[Plaintiff, Appellant] Plaintiff (Attorney Ahn Gwan-ju, Counsel for the Plaintiff)
[Defendant, Appellee] Defendant (Kwanghwamun Law Firm, Attorneys Lee Jae-yong and 7 others, Counsel for the Defendant)
[Judgment Below] Incheon District Court Decision 2021Na64385 Decided April 28, 2023
[Order]
The part of the judgment below against the Plaintiff is reversed, and this part of the case is remanded to the Incheon District Court.
[Reasoning]
The grounds for appeal are examined.
1. Overview of the Case
According to the reasoning of the judgment below and the record, the following facts may be established.
A. The Plaintiff and the Defendant are merchants.
B. On December 28, 2006, the Plaintiff borrowed KRW 30 million from the Defendant, with interest set at 20% per annum and the due date set as December 31, 2009 (hereinafter the "First Loan"), and, in order to secure all obligations owed to the Defendant, executed a registration of a collateral mortgage (근저당권, "geunjeodangkwon") in favor of the Defendant over the real property at issue owned by the Plaintiff, with the maximum secured amount set at KRW 150 million (hereinafter the "First Collateral Mortgage").
C. The Plaintiff borrowed from the Defendant KRW 90 million on June 20, 2009, with no interest rate fixed and the due date set as December 30, 2009 (hereinafter the "Second Loan"), and KRW 20 million on January 25, 2011, with neither interest rate nor due date fixed (hereinafter the "Third Loan").
D. On November 2, 2015, the Plaintiff borrowed KRW 100 million from the Defendant with the due date set as November 1, 2016 (hereinafter the "Fourth Loan"), and, in order to secure all obligations owed to the Defendant, executed a registration of a second collateral mortgage in favor of the Defendant over the real property at issue, with the maximum secured amount set at KRW 200 million (hereinafter the "Second Collateral Mortgage"). At that time, the loan certificate at issue prepared by the Plaintiff for the Defendant stated: "Principal amount: KRW 100,000,000. Previously unpaid amount KRW 140,000,000, total KRW 240,000,000," and "Interest shall be paid monthly at KRW 1,500,000 per year (apparently a clerical error for per month), payable on the 30th of each month."
E. The Plaintiff remitted to the Defendant KRW 1,500,000 on February 6, 2016, KRW 1,500,000 on March 19, 2016, KRW 5,000,000 on September 30, 2016, and KRW 10,000,000 on July 6, 2017, totaling KRW 18,000,000.
F. Pursuant to the Defendant's application for auction, a voluntary auction procedure was commenced with respect to the real property at issue on April 8, 2019, and at the distribution date of January 8, 2020, a distribution schedule was prepared allocating, of the actual amount to be distributed of KRW 546,597,075, KRW 461,436,162 to the Defendant as holder of the First and Second Collateral Mortgages, and the surplus of KRW 43,984,345 to the Plaintiff as the debtor and owner.
2. Whether a Novation Agreement Was Formed Under the Loan Certificate at Issue (First Ground of Appeal)
The court below determined that, considering the contents of the loan certificate at issue and the contents of the collateral mortgages established to secure the loan amounts, it was insufficient to find that a novation agreement had been concluded upon the preparation of the loan certificate at issue that extinguished the existing loan principal and interest thereon and created a new obligation. Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the record, this determination can be upheld, and there is no error therein, as alleged in the grounds of appeal, exceeding the limits of the principle of free evaluation of evidence in violation of the rules of logic and experience.
3. Whether the Benefit of Prescription Was Waived as to the Interest Obligations on the First and Second Loans (Second Ground of Appeal)
A. Determination of the Court Below
The court below determined, for the following reasons, that the Plaintiff had waived the benefit of the completion of extinctive prescription (소멸시효, "somyeolsihyo") as to the interest obligations that had accrued up to the respective due dates of the First and Second Loans (hereinafter the "First and Second Loan Interest Obligations"). Where the extinctive prescription period for a principal obligation has not been completed, but that for an interest obligation has been completed, and the debtor partially performs the obligation, then, absent any dispute as to the amount, it is presumed that the debtor has impliedly acknowledged the principal obligation and, with knowledge of the completion of the prescription period as to the interest obligation, waived the benefit thereof. The Plaintiff, in a state where the extinctive prescription period for the principal obligations of the First and Second Loans had not been completed but that for the First and Second Loan Interest Obligations had been completed, partially repaid the First through Fourth Loans from February 6, 2016 to July 6, 2017, thereby waiving the benefit of the completion of extinctive prescription as to the First and Second Loan Interest Obligations.
B. Validity of the Legal Doctrine of Presumed Waiver of the Benefit of Prescription
The court below reached the above conclusion based on the legal doctrine that "where a debtor acknowledges an obligation after the completion of the prescription period, it is presumed that the debtor knew of the completion of prescription and waived the benefit thereof" (Supreme Court Decision 66Da2173, decided February 7, 1967, etc.; hereinafter the "Presumption Doctrine"). However, the Presumption Doctrine is not valid, for the following reasons.
1) The Presumption Doctrine is a doctrine that infers, from a debtor's acknowledgment of an obligation after the completion of prescription, the debtor's awareness of the completion of prescription and the debtor's declaration of intention to waive the benefit thereof. Such presumption of awareness and presumption of declaration of intention constitute factual presumptions recognized on the basis of empirical rules. However, such presumptions are not supported by empirical rules, or rather, run contrary to empirical rules.
It is difficult to regard the presumption of awareness of the completion of prescription as grounded in empirical rules. Whether prescription has been completed is determined by various factors, such as the prescription period, the starting point for calculating the prescription period, and grounds for interruption or suspension of prescription. Determinations regarding these factors are sometimes unclear and complex, so it is difficult to generally say that a debtor knew of the completion of prescription merely because the prescription period has elapsed. Whether a debtor knew of the completion of prescription is a matter to be determined by comprehensively considering the various circumstances of the individual case, not a matter that can be uniformly presumed according to empirical rules.
It is also difficult to regard the presumption of a declaration of intention to waive the benefit of prescription as grounded in empirical rules. Waiver of the benefit of prescription is a declaration of intention premised on knowledge of the completion of prescription. However, it is unusual for a debtor, knowing that the completion of prescription confers the legal benefit of being released from the obligation retroactively to the date the prescription period began to run, to nonetheless make a declaration of intention to waive that benefit and continue to bear the obligation. This is because an ordinary debtor is unlikely to voluntarily forgo his or her own legal benefit and take on a legally disadvantageous position of his or her own accord. Rather, in light of empirical rules, it is more likely that an acknowledgment of obligation after the completion of prescription was made without the debtor's knowledge of the completion of prescription.
The empirical rule concerning the awareness and intention of a debtor who acknowledges an obligation after the completion of prescription is not a matter that would vary significantly from country to country. However, Korea's Presumption Doctrine is, from a comparative law perspective, regarded as an unusual doctrine. For example, no such presumption doctrine exists in Germany or the United States, and it is generally accepted in those jurisdictions that whether the benefit of prescription has been waived must be examined on a case-by-case basis. In France as well, no presumption doctrine exists, and there is a provision of the Civil Code (Article 2251, Paragraph 2) providing that implicit waiver of prescription is recognized only where circumstances clearly reveal an intention not to invoke prescription. In Japan as well, the Presumption Doctrine is not currently adopted in case law.
2) Acknowledgment of an obligation as a ground for interrupting extinctive prescription and waiver of the benefit of prescription are concepts that must be distinguished from each other. Acknowledgment of an obligation as a ground for interrupting extinctive prescription is a notice of perception (관념의 통지) that arises where, before the completion of extinctive prescription, the debtor expresses to the person who would lose the claim upon the completion of extinctive prescription that the other party's right or the debtor's own obligation exists. Waiver of the benefit of prescription is a declaration of intention that arises where, after the completion of extinctive prescription, the debtor, knowing that prescription has been completed, expresses an intention to forgo the legal benefit resulting therefrom.
Thus, waiver of the benefit of prescription is clearly distinguished from acknowledgment of an obligation in that it requires more than the mere expression of an awareness regarding the obligation; it requires a declaration of an intended legal effect (효과의사) desiring the legal effect of waiving the benefit of prescription legally guaranteed to oneself. This intended legal effect is a core element of waiver of the benefit of prescription that justifies, based on the debtor's self-determination, a legal consequence disadvantageous to the debtor. As this element is not required for an act of acknowledgment of obligation, even where there has been an act of acknowledgment of obligation constituting a ground for interruption of extinctive prescription after the completion of prescription, it cannot be concluded from that fact alone that there was a declaration of intention to waive the benefit of extinctive prescription (see Supreme Court Decision 2011Da21556, decided February 28, 2013, etc.).
The Presumption Doctrine, without sufficiently considering this fundamental difference between acknowledgment of obligation and waiver of the benefit of prescription, adopts a structure whereby, if there is an act of acknowledgment of obligation, a declaration of intention to waive the benefit of prescription is immediately presumed therefrom. This is problematic in that it permits the process of inquiry into the intended legal effect, which should be conducted in a detailed and rigorous manner, to be omitted at the outset by relying on the convenient legal device of presumption. Such omission renders the process of interpreting the declaration of intention to waive the benefit of prescription deficient, and as a result, carries the risk of infringing upon the debtor's freedom of decision regarding whether to waive the benefit of prescription.
3) The Supreme Court has developed the doctrine that declarations of intention bringing about significant disadvantages, such as waiver of rights, must be strictly interpreted. Waiver of a claim or release of an obligation may be made by an implicit declaration of intention, but the interpretation of such declaration of intention must be strict (Supreme Court Decision 2011Da94509, decided June 13, 2013). Waiver of a claim for damages must be carefully determined by comprehensively examining various circumstances, such as whether the party was in a situation where he or she could have been fully aware of the fact that he or she was able to exercise the right but was waiving it, and whether there was a motive or reason for the waiver (Supreme Court Decision 2005Da64552, decided November 29, 2007). Waiver of the defense of simultaneous performance may be made not only by an express declaration of intention but also by an implicit declaration of intention; however, recognition of waiver of the defense of simultaneous performance through interpretation of an implicit declaration of intention must be made strictly and carefully (Supreme Court Decision 2025Da209893, 209894, decided June 26, 2025). Where the content of an agreement asserted by one party imposes a significant disadvantage on the other party, such as waiver of a right, the meaning of such agreement must be strictly interpreted (Supreme Court Decision 2021Da219116, decided July 21, 2021).
The foregoing legal doctrines convey the point that, when determining whether there was a declaration of intention such as a voluntary waiver of a right or benefit, one must, in light of the unusual nature of such a declaration and the significance of its consequences, strictly and carefully examine, based on various circumstances, whether the party actually intended a legally disadvantageous consequence to himself or herself and expressed that intention externally. This standard of interpretation is of even greater importance, in particular, in the case of an implicit declaration of intention, whereby the actor's intention is inferred from a certain act. However, the Presumption Doctrine readily presumes a declaration of intention to waive the benefit of prescription, which brings about a significant disadvantage to the debtor, based solely on the act of acknowledgment of obligation after the completion of prescription. This is inconsistent with the general principle established in Supreme Court precedents requiring strict and careful interpretation of declarations of intention to waive a right or benefit.
