[Plaintiff, Appellant] ○○○ Labor Union (Attorneys Kwon Du-seop and 3 others of Law Firm Yeoneun, as Litigation Representative)
[Defendant, Appellee] △△ Heavy Industries Co., Ltd. (Attorneys and 6 others of Law Firm (Yuhan) Taepyeongyang, as Litigation Representative)
[Judgment Below] Busan High Court Decision 2018Na53149 decided November 14, 2018
[Order]
The appeal is dismissed. The costs of the appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiff.
[Reasoning] The grounds of appeal are examined.
1. Overview of the case and issues
A. Overview of the case
According to the reasoning of the judgment below and the evidence lawfully adopted by the court below, the following facts may be known.
1) The Defendant, a company engaged in shipbuilding and repair sales business, etc., entered into construction subcontract agreements with numerous in-house subcontractors, and the employees of those in-house subcontractors have been providing labor within the Defendant's place of business. The Plaintiff is an industry-wide labor union organized on a nationwide basis, and under it has established the △△ Heavy Industries In-house Subcontractors' Branch (hereinafter "this Branch"), whose members are employees of the Defendant's in-house subcontractors.
2) From April 11, 2016 to May 20, 2016, the Plaintiff demanded collective bargaining from the Defendant on a total of five occasions regarding matters such as the guarantee of union activities of this Branch. However, the Defendant refused this on the ground that it was not the employer under the employment contracts of the employees belonging to the in-house subcontractors, and thus did not fall under the category of employer as the counterparty to collective bargaining.
3) Accordingly, the Plaintiff filed this lawsuit against the Defendant seeking that the Defendant faithfully engage in collective bargaining regarding the eight bargaining items listed in the attached list.
B. Judgment of the court below
The court below determined that the Defendant does not fall under the category of employer bearing the duty of collective bargaining vis-à-vis the Plaintiff, and accordingly dismissed the Plaintiff's claim, on the grounds that: ① the Defendant's in-house subcontractors possessed the physical facilities necessary to perform their work, retained a substantial number of specialized personnel, and exercised substantively independent authority over matters such as attendance management and disciplinary power with respect to their own employees; ② the in-house subcontractors stationed on-site representatives at the work locations who directly directed and supervised the performance of work by their employees; and ③ work was not performed in a form in which employees of the in-house subcontractors and employees of the Defendant worked intermingled together; in light of these circumstances, it is difficult to find that an express or implied employment contract relationship was formed between the Defendant and the employees of its in-house subcontractors.
C. Statutory provisions and amendment
Article 2, Subparagraph 2 of the Act on the Establishment and Operation of Trade Unions and Labor Relations Adjustment (「노동조합 및 노동관계조정법」; hereinafter the "Trade Union Act") provided that "employer means a business owner, a person responsible for managing the business, or a person who acts on behalf of the business owner with respect to matters concerning the employees of the business." However, upon amendment by Act No. 21045 on September 9, 2025, the following second sentence was added to the same subparagraph: "In this case, even a person who is not a party to an employment contract shall also be deemed an employer, within that scope, if that person is in a position to substantially and specifically control and determine the working conditions of employees." (The Act prior to the above amendment is referred to as the "former Trade Union Act," and the Act as amended and enforced from March 10, 2026 is referred to as the "amended Trade Union Act.") Since no transitional provision was established with respect to the newly added provision, Article 2 of the former Trade Union Act applies to this case, in which performance of the duty of collective bargaining is sought on the ground of a refusal of a demand for collective bargaining made around 2016.
Meanwhile, Article 29, Paragraph 1 of the Trade Union Act provides that "the representative of a labor union has the authority to negotiate with the employer or an employer's association on behalf of the labor union or its members, and to conclude a collective agreement." Article 81, Paragraph 1, Item 3 of the Trade Union Act defines, as one type of unfair labor practice, an act by which an employer refuses or neglects, without justifiable reason, to conclude a collective agreement or otherwise engage in collective bargaining with the representative of a labor union or a person delegated by the labor union.
D. Issue in this case
The Supreme Court held, in its decisions of December 23, 1986, Case No. 85Nu856; December 22, 1995, Case No. 95Nu3565; September 5, 1997, Case No. 97Nu3644; and September 11, 2008, Case No. 2006Da40935, among others, that "an employer bearing the duty of collective bargaining" toward a labor union means "a person who is in a relationship of employment and subordination with an employee, that is, a person who has entered into an express or implied employment contract relationship with the employee for the purpose of directing and supervising the employee, receiving labor from the employee, and paying wages in return therefor." The judgment of the court below followed this precedent-based legal doctrine (hereinafter the "prior doctrine"). The issue in this case is whether the prior doctrine should be maintained, in a case to which Article 2 of the former Trade Union Act applies, with respect to the scope of "an employer bearing the duty of collective bargaining" under the Trade Union Act.
2. Judgment of the Supreme Court
A. In a case to which Article 2 of the former Trade Union Act applies, the prior doctrine regarding an employer bearing the duty of collective bargaining is valid and should be maintained. The reasons are as follows.
1) While the Supreme Court has held that an "employer" under the Trade Union Act is, in principle, a person who has entered into an express or implied employment contract relationship with an employee, it has in some cases premised its determination on the view that the scope of "employer" may be interpreted differently depending on the type of unfair labor practice at issue. With respect to "the unfair labor practice of domination or intervention" (Article 81, Paragraph 1, Item 4 of the Trade Union Act; although there have been several amendments to the Trade Union Act, including the amendment by Act No. 17432 of June 9, 2020, whereby the main text of Article 81 was changed to Article 81, Paragraph 1, and Paragraph 2 was added, the portion of Item 4 concerning "an act of dominating or intervening in a worker's organization or operation of a labor union" has not been amended; hereinafter "the unfair labor practice of domination or intervention"), the Supreme Court has held that even "a person who is in a position to substantially and specifically control and determine matters to the extent that that person can be viewed as bearing, in part, the authority and responsibility of the employer who hired the employee, with respect to the employee's basic working conditions" falls under the category of employer, and on that basis recognized that an unfair labor practice of domination or intervention by the principal contractor company was established with respect to the labor union activities of employees of in-house subcontractors (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2007Du8881, decided March 25, 2010). By contrast, in cases in which the issue was whether an unfair labor practice of "adverse treatment" (Article 81, Paragraph 1, Item 1 of the Trade Union Act; hereinafter "the unfair labor practice of adverse treatment") by a principal contractor company against employees of an in-house subcontractor was established, the Supreme Court held that an employer could be recognized as such only where an implied employment contract relationship had been formed with the employee (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2007Du9068, decided March 25, 2010).
2) In the case of the unfair labor practice of domination or intervention, even a person who has not directly entered into an employment contract, etc. with an employee, but who is in a position to substantially and specifically control and determine the employee's basic working conditions, may infringe upon the three labor rights through the factual act of domination or intervention; accordingly, the Supreme Court expanded the concept of "employer" with respect to the unfair labor practice of domination or intervention, from the perspective of the unfair labor practice system, which aims to prevent and remove infringements of the three labor rights. By contrast, in the case of "the unfair labor practice of refusal of collective bargaining" (Article 81, Paragraph 1, Item 3 of the Trade Union Act; hereinafter "the unfair labor practice of refusal of collective bargaining"), since collective bargaining presupposes the conclusion of a collective agreement for the purpose of maintaining and improving working conditions, etc. pertaining to contractual relationships such as employment contracts, the scope of an employer bearing the duty of collective bargaining is inevitably closely related to whether an individual employment contract relationship exists between the employee and the employer. In light of this, caution is required in interpreting a principal contractor company as bearing not only passive obligations, such as the obligation not to dominate or intervene with respect to the labor union of employees of an in-house subcontractor, but also an active obligation to engage in collective bargaining for the purpose of concluding a collective agreement. Therefore, it is difficult to interpret the text of Article 2, Subparagraph 2 of the former Trade Union Act as including, within the concept of "employer" as used throughout the Trade Union Act, "a person who is in a position to substantially and specifically control and determine the working conditions of an employee even though not a party to an employment contract."
3) Moreover, Article 90 of the Trade Union Act provides for criminal punishment of a person who commits an unfair labor practice by imprisonment for not more than two years or a fine not exceeding twenty million won, and since being "an employer bearing the duty of collective bargaining" is included among the elements of the unfair labor practice of refusal of collective bargaining, there is also a need, under the principle of nulla poena sine lege, to strictly interpret Article 2 of the former Trade Union Act with respect to the concept of "an employer bearing the duty of collective bargaining."
4) Furthermore, examining the content and background of the recent amendment to the Trade Union Act, since the reasons for the amendment state that "a person who is in a position to substantially and specifically control and determine an employee's working conditions is included within the concept of employer, so that the three labor rights may be effectively guaranteed," it is clear that the legislature, on the premise of respecting the Supreme Court's prior doctrine, made a legislative decision to amend the Act by adding the second sentence of Article 2, Subparagraph 2 in order to expand the concept of employer.
