[Order]
The part of the judgment below concerning the claim for return of unjust enrichment and claim for damages related to remuneration in the principal claim (bonso), the part concerning the claim for damages related to the construction contract, the part concerning the claim for damages related to driver expenses, and the counterclaim (banso) part are reversed, and this part of the case is remanded to the Seoul High Court. The appeal by the Defendant (Counterclaim Plaintiff) is dismissed.
[Reasoning] The grounds of appeal (including the supplementary brief on grounds of appeal submitted after the deadline for submission of grounds of appeal, to the extent it supplements the grounds of appeal) are examined as follows.
1. Regarding the part of the principal claim seeking return of unjust enrichment related to remuneration
A. As to the grounds of appeal of the Plaintiff (Counterclaim Defendant, hereinafter "Plaintiff") and the Defendant (Counterclaim Plaintiff, hereinafter "Defendant") regarding whether the determination and payment of remuneration to the Defendant is invalid for violating statutes and the articles of incorporation (정관)
1) Article 388 of the Commercial Act (상법) provides that "the remuneration of directors shall be determined by resolution of the general shareholders' meeting if the amount thereof is not fixed in the articles of incorporation." The "remuneration" under this provision includes all consideration paid as compensation for a director's performance of duties, regardless of its name, such as annual salary, allowances, or bonuses. This is a mandatory provision intended to protect the interests of the company, shareholders, and company creditors by preventing the harm that may arise from a director pursuing personal interests in connection with his or her own remuneration (see Supreme Court Decision 2018Da290436, decided April 9, 2020, etc.).
Article 361 of the Commercial Act provides that "the general shareholders' meeting may resolve only on matters prescribed by this Act or the articles of incorporation." Matters to be resolved by the general shareholders' meeting must necessarily be determined by the general shareholders' meeting, and such matters may not be delegated to another organ or a third party even by the articles of incorporation or a resolution of the general shareholders' meeting (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 2016Da251215, decided March 23, 2017). Therefore, while it is permissible for the articles of incorporation or the general shareholders' meeting to fix only the total amount or ceiling of remuneration for officers and delegate specific matters, such as the amount to be paid to individual directors, to the board of directors, it is not permitted to comprehensively delegate matters concerning directors' remuneration to the board of directors. Moreover, even where the general shareholders' meeting has delegated specific matters concerning directors' remuneration to the board of directors, it remains possible, as falling within the scope of authority prescribed by the Commercial Act, for the general shareholders' meeting to directly determine such matters itself.
Meanwhile, in the case of a so-called one-person company, where one person owns all of the shares of a stock company, it is evident that if that shareholder attends the general shareholders' meeting as the sole shareholder, the meeting is constituted as a meeting attended by all shareholders, and the resolution will be made in accordance with that shareholder's intent. For this reason, even if there is a defect in the procedure for convening the general shareholders' meeting or the minutes of the general shareholders' meeting were not prepared, if the intent of the sole shareholder coincides with the content of the resolution of the general shareholders' meeting, it may be found by evidence that a resolution with such content was made (see Supreme Court Decision 74Da1755, decided April 13, 1976, etc.). However, this legal doctrine applies only to a one-person company where there is a single shareholder. In a stock company that is not a one-person company, absent special circumstances, the mere fact that shareholders holding shares sufficient to satisfy the quorum for resolution at the general shareholders' meeting consented to or approved certain matters cannot be deemed to mean that it is evident that a resolution with such content would be made at the general shareholders' meeting, or that this is equivalent to there having been a resolution of the general shareholders' meeting with such content.
2) According to the reasoning of the judgment below and the record, the following facts may be found.
A) The Defendant, as the representative director of the Plaintiff, received an annual remuneration of approximately KRW 1,920,000,000 from around 2005 until January 2008, after which his remuneration was substantially increased beginning in February 2008. Of the remuneration paid to the Defendant, the increased amounts were KRW 5,180,000,000 from February 2008 to December 2008, KRW 5,550,000,000 in 2009, KRW 6,090,000,000 in 2010, and KRW 1,440,000,000 from January 2011 to April 2011, totaling KRW 18,260,000,000.
