[Plaintiffs, Appellants]
[Defendant, Appellee] Korean Broadcasting System (Attorney Han Kyung-guk, Counsel for Defendant)
[Judgment Below] Seoul High Court Decision 98Na24299 rendered on January 15, 1999
[Order]
The part of the judgment below concerning the plaintiffs' losing portion regarding annual leave allowance is reversed, and this part of the case is remanded to the Seoul High Court. The remainder of the appeal is all dismissed.
[Reasoning]
We examine the grounds of appeal.
1. On Ground 1
According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below found the facts as stated in the judgment concerning: the circumstances and content of the agreement on the entrusted operation of broadcasting transmission and relay stations (hereinafter "the entrustment agreement") concluded on October 30, 1984 between Defendant Corporation and non-party Korea Telecommunications Corporation (hereinafter "non-party Corporation"); and the circumstances under which the plaintiffs retired from Defendant Corporation and received retirement allowances pursuant to the entrustment agreement, then joined non-party Corporation, and thereafter, when the entrusted work reverted to its former state, retired from non-party Corporation and were re-employed by Defendant Corporation on June 1, 1988. The court below then determined as follows: in light of the fact that Defendant Corporation continued to hold ownership of the physical facilities being transferred and that the rights and obligations relating thereto were not comprehensively succeeded to by non-party Corporation, the legal relationship under the entrustment agreement between Defendant Corporation and non-party Corporation does not constitute a transfer of business or a merger of enterprises, nor can it be regarded as a legal relationship involving comprehensive succession of employment relationships such as occurs where part of an enterprise is separated and becomes independent, or where there is an organizational change or transfer of business between affiliated enterprises. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the plaintiffs' acceptance of the dismissal measure taken by Defendant Corporation pursuant to government policy, and their consequent retirement from Defendant Corporation and entry into non-party Corporation, occurred against the plaintiffs' will; moreover, since Defendant Corporation could not have anticipated that the entrusted work would later revert back, such measure by Defendant Corporation cannot be regarded as having been taken to evade payment of retirement allowances. Therefore, the employment relationship between the plaintiffs and Defendant Corporation must be deemed to have been severed by the above retirement and re-entry, and the fact that the plaintiffs later retired from non-party Corporation and were re-appointed by Defendant Corporation, due to the coincidental circumstance that the work entrusted to non-party Corporation reverted to Defendant Corporation, cannot be deemed to have revived the once-severed employment relationship.
Upon examination of the record, the above fact-finding and determination by the court below can be affirmed, and no illegality such as misapprehension of legal principles or misapprehension of facts can be found therein. This ground of appeal is not accepted.
2. On Ground 2
"A labor union may freely determine working conditions through a collective agreement with the employer, and even where a collective agreement is concluded that changes working conditions disadvantageously for some workers, or where a collective agreement that changes working conditions advantageously is concluded so as to exclude its application to some workers only, such an agreement between labor and management cannot be deemed invalid, absent special circumstances such that it can be seen as lacking reasonableness to a significant degree and thus deviating from the purposes of the labor union. Moreover, the labor union is not required to obtain individual consent or authorization from the workers concerned in advance for such an agreement, and whether a collective agreement lacks reasonableness to a significant degree must be determined in light of various circumstances, including the circumstances of the conclusion of the collective agreement and the employer's management conditions at the time" (see Supreme Court Decision 99Da7572 rendered on November 23, 1999; Supreme Court Decision 99Da67536 rendered on September 29, 2000).
Also, "since a retirement allowance claim cannot arise as an obligation of the employer to pay so long as the employment contract continues, and the obligation to pay arises only when the employment contract terminates, the standard wage and payment rate that form the basis for calculating the retirement allowance must, absent special circumstances, both be based on the time of retirement; and since the effect of retirement does not arise at the time a person is determined to be subject to honorary retirement, but only arises on the date of honorary retirement, if a collective agreement or the remuneration regulations based thereon are amended after a person has been determined to be subject to honorary retirement but before the honorary retirement takes place, such amendment shall also have effect as to those subject to honorary retirement" (see Supreme Court Decision 95Da19256 rendered on May 14, 1996; Supreme Court Decision 96Da56306 rendered on September 12, 1997, etc.).