5) Since the essence of the judicial function is to provide relief of rights in specific cases, courts may not declare abstract legal doctrine unrelated to a specific case. It is sufficient for courts to respect the above legislative decision and the intent of the legislature in not enacting a transitional provision, and to interpret the concept of "a person who is in a position to substantially and specifically control and determine an employee's working conditions" in accordance with the legislative purpose of effectively guaranteeing the three labor rights, in future specific cases to which the amended Trade Union Act applies. Nevertheless, it cannot be deemed appropriate to attempt to change the prior doctrine and to create and apply a legal doctrine substantially similar in content to the provisions of the amended Trade Union Act, with respect to a collective bargaining matter from around 2016 to which the former Trade Union Act applies.
B. In light of the aforementioned prior doctrine and the evidence lawfully adopted by the court below, since an express or implied employment contract relationship cannot be recognized between the Defendant and the employees of the in-house subcontractors, there is no error in the judgment below, which found that the Defendant does not fall under the category of employer bearing the duty of collective bargaining vis-à-vis the Plaintiff, in violating the principle of logic and experience so as to exceed the limits of the principle of free evaluation of evidence, or in misunderstanding the legal doctrine concerning employer and collective bargaining, etc. under the former Trade Union Act, such as to have affected the judgment.
3. Conclusion
The appeal is dismissed, and the costs of the appeal are to be borne by the losing party, and it is so decided in accordance with the Order. This judgment is unanimous among the participating Justices, except for the dissenting opinion of Justice Lee Heung-gu, Justice Oh Kyung-mi, Justice Shin Suk-hee, and Justice Ma Yong-ju, and there is a concurring opinion of Justice Lee Sook-yeon with respect to the majority opinion.
4. Dissenting opinion of Justice Lee Heung-gu, Justice Oh Kyung-mi, Justice Shin Suk-hee, and Justice Ma Yong-ju
A. Summary of the dissenting opinion
An "employer" under the former Trade Union Act, including Article 2, Subparagraph 2 thereof, basically means not only a person who has entered into an express or implied employment contract relationship with an employee under the Trade Union Act, but also the counterparty to a contract for the provision of labor other than an employment contract; however, it is not limited thereto. In light of Article 33 of the Constitution and the legislative purpose of the former Trade Union Act, which is to promote the maintenance and improvement of working conditions (including "conditions for the provision of labor" with respect to employees under the Trade Union Act; the same applies hereinafter) and the improvement of the economic and social status of employees by guaranteeing employees the three labor rights, including the right to collective bargaining, even in the absence of such a contractual relationship, if a person who carries out a business by means of a subcontract, etc. (hereinafter "principal contractor") is in a position to substantially and specifically control and determine the working conditions of the employees of a subcontractor (including a person who has entered into a contract for the provision of labor, such as an employment contract, with the subcontractor, and who falls under the category of employee under the Trade Union Act; hereinafter "subcontracted employees") who provide all or part of their labor within the principal contractor's place of business, then, absent special circumstances, that person falls under the category of employer under the former Trade Union Act bearing the duty of collective bargaining vis-à-vis the labor union of the subcontracted employees.
In this respect, we disagree with the majority opinion, which holds that, in a case to which Article 2 of the former Trade Union Act applies, an employer bearing the duty of collective bargaining is limited to a person who has entered into an express or implied employment contract relationship, thereby excluding from this category a person who has entered into a contract for the provision of labor other than an employment contract with an employee under the Trade Union Act, or a principal contractor who is in a position to substantially and specifically control and determine the working conditions of subcontracted employees. The specific reasons are as follows.
B. Grounds for and validity of determining employer status based on control
1) Direct normative force of the Constitution guaranteeing the three labor rights
Article 33, Paragraph 1 of the Constitution guarantees the three labor rights as fundamental rights by providing that "workers shall have the right to independent association, collective bargaining, and collective action for the purpose of improving working conditions." The purpose of the Constitution's guarantee of the three labor rights as fundamental rights is to enable employees to conclude collective agreements autonomously through collective bargaining on an equal footing with employers, thereby realizing substantive autonomy of labor and management with respect to working conditions (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 2016Da248998, decided August 27, 2020). In particular, in light of the purpose of the three labor rights, which is the improvement of working conditions, the right to collective bargaining is the most central right among the three labor rights (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 90Do357, decided May 15, 1990), and therefore, in determining whether a person falls under the category of employer bearing the duty of collective bargaining, the purpose and intent of the Constitution's direct guarantee of the three labor rights must be taken into account.
2) Necessity of determining the counterparty to collective bargaining for the effective guarantee of the three labor rights
Working conditions that have an important effect on employees, such as industrial accidents and health issues, are not limited to matters pertaining to the employment contract relationship. This is particularly true where an employee of a subcontractor who falls under the category of employee under the Trade Union Act provides all or part of his or her labor within the place of business of the principal contractor. In such a case, the place of business of the principal contractor becomes the very place where the subcontracted employee works, and the manner in which the subcontracted employee provides labor is also structurally constrained by the manner in which the principal contractor conducts its business; accordingly, there is a high likelihood that the subcontractor is not in a position to solely control and determine, in whole or in part, the factors that significantly affect the working conditions of the subcontracted employees. Where such a likelihood is realized, the subcontractor has, in fact, no or insufficient decision-making authority with respect to the maintenance and improvement of at least the relevant working conditions. In such a case, it is only when a labor union composed of subcontracted employees is able to engage directly in collective bargaining with the principal contractor, who is evaluated as being equivalent to directly determining all or part of the specific content of the relevant working conditions by, for example, controlling them, that the three labor rights of subcontracted employees can be effectively guaranteed.
3) Necessity of a unified interpretation of the concept of employer under the former Trade Union Act
The meaning of "employer" as used in the various provisions of the former Trade Union Act needs to be interpreted uniformly, in consideration of its relationship with Article 33 of the Constitution, the consistency of the statute, and the need for uniform regulation. The former Trade Union Act, in Article 2, Subparagraph 2, defines "employer" as "a business owner, a person responsible for managing the business, or a person who acts on behalf of the business owner with respect to matters concerning the employees of the business," as a term running throughout the entire Act; and Article 81, Paragraph 1 of the Trade Union Act, which concerns "unfair labor practices," provides that "an employer shall not engage in any of the following acts," and then classifies the types of unfair labor practices in Items 1 through 5, without defining the concept of employer differently for each type. There is no basis for concluding that the legislature contemplated and legislated different concepts of "employer" depending on the type of unfair labor practice. Just as the concept of "employee" defined in Article 2, Subparagraph 1 of the Trade Union Act is no different from the concept of "employee" as the object of an employer's unfair labor practice, "employer" under Article 2, Subparagraph 2 of the former Trade Union Act and "employer" as the subject of unfair labor practices likewise cannot differ. The Supreme Court has already held that "a person who is in a position to substantially and specifically control and determine matters to the extent that that person can be viewed as bearing, in part, the authority and responsibility of the employer who hired the employee, with respect to the employee's basic working conditions" falls under the category of employer bearing liability for unfair labor practices under Article 81, Paragraph 1, Item 4 of the Trade Union Act (see the above Supreme Court Decision 2007Du8881). There is no logical necessity to limit this to "employer" under Item 4 of the same paragraph alone. The purport of the above Supreme Court Decision 2007Du8881 can be directly connected to the interpretation of the concept of "employer" under Article 2, Subparagraph 2 of the former Trade Union Act as well.
4) The connection between the concept of employer and the concept of employee under the former Trade Union Act
In order to grasp the meaning of "employer" uniformly throughout the entire former Trade Union Act, this must be examined in connection with the concept of "employee" under the Trade Union Act. This is because the former concept and the latter concept are essentially connected through the medium of the labor union and collective bargaining system under the Trade Union Act, and thus cannot be grasped separately. Examining the overall structure and content of the former Trade Union Act, the employer under the former Trade Union Act must be understood uniformly, throughout the entire former Trade Union Act, as an entity corresponding to the concept of employee, who is the subject organizing and operating a labor union, and as the counterparty to collective bargaining demanded by the labor union to which the relevant employee belongs.
A) An "employee" under the Trade Union Act is "a person who lives on wages, salary, or other income equivalent thereto, regardless of the type of occupation (Article 2, Subparagraph 1)," and is also the subject who organizes and operates a labor union (Article 2, Subparagraph 4; Article 5). The fact that a certain person providing labor is recognized as an employee under the Trade Union Act means that that person may organize or join a labor union, and that labor union may demand collective bargaining, designating as the employer under the former Trade Union Act the business owner to whom the relevant employee provides labor (see Articles 5, 29, and 30 of the Trade Union Act). Ultimately, whether a certain business owner falls under the category of employer under the former Trade Union Act is determined in conjunction with whether the person providing labor to that business owner is recognized as an employee under the Trade Union Act. If the relevant person providing labor falls under the category of employee under the Trade Union Act, the business owner becomes the counterparty, as employer under the former Trade Union Act, in collective bargaining demanded by the labor union to which the relevant employee belongs, has the obligation to faithfully engage in such bargaining (Article 30 of the Trade Union Act), and becomes subject to the prohibition order against unfair labor practices under Article 81 of the Trade Union Act.