4) Extinctive prescription is a system that promotes legal stability by extinguishing a right, under certain requirements, where the holder of the right has failed to exercise it for a certain period, thereby creating a fluid and unstable state. Through this system, upon the completion of extinctive prescription, the debtor enjoys the legal benefit of being released from the burden of the obligation. In order to protect this legal benefit, the Civil Act (민법, "Minbeop") prohibits a debtor from waiving the benefit of extinctive prescription in advance (Article 184, Paragraph 1), while permitting the shortening or reduction of the extinctive prescription period by juristic act, but prohibiting its exclusion, extension, or aggravation (Article 184, Paragraph 2). These provisions, in consideration of the possibility that a creditor may be in a superior position to a debtor, are designed to allow the debtor to justly enjoy the benefit resulting from the completion of extinctive prescription, while also ensuring that the purpose of the extinctive prescription system is not unduly frustrated under the guise of a declaration of intention or juristic act.
Meanwhile, by a converse interpretation of Article 184, Paragraph 1 of the Civil Act, it is permissible for a debtor to waive the benefit of prescription after the completion thereof. However, in light of the purpose of the extinctive prescription system and the content of the above provisions concerning the protection of debtors, care must be taken, in the process of interpreting a declaration of intention to waive the benefit of prescription, to ensure that the debtor's legal benefit resulting from the completion of extinctive prescription is not unduly infringed. However, the Presumption Doctrine presumes, from the mere circumstance of acknowledgment of obligation after the completion of prescription, both awareness of the completion of prescription and a declaration of intention to waive the benefit of prescription, and imposes upon the debtor the burden of rebutting such presumption. This places the debtor in a disadvantageous position not originally contemplated by the law. Where such a doctrine is combined with judicial practice that rarely permits the rebuttal of such presumption, the structural disadvantage of the debtor may become even more severe. Furthermore, the Presumption Doctrine carries the risk of being abused by loan companies, debt collection agencies, and the like, to pressure or induce debtors, after the completion of prescription, into acts of acknowledgment of obligation such as partial repayment, thereby causing them to waive the benefit of prescription, potentially infringing upon the interests of financial consumers. In this respect, the Presumption Doctrine may also bring about undesirable results as a matter of policy.
C. Change of Precedent
Contrary to the foregoing, Supreme Court Decision 66Da2173, decided February 7, 1967, Supreme Court Decision 92Da4796, decided May 22, 1992, Supreme Court Decision 98Da46808, decided January 26, 1999, Supreme Court Decision 2013Da12464, decided May 23, 2013, Supreme Court Decision 2021Da244, 251, decided May 12, 2022, and other decisions to the same effect, which held that where a debtor acknowledges an obligation after the completion of prescription, it is presumed that the debtor knew of the completion of prescription and waived the benefit thereof, are hereby all changed to the extent inconsistent with the views expressed in this Decision.
D. Determination as to This Case
In light of the foregoing legal doctrine, the reasoning of the judgment below is examined. It is recognized that the Plaintiff partially repaid the Defendant a total of KRW 18,000,000 from February 6, 2016 to July 6, 2017 (this amount coincides with 12 months' worth of the agreed interest on the Fourth Loan, calculated from the time of borrowing to the due date); however, this fact alone cannot give rise to a presumption that the Plaintiff, at that time, made a declaration of intention not to receive the legal benefit resulting from the completion of prescription of the First and Second Loan Interest Obligations, despite knowing of the completion of prescription thereof. Accordingly, the court below should have specifically examined whether the Plaintiff, at the time of partially repaying part of the loan obligations owed to the Defendant, made a declaration of intention to waive the benefit of prescription while knowing of the completion of prescription of the First and Second Loan Interest Obligations. Here, whether the debtor made a declaration of intention to waive the benefit of prescription while knowing of the completion of prescription must be determined objectively and reasonably by comprehensively considering the various circumstances existing in the individual case, such as the specific motive, background, and voluntariness underlying the partial repayment, the difference between the amount partially repaid and the amount of the obligation for which prescription had been completed, the extent to which the prescription period had elapsed at the time of the partial repayment, the words and conduct at and around the time of the partial repayment, and the relationship, transactional knowledge, and experience of the parties.
Nevertheless, the court below, without sufficiently considering the above circumstances, immediately presumed, from the mere fact that the Plaintiff had partially repaid part of the loan to the Defendant in a state where the extinctive prescription period for the First and Second Loan Interest Obligations had been completed, that the Plaintiff had waived the benefit thereof while knowing of the completion of prescription of the First and Second Loan Interest Obligations, and rejected the Plaintiff's assertion of the completion of extinctive prescription. Such determination by the court below contains an error affecting the judgment, in that it misapprehended the legal doctrine concerning waiver of the benefit of prescription and failed to conduct the necessary examination.
4. Scope of Reversal
The portion of the judgment below in which the Plaintiff lost, insofar as it determined that the Plaintiff had waived the benefit of prescription with respect to the First and Second Loan Interest Obligations, contains the ground for reversal set forth above. However, since the amount of the Plaintiff's principal and interest debt owed to the Defendant and the scope of appropriation of repayment may change when the court below, upon remand, examines and determines the matter in accordance with the purport of this reversal, and in such a case it will be necessary to newly calculate the proper amounts to be distributed to the Plaintiff and the Defendant, the portion of the judgment below in which the Plaintiff lost must ultimately be reversed in its entirety.
5. Conclusion
Therefore, the portion of the judgment below in which the Plaintiff lost is reversed, and this part of the case is remanded to the court below for further examination and determination, and it is so decided as set forth in the Order. Except for the separate opinion of Justices Roh Tae-ak, Oh Suk-jun, Eom Sang-pil, Lee Suk-yeon, and Ma Yong-ju, the opinions of the participating Justices were unanimous, and there is a supplementary opinion of Justice Kwon Young-jun regarding the majority opinion, and a supplementary opinion of Justice Roh Tae-ak regarding the separate opinion.
6. Separate Opinion of Justices Roh Tae-ak, Oh Suk-jun, Eom Sang-pil, Lee Suk-yeon, and Ma Yong-ju
A. Summary of the Separate Opinion
We agree with the conclusion, in this case, that "the portion of the judgment below determining the First and Second Loan Interest Obligations contains an error affecting the judgment, in that it misapprehended the legal doctrine concerning waiver of the benefit of prescription and failed to conduct the necessary examination." However, we cannot agree with the majority opinion that, in order to reach that conclusion, precedent must be changed by abolishing the so-called "Presumption Doctrine." The Presumption Doctrine is one that the Supreme Court has long recognized as valid and applied, and remains valid both doctrinally and in practice, and therefore should be maintained.
B. First, the specific reasons for our determination as to this case are set forth below.
1) The separate opinion does not, in fact, differ from the majority opinion, not only in the conclusion of this case but also in the reasoning therefor. That is, as with the majority opinion, "it is recognized that the Plaintiff partially repaid the Defendant a total of KRW 18,000,000 from February 6, 2016 to July 6, 2017; however, this fact alone cannot give rise to a presumption that the Plaintiff, at that time, made a declaration of intention not to receive the legal benefit resulting from the completion of prescription of the First and Second Loan Interest Obligations, despite knowing of the completion of prescription thereof. Accordingly, the court below should have specifically examined whether the Plaintiff, at the time of partially repaying part of the loan obligations owed to the Defendant, made a declaration of intention to waive the benefit of prescription while knowing of the completion of prescription of the First and Second Loan Interest Obligations. Here, whether the debtor made a declaration of intention to waive the benefit of prescription while knowing of the completion of prescription must be determined objectively and reasonably by comprehensively considering the various circumstances existing in the individual case." However, whereas the majority opinion attributes the error of the court below to the Presumption Doctrine, the separate opinion holds that the problem lies not in the Presumption Doctrine itself, but in the court below's erroneous interpretation and application of that doctrine.
2) Even maintaining the Presumption Doctrine, the reasons why the determination of the court below cannot be accepted are as follows. This part, too, merely explains in greater detail what the majority opinion sought to convey by stating, regarding the Plaintiff's repayment amount of KRW 18,000,000, that "(this amount coincides with 12 months' worth of the agreed interest on the Fourth Loan, calculated from the time of borrowing to the due date)," and does not substantively differ from the majority opinion.
A) The determination of whether an obligation has been acknowledged and, further, whether a declaration of intention to waive the benefit of prescription exists, must be made objectively and reasonably, in accordance with the rules of logic and experience and common sense, so as to conform to the ideals of social justice and equity, by comprehensively examining the content, motive, and background of the expressed act or declaration of intention, and the purpose and true intent that the party sought to achieve by such declaration of intention (see Supreme Court Decision 2008Da25299, decided July 24, 2008; Supreme Court Decision 2011Da21556, decided February 28, 2013, etc.). Where multiple obligations of the same kind arise between the same parties through continuous transactions, and the debtor makes a partial repayment without designating a specific obligation, absent other special circumstances, it may be recognized as an acknowledgment of the remaining obligations, giving rise to the effect of interruption of prescription or waiver; however, where each obligation arose separately and has independence, such an interpretation cannot be uniformly applied, and where an obligation is repaid for a specific purpose, absent special circumstances, it cannot be regarded as an acknowledgment of, or a waiver of the benefit of prescription with respect to, a separate obligation unrelated to that purpose (see Supreme Court Decision 93Da14936, decided October 26, 1993; Supreme Court Decision 2013Da64793, decided January 23, 2014, etc.).
B) The First through Fourth Loan Obligations in this case arose separately, on four occasions, over approximately 10 years from December 28, 2006 to November 2, 2015, and have independence. The Plaintiff, in a state where the extinctive prescription period for the First and Second Loan Interest Obligations had been completed, additionally borrowed KRW 100 million from the Defendant as the Fourth Loan, and at that time, the loan certificate at issue prepared by the Plaintiff for the Defendant merely stated "Principal amount KRW 100,000,000. Previously unpaid amount KRW 140,000,000 (the principal of the First through Third Loans), total KRW 240,000,000," and "interest of KRW 1,500,000 per month payable on the 30th of each month," without any mention of the First and Second Loan Interest Obligations. In particular, the total of KRW 18,000,000 partially repaid by the Plaintiff to the Defendant from February 6, 2016 to July 6, 2017 coincides with the amount of 12 months' worth of agreed interest on the Fourth Loan as set forth in the loan certificate at issue, while it is significantly less than the First and Second Loan Interest Obligations, for which prescription had already been completed at that time. Considering these circumstances comprehensively, there is room to view that the Plaintiff repaid by designating the interest obligation on the Fourth Loan, and did not make a declaration of intention to acknowledge, or waive the benefit of prescription with respect to, the separate First and Second Loan Interest Obligations.
C) Nevertheless, the court below, without sufficiently examining these matters relating to the interpretation of intention concerning acknowledgment of obligation or waiver of the benefit of prescription, determined, based solely on the Presumption Doctrine, that the Plaintiff had waived the benefit of prescription with respect to the First and Second Loan Interest Obligations, and rejected the Plaintiff's assertion of the completion of extinctive prescription. Such determination by the court below contains an error affecting the judgment, in that it misapprehended the legal doctrine concerning acknowledgment of obligation or waiver of the benefit of extinctive prescription.