According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below found the facts as stated in the judgment concerning the circumstances and content of the amendment of the provisions on retirement allowance among Defendant Corporation's remuneration regulations, and then determined as follows: when a court judgment was rendered holding that the remuneration regulations as amended on January 27, 1981 (hereinafter "the amended remuneration regulations") were invalid because, although both the standard wage and payment rate for calculating retirement allowance under the amended remuneration regulations were disadvantageous to workers compared to the remuneration regulations dated February 26, 1976 (hereinafter "the former remuneration regulations"), consent had not been obtained through a method of collective decision-making by the workers, Defendant Corporation, in order to remedy this, concluded a collective agreement on June 30, 1994 with a labor union composed of a majority of workers who were aware that the amended remuneration regulations were invalid, and pursuant thereto amended the remuneration regulations on July 27, 1994 (hereinafter "the new remuneration regulations") and agreed to apply them retroactively; therefore, even though this collective agreement or the new remuneration regulations may be disadvantageous to workers who were subject to the former remuneration regulations, the new remuneration regulations are valid. Meanwhile, even though labor and management of Defendant Corporation concluded an agreement on wage structure improvement on July 16, 1994, setting the implementation date of that agreement as January 1, 1995, such that employees who retired before that date were disadvantaged, this fact alone cannot be deemed to render the provision regarding the implementation date of that agreement invalid as violating the principles of good faith and prohibition of abuse of rights. On these grounds, the court below determined that the retirement allowance and honorary retirement allowance for the plaintiffs who retired thereafter must be calculated pursuant to the new remuneration regulations.
Upon examination of the record and in light of the legal principles set forth above, the above fact-finding and determination by the court below are justified, and no illegality such as misapprehension of legal principles concerning the nature of retirement allowances or the labor union's right of consent to changes in the rules of employment can be found therein. This ground of appeal is also not accepted.
3. On Ground 3
A. Method of Calculating Annual Leave
"The right to annual leave arises as a matter of course where a worker has worked continuously for one year with perfect attendance or attendance of 90% or more, and, absent other special stipulations, annual leave is compensation for one year's labor, and the annual leave allowance is also fixed upon the completion of one year of labor with perfect attendance or attendance of 90% or more" (see Supreme Court Decision 91Da20494 rendered on December 24, 1991; Supreme Court Decision 93Da4649 rendered on May 24, 1994, etc.). Here, the one year of continuous labor should, in principle, be calculated from the date the worker commenced work; however, even if the employer, in order to uniformly implement annual leave for all workers within the workplace, sets a reference date for the accrual of the right to annual leave by collective agreement or rules of employment, and calculates the period of continuous service and the number of days worked on the basis of that reference date, if, for workers hired within one year prior to the reference date, the remaining period is treated as having been worked and they are treated as having worked continuously for one year for purposes of granting annual leave, this is not disadvantageous to the workers and must be deemed lawful.
According to the record, since its establishment on March 1, 1973, Defendant Corporation has, in order to uniformly calculate and pay annual leave allowances, set January 1 of each year as the reference date for the accrual of the right to annual leave, and on that basis has granted annual paid leave to all employees, treating even employees hired within one year prior to the reference date as having worked continuously for one year and granting them annual leave accordingly; and it can be seen that on June 4, 1989, Defendant Corporation newly established Article 24, Paragraph 3 of the rules of employment, thereby codifying the calculation period for annual leave, which had been implemented as described above, as running from January 1 to December 31 of each year. Therefore, the provision of the rules of employment regarding the calculation period for annual leave is clearly not disadvantageous to workers, and is accordingly lawful.
Although the judgment below reasoned differently, its conclusion that the provision of the rules of employment is lawful is justified, and no illegality such as misapprehension of legal principles concerning the calculation of annual leave can be found therein. This ground of appeal is not accepted.
B. Whether Annual Leave Allowance Was Paid in Advance
According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below determined as follows: Defendant Corporation, on December 21, 1993, before the right to claim annual leave allowance for labor performed from January 1, 1993 to December 31, 1993 had arisen, paid the annual leave allowance to all employees including the plaintiffs; and since the period of continuous service thereafter until the plaintiffs' retirement, which occurred between June 30, 1994 and August 31, 1994, was less than one year, there was no room for the right to claim annual leave allowance to arise; on these grounds, the court below rejected in its entirety the plaintiffs' claim seeking payment of the annual leave allowance for the one year of labor prior to retirement.
However, "where a worker who has acquired the right to annual leave does not use the annual leave within one year from the time the right accrued, or where it becomes fixed, before the lapse of one year, that the worker can no longer use the annual leave due to retirement or other reasons, the right to leave is extinguished, and instead the worker may claim the annual leave allowance as wages corresponding to the number of days of annual leave" (see Supreme Court Decision 90DaKa12493 rendered on December 26, 1990; Supreme Court Decision 94Da18553 rendered on June 29, 1995; Supreme Court Decision 95Da36695 rendered on November 22, 1996, etc.).