B) Within the overall structure and content of the former Trade Union Act, the concept of employer is firmly established as premised upon the existence of employees who organize labor unions and, through them, demand collective bargaining. The former Trade Union Act, in Chapters 2 and 3, provides for matters necessary for employees to organize and operate labor unions, as well as the procedures for a labor union to negotiate with an employer and conclude a collective agreement, and the effect of a collective agreement; in Chapters 4 and 5, it provides for the authority and obligations held by a labor union and an employer when a labor dispute arises, and the procedures for arbitration of labor disputes; and following that, in Chapters 6 through 8, it provides for provisions concerning unfair labor practices prohibited to employers, remedial procedures before the Labor Relations Commission, and penal provisions. In the provisions preceding Chapter 6 (concerning unfair labor practices), the term "employer" as used throughout the former Trade Union Act is regulated solely as "the counterparty to a demand for collective bargaining by a labor union organized by employees under the Trade Union Act, or a party to a labor dispute resulting therefrom." Accordingly, it is reasonable to understand "employer" as used in Chapter 6 of the former Trade Union Act, entitled "Unfair Labor Practices," in a unified sense as an extension thereof.
C) From this perspective, the criteria for recognizing employee status under the Trade Union Act that the Supreme Court presented in recognizing the status of home-study tutors and automobile salespersons (car masters) as employees under the Trade Union Act may serve as an important guide in interpreting the meaning of "employer" under the former Trade Union Act. That is, Supreme Court Decisions 2014Du12598 and 12604 (consolidated), decided June 15, 2018, and 2019Du33712, decided June 13, 2019, among others, held to the effect that "in light of the legislative purpose of the Trade Union Act, which was enacted to promote the maintenance and improvement of working conditions and the improvement of the economic and social status of employees, etc. through the constitutional guarantee of employees' three labor rights, as well as the provisions defining 'employee,' whether a person falls under the category of employee under the Trade Union Act must be determined from the perspective of whether there is a need to guarantee the three labor rights in light of the substance of the labor-provision relationship, and is not necessarily limited to employees under the Labor Standards Act." Accordingly, the meaning of "employer" under the former Trade Union Act, corresponding to "employee" under the Trade Union Act, must likewise be grasped from the perspective of who holds the position and authority to substantively guarantee and realize the three labor rights, in light of the substance of the labor-provision relationship.
5) The direction of Supreme Court decisions and the task of the era in guaranteeing the three labor rights
The Supreme Court has developed its legal doctrine in a direction that protects employees and substantively guarantees the three labor rights in new types of labor-provision relationships, in response to changes in actual labor conditions. Precedent has recognized employee status under the Trade Union Act in various types of labor-provision contractual relationships, and has recognized liability for unfair labor practices under Article 81, Paragraph 1, Item 4 of the Trade Union Act on the part of a principal contractor in a three-party relationship involving a principal contractor, a subcontractor, and a subcontracted employee; this has been recognized as legitimate as a constitutionally conforming method of interpretation for the substantive guarantee of the three labor rights. The concept of employer under Article 2, Subparagraph 2 of the former Trade Union Act, which is at issue in a three-party relationship as in this case, likewise needs to be grasped consistently, as an extension of this direction, together with the legal doctrine developed with respect to special statutes regulating new types of labor-provision relationships, such as the Act on the Protection, Etc. of Dispatched Workers (「파견근로자 보호 등에 관한 법률」; hereinafter the "Dispatched Workers Act"). This holds true even before the enforcement of the amended Trade Union Act, which confirms that employer status under the Trade Union Act may be recognized even in the absence of a direct employment contract relationship.
A) Since the 1990s, outsourcing of work has spread across various industrial sectors, and indirect employment, such as in-house subcontracting, has rapidly increased, giving rise to various new types of employees. First, there are persons in a two-party relationship who directly enter into a labor-provision contract with a business owner and live on the consideration received therefrom. These are a special type of employee possessing both the characteristics of a traditional employee and those of a self-employed person. Meanwhile, as a typical example of indirect employment, there are persons who belong to a subcontractor (contractor) of a business owner (principal contractor) and who provide labor at the principal contractor's place of business, while economically dependent on the principal contractor. Between business owners and employees in such two-party or three-party relationships, a practice of negotiating working conditions has failed to develop, and as a result, substantive guarantees of the three labor rights have weakened, and workplaces with poor working conditions have increased.
B) In response to such labor realities, the Supreme Court recognized home-study tutors, who had provided labor under consignment business contracts rather than employment contracts, as employees under the Trade Union Act, and held that a claim for remedy could be filed with respect to the termination of a consignment business contract, not only as an unfair labor practice under Article 81, Paragraph 1, Item 4 of the Trade Union Act, but also as an unfair labor practice of adverse treatment under Item 1 (the above Supreme Court Decisions 2014Du12598 and 12604, consolidated); and made determinations in the same vein with respect to broadcast performers (Supreme Court Decision 2015Du38092, decided October 12, 2018) and designated driver service drivers (Supreme Court Decision 2020Da267491, decided September 27, 2024). Through this legal doctrine, precedent effectively recognized the business owner corresponding to the relevant person providing labor as an employer under Article 2, Subparagraph 2 of the former Trade Union Act; accordingly, the prior doctrine on the concept of employer under the former Trade Union Act—namely, the view that only "a person who has entered into an express or implied employment contract relationship with an employee" falls under the category of employer under the former Trade Union Act bearing the duty of collective bargaining vis-à-vis a labor union—has, in effect, already been changed with respect to such two-party relationships as described above.
[Reasoning] (continued)
다. (c) The Supreme Court has maintained this same direction even in cases involving three-party relationships. In a case where in-house subcontracted workers—who, despite being able to raise demands regarding working conditions against subcontractors with whom they had a direct contractual relationship, were nevertheless placed in a vulnerable position where their rights were not substantially guaranteed—asserted that they held the status of employees of the principal contractor on the basis of the Act on the Protection, etc. of Temporary Agency Workers (파견법, hereinafter the "Dispatch Act"), enacted on February 20, 1998, the Supreme Court recognized that because the workers belonging to the in-house subcontractor were in a worker dispatch relationship, they were deemed, pursuant to the Dispatch Act, to have been directly employed as employees of the principal contractor (see Supreme Court Decision 2008Du4367, decided July 22, 2010). Around the same period, in the area of collective labor relations law, the Supreme Court rendered Decision 2007Du8881, holding that, with respect to liability for unfair labor practices under Article 81(1)(4) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act (노동조합법, hereinafter the "Trade Union Act"), a person who is in a position to substantially and concretely control and determine matters concerning the basic working conditions of a worker, to the extent that such person can be regarded as bearing, in part, the authority and responsibility of an employer who has hired that worker, falls within the meaning of "employer"—which reflects the same line of reasoning. As new Supreme Court doctrine has developed on the basis of the enforcement of special statutes such as the Dispatch Act since the prior doctrine was rendered, and as this development inevitably affects the doctrine concerning collective labor relations, it must be concluded that the prior doctrine has lost both the logical consistency needed to sustain it and the concrete reasonableness required to conform to the spirit of the Constitution. In interpreting the Trade Union Act, there cannot exist separately a concept of "employer" applicable to two-party relationships and a distinct concept of "employer" applicable to three-party relationships. The present labor reality demands that the Supreme Court resolve the task of establishing a concept of "employer" under the former Trade Union Act (구 노동조합법) that can be applied consistently across the board, encompassing not only two-party relationships but also three-party relationships.
다. Criticism of the Grounds for the Majority Opinion
1) The majority opinion is untenable in that, in grasping the meaning of "employer" under Article 2(2) of the former Trade Union Act, it fails to give sufficient consideration to the fact that the three labor rights (노동3권) are not rights that can be realized only through State intervention in the form of legislative enactment, but are concrete rights capable of directly taking effect as legal norms based solely on the constitutional provisions, even in the absence of a statute (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 2016Du32992, decided September 3, 2020). The majority opinion's position—that it is textually impossible under the former Trade Union Act to interpret "employer," who bears the duty of collective bargaining, as including a third party not in a direct employment relationship, that this is a matter properly left to legislation, and that, interpreting the intent of the legislature that recently amended Article 2(2) of the Trade Union Act, the "employer" under the former Trade Union Act is limited to a person who has directly entered into an employment contract with the worker—stems from that very stance. This amounts to treating the right to collective bargaining, one of the three labor rights, which has the force of legal norms based solely on constitutional provisions, as though it were a right that takes shape only pending specific legislation, in accordance with the content of such legislation. Since it is difficult for the legislature to anticipate in advance the changes in the labor environment and the diversity of employment forms and to enact labor-related statutes accordingly, there is also a need to interpret statutes in a manner that effectively guarantees the three labor rights in keeping with the changing labor environment.
2) If, as the majority opinion does, the prior doctrine—namely, the theory of express or implied employment contractual relationship—is adopted, it becomes impossible to maintain consistency, free of contradiction, with the doctrine set forth in the above-mentioned Supreme Court Decisions 2014Du12598, 12604, and others.