B) Originally, the Plaintiff's articles of incorporation provided in Article 31-2 that the determination of remuneration for the company's chief executive officer required a resolution of the board of directors, and in Article 34 that directors' remuneration was to be determined by the general shareholders' meeting; however, upon amendment and enforcement on December 28, 2010, Article 31-2 was deleted.
C) The composition and changes in the Plaintiff's shareholders, as of the times when the Defendant's remuneration at issue in this case was determined from February 2008 to April 2011, were as follows.
(1) In 2008, Eugene Himart Holdings Co., Ltd. (hereinafter "Eugene Himart Holdings") was the sole shareholder of the Plaintiff. All of the shares of Eugene Himart Holdings were held by Eugene Corporation (hereinafter "Eugene Corporation") and its affiliated companies, as well as by the Defendant, and a majority of the shares of Eugene Corporation were held by its representative director, the non-party (소외인), and his family members.
(2) In 2009, Eugene Corporation and the Defendant held all of the Plaintiff's shares, and a majority of the shares of Eugene Corporation were held by its representative director, the non-party, and his family members.
(3) In 2010, Eugene Corporation and the Defendant held approximately 80% of the Plaintiff's voting shares, and a majority of the shares of Eugene Corporation were held by its representative director, the non-party, and his family members.
(4) In 2011, Eugene Corporation and the Defendant substantially held approximately 60% of the Plaintiff's voting shares.
D) After February 2008, when paying remuneration to officers including the Defendant, the Plaintiff's personnel team prepared a document specifying the specific annual salary amount for each officer, reported it to the non-party, the representative director of Eugene Corporation, and obtained his approval; thereafter, an agenda item fixing the ceiling on the total remuneration to be paid to all officers for that year was submitted to the general shareholders' meeting through a board of directors' resolution and a resolution of the general shareholders' meeting. At this time, the sum of the individual officers' annual salaries approved by the non-party did not coincide with the total remuneration for officers approved at the general shareholders' meeting, and the latter was larger.
E) Between February 2008 and April 2011, there was no resolution of the Plaintiff's board of directors, nor any resolution of the Plaintiff's general shareholders' meeting, concerning the specific amount of remuneration for the Defendant, who, as representative director, was the chief executive officer.
3) The court below, for the reasons stated in its judgment, determined that, of the remuneration paid by the Plaintiff to the Defendant from January 2011 to April 2011, the portion remaining after deducting the amount corresponding to the remuneration as of before January 2008, which the Plaintiff acknowledged as the appropriate remuneration amount, constituted a benefit obtained without legal cause (the court below did not rule on the claim for damages, which stands in a relationship of selective consolidation with the claim for return of unjust enrichment); however, it determined that the increased portion of the remuneration paid by the Plaintiff to the Defendant from February 2008 to 2010 could not be deemed a benefit obtained without legal cause, for the following reasons.
A) Although the Plaintiff's general shareholders' meeting merely resolved on the ceiling amount of directors' remuneration without determining the specific amount thereof, the remuneration amount for individual directors was determined and paid within that ceiling; and if, in the process of determining and paying the remuneration amount for individual directors, a shareholder holding at least two-thirds of the voting shares—sufficient to amend the articles of incorporation to fix the directors' remuneration amount—approved the determination and payment of such remuneration, then, absent special circumstances, it may be evaluated that it is evident that a resolution to pay such remuneration amount would be made at the general shareholders' meeting, and that this is no different from there having been a resolution of the general shareholders' meeting.
