[Plaintiff, Appellant] ○○ Machinery Co., Ltd. (Attorney: Kukto Jonghap Law Firm, in charge of Attorney Kim Beom-jo)
[Defendant, Appellee] Korea Land and Housing Corporation (Attorneys: Sunwoo Law Firm, in charge of Attorney Woo Yang-tae and 3 others)
[Judgment Below] Suwon High Court Judgment 2023Na25786, dated September 11, 2025
[Order]
The judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Suwon High Court.
[Reasoning] The grounds of appeal are examined.
1. Overview of the Case
According to the reasoning of the judgment below and the evidence lawfully adopted and examined by the court below, the following facts may be known.
A. The deceased Nonparty (hereinafter referred to as "the deceased") constructed a factory building and other structures on 684㎡ of paddy field (답) at (Lot number 1 omitted), △△-ri, Uiwang-myeon, Siheung-gun, Gyeonggi-do (the administrative district was subsequently changed to "△△-ri, Uiwang-eup, Siheung-gun, Gyeonggi-do" and then to "△△-dong, Uiwang-si") [due to a division around 1986, the land area under the same lot number became 648㎡, but without distinguishing this, it shall be referred to as "the pre-division (Lot number 1 omitted) land"], and operated a machinery manufacturing business under the trade name ○○ Machinery Manufacturing Works. On June 15, 1982, the deceased applied to the Governor of Siheung-gun to change the land category of the pre-division (Lot number 1 omitted) land to "residential land" (대), and on June 17 of the same month, Siheung-gun prepared a resolution to change the land category of the said land to "factory site" (공장용지); however, around that time, the land register and the certificate of registration for the said land recorded the land category as having been changed to "residential land." Meanwhile, on April 28, 1983, the deceased obtained permission for land alteration (site preparation) with respect to 1,125㎡ out of 3,607㎡ of paddy field at (Lot number 2 omitted), △△-ri, Uiwang-eup, Siheung-gun, Gyeonggi-do (hereinafter referred to as "the pre-division (Lot number 2 omitted) land"), proceeded with site preparation work around that time, and constructed a warehouse building as an ancillary facility to the factory on the pre-division (Lot number 1 omitted) land.
B. Around 1988, the deceased divided the pre-division (Lot number 2 omitted) land into 1,109㎡ of paddy field at (Lot number 2 omitted), △△-ri, Uiwang-eup, Siheung-gun, Gyeonggi-do (hereinafter referred to as "the post-division (Lot number 2 omitted) land") and 2,498㎡ of paddy field at (Lot number 3 omitted), and then contributed each of the divided lands and the pre-division (Lot number 1 omitted) land to the Plaintiff as an in-kind contribution. On November 18, 1988, the Plaintiff completed the registration of ownership transfer with respect to each of the said lands on the ground of the in-kind contribution, and thereafter continued to operate the machinery manufacturing business that the deceased had operated. Around May 6, 1997, a portion of the pre-division (Lot number 1 omitted) land was divided to become 616㎡ of residential land (대) at (Lot number 1 omitted), △△-dong, Uiwang-si (hereinafter referred to as "the post-division (Lot number 1 omitted) land").
C. On December 31, 2015, the Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport designated and publicly announced the post-division (Lot number 1 omitted) land and the post-division (Lot number 2 omitted) land owned by the Plaintiff (hereinafter collectively referred to as "the instant lands") and the surrounding area as the "Uiwang △△ Public Housing District," and on December 28, 2016, partially amended the designation of the said public housing district and simultaneously approved and publicly announced the district plan for the said public housing district.
D. The Defendant, as the project operator of the Uiwang △△ Public Housing District Development Project (hereinafter referred to as "the instant project"), completed the registration of ownership transfer on the ground of land expropriation with respect to the instant lands on February 22, 2019, following expropriation procedures.