3) In summary, in applying the legal doctrine that "where a debtor acknowledges an obligation after the completion of prescription, it is presumed that the debtor knew of the completion of prescription and waived the benefit thereof," the court below made a determination, regarding the recognition of the fact of acknowledgment of obligation, which is the premise of that presumption, and the interpretation of intention regarding the existence of an intended legal effect to waive the benefit of prescription, that is inconsistent with the doctrine of prior precedent; it did not reach an erroneous determination because the Presumption Doctrine applied by the court below is itself erroneous.
C. Changing the precedent concerning the "Presumption Doctrine" is not necessary in order to reach the conclusion in this case.
1) In order to change a view expressed in Supreme Court precedent that has accumulated over a long period in a certain direction, there must be circumstances such that the view is clearly erroneous from the outset, or has come to significantly conflict with prevailing notions of justice due to changes in the times and circumstances, such that changing it possesses a far superior value compared to maintaining it, to the extent that the resulting sacrifice of legal stability is justified; it is neither proper nor desirable to change an accumulated body of precedent merely because a new legal view appears somewhat better or more reasonable. In particular, since the essence of the judiciary is to provide relief for rights in specific cases, it is difficult to recognize the necessity of changing precedent merely to construct a different reasoning for a judgment where doing so has no effect on the conclusion of the judgment. In principle, a change of precedent should be made in a case where the conclusion would differ depending on whether the precedent is maintained or not, because the purpose should be the resolution of the specific case, not the change of precedent itself.
2) The gist of the majority opinion is that the Presumption Doctrine should be abolished, and whether a debtor made a declaration of intention to waive the benefit of prescription while knowing of the completion of prescription should be determined through interpretation of intention. However, the Supreme Court has already, while maintaining the Presumption Doctrine, endeavored to reach substantively appropriate resolutions in specific cases through interpretation of intention as to whether an acknowledgment of obligation or a declaration of intention to waive the benefit of prescription exists, and predictability and legal stability in the application of the doctrine have been sufficiently secured through the accumulation of numerous precedents. Supreme Court Decision 2008Da25299, decided July 24, 2008, and Supreme Court Decision 2011Da21556, decided February 28, 2013, cited above, are precisely such cases, and the relevant portion of the latter decision is also cited by the majority opinion as a basis.
3) There is no essential difference between the specific standard of determination regarding the existence of a declaration of intention to waive the benefit of prescription proposed by the majority opinion and the standard of interpretation of intention under prior precedent. It is difficult to discern any difference between "objectively and reasonably determined by comprehensively considering the various circumstances existing in the individual case, such as the specific motive, background, and voluntariness underlying the partial repayment, the difference between the amount partially repaid and the amount of the obligation for which prescription had been completed, the extent to which the prescription period had elapsed at the time of the partial repayment, the words and conduct at and around the time of the partial repayment, and the relationship, transactional knowledge, and experience of the parties" (majority opinion) and "made objectively and reasonably, in accordance with the rules of logic and experience and common sense, so as to conform to the ideals of social justice and equity, by comprehensively examining the content, motive, and background of the expressed act or declaration of intention, and the purpose and true intent that the party sought to achieve by such declaration of intention" (prior precedent).
4) In conclusion, in this case, where the change of precedent does not produce a difference in the conclusion of the judgment, it is neither necessary nor desirable to change precedent. Moreover, it is difficult to view changing the precedent concerning the Presumption Doctrine as possessing a far superior value compared to maintaining it, and even examining the grounds relied upon by the majority opinion, it is difficult to find a reason or necessity for abolishing, at this point in time, the Presumption Doctrine that has been established over a long period. This is examined in detail below.
D. Validity and Necessity of Maintaining the "Presumption Doctrine"
1) Doctrinal Aspect
A) The Supreme Court has consistently held the legal doctrine that where a debtor acknowledges an obligation after the completion of prescription, it is presumed that the debtor knew of the completion of prescription and waived the benefit thereof, and this has become established as a settled doctrine. That is, ever since Supreme Court Decision 66Da2173, decided February 7, 1967, first held that "since it may be recognized that it is generally and commonly known that a claim is extinguished by extinctive prescription upon the lapse of the statutory period, where a debtor acknowledges an obligation after the completion of prescription, it may be presumed, in the first instance, that the debtor knew of the completion of prescription and waived the benefit thereof," the Supreme Court has consistently articulated the Presumption Doctrine and applied it to specific cases, up to the recent Supreme Court Decision 2021Da244, 251, decided May 12, 2022. As a result, this doctrine has functioned as a standard for the courts' determination in civil trials, or at least as a starting point for interpretation of intention, and the parties have made their assertions and proof in accordance with that doctrine and have accepted the resulting determinations.
B) There is no empirical evidence to suggest that the empirical rule underlying the Presumption Doctrine — that "it is generally known that a claim is extinguished upon the lapse of the prescription period" — was clearly erroneous from the outset, or has come to conflict with common sense in society to such an extent that its effect can no longer be maintained. Extinctive prescription has existed since the era of the former (Japanese colonial-era applied) Civil Code, and is an established system that has been applied consistently since the enforcement of the Civil Act enacted on January 1, 1960, to the present, and since the extinction of rights by prescription is now accepted as a matter of course in our society, the perception that "a claim is extinguished upon the lapse of the prescription period" can be evaluated as a common perception derived from the empirical experience of ordinary people over a long period. If it is difficult to deny the empirical rule that "it is generally known that a claim is extinguished upon the lapse of the prescription period," then it cannot be said to be erroneous, based thereon, to factually presume, in the context of the completion of extinctive prescription with respect to a specific obligation, that "a debtor who acknowledged the obligation after the completion of prescription would have known of the completion of prescription," and further, from the fact that "the debtor engaged in an act of acknowledgment of obligation despite knowing of the completion of prescription," to factually presume that "the debtor had an intention to waive the legal benefit resulting from the completion of prescription."
Meanwhile, the "ordinary debtor" contemplated by the majority opinion — that is, a debtor who is unlikely to voluntarily forgo his or her own legal benefit and take on a legally disadvantageous position of his or her own accord — is understood to be "a person who acts entirely in accordance with economic rationality." However, various recent experiments in the field of economics have shown that actual human behavior is influenced to a considerable degree by economic irrationality and psychological biases, and that people sometimes act by voluntarily forgoing their own interests in favor of others. Purely from an economic perspective, it is clearly irrational for a debtor to waive the benefit of being released from an obligation resulting from the completion of prescription and to make a declaration of intention to continue bearing the obligation. Nevertheless, greater caution is needed before concluding that such conduct is unusual in our society or contrary to empirical rules. Even where the prescription period for a claim has already elapsed and prescription has been completed, and the debtor is aware of that fact, the debtor may fully well express an intention to repay his or her debt at any time, regardless of legal obligation or liability, and such conduct or attitude of a debtor is not so rare or unfamiliar as to be inconsistent with our common sense. Although it may not be economically rational, it is our experience and common sense that the notion "a debt must be repaid even after a long time has passed" is at least as widespread — perhaps even more so — as the notion "a debt need not be repaid because the obligation is extinguished upon the lapse of the prescription period." On the other hand, it is entirely conceivable that, from an economic standpoint, acknowledging and repaying an obligation for which prescription has been completed may be a more rational choice for a debtor. This is all the more so in a society where the personal relationship between creditor and debtor is not entirely concluded or severed merely by the settlement of a monetary transaction.
The majority opinion points out that the Presumption Doctrine is unusual from a comparative law perspective; however, the empirical rule regarding extinctive prescription and the intention to bear an obligation may vary from country to country depending on the legal system governing extinctive prescription, social and economic conditions, and the perceptions of the citizenry. In Japan, the Presumption Doctrine was formerly adopted but was subsequently abolished on the ground that "it is unusual to acknowledge an obligation while knowing of the completion of prescription"; however, at the same time, Japan adopted the position that "once an obligation is acknowledged after the completion of prescription, invoking extinctive prescription thereafter, even if the debtor did not know of the completion of prescription, is not permitted under the principle of good faith," thereby taking the position of uniformly rejecting the debtor's defense of extinctive prescription. In this way, the circumstance that, where a debtor's acknowledgment of an obligation after the completion of prescription has given the creditor a reasonable trust that the debtor will not invoke prescription, the debtor's defense of the completion of prescription may be restricted under the principle of good faith, may, viewed from another perspective, also be evaluated as supporting the view that the prior precedential doctrine — which presumes acknowledgment of obligation after the completion of prescription to be a waiver of the benefit of prescription and rejects the debtor's defense of the completion of prescription — is not, as a result, unreasonable (merely differing in the legal construction by which the conclusion is reached).
Ultimately, without rigorous demonstration, it cannot readily be said that the Presumption Doctrine is contrary to logic and the empirical rules of our society.
C) The majority opinion contends that the Presumption Doctrine is improper because, without considering the fundamental difference between acknowledgment of obligation as a ground for interruption of extinctive prescription and waiver of the benefit of prescription, it adopts a structure whereby a declaration of intention to waive the benefit of prescription is immediately presumed upon an act of acknowledgment of obligation. However, this lightly disregards, or deliberately ignores, the fact that the Presumption Doctrine is merely a "factual presumption" that can be rebutted by counter-evidence, and the fact that the Supreme Court, even while maintaining the Presumption Doctrine, has clearly distinguished between acknowledgment of obligation and waiver of the benefit of prescription.
Supreme Court Decision 2011Da21556, cited above, clearly distinguished acknowledgment of obligation from waiver of the benefit of prescription, holding that "even where there has been an act of acknowledgment of obligation constituting a ground for interruption of extinctive prescription after the completion of prescription, it cannot be concluded from that fact alone that there was a declaration of intention to waive the benefit of extinctive prescription," on the ground that acknowledgment of obligation as a ground for interruption of extinctive prescription does not require an intended legal effect, whereas waiver of the benefit of prescription requires an intended legal effect of not receiving the legal benefit resulting from the completion of prescription. Supreme Court Decision 2014Da32458, decided July 11, 2017, and other decisions, have also consistently articulated the same doctrine, and the recent Supreme Court Decision 2020Da46663, decided July 28, 2022, expressly stated that "there may be cases which constitute an acknowledgment of obligation but do not constitute a waiver of the benefit of extinctive prescription." This series of precedents specifically explains the meaning of "factual presumption," and these precedents can be harmoniously interpreted together with the Presumption Doctrine as follows: "Where a debtor acknowledges an obligation after the completion of prescription, it is factually presumed that the debtor waived the benefit of prescription; however, if counter-evidence is submitted such that it is difficult to find, in interpreting the debtor's intention, that there was an intended legal effect to waive the benefit of prescription, the presumption may be rebutted."
Accordingly, the criticism that the Presumption Doctrine is improper based on the distinction between acknowledgment of obligation and waiver of the benefit of prescription is likewise unwarranted. If, in the course of applying the Presumption Doctrine, the inquiry into the intended legal effect was omitted and the interpretation of the declaration of intention to waive the benefit of prescription became deficient, this is a misunderstanding and misapplication of the Presumption Doctrine, not an error in the Presumption Doctrine itself.