B) At the time the Defendant's remuneration was determined in 2008, the non-party, who substantially controlled Eugene Himart Holdings, then the Plaintiff's sole shareholder, approved the Defendant's remuneration; and at the time the Defendant's remuneration was determined in 2009, the Plaintiff's shareholders were Eugene Corporation and the Defendant, and at that time, the non-party, the substantial controller of Eugene Corporation, approved the Defendant's remuneration. Moreover, considering circumstances such as the fact that the total amount of directors' remuneration was resolved unanimously at each general shareholders' meeting, the determination and payment of the increased remuneration to the Defendant during the above period constitutes a case where it is evident that, even if a resolution of the general shareholders' meeting on the specific amount of the Defendant's remuneration were to be undergone, the resolution would be made in accordance with the shareholder's intent.
4) Although the court below's determination regarding the portion of increased remuneration from around January 2011 to around April 2011 contains somewhat inappropriate reasoning, its conclusion recognizing the Defendant's obligation to return unjust enrichment is justified, and there is no error therein, as alleged in the grounds of appeal, of failing to conduct the necessary examination and thereby exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence in violation of the rules of logic and experience, or of misapprehending the legal principles concerning the interpretation of Article 388 of the Commercial Act, the normative character of the articles of incorporation, the respective roles of directors and shareholders under company law, the cure of defects in the nonexistence of a general shareholders' meeting and the calculation of voting share ratios, or the requirements for a general shareholders' meeting resolution concerning directors' remuneration, or of omitting judgment, or of inconsistency in reasoning.
However, upon examining the record in light of the legal principles set forth above, the court below's determination regarding the portion of increased remuneration from February 2008 to 2010 is difficult to accept, for the following reasons.
The Defendant, who originally received only approximately KRW 1,920,000,000 in annual remuneration as the Plaintiff's representative director, received remuneration several times the previous amount from February 2008 to April 2011, and as a result, the total increased remuneration received by the Defendant during this period amounted to KRW 18,260,000,000. However, although the Plaintiff's articles of incorporation, until amended on December 28, 2010, provided that the determination of the chief executive officer's remuneration required a resolution of the board of directors, no board resolution was made regarding the specific amount of remuneration to be paid to the Defendant, increased from the previous amount. Moreover, during the period in which the Defendant received the increased remuneration, the Plaintiff's general shareholders' meeting merely approved the ceiling on the total annual remuneration to be paid to all officers, without any resolution being made regarding the specific payment of remuneration to individual directors; thus, it cannot be said that the general shareholders' meeting directly determined the amount of remuneration for individual directors.
At the time the Plaintiff's general shareholders' meeting was held on March 14, 2008, to determine the total amount of directors' remuneration for 2008, the Plaintiff's sole shareholder was Eugene Himart Holdings, and there is no material showing that Eugene Himart Holdings' general shareholders' meeting or board of directors approved or resolved on the payment of specific remuneration to the Defendant, nor is there any other material showing that Eugene Himart Holdings was a one-person company of the non-party. Furthermore, in this case, where there is no material showing that the Plaintiff was a one-person company of the non-party at the time the Plaintiff's general shareholders' meetings were held on March 19, 2009, and March 18, 2010, to determine directors' remuneration for the respective years, the mere fact that the non-party, as the representative director or substantial controller of Eugene Corporation, the Plaintiff's major shareholder, approved the Defendant's remuneration each year, and that the Plaintiff accordingly paid such remuneration to the Defendant, cannot be deemed equivalent to there having been a resolution of the general shareholders' meeting concerning the directors' remuneration.
Nevertheless, the court below, for the reasons stated in its judgment, determined that the requirements of Article 388 of the Commercial Act were satisfied with respect to the increased portion of remuneration received by the Defendant from February 2008 to 2010, and thus that it could not be deemed a benefit obtained without legal cause. This determination by the court below contains an error affecting the judgment by misapprehending the legal principles concerning a director's right to claim remuneration. The Plaintiff's ground of appeal pointing this out is therefore well-founded.