E. Around February 2022, while conducting excavation work for the preparation of the instant project site, the Defendant discovered soil suspected of contamination on the instant lands, and around March of the same year, reported soil contamination to the Mayor of Uiwang-si, and around March 24 of the same year, received an order for detailed soil investigation from the Mayor of Uiwang-si.
F. Pursuant to the said investigation order, the Defendant conducted a detailed soil investigation (hereinafter referred to as "the instant detailed investigation") on 8 parcels of land, including the instant lands, that had previously been used as factory sites (hereinafter referred to as "the instant lands subject to investigation"). As a result of the instant detailed investigation, fluorine, copper, zinc, and Total Petroleum Hydrocarbons (TPH) were detected at levels exceeding the Category 1 Soil Contamination Concern Standards (hereinafter referred to as "the Category 1 Standards") set forth in [Attached Table 3] of the former Enforcement Rule of the Soil Environment Conservation Act (토양환경보전법 시행규칙) (before the amendment by Ordinance of the Ministry of Environment No. 1134 on December 12, 2024; hereinafter the same shall apply) in the instant lands subject to investigation.
G. On September 30, 2022, the Mayor of Uiwang-si issued an order for remediation of contaminated soil to the Defendant on the ground that "as a result of the instant detailed investigation, contaminated soil exceeding the Category 1 Standards was confirmed in the instant lands subject to investigation."
H. The Defendant entered into a contract with □□□ Co., Ltd. to outsource soil remediation services with respect to the instant lands subject to investigation for a price of KRW 4,108,024,000, and separately spent KRW 144,650,000 on the instant detailed investigation and related verification services.
I. Thereafter, around December 23, 2022, the Defendant requested the Plaintiff to pay KRW 805,051,609 by January 20, 2023, stating that this amount represented the costs related to the instant lands among the costs for the instant detailed investigation and verification services and the service fee under the service contract, being the amount expected to be incurred in remediating contaminants in the instant lands (hereinafter referred to as "the instant remediation costs"). On January 20, 2023, the Plaintiff paid KRW 805,051,609 to the Defendant as requested, and on the same day filed the instant lawsuit against the Defendant, seeking, in the alternative, a claim for restitution of unjust enrichment and a claim for damages based on tort.
J. Meanwhile, on August 30, 2024, the land category of the post-division (Lot number 1 omitted) land was ex officio corrected to "factory site" on the ground that "the land category registered in the land register was recorded differently from the resolution prepared at the time of the land category change on June 17, 1982, and other related documents."
2. Regarding the Ground of Appeal Concerning the Soil Contamination Concern Standards
A. Article 4-2 of the former Soil Environment Conservation Act (토양환경보전법) (before the amendment by Act No. 21065 on October 1, 2025; hereinafter the same shall apply), under the heading "Soil Contamination Concern Standards," provides that the standards for soil contamination that may impede human health and property or the growth of animals and plants (hereinafter referred to as "the Concern Standards") shall be prescribed by Ordinance of the Ministry of Environment, and Article 15(3) provides that the Mayor, etc. may order a person responsible for remediation to take measures such as remediation of contaminated soil within a specified period, as prescribed by Presidential Decree, where the results of regular monitoring, soil contamination status surveys, or detailed soil investigations exceed the Concern Standards. Article 1-5 and [Attached Table 3] of the former Enforcement Rule of the Soil Environment Conservation Act, delegated under Article 4-2 of the former Soil Environment Conservation Act, set forth stricter Concern Standards for Category 1 areas, such as areas whose land category under the Act on the Establishment, Management, etc. of Spatial Data (공간정보의 구축 및 관리 등에 관한 법률) is "paddy field" or "residential land," compared to Category 3 areas, such as areas whose land category is "factory site." According to Note 6 of [Attached Table 3], where a detailed soil investigation is ordered or remediation of contaminated soil is ordered pursuant to Article 15(3) of the former Soil Environment Conservation Act, the Concern Standards shall be based on the land category as of the time of the order for measures; however, where a change in land category is anticipated, such as where development permission or approval of an implementation plan has been obtained pursuant to relevant statutes, including the National Land Planning and Utilization Act (국토의 계획 및 이용에 관한 법률), and construction work such as land alteration has commenced, the standards shall be based on the anticipated land category following the change.