D) The majority opinion contends that, because the Presumption Doctrine readily presumes a declaration of intention to waive the benefit of prescription bringing about significant disadvantage to the debtor, it is inconsistent with the general principle of precedent requiring strict and careful interpretation of declarations of intention to waive a right or benefit. However, waiver of the benefit of prescription is distinguishable from the waiver of a right or benefit in general. This is because, in a situation where the completion of extinctive prescription is disputed, the person holding the right or benefit is, after all, the creditor, and the debtor is merely in a position to be able to raise the defense that prescription has been completed, thanks to the extinctive prescription system; if the debtor does not raise the defense of prescription, there is no impediment whatsoever to the creditor's suing on, and enforcing, the claim for which prescription has been completed, even absent a separate declaration of intention to waive the benefit of prescription. Accordingly, it is difficult to say that "a declaration of intention to waive the benefit of prescription" must be determined strictly and carefully by the same standard as "a declaration of intention to waive a right or benefit," which is not in the same position (level).
2) Policy Aspect
A) Extinctive prescription is a system whereby the legal effect of extinction of a right arises if the holder of a right, despite being able to exercise the right, fails to exercise it for a certain period. This is a system designed to cope with the increasing uncertainty of legal relationships with the passage of time, and its focus is on maintaining legal stability by preserving the social order that has continued for a certain period, protecting debtors from the difficulty of preserving evidence that increases with the passage of time, and excluding from legal protection persons who fail to exercise their rights (see Supreme Court Decision 2016Da244224, 244231, decided July 9, 2020, etc.). That is, the extinctive prescription system, by extinguishing a creditor's legitimate right on the ground that it was not exercised for a certain period, and discharging a debtor who has failed to perform an obligation for a long period without consideration, is grounded on the demands of debtor protection and legal stability.
However, where a debtor voluntarily engages in an act of acknowledgment of obligation despite the completion of extinctive prescription, it is difficult to say that the demands of debtor protection and legal stability are significant. This is because the peaceful state of affairs arising from the long-maintained non-exercise of a right through the elapse of the prescription period has itself been disrupted by the debtor's own act. Accordingly, in such a case, when determining whether a declaration of intention to waive the benefit of prescription exists, it is also necessary to give balanced consideration to the demand for protection of the creditor, who is the genuine holder of the right. In a situation where the waiver of the benefit of prescription is at issue, absent the Presumption Doctrine, the creditor would have to prove that "the debtor engaged in the act of acknowledgment of obligation with the intention of waiving the benefit thereof, while knowing of the completion of prescription," and proving such an inner state of mind is, in reality, extremely difficult. The Presumption Doctrine, in order to remedy this difficulty of proof faced by the creditor, presumes that a debtor who acknowledges an obligation after the completion of prescription knew of the completion of prescription and waived the benefit thereof, while leaving open the possibility for the debtor to rebut the presumption through counter-evidence. That is, the Presumption Doctrine is a doctrine that reasonably reconciles the interests of the creditor and the debtor.
B) The Supreme Court, while maintaining the Presumption Doctrine, has nonetheless reached appropriate conclusions in specific cases through interpretation of intention as to whether an acknowledgment of obligation exists and, further, whether a declaration of intention to waive the benefit of prescription exists, as shown below. Accordingly, it is difficult to say, as the majority opinion contends, that the Presumption Doctrine places the debtor in a disadvantageous position or brings about improper results as a matter of policy. Ultimately, this is not so much a problem with the doctrine itself, as a matter of the degree of proof as to whether a declaration of intention to waive the benefit of prescription existed, and a matter of interpretation of intention.
(1) Acknowledgment of obligation as a ground for waiver of the benefit of extinctive prescription may also be effected by implicit means, but it arises, at a minimum, where the debtor expresses an intention recognizing the existence of the obligation owed to the creditor, and the interpretation of whether such a declaration of intention exists must be made objectively and reasonably, in accordance with the rules of logic and experience and common sense, so as to conform to the ideals of social justice and equity, by comprehensively considering all relevant circumstances (Supreme Court Decision 2008Da25299, cited above). The determination of whether a declaration of intention to waive the benefit of prescription exists must likewise be made objectively and reasonably, in accordance with the rules of logic and experience and common sense, so as to conform to the ideals of social justice and equity, by comprehensively examining the content, motive, and background of the expressed act or declaration of intention, and the purpose and true intent that the party sought to achieve by such declaration of intention (Supreme Court Decision 2011Da21556, cited above).
[Reasoning] (continued)
In accordance with these legal principles, the Supreme Court has held, in a case where, in the context of a continuing supply contract for goods, the parties ordered and received new goods of the same kind without confirming the previously unpaid amount or paying part of the confirmed amount at each individual transaction (Supreme Court Decision 2006Da68940, decided January 25, 2007); in a case where the debtor, upon receiving a demand for performance of a joint and several surety obligation for which the extinctive prescription period had expired, denied the establishment and existence of the surety obligation while nevertheless proposing, out of consideration for business inconvenience, a settlement to pay part of the debt amount and close the matter, which proposal was rejected (the above-cited Supreme Court Decision 2008Da25299); in a case where the debtor disputed the existence of a loan claim while asserting a litigation set-off defense using that loan claim as the passive claim, and thereafter raised a defense of extinctive prescription (the above-cited Supreme Court Decision 2011Da21556); in a case where the debtor, in filing for individual rehabilitation (개인회생), listed in the creditor list a claim secured by a collateral mortgage (근저당권) for which the extinctive prescription period had expired (Supreme Court Decision 2014Da32458, decided July 11, 2017); and in a case where the debtor proposed exemption from the remaining debt on condition of partial payment (Supreme Court Decision 2018Da255266, decided March 14, 2019) — that it was difficult to find that there had been a manifestation of intent to acknowledge the debt or to waive the benefit of prescription.
(2) In the "partial payment" scenario at issue in this case as well, the Supreme Court has sought concrete reasonableness by basing its approach on the presumption doctrine while leaving open the possibility of rebuttal through interpretation of intent. That is, while stating that, in principle, partial payment after completion of the prescription period is presumed, under the presumption doctrine, to constitute an implied acknowledgment of the entire remaining debt and thus to be presumed to constitute a waiver of the benefit of prescription with knowledge of the completion of the prescription period, the Supreme Court has also pointed out that whether partial payment constitutes waiver of the benefit of prescription with respect to the remaining debt is a matter of interpreting the manifestation of intent (Supreme Court Decision 93Da14936, decided October 26, 1993), and has held that only where there is no dispute as to the amount (Supreme Court Decision 2001Da3580, decided June 12, 2001; Supreme Court Decision 2010Da6345, decided May 13, 2010; Supreme Court Decision 2013Da12464, decided May 23, 2013) and where partial payment is made without designating a specific debt (Supreme Court Decision 2021Da239745, decided September 30, 2021) can it be presumed, under the presumption doctrine, that the entire debt was implicitly acknowledged and that the benefit of prescription was thereby waived.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that where a person, while disputing the existence and scope of an obligation, deposits (공탁) a sum for damages in criminal proceedings for the purpose of avoiding or mitigating criminal punishment, this cannot be deemed to constitute acknowledgment of a damages obligation exceeding the deposited amount (Supreme Court Decision 2010Da36735, decided September 30, 2010; Supreme Court Decision 2014Da85216, decided April 9, 2015). It has also held that where multiple claim relationships of the same kind have arisen between the same parties through continuing transactions, and the debtor makes partial payment without designating a specific debt, if the debtor made the payment for the purpose of releasing a provisional attachment (가압류) on the secured claim or for the purpose of canceling the registration of a collateral mortgage on the secured claim, it cannot be said, absent special circumstances, that the debtor thereby acknowledged, or waived the benefit of prescription with respect to, a separate obligation other than the secured claim (Supreme Court Decision 93Da14936, decided October 26, 1993; Supreme Court Decision 2013Da64793, decided January 23, 2014).
(3) The majority opinion points out that the presumption doctrine carries the risk of being abused by loan companies, debt collection agencies, and the like, which may pressure or induce debtors into acts of debt acknowledgment such as partial payment after completion of the prescription period, thereby causing them to waive the benefit of prescription. However, if such circumstances exist, the presumption would be rebutted under the interpretive principles discussed above, and no manifestation of intent to acknowledge the debt or waive the benefit of prescription would be recognized. The majority opinion overlooks the fact that the Supreme Court has, until now, endeavored to achieve substantively reasonable resolutions in specific cases through the harmonization of the presumption doctrine and the principles of interpretation of intent. Meanwhile, as can be seen from the fact that in Japan—where the presumption doctrine was abolished in favor of rejecting the debtor's invocation of extinctive prescription under the principle of good faith—there were nevertheless numerous instances in which loan sharks pressured or deceived debtors into acknowledging debts, such as through partial payment, in order to prevent invocation of extinctive prescription, abolishing the presumption doctrine does not by itself resolve the above-mentioned concerns.
E. For the foregoing reasons, while I agree with the majority opinion's conclusion that the portion of the judgment below against the plaintiff should be reversed and the case remanded to the court below, I cannot agree with the change in precedent abolishing the presumption doctrine, and I therefore state a separate opinion.
7. Supplementary Opinion of Justice Kwon Young-jun Concerning the Majority Opinion
Below, I supplement the majority opinion regarding the validity of the presumption doctrine and the necessity of the change in precedent, and I rebut the separate opinion.
A. On the Validity of the Presumption Doctrine
1) Regarding the Rule of Experience
The separate opinion argues that, based on the rule of experience that "it is generally known that a claim is extinguished upon expiration of the prescription period," a debtor who acknowledges a debt after completion of the prescription period may be factually presumed to have known of the completion of the prescription period, and further, may be factually presumed to have had the intent to effect a waiver of the benefit of prescription. However, this inference is difficult to accept. The rule of experience referred to in the separate opinion concerns the general understanding of the prescription system. However, this general understanding cannot serve as a basis for presuming awareness of the completion of the prescription period with respect to a specific claim, much less for presuming, on the basis of such awareness, an intent to effect the waiver of the benefit of prescription. This is because no rule of experience can be found to support such a presumptive relationship. Indeed, criticism that the presumption doctrine is contrary to the rule of experience has continuously been raised in Korea.
The rule of experience concerning the general understanding of the prescription system, which the separate opinion presents as the basis for the presumption doctrine, is the same in content as the rule of experience set forth by the Japanese Daishin-in (Great Court of Cassation) in its 1917 decision. This, too, became the starting point supporting the presumption doctrine in Japan. However, the Japanese Supreme Court, in its 1966 decision, denied the existence of a rule of experience regarding awareness of completion of prescription and the intent to effect waiver of the benefit of prescription, and abolished the presumption doctrine. In other major countries such as Germany, France, and the United States, such a presumption doctrine is not recognized, and the recognition of waiver of the benefit of prescription is made on an individual and strict basis. In short, deriving the presumption doctrine from the starting point of a general understanding of the prescription system is not a universally accepted approach even from a comparative law perspective.
