comparable and that the non-payment of the family allowance, etc. constitutes discriminatory treatment does not damage the precious fence of the national public official system. The attitude of denying this and viewing the national public official system as an inflexible thing incapable of comparison may transform the fence that has protected society into a wall of discrimination and alienation. Denying, in this case, the comparability of public officials and the discriminatory treatment of public-service workers on the grounds of the value and particularity of the national public official system is adding one more stone to the wall of discrimination and alienation. Removing a few stones from it will not cause the precious fence to collapse. Even the smallest discrimination among colleagues doing the same work at the same workplace, if corrected out of an earnest desire, may turn the place where a few stones were removed from the high wall into a window that allows both sides to look over the stone wall and communicate with each other.
If the proposition that labor flexibility, which is spreading regardless of whether it is the public sphere or the private sphere, is necessary for corporate activity and economic efficiency is correct, then the problem of discrimination must be actively corrected so that the differences in working conditions caused by labor flexibility remain within a tolerable range that does not harm human dignity, the principle of equality, and the right to work. If labor flexibility is necessary, then to that same extent, flexibility is also necessary in the interpretation and application of Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act in determining discriminatory treatment on the ground of social status between public officials and public-service workers.
The foregoing sets forth the supplementary opinion to the dissenting opinion.
9. Supplementary Opinion of Justice Kim Seon-su to the Dissenting Opinion
I supplement the dissenting opinion from the perspective of seeking ways to enhance the inclusiveness of our society, while recalling the circumstances of the plaintiffs (indefinite-term contract national road managers), who knocked on the doors of the courts to correct the discriminatory treatment they cannot help but think of every time they receive their monthly salary at work, and the role of labor law and the courts.
가. The image of human beings assumed by modern civil law is an abstract individual possessing reason and free will. Civil law takes as its basic proposition the principle of private autonomy, that a contract concluded according to reason and free will must be honored. However, human beings in the real world do not always make rational judgments based on reason and free will, and conclude contracts on that basis, due to hierarchical and structural limitations. If the principle of private autonomy is enforced without exception, it may lead to results that deepen inequality and unfairness due to such structural limitations.
The image of human beings assumed by labor law is that of concrete and realistic human beings, divided into workers, who, due to the unequal social structure based on ownership of capital or means of production, must provide labor in a subordinate position in order to maintain their existence, and employers, who are in a superior position and use such workers. In labor law, if absolute binding force is recognized for contracts concluded by individuals of unequal status, this may result in threatening the maintenance of the community oriented toward the common good; to prevent this, the State modifies the principle of private autonomy through the enactment of mandatory provisions. The modification of the principle of private autonomy by labor law can be said to be an unavoidable minimum measure for maintaining the community of civil society.
In order to make correct determinations on labor law issues, one must properly understand and empathize with the circumstances, perceptions, and feelings of human beings living in concrete situations and individual realities, rather than abstract individuals. In this case, the plaintiffs are being discriminated against in important working conditions for the sole reason that they are indefinite-term contract national road managers rather than public officials. Without giving due weight to the frustration, resentment, and anger that they experience and feel every day, one cannot accurately perceive reality, nor is it possible to find a means of correcting it. In order to find the correct solution to the issue in this case, it is necessary to accurately perceive and understand the specific discriminatory situation that the plaintiffs, as indefinite-term contract national road managers, constantly experience at their workplace, and the feelings arising therefrom.
나. As pointed out in the dissenting opinion as well, there is no meaningful difference in the specific work in charge between national road managers and the comparison-subject public officials, namely driver-position and overload-inspection-position public officials; the only difference is that they hold different statuses, namely "indefinite-term contract worker" and "public official." Under these circumstances, indefinite-term contract national road managers have no choice but to live daily comparing themselves with the driver-position and overload-inspection-position public officials with whom they perform the same work in the same space, feeling frustration and despair due to the discrimination.
The family allowance is paid to all national public officials regardless of the content or nature of the labor (work) actually provided, so long as they have dependent family members, and the purpose of encouraging childbirth is reflected in the amount paid. The failure to pay the family allowance to indefinite-term contract national road managers, despite their performing the same work in teams together in the same space, treats the families of national road managers as existing beings who are treated as if they do not exist. National road managers cannot help but perceive that only the families of public officials are recognized as human beings, while their own families are not even recognized as human beings, and that they themselves are not even recognized as members of society or citizens of the State whom the State calls upon to encourage childbirth. In this way, the complete non-payment of family allowances to national road managers who perform the same work in the same space is not only destructive of human dignity and worth, but also a failure to give the treatment that they, as citizens or members of society, rightfully deserve.
