[Defendant]
[Appellant] Defendant
[Judgment Below] Seoul Southern District Court Decision 2005No684, decided November 11, 2005
[Order]
The appeal is dismissed.
[Reasoning]
The grounds of appeal are examined.
1. As to Ground No. 1
The Defendant's argument on this point must be regarded as challenging the selection and evaluation of evidence and the fact-finding, which fall within the exclusive authority of the lower court, and this does not constitute a legitimate ground of appeal (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 2005Do3909, decided October 19, 2006). Furthermore, upon examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the record, the lower court's measure of finding, based on the evidence it adopted, that the Defendant, as the chairman of the Guro-A District Committee of the United Liberal Democrats in Seoul, ran for the 17th National Assembly election and, while operating a campaign office during the election period, employed Non-Indicted 2 as a driver of the campaign publicity vehicle during the election period through instructions to office manager Non-Indicted 1, and thereupon found the facts charged in this case to be guilty, is justified, and there is no illegality such as misapprehension of facts due to violation of the rules of evidence as alleged in the grounds of appeal.
2. As to Ground No. 2
A. Article 10 of the former Labor Standards Act (근로기준법) (before its full amendment by Act No. 8372 on April 11, 2007; hereinafter the same) (see current Article 11), which provides for the scope of application of the Labor Standards Act, stipulates that it applies to all businesses or workplaces ordinarily employing five or more workers. Whether something constitutes a workplace as referred to therein depends on whether it is a unit place where all work is continuously performed as a social activity under organic connection by a single entity, or a spatially demarcated part of a business entity, and thus the type of business is not limited, whether or not it is for profit is immaterial, and it cannot be said that something is excluded from the application of the Labor Standards Act merely because it is a one-time undertaking or of a temporary duration (see Supreme Court Decision 94Da21979, decided October 25, 1994). Furthermore, since Article 14 of the same Act (see current Article 2(1)(1)), which defines "worker," does not limit the type of occupation, a political organization also falls within the meaning of "business," "workplace," or "occupation" under each of the above provisions.
According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the lower court held that where a candidate for the National Assembly, in order to conduct election campaign activities, establishes a campaign office at a certain place, employs persons on a daily wage basis, and has them carry out election publicity under his own direction and supervision, continuously operating the office for a certain period (13 days), such campaign office constitutes, at least within that scope, a "workplace" as defined in Article 10 of the Labor Standards Act, and that even a campaign worker who has been appointed at the campaign office and duly reported to the competent National Election Commission must be regarded as a "worker" under the Labor Standards Act if he agreed with the election candidate to be paid money on a daily wage basis and provided the prescribed labor under the candidate's direction and supervision. On this basis, the lower court rejected all of the Defendant's arguments that the campaign office did not constitute a workplace and that the campaign worker was not a worker.
Upon examining the record in light of the legal principles set forth above, the lower court's measure is justified and acceptable, and there is no illegality such as misapprehension of the legal principles regarding the violation of the Labor Standards Act in the judgment below.
B. Article 127(3) of the Act on the Election of Public Officials and the Prevention of Election Malpractices (공직선거 및 선거부정방지법) (the title of the Act was changed to the "Public Official Election Act" (공직선거법) by Act No. 7681 on August 4, 2005) provides that, once an accounting officer has been appointed and reported, no one other than the accounting officer may disburse election expenses. The purpose of this provision is to ensure transparency in the disbursement of election expenses by having all such expenses disbursed through the accounting officer, who serves as a single, official channel, and it does not mean that the accounting officer bears the ultimate responsibility for payment of all costs incurred in connection with the election.
The lower court, in the same vein, rejected all of the Defendant's arguments that, because the Defendant, as the candidate and the person with overall responsibility for the operation of the campaign office, bore the ultimate responsibility for payment of the unpaid allowances, etc. to Non-Indicted 2 in this case, and nevertheless failed to pay them, the Defendant, not being the accounting officer, had no authority to make payment due to the restriction of the above provision and thus bore no responsibility therefor, or had no intent or responsibility with respect to the violation of the Labor Standards Act. This measure of the lower court is justified and acceptable, and it cannot be said that there is any illegality such as misapprehension of the legal principles as alleged in the grounds of appeal in the judgment below.
3. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and this Judgment is rendered by the unanimous opinion of the participating Justices, as set forth in the Order.
Justice Park Si-hwan (Presiding Justice), Kim Yong-dam, Park Il-hwan, Kim Neung-hwan (Justice in charge)