Whether a specific claim has been extinguished by prescription is often determined through a complex judgment involving various legal factors, going beyond the mere general understanding that "a claim is extinguished upon expiration of the prescription period." Let me give some example questions concerning these legal factors. Is the prescription period applicable to the right in question 10 years, 5 years, or 3 years? When does the prescription period begin to run? Is the right in question subject to a time limit? If so, is it a fixed or an uncertain time limit? If uncertain, has the time limit arrived? Has the benefit of the time limit been forfeited? Was there a legal impediment to the exercise of the right? Has a cause for interruption of prescription arisen? What conduct of the debtor may be evaluated as an acknowledgment of debt? What is the scope of the interruption of prescription? From when does the interrupted prescription period begin to run anew? Are there no grounds for suspension of prescription? The answers to these numerous questions affecting the completion of prescription may vary from case to case. Sometimes complex and difficult legal judgments are required to answer them. This is also why legal disputes concerning prescription are frequent.
A presumption declared in the form of a standardized legal doctrine inevitably entails a degree of uniform fact-finding. However, the interpretation of a manifestation of intent, particularly an implied manifestation of intent, must be conducted individually, taking into account the various circumstances of the case. The presumption doctrine is problematic not only because it is based on a nonexistent rule of experience, but also because it excessively standardizes, in a manner disadvantageous to the debtor, the interpretation of intent that ought to be individually examined. In this connection, the separate opinion, citing experimental findings in economics that human behavior is sometimes driven by economic irrationality and psychological bias, states that it is also possible for a debtor to waive the benefit of prescription even while knowing of the completion of the prescription period. Of course this is possible. However, the issue here is not whether such conduct is possible. The issue is whether such conduct by a debtor is a general behavior supported by a rule of experience to the extent that it would justify the presumption doctrine. The majority opinion takes the position that it cannot be so viewed. The separate opinion offers no affirmative and meaningful answer to this.
The presumption doctrine is also problematic from the standpoint of confidence in the judiciary. A rule of experience is a rule of factual judgment concerning the nature of things or causal relationships, derived inductively from experience. Rules of experience are divided into those based on general common sense and those specialized to expert fields. The rule of experience at issue in this case is the former, that is, one based on general common sense. When a court constructs a legal doctrine concerning a rule of experience based on such general common sense, it must repeatedly examine whether it truly accords with the common sense of ordinary people. However, presuming that a debtor knew of the completion of the prescription period and nevertheless waived the benefit of prescription, merely because there was an act of acknowledgment of the debt, is unpersuasive even in light of ordinary common sense. Such a discrepancy between the court's perception of the rule of experience and the common sense of ordinary people can lead to distrust of the judiciary. This is an important reason why the presumption doctrine should be abolished.
2) Regarding Rebuttal of the Presumption
The separate opinion argues that, since the presumption doctrine concerns merely a "factual presumption," the debtor may rebut the presumption by presenting counterevidence. It also emphasizes that Supreme Court Decision 2011Da21556, decided February 28, 2013 (hereinafter "the 2013 Decision"), and other decisions have made clear that acknowledgment of debt does not always lead to waiver of the benefit of prescription. Underlying the separate opinion is the notion that "since a factual presumption can be freely rebutted through counterevidence, the presumption doctrine is not a significant problem." However, the influence that the presumption doctrine actually exerts in reality is by no means minor. Nor did the 2013 Decision fundamentally resolve the problems of the presumption doctrine. Rather, this decision left behind the unfinished task of clarifying, for the future, the legal doctrine concerning the interrelationship between acknowledgment of debt and waiver of the benefit of prescription.
A factual presumption is an operation whereby, applying a rule of experience, another fact is inferred from a given fact. Of course, the making of a factual presumption does not itself effect a shift in the burden of proof. However, a factual presumption treats the fact to be proved as having been established for the time being upon proof of only certain indirect facts. As a result, the burden of proving the fact to be proved is eased. Correspondingly, the opposing party bears the burden of rebutting the presumption. This is a factor that can significantly affect the parties' respective positions regarding proof of the fact to be proved, as well as the outcome of the case. For example, the Supreme Court has held that where a seal impression affixed to a document is that of the seal of the person whose name appears as the maker of the document, the act of affixing the seal is factually presumed to have been done pursuant to the intent of that person (see Supreme Court Decision 96Jaeda462, decided June 13, 1997, and others). In disputes concerning the authenticity of a document, the parties' respective positions and the outcome of the case can differ significantly depending on whether such a presumption is recognized or not.
Where the object being presumed is an "internal intent," which is difficult to prove, the impact of a factual presumption becomes even greater. The separate opinion cites, as one basis for supporting the presumption doctrine, the difficulty a creditor faces in proving the debtor's internal intent, namely awareness of the completion of prescription. However, it is an even greater problem to quietly shift such a difficult burden of proof onto the debtor. Ultimately, absent special circumstances, this allocation of burden should be made faithfully in accordance with the general principles governing the allocation of the burden of proof. In order to reallocate that burden between the creditor and the debtor through a factual presumption, such reallocation must be clearly justified by a rule of experience. However, as examined above, the presumption of waiver of the benefit of prescription is not justified by any rule of experience.
Of course, as the separate opinion argues, a presumption under the presumption doctrine can be rebutted. However, it is an undeniable reality that precedents recognizing rebuttal of the presumption while applying the presumption doctrine are difficult to find. This is similar to the situation in Japan before the presumption doctrine was abolished there, that is, a situation in which criticism was raised that the factual presumption had, in practice, become fixed as if it were a virtual legal fiction and was functioning excessively in practice. The weight and influence carried by the term "presumption," once officially recognized as a legal doctrine by the Supreme Court, are formidable, such that once acknowledgment of debt is recognized, there is a considerably increased likelihood of immediately reaching the conclusion that the benefit of prescription was waived. This is because it is easy for a judge to rely on the convenient path of judgment provided by the Supreme Court in the form of the presumption doctrine in order to resolve a case safely. However, such convenient case resolution renders meaningless the interpretation of manifestations of intent that ought to be conducted meticulously in each individual case. This also confers an unfairly favorable outcome upon the creditor at the sacrifice of the debtor who is deprived of the benefit of prescription.
More fundamentally, the true crux of the discussion should not be whether the presumption can be rebutted, but rather whether the presumption doctrine is, in the first place, a legitimate doctrine in light of the rule of experience. The legitimacy of a doctrine that saddles the debtor with the yoke of presumption and imposes upon the debtor the burden of rebuttal, without clear grounds, cannot be recognized merely on the ground that "rebuttal is possible." Illegitimate doctrines should, in principle, be corrected; one should not merely hope for the validity of individual conclusions built upon the foundation of an illegitimate doctrine. The presumption doctrine is like a playing field tilted against the debtor. It is a field tilted even more unfavorably against a good-faith debtor who has taken action for the benefit of the creditor, such as through partial payment, than against a debtor who has made no acknowledgment of debt whatsoever. Of course, it is possible for a debtor to overcome the tilted field and prevail. However, it would be irresponsible to say, on the basis of such a possibility, that it is acceptable for the field to be tilted in the first place. Fairly correcting the erroneous structure itself, which is tilted to one side, is the legitimate and fundamental solution. Through this, universal validity, rather than fragmentary validity, can be pursued.
3) Regarding Strict and Careful Interpretation
The separate opinion argues that, in the context in which the completion of prescription is at issue, it is the creditor who retains the right or benefit, while the debtor is merely in the position of being able to raise the defense of completion of prescription; therefore, waiver of the benefit of prescription is to be distinguished from "a manifestation of intent to waive a right or benefit." Accordingly, it argues that the principle of strict and careful interpretation applicable to "a manifestation of intent to waive a right or benefit" does not apply to waiver of the benefit of prescription. This argument appears to be based on the so-called relative extinction theory, according to which a debt is not necessarily extinguished merely by the completion of the prescription period. However, it must first be noted that it is difficult to conclude that precedent clearly adopts either the absolute extinction theory or the relative extinction theory to the exclusion of the other (see Supreme Court Decision 65Da2445, decided January 31, 1966; Supreme Court Decision 83Nu655, decided May 14, 1985; Supreme Court Decision 2010Da51192, decided July 12, 2012, and others, which are evaluated as based on the absolute extinction theory).
Meanwhile, whichever of the two positions one follows, it must be considered that the debtor holds a certain "right or benefit" after the completion of prescription. Under the absolute extinction theory, the debt is naturally extinguished upon completion of prescription, and the debtor enjoys the legal benefit of being released from that debt. Waiver of the benefit of prescription, in substance, becomes a manifestation of intent to voluntarily re-assume a debt that has already been extinguished. Under the relative extinction theory, the debt is not naturally extinguished upon completion of prescription, but the debtor acquires a "right to assert the benefit of prescription," that is, a right of invocation of prescription. Waiver of the benefit of prescription is a manifestation of intent to waive this right of invocation.
Whichever position is followed, waiver of the benefit of prescription has, in essence, the nature of an act of waiving a certain right or benefit. The Supreme Court, too, has defined waiver of the benefit of prescription as a manifestation of intent not to accept the legal benefit resulting from the completion of prescription (see Supreme Court Decision 2011Da21556, decided February 28, 2013; Supreme Court Decision 2014Da32458, decided July 11, 2017, and others). If so, there is no reason why the principle of strict and careful interpretation should not apply to waiver of the benefit of prescription, which has the essential nature of a waiver of a right or benefit. Nor does the fact that this benefit of prescription is asserted in the form of a "defense" change this conclusion. The Supreme Court recently held that waiver of the "defense" of simultaneous performance must also be interpreted strictly and carefully (see Supreme Court Decision 2025Da209893, 209894, decided June 26, 2025).
4) Regarding the Reasonable Coordination of the Interests of the Creditor and the Debtor
The separate opinion argues that the presumption doctrine is a doctrine that reasonably coordinates the interests of the debtor and the creditor and is thus recognized as policy-justified. It focuses in particular on the fact that the peaceful state of affairs resulting from the long-maintained non-exercise of the right until the expiration of the prescription period has been disrupted by the debtor's act of acknowledgment of debt, and argues that the need to protect a debtor who acknowledges the debt after completion of prescription, and the need for legal stability, are not so great. It thus argues that the presumption doctrine does not result in an unfair outcome for the debtor. However, I find it difficult to agree with this argument.
The reasonable coordination of the interests of the creditor and the debtor is a core requirement of the law of obligations, and the extinctive prescription system is not unrelated to this requirement. However, among the numerous systems and doctrines relating to claims, the extinctive prescription system is one that relatively strongly reflects the purpose of protecting the debtor. Extinctive prescription is a system whereby, if a state in which the creditor does not exercise the right continues for a substantial period, the debtor is released from that obligation under certain requirements. Through this, the debtor is able to escape the burden of a potential dispute and make a fresh start. In this respect, extinctive prescription bears some similarity to the discharge system under insolvency law. This debtor-protective function of extinctive prescription manifests itself in earnest after the completion of prescription. Therefore, the interests of the creditor and the debtor differ significantly before and after the completion of prescription.