Meanwhile, while expecting indefinite-term contract national road managers to work diligently and achieve considerable performance and results, failing to pay them performance bonuses, unlike public officials, reflects a lack of understanding of human nature. For a worker, the workplace is not merely a place to earn money, but also a place to achieve self-fulfillment through labor. Receiving a fair evaluation for one's diligent work and results at the workplace and being compensated accordingly is an important element in satisfying the need for self-realization. Therefore, it must not be overlooked that excluding national road managers from the subjects of performance bonus payment deprives them of the opportunity to feel pride and fulfillment by working diligently, achieving excellent results, and being recognized, and instead causes them to feel a sense of alienation as being excluded from the group of members qualified to receive compensation for performance, thereby causing them to even lose their human dignity.
다. As a court whose mission is to protect the rights and interests of minorities, the courts must present legal doctrine to eliminate unreasonable discrimination suffered by minority workers. If the courts leave unjust and unreasonable discrimination unaddressed due to lack of consideration, lack of understanding of reality, or lack of ability to find appropriate solutions, this would be an abandonment of the courts' duty, whose primary mission is to protect the rights and interests of minorities and the socially weak. If the courts, in this case, partially accept the plaintiffs' claims and present legal doctrine to correct unreasonable discrimination, it will be entirely possible for society to accept this and design and respond to the system with appropriate measures. However, if the courts simply reject the plaintiffs' claims without presenting any solution, policymakers in our society will have no incentive to correct discrimination. Regrettably, the majority opinion has abandoned the courts' mission of protecting the rights and interests of minorities, and has failed to provide our society with an opportunity to correct unreasonable discrimination. Has not the court, by turning its back on the indefinite-term contract national road managers who knocked on the doors of the courts to correct discrimination, once again inflicted upon them frustration, resentment, and anger?
라. If water is filled into a container surrounded by walls of differing heights, it will overflow at the lowest part of the wall, so the amount of water that the container can hold is determined by the height of the lowest part of the wall. In order to increase the amount of water that the container can hold, the lowest part of the wall must be raised; no matter how much higher the higher parts are made while the lowest part remains unchanged, the amount of water that the container can store will not increase at all. In our society, it is labor law that plays the role of raising the lowest part of the wall.
Likewise, the inclusiveness of a society is determined by the level of treatment and respect received by the most vulnerable classes in that society. In order to raise the level of a society's inclusiveness, the treatment of vulnerable classes must be improved; raising the level of treatment of those in wealthy and powerful positions does not affect the level of a society's inclusiveness. Rather, if the treatment of the wealthy and powerful classes is improved while the treatment of vulnerable classes remains unchanged, this will only widen the gap between classes, deepening relative inequality, and thereby further increasing the instability of society. One of the most important roles of the courts, which are entrusted with judicial power by the Constitution (헌법), is to raise the level of society's overall inclusiveness by guaranteeing the rights and interests of the socially weak and minorities who cannot protect themselves by the principle of majority rule.
Confucius once said, "不患寡 患不均" (bulhwan gwa hwan bulgyun), meaning "one should not worry about absolute poverty, but should worry about (relative) inequality" (Analects, Book of Ji-shi), and also said, "周急不繼富" (jugeup buljyebu), meaning "one should help those in urgent and difficult circumstances, not add further wealth to the rich" (Analects, Book of Yong-ye). There is regret that judicially condoning a compensation system that undermines human dignity and worth and even fails to recognize status as a member of the State and society, merely on the ground of not holding the status of public official, falls short even of the awareness of Confucius, who lived 2,500 years ago. The majority opinion has newly created, in 21st-century Korea, a privileged, chosen status of public official that transcends labor law, one that non-public officials dare not even set up as a subject of comparison. The grounds put forward by the majority opinion and the separate opinion in explaining the particularity of the status of public officials are all identical to the grounds presented by the so-called "special power relationship theory" (특별권력관계론) concerning the relationship of public officials. It is difficult to escape the criticism that the perception of the relationship of public officials held by the majority opinion and the separate opinion revives the "special power relationship theory," which was overcome long ago, and does not conform to the times.
마. Judicial resolution is not the only method for resolving social disputes and conflicts. Even though a judicial resolution has a final character, it is not the only resolution. There are also resolutions through legislation or through the government's establishment of policy, and in the case of labor disputes in particular, there is also the resolution of labor-management agreement in the industrial field.
Failing to pay national road managers family allowances and performance bonuses, thereby seriously undermining their dignity and worth as human beings and even denying their status as members of the community, significantly lowers the level of our society as a whole. Although a judicial resolution could not be presented through this case, I write this supplementary opinion with the hope that, without stopping here, the State will set an example as a good employer, and that solutions will be devised at various levels.
The foregoing sets forth the supplementary opinion to the dissenting opinion.
[Attachment] List of Plaintiffs: Omitted
Chief Justice Kim Myeong-su (Presiding Judge), Justice Ahn Cheol-sang, Justice Min Yu-sook, Justice Kim Seon-su, Justice Lee Dong-won, Justice Noh Jeong-hee (Justice in Charge), Justice Noh Tae-ak, Justice Lee Heung-gu, Justice Cheon Dae-yeop, Justice Oh Kyung-mi, Justice Oh Seok-jun, Justice Seo Kyung-hwan, Justice Kwon Young-jun