B. The court below determined, for the reasons stated in its judgment, that as the Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport approved and publicly announced the district plan for the instant project site, development permission and approval of an implementation plan, etc. under relevant statutes were deemed granted with respect to the instant lands, and as the Defendant commenced construction work for land alteration of the instant lands by no later than around February 2022, a change in the land category of the instant lands was anticipated; therefore, the Concern Standards for the instant lands should be the Category 1 Standards corresponding to the "anticipated land category following change" of the said lands, pursuant to Note 6 of [Attached Table 3] of the former Enforcement Rule of the Soil Environment Conservation Act.
Examining the matter in light of the relevant legal principles and the evidence lawfully adopted and examined by the court below, there is no error in the above determination of the court below, as alleged in the grounds of appeal, that misunderstood the legal principles concerning the Concern Standards under [Attached Table 3] of the former Enforcement Rule of the Soil Environment Conservation Act, thereby affecting the judgment.
3. Regarding the Grounds of Appeal Concerning Whether the Plaintiff Falls Under a Person Responsible for Remediation and the Scope of the Defendant's Exercise of the Right of Reimbursement
A. Relevant Provisions and Legal Principles
1) Article 10-4(1) of the former Soil Environment Conservation Act provides that a person falling under any of the following subparagraphs shall, as a person responsible for remediation, undertake detailed soil investigation, remediation of contaminated soil, or implementation of a contaminated soil improvement project (hereinafter referred to as "soil remediation, etc.") pursuant to Article 15(3), etc., and lists in subparagraph 1 "a person who has caused soil contamination through leakage, discharge, dumping, abandonment, or other acts involving soil contaminants," and in subparagraph 4 "a person who owned the land on which soil contamination occurred, or who currently owns or possesses such land." Paragraph (3) of the same Article provides that where there are two or more persons responsible for remediation who may be ordered to undertake soil remediation, etc., the Mayor, etc. shall order soil remediation, etc. after considering the degree of fault of each person responsible for remediation with respect to the relevant soil contamination, the possibility of prompt and smooth soil remediation, and other factors, as prescribed by Presidential Decree. Article 5-3(1) of the Enforcement Decree of the Soil Environment Conservation Act, delegated under the said provision, provides that where there are two or more persons responsible for remediation, the Mayor, etc. shall order soil remediation, etc. in the following order, designating in subparagraph 1 the person responsible for remediation under Article 10-4(1)1 of the former Soil Environment Conservation Act, and in subparagraph 4 the person, among those responsible for remediation under Article 10-4(1)4 of the former Soil Environment Conservation Act, who currently owns or possesses the land on which soil contamination occurred, as the respective addressees of orders for soil remediation, etc. Furthermore, Article 10-4(4) of the former Soil Environment Conservation Act provides that where a person responsible for remediation who has received an order for soil remediation, etc. pursuant to Article 15(3), etc. has undertaken soil remediation, etc. at his or her own expense, such person may exercise the right of reimbursement against another person responsible for remediation with respect to the portion borne by such other person.
2) In light of the content and structure of the aforementioned relevant statutes, and considering further that Article 10-4(3) and (4) of the former Soil Environment Conservation Act and Article 5-3(1) of the Enforcement Decree of the Soil Environment Conservation Act set forth the order of orders for soil remediation, etc. and the right of reimbursement with respect to multiple persons responsible for remediation, it should be understood that, as a general principle, a person responsible for remediation of higher priority shall bear the remediation costs on a final basis and may not exercise the right of reimbursement against a person responsible for remediation of lower priority.