Before the completion of prescription, the creditor undeniably holds the right, and the debtor undeniably bears the obligation. The debtor's expectation or hope that the prescription period may in the future be completed and the debt may thereby be extinguished is not a legal right or benefit at a stage that can be actively exercised. Focusing on this aspect, to use a metaphor, the time before the completion of prescription is "the creditor's time." It is understandable, to some extent, that the Supreme Court has generously interpreted the grounds and scope of interruption of prescription, such as acknowledgment of debt, that occur during this "creditor's time." The separate opinion's point that, because the act of acknowledgment of debt disrupts the peaceful state of affairs resulting from the creditor's non-exercise of the right, the need for debtor protection and legal stability is not great, is also understandable insofar as it concerns matters relating to interruption of prescription.
However, after the completion of prescription, this legal landscape changes. The debtor no longer bears the legal obligation (under the absolute extinction theory), or acquires the right of invocation of prescription to assert the benefit of prescription (under the relative extinction theory). The legal status, right, or benefit that the debtor acquires as a result of the completion of prescription is a powerful and new normative weapon that was not available to the debtor before the completion of prescription. Focusing on this aspect, to use a metaphor, the time after the completion of prescription is "the debtor's time." The deprivation of the benefit of prescription occurring during this "debtor's time" causes serious detriment to the debtor. Accordingly, the judgment thereof must be made as strictly and carefully as the strict and careful judgment applied to the deprivation of the creditor's right, achieved by broadly interpreting the grounds for interruption of prescription during "the creditor's time."
B. On the Necessity of the Change in Precedent
1) General Discussion
The separate opinion argues that a change in precedent should be made only where there are circumstances such that changing the precedent has vastly superior value compared to maintaining it, to the extent that the resulting sacrifice of legal stability is justified, and that precedent should not be changed merely because a new legal view appears somewhat better or more reasonable. This is understood as presenting a standard for judging the necessity of changing precedent. There can be no disagreement with the point that precedent should not be too readily changed. In that respect, there are aspects of the separate opinion worth heeding. However, this standard may, if not carefully applied, excessively raise the threshold for changing precedent and thereby operate in a direction that impedes the development of the law. Accordingly, I state my opinion on the standard for judging the necessity of a change in precedent from a somewhat different perspective.
If a given precedent is unjust, that precedent should, in principle, be changed. Here, "unjust" means not merely that there is a difference of view or that one view is somewhat better than another, but rather that the validity of the existing precedent is clearly and evidently negated. The burden of demonstrating such injustice lies with the party asserting that the precedent should be changed. However, if the social and legal costs resulting from the change in precedent are greater than the benefits, then, even if the precedent is unjust, it may exceptionally be maintained. The burden of demonstrating such circumstances lies with the party asserting that the precedent should be maintained. Below, I examine in more detail the second issue, namely the costs and benefits of the change in precedent.
The costs of a change in precedent relate mainly to legal stability. Precedent enhances legal predictability, restrains arbitrary judgment by judges, and enables equal and consistent handling of cases. It provides standardized criteria for judgment, containing judicial wisdom accumulated over a long period, thereby saving judges' time and effort. It also reduces the possibility of vexatious litigation (濫訴) asserting unnecessary changes in precedent. Our positive law, too, treats precedent as normatively significant, in consideration of this weight of precedent (see Article 3, Item 2 of the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Trial of Small Claims (소액사건심판법); Article 4, Paragraph 1, Items 3 and 4 of the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Procedure for Appeal to the Court of Final Appeal (상고심절차에 관한 특례법); Article 7, Paragraph 1, Item 3 of the Court Organization Act (법원조직법)). Nevertheless, changing precedent too frequently can undermine the trust of the public who have made decisions and taken actions based on precedent, thereby impairing legal stability. That is, the greatest cost of a change in precedent is such an impairment of trust.
The benefits of a change in precedent relate mainly to legal validity. It is the essential mission of the courts to interpret and apply the law appropriately and thereby realize justice in specific cases. Correcting an unjust precedent is part of the strenuous effort to achieve this mission. Where a precedent fails to function properly in reality, distorts the doctrinal system, or has negative policy ramifications, a change in precedent contributes to restoring the normative effectiveness of the law and dispelling distrust of the judiciary. It fundamentally removes the burden or side effects that may be imposed on our society and legal system by the continued application of an erroneous precedent going forward. A change in precedent in the sense of resolving mutually contradictory or conflicting precedents provides clearer and more valid guidance for conduct and judgment. Through such appropriate changes in precedent, the law can communicate with society and develop in a legitimate direction. This is precisely the unique and important benefit that a change in precedent carries. This benefit becomes even greater where the injustice of the precedent is conspicuous or where a legislative solution cannot be expected.
2) The Necessity of the Change in Precedent Concerning the Presumption Doctrine
As examined in detail in the majority opinion and this supplementary opinion, the presumption doctrine is unjust. If so, it is, in principle, appropriate that the precedent embodying the presumption doctrine be changed. On the other hand, it is difficult to say that the separate opinion has successfully demonstrated that the social and legal costs of the change in precedent are greater than its benefits.
a) The Costs of the Change in Precedent
The separate opinion argues that the presumption doctrine has been maintained for a long time, and that, through the accumulation of a considerable number of cases, predictability and legal stability regarding the application of the doctrine have been sufficiently secured. It further argues that a change in precedent is permissible only where there are circumstances such that the sacrifice of legal stability is justified. The "sacrifice of legal stability" mentioned in the separate opinion appears to have in mind the impairment of trust that may occur upon changing existing precedent. However, the change in precedent concerning the presumption doctrine has little to do with impairment of trust.
Waiver of the benefit of prescription is a problem that arises only when the creditor's failure to exercise the right for a considerable period leads to the completion of prescription. The presumption doctrine is merely a post hoc evaluative tool that may be invoked when such a problem actually arises in the future. It is difficult to conceive of a case in which a creditor, recognizing and relying on the future possibility of completion of prescription, acknowledgment of debt, and the presumption doctrine applicable to such a situation, acquires a claim or decides whether to exercise it. This is all the more true when one recalls that waiver of the benefit of prescription is a matter entirely to be determined according to the debtor's own intent, and thus lies outside the creditor's sphere of control. In short, the presumption doctrine does not serve as a basis of trust determining the creditor's decision-making or conduct; therefore, even if the presumption doctrine is abolished, impairment of trust, or the resulting impairment of legal stability, is unlikely to be a problem. In other words, the change in precedent entails almost no cost.
Of course, there may be a creditor who believes that the debtor has waived the benefit of prescription because of the debtor's act of acknowledgment of debt. However, such a belief is trust formed only by the debtor's conduct occurring after the completion of prescription, and it is difficult to regard it as trust arising from the precedent embodying the presumption doctrine. Indeed, it is questionable how many creditors actually know of the existence and content of the presumption doctrine and evaluate an acknowledgment of debt as a waiver of the benefit of prescription in light of that doctrine. Ultimately, such a belief on the part of the creditor is generally unrelated to trust in the precedent embodying the presumption doctrine itself, and can only serve as a factor to be considered in the context of a violation of the principle of good faith, which will be examined later.
b) The Benefits of the Change in Precedent
The separate opinion argues that, since abolishing the presumption doctrine would have little effect on the conclusion, the practical benefit of changing precedent is not great, and makes various arguments in support of this. I defer specific rebuttals to each of these arguments to the next section, and first set out the general direction of this change in precedent and the benefits it will entail.
First, the separate opinion has a limited but valid point. Even if the presumption doctrine is abolished, there may well be cases in which, in accordance with the general principles of interpreting a manifestation of intent, the debtor's acknowledgment of debt is nevertheless interpreted, as a result, as a manifestation of intent to waive the benefit of prescription with knowledge of the completion of prescription. Even if the presumption doctrine is abolished, acknowledgment of debt will continue to function as an important indirect fact in determining whether the benefit of prescription has been waived. Moreover, even where acknowledgment of debt is not interpreted as a waiver of the benefit of prescription, there may be cases in which the assertion of prescription is not permitted under the principle of good faith. To this extent, the abolition of the presumption doctrine does not immediately lead to a change in the conclusion.
Considering this, this change in precedent may be likened not to a large-scale reconstruction but to a small-scale repair. However, a small-scale repair is not without practical benefit merely because it is small-scale. Rather, performing a small-scale repair at the necessary time and under the necessary circumstances is the shortcut to preventing the confusion and complications of a large-scale reconstruction. The Supreme Court has, even recently, made changes in precedent that are doctrinally significant even though the number of cases actually at issue is not so large (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 2020Meu15896, decided May 23, 2024, concerning the interest in seeking confirmation of nullity of marriage after divorce; Supreme Court en banc Decision 2018Seu724, decided July 18, 2024, concerning the extinctive prescription of the right to claim child support determined by agreement or by adjudication before such determination). Such development of the law has a positive effect not only on the cases to which the relevant doctrine is directly applied, but also on the resolution of related cases organically connected thereto, and further on enhancing the coherence of the legal order as a whole. This cannot be said to be useless or meaningless.
This change in precedent, too, provides meaningful direction. The direction of this change in precedent is to correct the creditor-favoring bias in the doctrine of waiver of the benefit of prescription and to emphasize neutral interpretation of manifestations of intent; to restore the relationship between the creditor and the debtor, in the context of the completion of prescription, to the state originally intended by the law; and to safeguard the spirit of respect for intent and private autonomy by fixing individualized examination, rather than uniform presumption, as the basic approach. Such a change of direction itself constitutes an important benefit of the change in precedent. Furthermore, this will also affect the actual interpretation of manifestations of intent to waive the benefit of prescription. The task of interpreting, from an act of acknowledgment of debt, whether the benefit of prescription has been waived must be carried out in a meticulous and individualized manner, comprehensively considering such factors as the length of the prescription period, the degree to which the prescription period has elapsed, the relationship between the parties, the parties' transactional experience or legal knowledge, the specific motive, circumstances, and voluntariness of the acknowledgment of debt, the timing of the acknowledgment of debt and the conduct before and after it, where partial payment is at issue, the amount paid and the amount remaining, and the existence of grounds for interruption or suspension of prescription. The uniform presumptive method that directly links acknowledgment of debt to waiver of the benefit of prescription should now be expelled from the list of interpretive tools.
As a result, among cases in which waiver of the benefit of prescription was previously easily recognized, having been dissolved within the framework of the presumption doctrine, there may arise cases in which, under the direction of "individuality rather than uniformity," waiver of the benefit of prescription is denied after a meticulous and individualized inquiry into the manifestation of intent. To give just one example, while partial payment of a debt may, in principle, be regarded as an implied acknowledgment of the remaining debt, once the doctrine of presuming waiver of the benefit of prescription from acknowledgment of debt is abolished, such implied acknowledgment cannot immediately be presumed to constitute waiver of the benefit of prescription with respect to the remaining debt as well (the general interpretive theory in Germany is likewise). Even this example alone shows that it cannot be concluded that the change in precedent has no bearing on the conclusion in specific cases.