B. As to the Defendant's ground of appeal concerning the defense of ratification of a void act and the defense of payment of a non-existent debt (비채변제)
The court below, citing circumstances as stated in its judgment, determined that it is difficult to find that the Plaintiff subsequently ratified the payment of remuneration to the Defendant from January 2011 to April 2011, which lacked legal cause, or that such payment of remuneration constitutes payment of a non-existent debt (비채변제) as prescribed in Article 742 or Article 744 of the Civil Act (민법).
Upon examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the relevant legal principles and the record, the above determination by the court below is justified, and there is no error therein, as alleged in the grounds of appeal, of exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence in violation of the rules of logic and experience, or of misapprehending the legal principles concerning ratification of a void act and payment of a non-existent debt.
C. As to the Defendant's ground of appeal concerning the defenses of simultaneous performance and set-off
The court below, citing circumstances as stated in its judgment, determined that the Plaintiff was seeking return of unjust enrichment against the Defendant not for the entire remuneration paid from January 2011 to April 2011, but for the amount corresponding to the remuneration paid in excess of the previous remuneration amount paid up to January 2008; and that it is difficult to recognize that the Defendant, by providing labor exceeding the level corresponding to the previous remuneration amount up to January 2008 during the said period, gave rise to an obligation on the Plaintiff's part to return the labor provided by the Defendant. Accordingly, the court below rejected the Defendant's defenses of simultaneous performance and set-off, which were premised on a claim for return of value arising from the impossibility of the Plaintiff's obligation to return labor.
Upon examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the relevant legal principles and the record, the above determination by the court below is justified, and there is no error therein, as alleged in the grounds of appeal, of exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence in violation of the rules of logic and experience, thereby erroneously finding facts.
D. As to the Defendant's ground of appeal concerning the defense of violation of the principle of good faith
The court below, citing circumstances as stated in its judgment, determined that it is difficult to find that the Plaintiff's claim for return of unjust enrichment in relation to the remuneration paid to the Defendant from January 2011 to April 2011 violates the principle of good faith.
Upon examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the relevant legal principles and the record, the above determination by the court below is justified, and there is no error therein, as alleged in the grounds of appeal, of exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence in violation of the rules of logic and experience, or of misapprehending the legal principles concerning the principle of good faith.
2. As to the Defendant's remaining grounds of appeal
A. Regarding the part of the principal claim seeking damages related to the construction contract
The court below, citing circumstances as stated in its judgment, determined that the Defendant's act of causing the Plaintiff to enter into a construction contract with a company owned by the Defendant's family, and further intervening in the subcontract for the construction, constituted a breach of the duty of care owed to the Plaintiff, and that, as a result, the Defendant is liable to the Plaintiff for damages equivalent to the difference between the construction cost under the contract between the Plaintiff and the original contractor and the construction cost under the subcontract between the original contractor and the subcontractor; meanwhile, the court below rejected the Defendant's argument for limitation of liability for damages.
Upon examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the relevant legal principles and the record, the above determination by the court below is justified, and there is no error therein, as alleged in the grounds of appeal, of failing to conduct the necessary examination and thereby exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence in violation of the rules of logic and experience, or of misapprehending the legal principles concerning the duty of care, the occurrence of damages and the calculation of the amount of damages, or the limitation of liability for damages, or of omitting judgment.
B. Regarding the part of the principal claim seeking return of unjust enrichment related to the sale of paintings
The court below, citing circumstances as stated in its judgment, determined that the Plaintiff's purchase of paintings owned by the Defendant without board approval, and payment of the purchase price to a person designated by the Defendant, was invalid as a violation of Article 398 of the Commercial Act, and that the Defendant is therefore obligated to return to the Plaintiff unjust enrichment equivalent to the purchase price; the court below rejected the Defendant's argument that the sale was valid because all shareholders had consented thereto.
Upon examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the relevant legal principles and the record, the above determination by the court below is justified, and there is no error therein, as alleged in the grounds of appeal, of exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence in violation of the rules of logic and experience, or of misapprehending the legal principles concerning self-dealing by directors.