가) The majority opinion appears to proceed on the premise that the concepts of "employer" under each subparagraph of Article 81(1) of the Trade Union Act differ from one another, and on that basis to regard the concept of "employer" as the subject of the unfair labor practice of refusal to bargain collectively under subparagraph 3 as identical to the concept of "employer" under Article 2(2) of the former Trade Union Act. Proceeding from this premise, the majority opinion, in relation to the above-mentioned Supreme Court Decision 2007Du9068, compares the unfair labor practice of domination or interference as a factual act with the unfair labor practice of refusal to bargain collectively, stating that while a business owner who has not directly entered into an employment contract, etc. with the worker may be the subject of the former, this is not so for the latter. The majority opinion gives as its reason the fact that collective bargaining, the object of the unfair labor practice of refusal to bargain collectively, "presupposes the conclusion of a collective agreement for the maintenance and improvement of working conditions relating to a contractual relationship such as an employment contract." However, this majority opinion view contains a contradiction: while holding that only "a person who has an express or implied employment contractual relationship with the worker" falls within the meaning of "employer" under Article 2(2) of the former Trade Union Act, who bears the duty of collective bargaining, it nevertheless premises the meaning of "employer" in the unfair labor practice of refusal to bargain collectively on "a person who has a direct contractual relationship such as an employment contract, etc." This is because "a direct contractual relationship such as an employment contract, etc." is a broader concept that, in addition to "express or implied employment contractual relationships," also includes labor-service contractual relationships such as commission contracts.
나) The reason this contradiction has arisen appears to be related to the fact that the above-mentioned precedents, such as Supreme Court Decisions 2014Du12598 and 12604, have already recognized worker status under the Trade Union Act in labor-service contractual relationships such as commission contracts. Because of this doctrine, it has become impossible to explain, without logical contradiction, the scope of "employer" under the former Trade Union Act against whom a trade union to which the relevant worker belongs may demand collective bargaining, by means of the "express or implied employment contractual relationship" theory.
3) The majority opinion, which adheres to the theory of express or implied employment contractual relationship, is difficult to view as reflecting a constitutionally conforming interpretation of the statute aimed at effectively guaranteeing workers' three labor rights in keeping with the changing labor environment. This runs counter to the stance and direction of precedent, which has expanded the concept of "worker" under the Trade Union Act and the concept of "employer" under Article 81(1)(4) of the Trade Union Act, and it is also difficult to maintain consistency with precedent, which, since the enactment of the Dispatch Act, has applied the doctrine of the Dispatch Act to the three-party relationships, etc., in which workers belonging to subcontractors find themselves.
가) As noted above, since the 1990s, as indirect employment such as in-house subcontracting has rapidly increased, labor relationships have changed from the traditional two-party relationship to three-party or multi-party relationships. Against that background, the Dispatch Act came into force with respect to three-party relationships, the above-mentioned Supreme Court Decision 2007Du8881 expanded the scope of "employer" bearing liability for unfair labor practices under Article 81(1)(4) of the Trade Union Act, and, through the above-mentioned Supreme Court Decisions 2014Du12598, 12604, and others, the concept of "worker" under the Trade Union Act was expanded, even in two-party relationships, so as not to be confined to employment contractual relationships—doctrinal changes that have accompanied these developments. As a result, the prior doctrine, which held that "employer," who bears the duty of collective bargaining, is limited to a person having an express or implied employment contractual relationship, can no longer be sustained.
나) The precedents that articulated the prior doctrine concerned matters unrelated to the three-party (multi-party) labor relationships that have thus changed as described above, and have thereby lost their significance as precedent applicable to the problems arising in the labor reality that has evolved into three-party (multi-party) relationships. This is all the more so given that, in connection with the Dispatch Act, through the accumulation of doctrine—such as in the above-mentioned Supreme Court Decision 2008Du4367—recognizing that workers belonging to subcontractors are deemed to have been directly employed as employees of the principal contractor, or recognizing the principal contractor's duty of direct employment, a situation has arisen in which even a user company that has not directly entered into an employment contract with a dispatched worker is recognized, with respect to certain matters, as the employer of the dispatched worker. It may also be understood, as an extension of this trend, that recently the Labor Relations Commission and numerous first- and second-instance courts—including the Seoul High Court Decision 2023Nu34646, decided January 24, 2024, and the Seoul Administrative Court Decision 2022Guhap69230, decided July 25, 2025—have adopted the substantial control theory, actively interpreting the scope of "employer" under the former Trade Union Act bearing the duty of collective bargaining. These decisions of the Labor Relations Commission and the first- and second-instance judgments applied, in three-party relationships, the purport of the above-mentioned precedent under Supreme Court Decisions 2014Du12598, 12604, and others concerning two-party relationships, in order to strengthen the guarantee of the three labor rights in keeping with the changing labor reality, in which various forms of outsourcing, such as freelance contracts and commission contracts, are accelerating in two-party relationships and indirect employment is expanding. This is an instance of a constitutionally conforming interpretation of the text of the provisions of the former Trade Union Act, within the bounds of the spirit of the Constitution, and the amended Trade Union Act merely reflects and clarifies this statutory interpretation by the Labor Relations Commission and the lower courts, rather than constituting an entirely new piece of legislation. It is not unusual for the legislature to codify, by way of statutory amendment, doctrine that the courts have declared through constitutionally conforming interpretation. For example, the proviso to Article 94(1) of the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법), which requires the collective consent of workers for a disadvantageous change to the rules of employment, was first codified in the proviso to Article 95(1) of the Labor Standards Act as amended by Act No. 4099 on March 29, 1989; this is a representative example of legislation that confirmed, in statutory form, the doctrine that the Supreme Court had, even before that amendment—when the Labor Standards Act contained no explicit provision on the matter—declared through constitutionally conforming interpretation based on the protective spirit and legislative purpose of the Labor Standards Act, as in Supreme Court Decision 77Da355, decided July 26, 1977, and others. The case of the proviso to Article 1008 of the Civil Code (민법), recently amended by Act No. 21454 and enforced from March 17, 2026, is likewise an example. This provision excludes the application of the main text of Article 1008 of the Civil Code, to the extent corresponding to the contribution, where, among co-heirs, a person who received a gift or testamentary gift of property from the decedent made such inter vivos gift, etc., as compensation for a contribution such as having provided special support to the decedent. This statutory amendment is a case in which the doctrine declared in Supreme Court Decision 2021Da230083, 230090, decided March 17, 2022, was confirmed and codified.
다) The majority opinion emphasizes only the point that the prior doctrine does not contradict or conflict with the precedent that expanded the meaning of "employer" as the subject of unfair labor practices under Article 81(1)(4) of the Trade Union Act. Content with such a merely negative demonstration, the majority opinion turns a blind eye to the substantial conflict between the prior doctrine and the above-mentioned Supreme Court Decision 2014Du12598, 12604, and the precedent relating to the Dispatch Act. In particular, we cannot but ask the majority opinion whether, even in a three-party relationship where the Dispatch Act applies and a duty of direct employment is recognized, it takes the view that a demand for collective bargaining by a trade union to which a dispatched worker belongs, directed against a user company that has failed to fulfill its duty of direct employment, cannot be accepted. The majority opinion, bearing such limitations, would render meaningless the achievement of the Labor Relations Commission and numerous lower courts, which recently, in response to the vigorous efforts of workers who have knocked on the doors of the judiciary asserting the effective guarantee of the three labor rights, adopted the substantial control theory on the basis of a constitutionally conforming interpretation of the concept of "employer" under Article 2(2) of the former Trade Union Act; for this reason, we cannot agree with the majority opinion.
4) The majority opinion is untenable in that it denies the duty of collective bargaining of a contracting business owner (도급 사업주) even with respect to matters as to which the legislature, in individual statutes, has imposed on a contracting business owner who has not directly entered into an employment contract with a subcontracted worker (수급근로자) a duty to protect the subcontracted worker, premised on the position of the contracting business owner being able to substantially and concretely control and determine certain working conditions of the subcontracted worker.
가) Article 29(1) of the former Occupational Safety and Health Act (산업안전보건법, before its full amendment by Act No. 16272 on January 15, 2019, hereinafter the "former Occupational Safety and Health Act") imposes on a business owner who subcontracts a part of its business or the entirety of a specialized construction work, in a case where its own workers and the workers of the subcontractor perform work at the same location, a duty to take measures for the prevention of industrial accidents. The imposition of such a duty on the contracting business owner takes into account the fact that the business owner has the ability and duty to oversee and coordinate the overall progress of the business (see Supreme Court Decision 2015Do8621, decided March 24, 2016; Supreme Court Decision 2021Do17523, decided August 31, 2022, and others). This being so, it may be said that the legislature, through the former Occupational Safety and Health Act, imposed the duty to take measures for the prevention of industrial accidents on the premise that, when workers of the contracting business owner and subcontracted workers perform work at the same location, the contracting business owner has the ability to oversee and coordinate matters concerning industrial accidents and safety-related working conditions at that location, and is thereby in a position to substantially control and determine such matters.
나) The majority opinion, in failing to recognize a duty of collective bargaining even with respect to matters concerning industrial safety, as to which the former Occupational Safety and Health Act imposed a duty on the contracting business owner premised on that owner's substantial control, disregards the legislative purpose of such provisions and their consistency with individual statutes. Furthermore, such individual statutes do not create, as an exception, matters over which a contracting business owner has substantial control, but merely provide concrete illustrations thereof; accordingly, it is proper to interpret the former Trade Union Act and individual statutes consistently and to determine the concept of "employer" according to substantial control.