3) Rebuttal to the Specific Arguments of the Separate Opinion
The separate opinion argues, through several specific arguments as follows, that a change in precedent is unnecessary. However, none of these arguments provides sufficient grounds to negate the necessity of the change in precedent.
a) Regarding the 2013 Decision
The separate opinion, emphasizing the 2013 Decision and various other precedents that denied waiver of the benefit of prescription, argues that since such precedents can be harmonized with the presumption doctrine, the necessity of abolishing the presumption doctrine is not great (hereinafter, for convenience, the discussion focuses on the 2013 Decision). However, the 2013 Decision emphasized the distinction between acknowledgment of debt and waiver of the benefit of prescription, in particular the difference depending on the existence of an effect-intent, and presented a path of directly interpreting the manifestation of intent without relying on the schema of "presumption." That is, this decision did not take the approach of accepting the presumption doctrine while filling in its limits through the possibility of rebuttal, but rather took a new approach that circumvents that doctrine, based on a critical attitude toward the presumption doctrine. In this respect, the two doctrines are, in substance, also in conflict in certain respects. For reference, no precedent can be found that sets forth both the presumption doctrine and the doctrine of the 2013 Decision together.
Ultimately, it is difficult to say that the existing presumption doctrine was abolished or fully overcome through the 2013 Decision. Even after the 2013 Decision, decisions based on the presumption doctrine have continued to be rendered (e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2021Da244, 251, decided May 12, 2022). The two doctrines coexist without a clear standard, and courts frequently apply whichever doctrine fits the conclusion depending on the circumstances of the case. In this way, the shadow cast by the presumption doctrine still remains. Even in this very case, with respect to the same facts, the court below applied the presumption doctrine, while the separate opinion, emphasizing the doctrine of the 2013 Decision, reached a different conclusion. Such a situation needs to be clearly resolved.
b) Regarding the Conclusion of This Case
The separate opinion argues that, in light of the essential nature of the judiciary, which is aimed at the relief of rights in specific cases, it is unnecessary to change precedent in this case, where whether or not precedent is changed does not make a difference in the conclusion. First of all, the argument that precedent cannot be changed in a case where the change in precedent does not make a difference in the conclusion of that case lacks any basis. Theoretically, even in such a case, there is no reason why precedent cannot be changed if there is a need and utility for declaring a new legal doctrine. There is no statutory provision prohibiting this, nor is there any established precedent or doctrine to that effect. The 1966 decision of the Japanese Supreme Court, which the separate opinion also invokes, is itself a decision that abolished the presumption doctrine while constructing a doctrine that reached, in substance, the same conclusion through the application of the principle of good faith, thereby maintaining the conclusion of the court below (which had applied the presumption doctrine) while nevertheless changing the existing precedent.
Furthermore, this case is one in which the conclusion may differ depending on whether precedent is changed. It is true that the separate opinion, as a result, agrees with the conclusion of the majority opinion to reverse and remand. However, strictly speaking, the separate opinion is closer to having applied the doctrine of the 2013 Decision rather than the presumption doctrine. It is doubtful whether, had the presumption doctrine been applied in the manner previously understood or operated, the same conclusion as the majority opinion would have been reached. Indeed, the court below, which applied the presumption doctrine in this case, reached a different conclusion. Had the change in precedent not been at issue, this judgment of the court below would likely have been upheld by the Supreme Court as well. This is because it is difficult to find a case in which a judgment of the court below, which applied the presumption doctrine but did not recognize its rebuttal, was reversed. Therefore, it cannot be concluded, based solely on the conclusion reached by the separate opinion by, in effect, circumventing the presumption doctrine, that whether the presumption doctrine is abolished has no bearing whatsoever on the conclusion of this case.
Meanwhile, the separate opinion, premising that the first through fourth loan obligations were each separately established and independent, states that there is room to view that the plaintiff designated and repaid the interest obligation on the fourth loan, and that this does not constitute a manifestation of intent to acknowledge, or to waive the benefit of prescription with respect to, the separate interest obligations on the first and second loans. This appears to be an argument to the effect that, since the same conclusion can be reached even under the existing precedent, a change in precedent is unnecessary. However, whether the plaintiff's payment was made with a designation that it be applied to the interest obligation on the fourth loan is a question of fact-finding, in which the Supreme Court cannot, in principle, intervene. The court below never found such a fact; rather, it appears to have applied the presumption doctrine on the premise that there was no such designation. Ultimately, here too, the separate opinion appears to have reached the same conclusion as the majority opinion not by applying the presumption doctrine itself, but through the detour of construing the facts differently.
The role of the Supreme Court must also be considered. A court cannot declare an abstract legal doctrine unrelated to a specific case. However, it is the role of the court to explore and develop the legal doctrine to be applied to a specific case. This role is even more important for the Supreme Court, which is a court of law. The Supreme Court must perform the future-oriented function of not merely resolving specific past cases, but also securing consistency and coherence in the interpretation and application of the law with respect to similar cases and developing related legal doctrine. This case, too, is one in which such a function should be exercised. The court below applied the presumption doctrine and affirmed waiver of the benefit of prescription. The validity of the presumption doctrine has been questioned. The plaintiff, too, in the grounds of appeal, disputed the judgment below applying the presumption doctrine and argued that, under the doctrine of the 2013 Decision, waiver of the benefit of prescription should be denied. Against this background, the Supreme Court deliberated on whether to change the precedent embodying the presumption doctrine, and a majority of the Justices recognized the propriety and necessity of the change in precedent. It is expected that the changed precedent will perform a guiding function in the determination of waiver of the benefit of prescription in similar cases going forward. If so, changing precedent is a natural and appropriate conclusion.
c) Regarding the Application of the Principle of Good Faith
The separate opinion, citing the 1966 decision of the Japanese Supreme Court, which abolished the presumption doctrine but held that an assertion of prescription after acknowledgment of debt is not permitted under the principle of good faith, suggests that if the same conclusion would in any event be reached under the principle of good faith as under the application of the presumption doctrine, there would be little practical benefit in changing precedent. However, in Japan, strong criticism has been raised to the effect that the Supreme Court's stance of uniformly rejecting assertions of prescription based on the principle of good faith is itself improper, as it creates yet another uniform fiction, or that no trust of the creditor worthy of protection is formed with respect to acknowledgment of debt after completion of prescription. Such criticism was also predominant in the process of the 2017 amendment of the Japanese Civil Code, and against that background, an amendment proposal to the effect that the right of invocation of prescription is not extinguished merely by acknowledgment of debt was also discussed (this issue was ultimately left to be resolved through interpretation). Comparatively as well, cases in which an assertion of prescription is uniformly rejected under the principle of good faith, as described above, are not easily found. Therefore, it is inappropriate to invoke the above decision as a ground for rejecting the change in precedent in our country.
The principle of good faith at issue in this context is the principle prohibiting conduct inconsistent with one's prior conduct (venire contra factum proprium). However, an act of acknowledgment of debt and an assertion of prescription cannot necessarily be said to be mutually inconsistent. This is all the more so if one takes the position of the relative extinction theory, under which the debt does not naturally become extinguished but continues to exist, at least provisionally, even after the completion of prescription. Acknowledgment of debt is an act expressing awareness of the existence of such a debt, while an assertion of prescription is an act of exercising, on the basis of that awareness, the right of invocation of prescription to extinguish that debt by reason of the completion of prescription. The two acts can coexist without contradiction. Ultimately, it cannot be said that an assertion of prescription after acknowledgment of debt uniformly violates the principle of good faith. Even in this case, the separate opinion does not appear to determine that the plaintiff's assertion of prescription constitutes a violation of the principle of good faith. Moreover, where a party does not raise an argument of violation of the principle of good faith, the court does not necessarily bear an obligation to determine this issue of its own accord. Ultimately, whether there is a violation of the principle of good faith must be determined individually, comprehensively considering all the circumstances on both sides, including the need to protect the creditor's trust and the context and form of the debtor's conduct.
I have thus stated my supplementary opinion concerning the majority opinion.
8. Supplementary Opinion of Justice Noh Tae-ak Concerning the Separate Opinion
In this case, the conclusions of the majority opinion and the separate opinion do not differ. The difference appears to lie in how the precedents that the Supreme Court has taken up until now are to be regarded.
[Reasoning]
The majority opinion states, through its supplementary opinion, that none of the arguments in the separate opinion provide sufficient grounds to negate the necessity of changing the precedent. However, this argument puts the cart before the horse. The gist of the separate opinion is that, even upon examining the grounds put forward by the majority opinion, it is difficult to readily acknowledge the necessity of changing the precedent doctrine that has been meticulously developed and established through numerous cases over a long period of time. In other words, the point is that changing the precedent in this case requires caution.
Below, I wish to supplement the separate opinion on the necessity of changing the precedent, rebut the grounds put forward by the majority opinion and the majority supplementary opinion, and re-emphasize points as necessary, even where there is some overlap.
A. On the meaning and necessity of changing precedent
Precedent refers to the Supreme Court's definitive interpretation of the statutes applicable to the facts of a given case, and it serves as a guideline for future adjudications; the people, who are subject to legal norms, also use precedent as a guide for their decision-making and conduct. In order to realize the normative character of precedent and the value of legal stability, changes to precedent must be undertaken with caution. This is especially true where precedent has been established in a consistent direction over a long period of time with respect to a particular issue. In order to overturn an established precedent, there must be clear circumstances such that the previous view has come to significantly conflict with prevailing notions of justice due to changes in the times and circumstances, or has come to significantly deviate from the purpose of the relevant statute, such that changing the precedent has far superior value compared to maintaining it, to the extent that the sacrifice of legal stability resulting therefrom is justified. Changing an established precedent merely because a new legal view appears somewhat better or more reasonable seriously undermines legal stability and is not appropriate.
In particular, there is a significant difference in the necessity of changing precedent between a case where the precedent was wrong from the outset and a case where it has ceased to be valid due to changes over time. In the latter case, the past interpretation was not wrong; it is merely that a new interpretation has become necessary due to changed circumstances, so the interests in legal stability and protection of reliance are far greater. Therefore, in the latter case, even greater caution must be exercised in changing precedent.
B. Doubts as to the necessity of changing the precedent on the doctrine of presumption
1) The first doubt that arises is whether the precedent on the doctrine of presumption was wrong from the outset. The majority opinion states that the doctrine of presumption is not supported by empirical rules and lacks persuasiveness in light of common sense.
However, Korean society has traditionally formed relatively close human bonds compared to Western societies, which have pursued rationality and individualism. In our society, where there is a strong perception, at least from an ethical standpoint, that debts must necessarily be repaid, can it truly be concluded that the doctrine of presumption—whereby a debtor who acknowledges a debt after the completion of the prescription period is factually presumed to have "waived the benefit of prescription while knowing of the completion of prescription"—was wrong from the outset in contravening empirical rules or common sense? Considering the past society in which monetary transactions primarily took place only between close acquaintances within village communities, this does not seem particularly doubtful. The bankruptcy law discharge system, which the majority supplementary opinion states has similarities to extinctive prescription, was also specifically introduced by statute out of legislative policy necessity, not as a reflection of empirical rules or common sense in our society. Nevertheless, to dismiss the doctrine of presumption as having been wrong from the outset in contravening empirical rules and common sense would, in one stroke, negate the precedents that have long acknowledged the validity of the doctrine of presumption and the practice of lower courts developed on that basis, which cannot be considered desirable.