However, in light of the principle of self-responsibility or the principle of equity, exceptional circumstances may well be envisaged under which a person responsible for remediation of higher priority should be permitted to exercise the right of reimbursement against a person responsible for remediation of lower priority. The order of priority for remediation responsibility set forth under the Soil Environment Conservation Act and its Enforcement Decree was established primarily from the public law perspective of prompt and effective soil remediation, and it is difficult to view it as having taken into account the specific weighing of interests between private parties. Therefore, the final apportionment of costs among persons responsible for remediation for whom the exercise of the right of reimbursement is permitted must be determined under civil law, taking into specific consideration the principle of equity and other relevant factors.
3) The term "the portion borne by another person responsible for remediation" under Article 10-4(4) of the former Soil Environment Conservation Act, which governs the relationship of reimbursement among multiple persons responsible for remediation, must be reasonably determined by considering the cause of the soil contamination, the type and quantity of soil contaminants, the degree to which each person responsible for remediation contributed to the occurrence of the soil contamination and the remediation costs and the grounds for such fault, the party to whom the benefits from the remediation of contaminated soil accrue, and the circumstances giving rise to the remediation costs, among other factors. In particular, where the remediation costs of contaminated soil have increased because a heightened Concern Standard applies due to a change in the land category of the land as a result of the implementation of a public project, etc., such circumstances must be fully considered in calculating the portion to be borne.
4) Meanwhile, the main text of Note 6 of [Attached Table 3] of the former Enforcement Rule of the Soil Environment Conservation Act provides that the Concern Standards shall be based on the land category as of the time of the order for measures. However, where a landowner has lawfully obtained development permission, etc. for land alteration and has used the land accordingly, but only the change in land category has not been made, or where the land category has come to differ from the actual state of the land due to erroneous administrative processing, etc., it is reasonable to determine the Concern Standards based on the "actual state" of the land. This is because whether there is human contact with soil contaminants, and the degree of necessity to preserve the soil environment from soil contaminants, are more significantly affected by the actual state of the land than by the land category recorded in the cadastral register, and thus basing the standards on the land category alone would be difficult to reconcile with the purpose of the former Soil Environment Conservation Act, which is to prevent risks to public health and the environment and to preserve the soil ecosystem.
B. Determination of the Court Below
The court below determined, citing the following circumstances, that the Plaintiff, as the person responsible for remediation of higher priority, must bear the entirety of the instant remediation costs, and that therefore the Plaintiff's claim for restitution of unjust enrichment, which presupposes that the Defendant's receipt of the instant remediation costs from the Plaintiff lacked legal grounds, is difficult to accept.
1) The Defendant, who currently owns or possesses the instant lands, has the right, pursuant to Article 10-4(4) of the former Soil Environment Conservation Act, to seek reimbursement from the Plaintiff, who is a person responsible for remediation under subparagraph 1, 2, or 3 of paragraph (1) of the same Article, with respect to the Plaintiff's portion of the instant remediation costs calculated by applying the Category 1 Standards.
2) With respect to the apportionment of the burden between the Plaintiff and the Defendant, the Plaintiff, as the person responsible for remediation of higher priority who is highly likely to have generated soil contaminants while operating a factory on the instant lands, bears the ultimate responsibility for the instant remediation costs. It would not be consistent with the polluter-pays principle and the purport and context of the overall provisions of the Soil Environment Conservation Act to hold that the Plaintiff, having used the instant lands as a factory site, should bear only the remediation costs calculated according to the Category 3 Standards corresponding to factory sites (hereinafter referred to as "the Category 3 Standards") under [Attached Table 3] of the former Enforcement Rule of the Soil Environment Conservation Act, while the remaining remediation costs should be borne by the Defendant or other third parties.
C. Determination of the Supreme Court
1) In light of the legal principles examined above, while the portion of the judgment below's determination that the Defendant has the right to seek reimbursement from the Plaintiff, who is the person responsible for remediation of higher priority, with respect to the Plaintiff's portion of the instant remediation costs, may be accepted, the portion holding that the Plaintiff must bear the entirety of the instant remediation costs, with respect to the apportionment of the burden between the Plaintiff and the Defendant, solely on the ground that the Plaintiff is the person responsible for remediation of higher priority in relation to the Defendant, is difficult to accept, for the following reasons.