5) The majority opinion criticizes the dissenting opinion on the grounds that it merely declares abstract doctrine, or that it creates doctrine substantially similar to that under the amended Trade Union Act. However, the dissenting opinion does not declare abstract doctrine, but presents doctrine to be applied in this specific case. Even if it may be said that, with respect to disputes that will arise in the future, the ambiguity of the concept of "employer" has been resolved through the amended Trade Union Act, the issue in this case—namely, whether it may be recognized that the Defendant bears a duty of collective bargaining—remains a matter subject to judicial remedy and requires a determination on this point. The dissenting opinion presents doctrine to resolve this case, while taking the position that, in light of the fact that the three labor rights are concrete rights that take effect directly as legal norms, such doctrine remains the same regardless of whether it is before or after the amendment of the Trade Union Act; accordingly, the above criticism by the majority opinion is untenable.
6) The majority opinion states that Article 2 of the former Trade Union Act needs to be strictly interpreted because of the risk of criminal punishment. However, the Supreme Court has already expanded the concept of "employer" with respect to the unfair labor practice of domination or interference, which is likewise subject to criminal punishment. With respect to the unfair labor practice of refusal to bargain collectively, the characteristic feature of refusal to bargain collectively directed against a worker with whom there is no direct contractual relationship may be taken into account at the stage of determining whether there is a justifiable reason for the refusal to bargain collectively, or at the stage of determining intent with respect to the unfair labor practice; accordingly, it is untenable to interpret the three labor rights restrictively solely on the basis of the risk of criminal punishment.
라. The Meaning of a Position Enabling Substantial and Concrete Control and Determination over the Working Conditions of a Subcontracted Worker
1) A contracting party's position enabling it to substantially and concretely control and determine the working conditions of a subcontracted worker is recognized where the contracting party can, in effect, unilaterally determine a factor that has a substantial influence on the working conditions of the subcontracted worker relating to the matters as to which the trade union of the subcontracted worker has demanded bargaining, such that this may be evaluated as equivalent to the contracting party being able to directly determine, even in part, the concrete content of the relevant working condition; and further, where, in light of the substance of the economic dependence of the subcontracted worker on the contracting party as it appears in the labor-service relationship among the subcontracted worker, the subcontractor, and the contracting party, there is a need, in order to guarantee the subcontracted worker's three labor rights, to impose on the contracting party as well a duty of collective bargaining with respect to the relevant bargaining matter.
2) More specifically, in order for it to be evaluated as equivalent to the contracting party being able to directly determine, even in part, the content of the subcontracted worker's working conditions relating to the bargaining matter, it is required that the contracting party be able to unilaterally determine a factor that has a substantial influence on the relevant working condition, or, even if not, be able to make a determination that is, in effect, binding on the subcontractor. This must be determined by considering the structure and manner in which the worker's working conditions and the factors influencing them are determined and controlled; the existence and degree of a relationship of work-related direction and supervision between the contracting party and the subcontracted worker; whether the subcontractor has authority to manage or change the place where the subcontracted worker provides labor; whether the subcontractor possesses an independent business organization or facilities necessary to achieve the purpose of the contract; the proportion that transactions with the contracting party occupy in the subcontractor's overall transactions; whether the subcontractor, even if unable to transact with the contracting party, can gain access to the market and maintain the scale of its transactions; and the manner and criteria by which the contracting party enters into re-contracts or renewal contracts with the subcontractor. Further, whether there is a need to impose a duty of collective bargaining on the contracting party as well, in order to guarantee the three labor rights, must be determined comprehensively by considering, in addition to the circumstances relating to the subcontractor's economic dependence on the contracting party as enumerated above: whether there exists, among the factors relating to the relevant working condition, something that the subcontractor can determine unilaterally; if such a factor exists, whether it nonetheless fails to have a substantial influence on the subcontracted worker's relevant working condition, or whether it is difficult to expect the maintenance or improvement of the relevant working condition merely by altering that factor alone; whether, owing to a structure in which the contracting party side determines and controls such matters, the subcontractor's discretion to determine the relevant working condition is inherently restricted; and whether the subcontracted worker is incorporated into the contracting party's business and provides, to a substantial degree, labor that is continuous and exclusive and essential to the performance of that business. However, circumstances such as whether a relationship of work-related direction and supervision exists between the contracting party and the subcontracted worker, or whether the subcontracted worker may be regarded as having been substantially incorporated into the contracting party's business, are, in principle, matters relevant to the determination of the existence of an individual employment relationship, and are merely circumstances that increase the likelihood that the contracting party is in a position to substantially and concretely control and determine the subcontracted worker's working conditions; accordingly, the absence of such circumstances alone should not be used readily to deny "employer" status bearing the duty of collective bargaining.
마. Necessity of Changing Precedent
Precedent following the prior doctrine, which, contrary to the foregoing, held that only a person having an express or implied employment contractual relationship with a worker can fall within the meaning of "employer" bearing the duty of collective bargaining—namely, Supreme Court Decision 85Nu856, decided December 23, 1986; Supreme Court Decision 95Nu3565, decided December 22, 1995; Supreme Court Decision 97Nu3644, decided September 5, 1997; Supreme Court Decision 2006Da40935, decided September 11, 2008; as well as decisions to the same effect—should be changed to the extent that they conflict with the view set forth above.
바. Resolution of This Case
1) Facts Common to All Bargaining Matters
According to the reasoning of the judgment below and the evidence that the court below lawfully adopted, it can be seen that the workers belonging to the Defendant's in-house subcontractors, within the Defendant's shipyard, which operates the business of shipbuilding, etc., or within the Defendant's business premises, such as the ships that the Defendant builds, over which the Defendant exercises facility management rights, provided, in a continuous and exclusive manner through the in-house subcontractors, labor essential to the Defendant's shipbuilding, etc., under a structure controlled in accordance with the shipbuilding plans established by the Defendant, using the equipment and materials, etc., provided by the Defendant, and that the work performed within the Defendant's business premises by the workers belonging to the in-house subcontractors and the workers belonging to the Defendant was carried out in a closely interlinked manner.
2) The Scope of Matters as to which the Defendant Bears a Duty of Collective Bargaining
가) Matters concerning the industrial safety and disaster compensation of union members (Item 2 of the attached list)
As a shipbuilding business owner, the Defendant subcontracted a part of its business, causing the Defendant's own workers and the workers of the in-house subcontractors, who are the Plaintiff's union members, to perform work at the same location; accordingly, the Defendant is a contracting business owner who, pursuant to Article 29(1) and (3) of the former Occupational Safety and Health Act, bears a duty to take measures for the prevention of industrial accidents arising when its own employed workers and the workers of the in-house subcontractors perform work at the same location. As noted above, since the legislature, through the former Occupational Safety and Health Act, imposed the duty to take measures for the prevention of industrial accidents on the premise that a contracting business owner is in a position to substantially control and determine working conditions relating to industrial accidents and safety, it may be said that, with respect to the matters set forth in Item 2 of the attached list, the Defendant is in a position to substantially and concretely control and determine matters concerning the workers of the in-house subcontractors who are the Plaintiff's union members. Accordingly, it must be held that the Defendant bears a duty to engage in good-faith collective bargaining with the Plaintiff with respect to the above bargaining matter.
나) Matters concerning employment security (Item 3 of the attached list)
(1) Under the former Trade Union Act, whether to implement corporate restructuring, such as layoffs for managerial reasons or the merger or consolidation of business organizations, is a matter belonging to a high-level managerial decision by the management body and, in principle, cannot be the subject of collective bargaining (see Supreme Court Decision 99Do5380, decided February 26, 2002). Meanwhile, Article 2(5) of the amended Trade Union Act was amended to add, to the definition of "labor dispute," a state of dispute arising from disagreement in assertions concerning "a business management decision affecting working conditions"; however, since the demand for collective bargaining at issue in this case occurred around 2016, the former Trade Union Act applies to this case.
(2) Item 3 of the attached list is described as "matters concerning employment security"; however, even upon examining the written submissions filed up to the date the oral argument at the court below was concluded, it is not clear whether such matter is asserted as a bargaining matter concerning the decision itself regarding the restructuring—namely, the merger or consolidation of a particular process or duty of the Defendant and the resulting increase or decrease in the number of workers—or whether it is asserted as a bargaining matter concerning consultation on measures to avoid dismissal, in the event that dismissals occur at the subcontractor as a result of such restructuring.
(3) Accordingly, the court below should have clearly examined what content the Plaintiff was asserting with respect to this bargaining matter, and then examined whether it is a matter that can be the subject of collective bargaining, and, if it is a matter that can be the subject of collective bargaining, whether it falls within a matter that the Defendant can substantially and concretely control and determine.
다) Matters concerning employment security and the succession of working conditions such as seniority in the event of closure of a subcontractor's business (Item 7 of the attached list)
(1) This bargaining matter concerns a request that, in the event a subcontractor closes its business or is changed for reasons such as the Defendant's termination of the subcontract, etc., employment be guaranteed by, for example, having a new subcontractor succeed to the employment.