2) As such, where a precedent doctrine was not wrong from the outset and has been established in a consistent direction over a long period of time, changing the precedent on the grounds of changes in the times and circumstances must be undertaken with great caution. In particular, where the Supreme Court, while developing the doctrine, has reasonably limited the possibility of unreasonable results arising from mechanical application of the doctrine, the necessity of changing the precedent is further diminished.
As a representative example, in the Supreme Court en banc Decision 2018Da248855, 248862, decided July 21, 2022, where the issue was whether to change the precedent holding that "Article 398(2) of the Civil Act (민법) concerning liquidated damages cannot be applied by analogy to reduce a penalty for breach of contract," the majority opinion held that the precedent was valid and that the realities of commercial transactions had become settled in accordance with that doctrine, and therefore it should be maintained as is. The supplementary opinion to the majority opinion pointed out that "the Supreme Court has, over a long period, maintained the doctrine on penalties for breach of contract in its broad framework while adding the doctrine of 'partial invalidity due to contravention of public order and good morals,' thereby achieving fairness through reasonable interpretation based on specific factual relationships. Furthermore, by recognizing the existence of 'penalty for breach that has the character of both liquidated damages and a penalty,' the Court has continuously supplemented the shortcomings of the doctrine on penalties for breach of contract by reflecting the parties' intent and the substance of the transaction."
It is also worth noting that in the Supreme Court en banc Decision 2017Da35588, 35595, decided May 11, 2023, where the issue was changing the precedent on the "doctrine of social reasonableness" concerning the validity of employment rules, the six Justices who opposed changing the precedent emphasized in their separate opinion that "the Supreme Court has strictly interpreted and applied the doctrine of social reasonableness, and through the accumulation of cases over a considerable period, predictability and legal stability regarding the application of the doctrine have been sufficiently secured to the point where it is now difficult to easily find cases in current adjudication practice where the abolition of the doctrine is at issue."
Likewise, with respect to the doctrine of presumption, the Supreme Court, while maintaining the precedent, has supplemented its shortcomings and sought concrete reasonableness by allowing the presumption to be rebutted, in Supreme Court Decision 2008Da25299, decided July 24, 2008, and Supreme Court Decision 2011Da21556, decided February 28, 2013, among others, where counter-evidence is submitted showing that, as a result of interpreting the party's intent, it is difficult to find an intent to acknowledge the debt or waive the benefit of prescription.
In response, the majority supplementary opinion points out that the influence exerted by the doctrine of presumption in reality is by no means insignificant, that precedents recognizing the rebuttal of the presumption are difficult to find, and that the doctrine of presumption is like a playing field tilted unfavorably against debtors, and therefore should be changed. However, this is a practical problem arising from the failure of the doctrine of presumption and the doctrine of rebuttal through interpretation of intent to operate harmoniously together, not a problem with the doctrine of presumption itself. Since the doctrine of presumption is a "factual presumption," it can be rebutted at any time, and if precedents accumulate in which, as a result of interpreting the party's intent, the presumption is rebutted and a waiver of the benefit of prescription is not recognized, the practical problem of concern to the majority supplementary opinion can be resolved without changing the precedent. The doctrine of presumption itself was not wrong from the outset; its shortcomings have been supplemented through the development of the doctrine of rebuttal through interpretation of intent, and cases are in fact accumulating in which, even where a debt was acknowledged after the completion of prescription, a waiver of the benefit of prescription was not recognized as a result of interpreting the party's intent. Therefore, there is no significant necessity to change the doctrine of presumption, which has been established over a long period of time.
3) The majority supplementary opinion points out that the doctrine of presumption does not form the basis of reliance that determines a creditor's decision-making or conduct, and states that even if the doctrine of presumption is abolished, there is little likelihood that infringement of reliance or impairment of legal stability would become an issue, and therefore the cost of changing the precedent is negligible. However, the issue of changing precedent should not be approached solely as a matter of cost. The reliance whose infringement is at issue as a result of changing the precedent on the doctrine of presumption is not the creditor's reliance at the time of a specific act, but reliance in the overall legal system surrounding extinctive prescription and waiver of the benefit of prescription. That is, the issue is the infringement of reliance in the overall legal system that arises when, having relied on the fact that precedent recognized a waiver of the benefit of prescription in the same type of case where a dispute arose, the precedent is then changed so that a waiver of the benefit of prescription is no longer recognized. It would rather be exceptional for an ordinary person to recognize the existence of a specific precedent and act in reliance thereon; if, as the majority supplementary opinion suggests, the cost of changing precedent arises only where individual reliance is infringed, there would be almost no case in which infringement of reliance due to changing precedent becomes an issue. Furthermore, it is also difficult to say that the doctrine of presumption is unrelated to the reliance of a specific creditor. When a debtor acknowledges a debt after the completion of prescription, the creditor will ordinarily rely on the belief that the debt will be repaid; underlying this reliance may be the reliance that, once the debtor has acknowledged the debt, the debtor will not be able to retract it—that is, reliance on the doctrine presuming a waiver of the benefit of prescription. Therefore, it is also difficult to agree with the assertion that the cost of changing the precedent on the doctrine of presumption is not significant.
4) The majority supplementary opinion states that changing the precedent on the doctrine of presumption has the benefit of correcting the creditor-favoring bias in the doctrine of waiver of the benefit of prescription and providing meaningful direction by establishing individualized consideration, rather than uniform presumption, as the basic analytical framework. It states that one cannot say that changing the precedent as the majority opinion proposes is futile or meaningless. However, the separate opinion is not saying that changing the precedent is futile or meaningless. To emphasize once again, the point is that caution should be exercised in changing a long-established precedent doctrine. Furthermore, the criticism that the doctrine of presumption is biased in favor of creditors or is uniform is, as noted above, a practical problem arising from the failure of the doctrine of presumption and the doctrine of rebuttal through interpretation of intent to operate harmoniously together, not a problem with the doctrine of presumption itself. Moreover, the factors for determination put forward by the majority supplementary opinion, which asserts that the precedent on the doctrine of presumption should be changed and whether the benefit of prescription has been waived should be considered individually, are not fundamentally different from the factors for determination in the doctrine of interpretation of intent that the Supreme Court has developed together while maintaining the doctrine of presumption. In other words, even without changing the precedent on the doctrine of presumption, whether the benefit of prescription has been waived is ultimately determined through concrete interpretation of intent, so it cannot be said that changing the precedent on the doctrine of presumption has a significant impact on the outcome of individual cases, and therefore the practical benefit of changing the precedent is not great.
C. On changes in the composition of the Supreme Court and changes in precedent
1) Precedent itself cannot be called a legal norm. However, precedent, which concretizes law in the real world, undoubtedly constitutes part of the legal order and, in the field of daily life, sometimes exerts a normative force that is no less powerful and real than abstract law itself. Such normative force can only be secured, and thereby contribute to legal stability, when precedent is not easily changed despite the passage of time and social changes, and is accorded heavy respect.
Our Supreme Court has maintained the following position regarding statutory interpretation. That is, since law is, in principle, a universally valid social norm that has the same binding force on an unspecified number of persons, it must be interpreted so as to clarify the standard meaning of the law and ensure objective validity, and consistency that can be accepted by as many people as possible should be maintained so that legal stability is not undermined. Since positive law is generally enacted with universal and typical cases in mind, it is also required to be interpreted and applied so as to achieve the most reasonable resolution suited to the specific case among the various cases that arise in social reality. In short, the goal of statutory interpretation must ultimately be to find concrete reasonableness within the scope that does not undermine legal stability. Furthermore, to that end, while adhering in principle to interpretation faithful to the ordinary meaning of the language used in the statute as far as possible, a reasonable interpretation that meets the above requirements of statutory interpretation must be reached by additionally employing systematic and logical interpretation methods that consider the legislative intent and purpose of the statute, the history of its enactment and amendment, harmony with the legal order as a whole, and its relationship with other statutes (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 2011Da83431, decided January 17, 2013, and Supreme Court en banc Decision 2011Da112391, decided June 21, 2018, among others).
However, if there is a possibility that precedent may be easily changed depending on changes in the composition of the Supreme Court, the normative force of precedent will be significantly weakened, ultimately threatening the stability of the legal order as a whole. It cannot be said to be consistent with the constitutional principle of equality for the judgment received by parties to differ, due to a change in precedent depending on the composition of the panel at a particular point in time, even though the case is essentially identical.
If a certain precedent has been established over a long period of time, it is desirable to refrain as much as possible from changing the precedent due to changes in the composition of the Supreme Court. The fact that a precedent has been established over a long period of time means that the numerous judges who have been involved during that time, adjudicating according to their conscience under the Constitution and statutes, have taken the view that the precedent in question is valid. Therefore, if the Justices constituting the Supreme Court at a particular point in time wish to change a precedent that has been established over a long period, it is necessary to demonstrate that the new view is overwhelmingly superior, and it is not desirable to attempt to change precedent merely on the ground that, while both views are possible, the new view is somewhat more persuasive.
2) The precedent on the doctrine of presumption has been consistently established for over 50 years since Supreme Court Decision 66Da2173, decided February 7, 1967, and although numerous Justices have been involved during that time, no attempt has been made to change the precedent through an en banc decision. Of course, there have been cases pointing out problems with the mechanical application of the doctrine of presumption, but the Supreme Court has supplemented the shortcomings of the doctrine of presumption through the doctrine of interpretation of intent (see Supreme Court Decision 2008Da25299, decided July 24, 2008; Supreme Court Decision 2011Da21556, decided February 28, 2013; among others), and through this, consistency of precedent and legal stability have been secured. As recently as possible, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the above doctrine and applied it to a specific case without any significant doubt as to the necessity of changing the precedent (Supreme Court Decision 2021Da244, 251, decided May 12, 2022).
Even upon examining the grounds put forward by the majority opinion for changing the doctrine of presumption, they do not appear to be far superior to the grounds for the previous doctrine of presumption; moreover, given that cases are accumulating in which the Supreme Court has maintained the doctrine of presumption while supplementing its shortcomings through interpretation of intent to achieve concrete reasonableness, it is difficult to say that changing the precedent would bring about any particular difference in outcome. Nevertheless, one must reflect on whether the majority opinion's stance that changing the precedent is necessary places excessive emphasis solely on the necessity of changing the precedent, without heeding the views of the numerous Justices who have, over the years, acknowledged the validity of the doctrine of presumption. Changing precedent that is not supported by overwhelmingly superior grounds and values, and that has no particular effect on the outcome, is contrary to the goal of statutory interpretation, which is ultimately to find concrete reasonableness within the scope that does not undermine legal stability, and is also inconsistent with the courts' function of interpreting statutes in a manner aimed at maintaining the continuity of society under the given laws.
D. As set forth above, this supplementary opinion to the separate opinion is hereby stated.
Chief Justice Cho Hee-dae (Presiding Justice), Justices Roh Tae-ak, Lee Heung-gu, Oh Kyung-mi, Oh Seok-jun, Seo Kyung-hwan, Kwon Young-jun (Justice in charge), Um Sang-pil, Shin Sook-hee, Roh Kyung-pil, Park Young-jae, Lee Suk-yeon, Ma Yong-ju