According to the record, the following facts can be found: Defendant Corporation decided on December 15, 1975 to pay annual leave allowance to employees who had joined between March 1, 1973, the date of its establishment, and January 1, 1975; accordingly, it calculated and paid, on December 30, 1975, allowances for the number of days of unused annual leave, for the period from January 1, 1974 to December 31, 1975, as follows: for employees who joined between March 1, 1973 and January 1, 1974 and had perfect attendance, 17 days (8 days for 1974 and 9 days for 1975); and for employees who joined thereafter up to January 1, 1975 and had perfect attendance, out of 8 days (for 1974); and Defendant Corporation has since calculated and paid annual leave allowance in the same manner; and the plaintiffs, on December 21, 1993, the year before their retirement, received payment only for the allowance corresponding to the number of days of annual paid leave unused that year, and then retired. Given these facts, the annual leave allowance that the plaintiffs received on December 21, 1993 arose because they did not use, within one year from the time of its acquisition, the right to annual leave acquired on January 1, 1993 as compensation for labor performed from January 1, 1991 to December 31, 1992. Furthermore, the plaintiffs acquired the right to annual paid leave on January 1, 1994 as compensation for labor performed from January 1, 1993 to December 31, 1993, but retired at the end of June or end of July of that year, before the lapse of one year from that time, and it is only natural that they may claim payment of the allowance corresponding to the number of days of annual leave that they were thereby no longer able to use.
The judgment below, having determined otherwise, committed an illegality affecting the judgment by misapprehending the legal principles concerning annual leave allowance or by misapprehending the facts, and the portion of the grounds of appeal pointing out this matter is well-founded.
C. Calculation of Annual Leave Allowance (Ordinary Wages)
"Article 31, Paragraph 1 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법시행령) (as amended by Presidential Decree No. 13997 on October 22, 1993) provides that 'ordinary wages' under the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법) means 'the hourly wage amount, daily wage amount, weekly wage amount, monthly wage amount, or piece-rate amount determined to be paid regularly and uniformly for prescribed labor or total labor to a worker.' Therefore, in principle, money or goods paid to a worker as compensation for prescribed labor or total labor, which are paid regularly and uniformly, constitute wages falling under ordinary wages. However, in light of the legislative purpose of the Labor Standards Act in guaranteeing a minimum floor for average wages and in recognizing ordinary wages as the standard for calculating extra pay such as overtime allowance, night work allowance, and holiday work allowance, dismissal notice allowance, etc., as well as the function and necessity of ordinary wages, in order for a certain wage to fall under ordinary wages, it must belong to fixed wages paid regularly and uniformly; therefore, wages whose payment or amount varies depending on actual work performance cannot be regarded as fixed wages and thus do not fall under ordinary wages" (see Supreme Court Decision 95Da2227 rendered on May 10, 1996; Supreme Court Decision 97Da28421 rendered on April 24, 1998, etc.).
Examining this case in light of these legal principles, according to the record, the meal allowance and transportation subsidy referred to in the judgment below (excluding cases where vehicle driving allowances, etc. were provided) were paid as a fixed monthly amount to all employees including the plaintiffs, and constitute money or goods determined to be paid for prescribed labor or total labor, and are also fixed wages paid regularly and uniformly; therefore, they fall under ordinary wages. The long-service allowance referred to in the judgment below is also not paid gratuitously irrespective of the quantity or quality of labor, but is paid as a fixed monthly amount, regardless of actual work performance, to those who have reached a certain length of service; therefore, being a fixed wage paid regularly and uniformly, it must be deemed to fall under ordinary wages. However, the overtime work allowance referred to in the judgment below is merely something determined to be paid for labor performed outside working hours, such as night work or holiday work, and cannot be said to be money or goods determined to be paid as compensation for prescribed labor or total labor; and the family allowance, likewise, being paid according to the number of dependents, cannot be regarded as being paid uniformly; therefore, these items of money are not included in ordinary wages.
Accordingly, the court below's determination that the overtime work allowance and family allowance do not fall under ordinary wages is justified, and no illegality as pointed out in the grounds of appeal can be found therein. However, the calculation of ordinary wages excluding the meal allowance, transportation subsidy, and long-service allowance, which fall under ordinary wages, constitutes an illegality affecting the judgment by misapprehending the legal principles concerning ordinary wages, and the portion of the grounds of appeal pointing out this matter is well-founded.
4. Conclusion
Therefore, the part of the judgment below concerning the plaintiffs' losing portion regarding annual leave allowance is reversed, and this part of the case is remanded to the court below, and the remainder of the appeal is all dismissed. This Judgment is rendered by the unanimous opinion of the Justices participating, as set forth in the Order.
Justice Lee Kyu-hong (Presiding Justice), Song Jin-hoon (Justice in Charge), Yoon Jae-sik, Yoon Jae-sik