(2) Such a matter is difficult to regard as disputing the Defendant's managerial decision itself, such as termination of the subcontract, but rather relates to employment stability, recognition of length of service, etc., following the closure of the subcontractor's business, etc. Although this concerns rights and obligations premised on the future termination of the employment relationship between the subcontractor and the subcontracted worker, it is directly related to the maintenance of the currently existing employment relationship, and thus may be regarded as falling within a bargaining matter concerning working conditions.
(3) Furthermore, since this presupposes the discontinuation of the subcontractor's business, the Defendant, as the contracting party, can, in effect, unilaterally decide whether to make the succession of employment of the existing subcontracted workers, etc., a condition when entering into a new subcontract, whereas the subcontractor has no meaningful decision-making authority with respect to this bargaining matter. Such a matter is directly related to the maintenance of the subcontracted worker's employment relationship itself, and since only the contracting party has substantial decision-making authority over it, it is clear that the maintenance or improvement of working conditions cannot be pursued through collective bargaining with the subcontractor; accordingly, there is also a need, in order to guarantee the subcontracted worker's three labor rights, to impose on the contracting party a duty of collective bargaining with respect to the above bargaining matter.
(4) Adding the above circumstances to the facts noted earlier, it may be said that the Defendant is in a position to substantially and concretely control and determine the working conditions of the in-house subcontractors' workers with respect to the matters set forth in Item 7 of the attached list; accordingly, it must be held that the Defendant bears a duty to engage in good-faith collective bargaining with the Plaintiff with respect to the above bargaining matter.
라) Matters concerning the labor-management council (Item 5 of the attached list)
「Act on the Promotion of Workers' Participation and Cooperation」(hereinafter referred to as the "Workers' Participation Act") Article 3, Item 1 provides that "a labor-management council refers to a consultative body organized by workers and employers to promote workers' welfare and the sound development of the enterprise through participation and cooperation," and Article 3, Items 2 and 3 of the Workers' Participation Act provide that "workers" and "employers" under the said Act mean workers and employers under Article 2 of the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법).
Insofar as it is difficult to view the Defendant as an employer under Article 2 of the Labor Standards Act in relation to workers belonging to the in-house subcontracting companies, the Defendant does not bear an obligation to establish and operate a labor-management council in relation to workers belonging to said in-house subcontracting companies, and therefore it is difficult to recognize that the Defendant bears an obligation of collective bargaining toward the Plaintiff with respect to matters concerning the labor-management council.
(e) Matters concerning guarantee of union activities, matters concerning collective bargaining, matters concerning labor disputes, and other matters concerning the effect of collective agreements, etc. (Items 1, 4, 6, and 8 of the attached list)
As seen above, insofar as the Defendant bears an obligation of collective bargaining toward the Plaintiff with respect to each of the matters set forth in Items 2 and 7 of the attached list, it is reasonable to view that, absent special circumstances, the Defendant also bears an obligation to engage in collective bargaining in good faith with respect to matters concerning the guarantee of union activities, collective bargaining, labor disputes, and other matters concerning the effect of collective agreements of workers belonging to the in-house subcontracting companies, at least to the extent related thereto.
G. Conclusion
The court below determined whether the Defendant constitutes an employer bearing an obligation of collective bargaining toward the Plaintiff based on the previous legal doctrine, i.e., on the criterion of whether an express or implied employment relationship was established between the Defendant and workers belonging to its in-house subcontracting companies, and as a result determined that the Defendant does not bear an obligation of collective bargaining with respect to all eight bargaining matters listed in the attached list.
However, with respect to the matters set forth in Items 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, and 8 of the attached list, it can be seen that the Defendant is capable of determining factors that have a significant impact on the working conditions of workers belonging to the in-house subcontracting companies, and that said workers are economically dependent on the Defendant, such that there is a need to impose an obligation of collective bargaining on the Defendant as well. Therefore, it should be held that the Defendant bears an obligation of collective bargaining toward the Plaintiff with respect to the above matters, and accordingly the judgment of the court below in this regard contains an error affecting the judgment, such as a misunderstanding of the legal doctrine concerning the scope of employers bearing an obligation of collective bargaining.
Furthermore, with respect to the matter set forth in Item 3 of the attached list, the court below should have clearly examined what the content of the Plaintiff's assertion regarding this bargaining matter was, and then examined whether it constitutes a matter that can be the subject of collective bargaining and whether it constitutes a matter that the Defendant can substantially and specifically control and determine. Nevertheless, the court below determined that the Defendant does not bear an obligation of collective bargaining with respect to the above matter based solely on the reasons stated in its judgment, and thus the court below's determination in this regard contains an error affecting the judgment by failing to conduct the necessary examination due to a misunderstanding of the legal doctrine concerning the scope of employers bearing an obligation of collective bargaining, etc.
Meanwhile, although the court below's reasoning in determining that the Defendant does not bear an obligation of collective bargaining with respect to the matter set forth in Item 5 of the attached list is somewhat inappropriate in its statement of reasons, its conclusion is justified, and therefore it cannot be said that the court below's determination in this regard contains an error, such as a misunderstanding of the legal doctrine, that affected the judgment.
Therefore, the portion of the judgment of the court below concerning each matter other than Item 5 of the attached list should be reversed.
For the foregoing reasons, we state that we cannot agree with the majority opinion.
5. Concurring Opinion of Justice Lee Sook-yeon to the Majority Opinion
A. Summary of the Concurring Opinion
The dissenting opinion states that there is a need to effectively guarantee the three labor rights, which are concrete rights under the Constitution, and that since the Supreme Court has expanded the concept of employer in relation to unfair labor practices of domination and interference, there is a need to interpret the meaning of employer uniformly; considering this together with the consistency with precedents that expanded the concept of worker under the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act (노동조합 및 노동관계조정법, hereinafter the "Trade Union Act") in two-party relationships, precedents applying the legal doctrine of the Act on the Protection, etc. of Temporary Agency Workers (파견근로자 보호 등에 관한 법률, hereinafter the "Dispatch Act") in three-party relationships, and the fact that the legislature enacted a provision recognizing "substantial control" on the part of the principal contractor under the former Occupational Safety and Health Act (산업안전보건법); the dissenting opinion argues that an employer under the former Trade Union Act is not limited to a counterparty who has entered into an express or implied employment contract or labor supply contract with a worker under the Trade Union Act, and that even absent such a contractual relationship, a principal contractor who has substantial control over the working conditions of subcontracted workers also constitutes an employer under the former Trade Union Act.
While we deeply sympathize with the need, as pointed out in the dissenting opinion, to improve the working conditions of subcontracted workers through the substantive guarantee of the three labor rights, the following limitations exist under the former Trade Union Act, and therefore the interpretation of the dissenting opinion is difficult to accept.
B. Criticism of the Dissenting Opinion's Expansion of the Concept of Employer
1) Grounds Making It Difficult to Adopt the "Substantial Control Theory" Without Legislation
(a) The Meaning of Collective Bargaining
"Collective bargaining" under the Trade Union Act refers to the legal procedure for concluding a "collective agreement" determined by consultation between labor and management, as an act by which a labor union negotiates with an employer to maintain and improve working conditions and to enhance the economic and social status of workers, thereby concretely forming the working conditions constituting the content of the employment relationship, premised on the fundamental principle of autonomy of agreement in collective labor relations. Accordingly, under the former Trade Union Act, collective bargaining was, in principle, premised on the parties to an employment contract concluding a collective agreement.
(b) Problems with Expanding the Concept of Employer in Relation to the Effects and Sanctions Arising from a Breach of the Obligation of Collective Bargaining, etc.
When a party is recognized as an employer bearing an obligation of collective bargaining, that party bears an obligation to engage in collective bargaining in good faith (Article 30, Paragraph 1 of the Trade Union Act); an unfair labor practice is established when that party refuses or neglects collective bargaining without justifiable grounds (Article 81, Paragraph 1, Item 3 of the Trade Union Act); and upon application for remedy by a worker or labor union, the party may be subject to a remedial order from the Labor Relations Commission for the unfair labor practice of refusing collective bargaining (Article 82, Paragraph 1 and Article 84 of the Trade Union Act). In addition to such administrative sanctions, the party may be subject to civil litigation, such as a claim demanding compliance with collective bargaining or a claim for damages arising from an unfair labor practice, as well as criminal punishment of imprisonment for not more than two years or a fine not exceeding twenty million won (Article 90 of the Trade Union Act).
As such, legal systems that impose criminal punishment on unfair labor practices in addition to administrative sanctions or civil liability are extremely rare worldwide, and if a legal system maintaining criminal punishment for unfair labor practices is to be maintained, the interpretation of its constituent elements must be even more clear and strict, as pointed out in the majority opinion.
Furthermore, becoming the counterparty to collective bargaining means becoming a potential counterparty to industrial action, and thus a labor union of a subcontractor's employees may also engage in industrial action against the principal contractor if the principal contractor refuses collective bargaining. As such, bearing an obligation of collective bargaining does not stop at engaging in collective bargaining in good faith, but also entails bearing the risk of industrial action should collective bargaining not proceed smoothly.