A) The reason the Category 1 Standards were applied in determining the degree of contamination of the instant lands is that, as the Defendant implements the instant project, both the land category and the actual state of the instant lands are scheduled to be changed to "residential land." However, if the instant project had not been implemented, there is a possibility that the Category 3 Standards, rather than the Category 1 Standards, would have been applied in determining the degree of contamination of the instant lands based on the actual state of the instant lands, in which case the contaminated soil of the instant lands would appear to have been considerably less than at present. According to the land category and actual state of the instant lands as recognized above, there is room to view the instant case as one in which the landowner obtained development permission, etc. for land alteration and used the land as a factory site, but the change in land category was not properly made, or the land category came to differ from the actual state of the land due to insufficient administrative processing; therefore, there is also a possibility that, had the instant project not been implemented, the Concern Standards would have been determined based on the "actual state" of the land.
Ultimately, it appears that the remediation costs increased substantially as a result of the application of the Category 1 Standards due to the Defendant's implementation of the instant project, and such circumstances must be fully taken into account in calculating the portion to be borne.
B) As the Defendant is the party that has acquired ownership of and possesses the instant lands, the benefit derived from remediating the degree of contamination of the instant lands in accordance with the Category 1 Standards accrues entirely to the Defendant, not the Plaintiff.
C) As for the Plaintiff, who transferred ownership of the instant lands pursuant to the expropriation procedure, it appears to have been difficult for the Plaintiff to have foreseen, prior to the expropriation, while lawfully obtaining development permission for land alteration with respect to the instant lands and using them as a factory site, that it would come to bear responsibility for remediation of soil contaminants in accordance with the Category 1 Standards rather than the Category 3 Standards; and it does not appear that the possibility of the occurrence of remediation costs was considered in the process of calculating the compensation for losses.
D) In light of the aforementioned circumstances, it is difficult to conclude that the Plaintiff must bear the entirety of the remediation costs solely on the ground that it is the person responsible for remediation of higher priority under Article 5-3(1) of the Enforcement Decree of the Soil Environment Conservation Act in relation to the Defendant; rather, it appears to be a case in which, in light of the principle of equity, the Plaintiff, as the person responsible for remediation of higher priority, should be permitted to seek from the Defendant, the person responsible for remediation of lower priority, the return of the portion of the instant remediation costs exceeding the Plaintiff's own portion to be borne.
2) Nevertheless, the court below, without considering the aforementioned circumstances, determined for the reasons stated in its judgment that the Plaintiff must bear the entirety of the instant remediation costs. Such determination by the court below contains an error that misunderstood the legal principles concerning "the portion borne by another person responsible for remediation" under Article 10-4(4) of the former Soil Environment Conservation Act, thereby affecting the judgment. The Plaintiff's ground of appeal pointing this out is well-founded.
4. Scope of Reversal
Where a plaintiff appeals against a judgment of the appellate court that dismissed all of several claims combined in the alternative, if the appellate court finds that the appeal with respect to any one of the alternative claims is well-founded, the judgment below must be reversed in its entirety (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 2010Da95390, decided January 19, 2012, and others). As discussed above, since the portion concerning the Plaintiff's claim for restitution of unjust enrichment is unlawful and must be reversed, the portion concerning the claim for damages based on tort, which is in an alternative relationship with the aforementioned claim, must also be reversed.
5. Conclusion
Accordingly, the judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court below for further hearing and determination, in accordance with the unanimous opinion of the Justices participating in this decision, as set forth in the Order.
Justice Eom Sang-pil (Presiding Justice), Oh Kyung-mi (Justice in charge), Kwon Young-jun, Park Young-jae