C. Regarding the part of the principal claim seeking damages related to driver expenses
The court below, citing circumstances as stated in its judgment, determined that the Defendant's act of causing the Plaintiff to operate and pay the expenses for a personal driver serving the Defendant's spouse constituted a breach of the duty of care owed to the Plaintiff, and that, as a result, the Defendant is liable to the Plaintiff for damages equivalent to such expenses; meanwhile, the court below rejected the Defendant's argument for limitation of liability for damages.
Upon examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the relevant legal principles and the record, the above determination by the court below is justified, and there is no error therein, as alleged in the grounds of appeal, of exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence in violation of the rules of logic and experience, or of misapprehending the legal principles concerning the limitation of liability for damages.
D. Regarding the counterclaim
The court below, citing circumstances as stated in its judgment, determined that the Plaintiff's obligation to pay retirement benefits (퇴직금) is an obligation without a fixed due date, and that the Plaintiff is liable for delay from the day after service of the copy of the counterclaim complaint in this case, by which the Defendant demanded performance.
Upon examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the relevant legal principles and the record, the above determination by the court below is justified, and there is no error therein, as alleged in the grounds of appeal, of exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence in violation of the rules of logic and experience, or of misapprehending the legal principles concerning the due date of a director's claim for retirement benefits, or of omitting judgment.
3. Scope of Reversal
The court below rejected the portion of the Plaintiff's claims in the principal claim seeking return of unjust enrichment and damages related to remuneration for the period from February 2008 to 2010, while granting the portion of the claim for return of unjust enrichment related to remuneration for the period from January 2011 to April 2011, the claim for damages related to the construction contract, the claim for return of unjust enrichment related to the sale of paintings, and the claim for damages related to driver expenses, as well as the Defendant's counterclaim for retirement benefits. The court below then determined that, of the Plaintiff's claims, excluding the claim for return of unjust enrichment related to the sale of paintings for which simultaneous performance was ordered by accepting the Defendant's defense of simultaneous performance, the sum of the Plaintiff's remaining claims had been extinguished by set-off to the extent of the equivalent amount against a portion of the Defendant's claims, and accordingly recognized the Plaintiff's obligation to pay the remaining balance of the Defendant's claim after set-off, thereby granting a portion of the Defendant's counterclaim. However, given that, as noted above, there is an error in the court below's determination regarding the Plaintiff's claim for return of unjust enrichment related to remuneration for the period from February 2008 to 2010, it is necessary to recalculate the total amount of the claims held by the Plaintiff and the Defendant against each other subject to set-off, and to newly determine the amount of claims extinguished by set-off and the remaining balance. Therefore, the part of the judgment below concerning the claim for return of unjust enrichment related to remuneration in the principal claim and the claim for damages standing in a relationship of selective consolidation therewith, the part concerning the claim for damages related to the construction contract, the part concerning the claim for damages related to driver expenses, and the counterclaim part must all be reversed.
Meanwhile, since it is determined that the obligation to return unjust enrichment arises not only with respect to the portion of increased remuneration received by the Defendant from January to April 2011, but also with respect to the portion of increased remuneration received from February 2008 to 2010, thereby reversing the court below's determination on this part in its entirety, judgment on the Defendant's ground of appeal concerning the calculation of the amount of unjust enrichment, which is premised on a different basis, shall be omitted.
4. Conclusion
Therefore, the part of the judgment below concerning the claim for return of unjust enrichment and claim for damages related to remuneration in the principal claim, the part concerning the claim for damages related to the construction contract, the part concerning the claim for damages related to driver expenses, and the counterclaim part are reversed, and this part of the case is remanded to the court below for further examination and judgment; the Defendant's appeal is dismissed. This judgment is rendered as stated in the Order by the unanimous opinion of the participating Justices.
Justice Kwon Soon-il (Presiding Justice), Justice Lee Ki-taek, Justice Park Jung-hwa (Justice in charge), Justice Kim Sun-su