If, in the various contexts of the above remedy application procedures before the Labor Relations Commission, administrative litigation, civil litigation, criminal investigation and trial proceedings, and industrial action, employer status, the existence of an obligation of collective bargaining, and the legitimacy of industrial action become issues, the conclusion of the case may differ depending on whether a principal contractor recognized as having "substantial control" is included as an employer. Accordingly, until a determination is made through a final and conclusive judgment of the court, the parties themselves cannot easily predict whether a principal contractor constitutes an employer of the subcontracted workers, resulting in considerable uncertainty and confusion in legal relationships. For enterprises standing at the crossroads of survival and sustainable growth amid intensified international competition, such uncertainty and confusion may make prompt management decisions and timely business execution difficult, thereby becoming a factor that hinders the development of our industry.
Ultimately, it is also difficult to agree with expanding the concept of employer without specific legislation, in that this may give rise to such uncertainty and confusion in legal relationships as described above.
(c) Balancing of Fundamental Rights or Interests
The three labor rights are fundamental rights intended to enable workers to improve working conditions through labor-management autonomy on an equal footing with employers and thereby enhance their economic and social status, and their constitutional status is by no means insignificant. However, since the three labor rights, like other rights, are not absolute rights but rights subject to limitation, the right to collective bargaining may also be restricted under Article 37, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution for reasons of public interest such as national security, maintenance of order, or public welfare, and such restriction is determined at the point where the guarantee of fundamental labor rights and the necessity of public interest are appropriately balanced through a comparative weighing conducted in each specific case (see Constitutional Court en banc Decision 94Hun-Ba13, etc., delivered February 27, 1998; Constitutional Court en banc Decision 2003Hun-Ba58, etc., delivered August 26, 2004; and others). Furthermore, since the exercise of the three labor rights inevitably occurs in an area that intersects with the constitutional fundamental rights or legal interests of third parties, including employers, the specific scope and limits of the guarantee thereof can only be delineated through norm-harmonizing interpretation and reasonable balancing of interests between the conflicting fundamental rights. Of course, even in such cases, the essential content of the three labor rights must not be undermined.
(1) Aspect of Protecting and Fostering Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises
Article 119, Paragraph 1 of the Constitution provides that "the economic order of the Republic of Korea shall be based on respect for the economic freedom and creative initiative of individuals and enterprises," and Article 123, Paragraph 3 of the Constitution provides that "the State shall protect and foster small and medium enterprises."
If a collective agreement is concluded pursuant to collective bargaining between a principal contractor and a labor union of subcontracted workers, the subcontractor would be unable to exercise any decision-making authority whatsoever regarding the working conditions of its own employees, and would merely bear the obligation to reflect the matters of the collective agreement determined by the principal contractor in its contractual relationship with the principal contractor or simply to perform them, which would constitute a serious restriction on the subcontractor's freedom of contract and status as a business entity, and this may make it difficult to substantively realize the constitutional provision for the protection and fostering of subcontractors, who in most cases would appear to be small and medium-sized enterprises.
Therefore, absent prior specific legislation permitting collective bargaining between a labor union of subcontracted workers and a principal contractor, the authority of the subcontractor to autonomously form the content of working conditions by concluding a collective agreement through collective bargaining with that labor union would be seriously restricted.
(2) Aspect of the Principal Contractor's Freedom to Enter into Contracts
(a) The dissenting opinion points out the need to protect the three labor rights due to the spread of outsourcing and indirect employment in both two-party and three-party relationships, and there are aspects of this worth heeding. However, deriving an obligation of collective bargaining on the part of the principal contractor directly, without separate legislation, on the ground of the need to protect the three labor rights, excessively disregards the principal contractor's freedom to enter into contracts.
(b) Each economic entity has the freedom to enter into contracts within multi-layered transactional relationships, and accordingly may freely determine the form of contract and the counterparty to the contract in concluding a contract, but in exchange must also bear on its own the risks arising from concluding such a contract and the obligations specifically prescribed by statute. For example, when an employment contract is concluded, the party will be subject to regulation under the Labor Standards Act with respect to individual employment relationships, and will bear the obligation to guarantee the three labor rights and to tolerate the exercise thereof under the Constitution and the Trade Union Act with respect to collective labor relations.
Since the obligations under the Labor Standards Act and the Trade Union Act are aimed at the special need for protection of labor and the guarantee of the three labor rights, and can be seen as intended to have the party who receives the provision of labor and enjoys the benefit thereof also bear such obligations, it should in principle be understood that these obligations arise on the premise that they apply to the contractual counterparty who has concluded the employment contract.
(c) Meanwhile, even where the form of a subcontract is adopted, if it can be viewed as an employment contract according to the substance of the relationship of subordination in employment, the party will be subject to regulation under the Labor Standards Act, etc., and there is no doubt that where a principal contractor gives substantial direction and orders to subcontracted workers and the subcontracted workers are substantially incorporated into the principal contractor's business, such that a worker dispatch relationship is established, the party will be deemed to have hired the workers or will bear an obligation to hire them pursuant to the Dispatch Act.
However, in the case of a pure subcontract that does not constitute a substantive employment contract or worker dispatch relationship, the freedom of contract of a principal contractor who has not concluded an employment contract directly with the worker but has concluded a subcontract with the subcontractor, who is the worker's employer, needs to be respected. Such a principal contractor does not receive the provision of labor itself through an employment contract and pay wages therefor, but rather, as the expression "indirect employment" suggests, pays a fair consideration through a contract with the subcontractor and receives the contractual performance in return, and such performance merely indirectly includes the value arising from the labor provided pursuant to the employment contract between the subcontractor and the subcontracted worker. It cannot be considered reasonable to impose, without any express statutory provision, an obligation of collective bargaining, which is borne by the counterparty to an employment contract, on a principal contractor who enjoys such indirect benefit.
(d) As seen above, the Supreme Court has held that a principal contractor, as an original contracting company, may be the subject of an unfair labor practice of domination or interference with respect to the union activities of workers belonging to an in-house subcontracting company that is the subcontractor, and accordingly the principal contractor bears a negative obligation not to dominate or interfere with the organization or operation of the subcontracted workers' labor union. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that "although a principal contractor does not have a direct employment relationship with workers belonging to a subcontractor, the principal contractor enjoys certain benefits from the labor provided by workers belonging to the subcontractor, and since the principal contractor provided its place of business as the place of labor for workers belonging to the subcontractor in order to enjoy such benefits, there may be cases where, even if the principal contractor's legal interests are infringed to a certain extent by industrial action occurring at that place of business, such infringement should be tolerated as a matter of social norms," and determined that where industrial action possessing legitimacy vis-à-vis the subcontractor, who is the employer, is conducted at the principal contractor's place of business, the illegality thereof may be negated as an "act not in violation of social rules" under Article 20 of the Criminal Code (see Supreme Court Decision 2015Do1927, decided September 3, 2020, and others); accordingly, the principal contractor also bears an obligation to tolerate infringement of its legal interests caused by legitimate industrial action taken by subcontracted workers against the subcontractor. However, to interpret this as meaning that the principal contractor bears, beyond such passive obligations not to interfere with the exercise of the three labor rights by subcontracted workers—namely, the obligation not to dominate or interfere with the organization or operation of the subcontractor's labor union and the obligation to tolerate infringement of legal interests caused by industrial action against the subcontractor—an active obligation to respond to collective bargaining for the conclusion of a collective agreement with the subcontracted workers' labor union, excessively restricts the principal contractor's freedom to enter into contracts and causes it to bear risks that it did not itself assume, and is therefore difficult to accept as an interpretive theory of the former Trade Union Act.
2) Rebuttal to the Argument That a Uniform Interpretation of the Concept of Employer Is Necessary
(a) The Position of Supreme Court Precedents
As seen in the majority opinion, the Supreme Court has determined the concept of "employer" under Article 2, Item 2 of the former Trade Union Act differently depending on each item of Article 81, Paragraph 1 of the Trade Union Act. In Supreme Court Decision 2007Du8881, decided March 25, 2010, the Supreme Court recognized the establishment of an unfair labor practice of domination or interference on the part of the original contracting company, while, on the same date, the same panel, in a case concerning the unfair labor practice of unfavorable treatment by the original contracting company against the same in-house subcontracting company's employees, held that the original contracting company did not constitute an employer with standing as a counterparty to the remedy application, on the ground that there was insufficient evidence to recognize the establishment of an implied employment relationship between the original contracting company and the subcontractor's employees (see Supreme Court Decision 2007Du9068, decided March 25, 2010, and others). Even after determining that the original contracting company constitutes an employer with respect to the unfair labor practice of domination and interference as described above, the Supreme Court has not changed its previous legal doctrine concerning the employer bearing an obligation of collective bargaining.
Even examining the content of the holding in Supreme Court Decision 2007Du8881, decided March 25, 2010, it stated that "if a person who is in a position to substantially and specifically control and determine matters such as the basic working conditions of a worker, to the extent that such person can be seen as bearing, in part, the authority and responsibility of a business owner who employs that worker, engages in conduct such as dominating or interfering with the organization or operation of a labor union as prescribed in Article 81, Paragraph 1, Item 4 of the Trade Union Act, that person constitutes an employer who must comply with a remedial order directing the correction thereof," and therefore it is clear from the text that the Supreme Court did not intend to determine every concept of "employer" according to "substantial control."
Moreover, there is room to interpret the concept of "a position that can substantially and specifically control and determine" in the precedent itself as presupposing an unfair labor practice of domination or interference. This is because the Supreme Court held that an unfair labor practice is established where a person who is in a position to control and determine matters such as the basic working conditions of a worker actually engages in conduct dominating or interfering with the organization or operation of a labor union, and it is therefore not appropriate to generalize such a holding to every other concept of "employer" under the former Trade Union Act.
Accordingly, it should be understood that the Supreme Court reached this conclusion on the premise that the scope of employer may be determined differently depending on the specific requirements of the unfair labor practice and the nature of the remedial order.
(b) Rebuttal to the Uniform Interpretation of the Concept of Employer
The dissenting opinion argues that there is no logical necessity to limit the content of Supreme Court Decision 2007Du8881 to the "employer" under Article 81, Paragraph 1, Item 4 of the Trade Union Act, but for the following reasons, this is difficult to agree with.
In the case of an unfair labor practice of domination or interference, there is a need to expand the concept of "employer" to the entity exercising substantial control over the working conditions of the relevant worker. An act infringing upon the three labor rights need not necessarily be committed only by an employer in an express or implied employment relationship, and can just as readily be committed, as a factual act of substantial domination or interference, by a third party who is not in an express or implied employment relationship. The Supreme Court expanded the concept of employer with respect to the unfair labor practice of domination or interference from the perspective of the unfair labor practice system, which functions to prevent and remedy infringements of workers' right of association.
By contrast, since the collective bargaining system is essentially characterized by the function and possibility of collectively forming and altering working conditions through a collective agreement, the scope of the employer bearing an obligation of collective bargaining is necessarily closely related to the existence of an individual employment relationship between the worker and the employer.
Furthermore, since the Trade Union Act separately regulates the collective bargaining system and the unfair labor practice system for the guarantee and realization of the three labor rights, when interpreting the concept of "employer," consideration should also be given to the fact that each system has different purposes and functions. This is because the collective bargaining system aims to maintain an orderly collective bargaining process for forming and altering working conditions by providing the basic procedures and methods for collective bargaining, whereas the unfair labor practice system aims to sanction and prevent an employer's conduct that maliciously nullifies or infringes upon the order of collective labor relations.
Considering these circumstances together with the uncertainty and confusion regarding various legal relationships arising from a breach of the obligation of collective bargaining, as discussed above, caution is required in hastily expanding the concept of "employer" with respect to collective bargaining as well, absent specific legislation.
3) Rebuttal to the Argument Concerning the Expansion of Worker Status Under the Trade Union Act in Two-Party Relationships
As pointed out in the dissenting opinion, the Supreme Court has recognized worker status under the Trade Union Act for home-study tutors (학습지교사), broadcast actors, designated drivers, and car salespersons (car masters), etc., who entered into entrustment business contracts or similar arrangements rather than employment contracts (see Supreme Court Decisions 2014Du12598 and 12604, and others, cited above). Since the concept of employer under the former Trade Union Act needs to be understood in correspondence with the concept of worker under the Trade Union Act, there is room for the previous legal doctrine, which limited the scope of employers bearing an obligation of collective bargaining to those in an "express or implied employment relationship," to be expanded to those in an "express or implied contractual relationship." This point raised in the dissenting opinion is valid.
However, such expansion of the concept of worker under the Trade Union Act is not directly related to the resolution of this case. The precedents that expanded the concept of worker under the Trade Union Act as described above concern cases involving a two-party relationship between a business owner and a worker whose worker status is at issue, in which a direct contract, albeit not an employment contract but in the form of various labor supply contracts, was concluded. The Supreme Court determined worker status under the Trade Union Act in such cases, where a direct contractual relationship exists, from the perspective of the substance of the labor supply relationship and the need to guarantee the three labor rights; it did not determine that subcontracted workers constitute workers under the Trade Union Act even with respect to a principal contractor in a three-party relationship with whom no direct contractual relationship exists.
In this case, while the subcontractor and the subcontracted workers concluded an employment contract, no contractual relationship whatsoever exists between the Defendant, the principal contractor whose employer status is at issue, and the subcontracted workers. Therefore, the mere existence of precedents expanding worker status under the Trade Union Act in two-party relationships does not readily lead to the conclusion that, in this case, the Defendant's employer status is recognized under the "substantial control doctrine" despite the absence of any express or implied contractual relationship between the Defendant and the Plaintiff's union members, and whether to recognize employer status based on "substantial control" in a three-party relationship still requires further reasoning.
4) Rebuttal to the Argument of Inconsistency with Precedents Concerning the Dispatch Act in Three-Party Relationships
The dissenting opinion states that the previous legal doctrine "is difficult to reconcile with precedents that have applied the legal doctrine of the Dispatch Act to the three-party relationships in which workers belonging to subcontractors are placed," or that it "turns a blind eye to the problem of substantive conflict with precedents concerning the Dispatch Act." However, since the Dispatch Act aims to ensure the proper operation of worker dispatch businesses and to establish standards concerning the working conditions, etc. of dispatched workers, thereby contributing to the employment stability and welfare enhancement of dispatched workers, and is directed at regulating the individual employment relationship between the dispatched worker and the user company, etc., it operates on a different plane of discussion from the Trade Union Act, which regulates collective labor relations. Since the precedents related to the Dispatch Act determined the establishment of a dispatch relationship in accordance with the legislative purpose of the Dispatch Act, such as the employment stability of dispatched workers, in the context of individual employment relations as described above, they are not directly related to whether an obligation of collective bargaining should be recognized in collective labor relations, and therefore it cannot be said that there is a conflict with precedent as pointed out in the dissenting opinion.
Where, pursuant to the Dispatch Act, a user company is deemed to have directly employed a dispatched worker, or where an obligation of direct employment of a dispatched worker is recognized and that obligation of employment has been fulfilled, an employment relationship is established between the dispatched worker and the user company, and in such a case, there is no doubt that a labor union composed of dispatched workers who are in an employment relationship may engage in collective bargaining with the user company. The dissenting opinion appears to go beyond such cases and to hold that even where an obligation of direct employment is recognized but has not been fulfilled, a labor union composed of dispatched workers may engage in collective bargaining based on "substantial control." However, even if the Dispatch Act imposes certain specific obligations on the user company, since the Dispatch Act differs from the Trade Union Act in its legislative purpose and the subject matter it regulates, it cannot be said that a legal effect in the form of an obligation of collective bargaining, which is not conferred under the Dispatch Act, can be derived therefrom.
5) Rebuttal to the Argument That Statutes Have Recognized Substantial Control
The dissenting opinion argues that since the former Occupational Safety and Health Act (구 산업안전보건법), Article 29, Paragraph 1, and other provisions impose on a contracting business owner (도급 사업주) an obligation to take measures for the prevention of industrial accidents on the premise that such owner possesses actual control, it is appropriate to interpret the concept of "employer" under the former Trade Union Act (구 노동조합법) in a manner consistent with that Act, i.e., based on actual control.
However, the above argument concerning the provisions of the former Occupational Safety and Health Act can only serve as a basis for the argument that, where the concept of "employer" is determined based on actual control, matters relating to the prevention of industrial accidents may be included among the matters over which actual control is specifically found to exist; it is not, by itself, a sufficient argument for the proposition that the concept of "employer" must be determined based on actual control. It is difficult to conclude that, merely because a principal contractor (도급인) may bear administrative or criminal obligations under other statutes, an obligation to engage in collective bargaining is thereby directly derived even with respect to workers with whom there is no direct contractual relationship.
The former Occupational Safety and Health Act has as its purpose the maintenance and promotion of the safety and health of persons who provide labor by, among other things, establishing standards for industrial safety and health, and it applies under certain requirements regardless of whether the contracting business owner exercises actual control over the working conditions of subcontracted workers. In this way, there is concern that importing the former Occupational Safety and Health Act—which has a legislative purpose separate from that of the former Trade Union Act and governs a different subject matter—into the interpretation of the former Trade Union Act may instead result in the error of limiting the scope of persons obligated to take industrial accident prevention measures under the former Occupational Safety and Health Act to contracting business owners who exercise actual control.
(c) Prospects following the amendment of the Trade Union Act
In light of the limitations discussed above, it is difficult to expand the concept of "employer" through interpretation of the former Trade Union Act. The legislature amended the Trade Union Act to expand the concept of "employer" in order to effectively protect the three labor rights of subcontracted workers.
The court hereby states that, in future cases to which the amended Trade Union Act applies, it will respect this legislative determination and pursue the improvement of the working conditions of subcontracted workers, while fulfilling its judicial duty to interpret and apply the law with due consideration also given to industrial development and the protection and fostering of small and medium-sized enterprises.
The foregoing sets forth the supplementary opinion to the majority opinion.
Chief Justice Cho Hee-dae (Presiding Judge), Justice Lee Heung-gu, Justice Cheon Dae-yeop, Justice Oh Kyung-mi (Justice in Charge), Justice Oh Seok-jun, Justice Seo Kyung-hwan, Justice Eom Sang-pil, Justice Shin Sook-hee, Justice Noh Kyung-pil, Justice Park Young-jae, Justice Lee Sook-yeon, Justice Ma Yong-joo