[Plaintiffs, Appellees] Plaintiff 1 and 16 others (Attorney: Lee San Law Firm, Attorney in charge Lee Won-young)
[Defendant, Appellant] SK Life Insurance Co., Ltd. (Attorneys: Jipyong Law Firm, Attorneys in charge Cho Yong-hwan and 2 others)
[Lower Court Judgment] Seoul High Court Decision 2000Na53382 rendered on October 24, 2001
[Order]
All appeals are dismissed. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Defendant.
[Reasoning]
The grounds of appeal are examined.
1. As to the allegation of insufficient deliberation and violation of the rules of evidence
The court below recognized the facts stated in its judgment based on the evidence it adopted. Upon examining the relevant evidence in conjunction with the record, the lower court's fact-finding is deemed proper, and it cannot be said that there was any illegality in the lower court's judgment due to insufficient deliberation or misapprehension of facts in violation of the rules of evidence. Accordingly, this ground of appeal is not accepted.
2. As to the allegation of misapprehension of the legal principles concerning the effect of the submission of a letter of resignation
Where an employer terminates an employment relationship in the form of an accepted voluntary resignation by receiving a letter of resignation from an employee, if the employee, who had no intention to resign, was compelled to prepare and submit the letter of resignation, this in substance constitutes a termination of the employment relationship by the unilateral intention of the employer, and therefore amounts to a dismissal (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2000Du4675 rendered on May 14, 2002).
With respect to the submission of letters of resignation by Plaintiff 1, Plaintiff 2, Plaintiff 3, Plaintiff 4, Plaintiff 5, Plaintiff 6, Plaintiff 7, Plaintiff 8, Plaintiff 9, and Plaintiff 10, the court below determined, in light of the various circumstances set forth in its judgment, that these Plaintiffs, without any knowledge whatsoever as to whether their resignations would be accepted or the criteria for acceptance, understood the submission merely as a symbolic and formal act signifying their willingness to take responsibility for the company's deteriorating management, and, for the sole reason that it was a decision made by the company's upper management, prepared and submitted their letters of resignation involuntarily despite having no actual intention to resign; and that the acceptance of resignation letters submitted under such circumstances by Kookmin Life Insurance Co., Ltd. (hereinafter "Kookmin Life"), the pre-merger entity, and the consequent treatment of the Plaintiffs as having retired, in substance constituted a termination of the employment relationship by the unilateral intention of the employer, and thus amounted to a dismissal. With respect to the submission of letters of resignation by Plaintiff 11, Plaintiff 12, Plaintiff 13, Plaintiff 14, Plaintiff 15, Plaintiff 16, and Plaintiff 17, the court below, after finding the facts set forth in its judgment, further determined that the working conditions of the direct sales team ("Jikpan Team") to which these Plaintiffs belonged were, in comparison with other departments, so poor as to make it virtually impossible to provide normal labor; that these Plaintiffs submitted their letters of resignation because they could not withstand the company's demands that they resign under such working conditions; and that, considering as a whole the process by which the Plaintiffs were transferred to the Jikpan Team and eventually came to submit their letters of resignation, the Jikpan Team was nothing more than a department deliberately established not to perform its ostensible duties but rather to minimize the friction and backlash arising from dismissals; and that, even though the Plaintiffs' retirement formally took the shape of voluntary resignation, it is reasonable to view that the submission of the letters of resignation resulted from the company's active coercion aimed at avoiding an unlawful dismissal of specific employees, that the employees subject to retirement had in fact already been determined by the company, and that these Plaintiffs had no option other than to retire; and therefore, the retirement of these Plaintiffs in substance constituted a case in which the employer unilaterally terminated the employment relationship of employees who had no actual intention to resign, and thus amounted to a de facto dismissal.
Upon examination in conjunction with the record, the lower court's determination as above is acceptable in light of the aforementioned legal principles, and it cannot be said that there was any illegality due to misapprehension of the legal principles concerning the effect of the submission of a letter of resignation. Accordingly, this ground of appeal is likewise not accepted.
3. As to the allegation of misapprehension of the legal principles concerning ratification of a void act or the principle of good faith
Where an employee dismissed by the employer receives severance pay, etc. without raising any reservation of objection or condition, it is to be deemed, absent special circumstances, that the employee has accepted the validity of the dismissal; therefore, filing a lawsuit disputing the validity of the dismissal a long time after such receipt is not permissible as it violates the principle of good faith or the principle of estoppel. However, even in such a case, if there are objective circumstances indicating that the employee did not accept the validity of the dismissal and was disputing it, or if there are other circumstances suggesting that the employee received the payment under considerable justifiable reasons, then even where severance pay was received without an explicit reservation of objection, it should not be uniformly concluded that the validity of the dismissal was accepted (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 95Da51847 rendered on March 8, 1996).
The court below, comprehensively considering the evidence it adopted, found that the Plaintiffs had continuously protested to the company against the pressure to submit letters of resignation; that when the Plaintiffs and other employees submitted their letters of resignation, the company announced that, simultaneously with processing the resignations, it would raise the interest rate on loans that employees had borrowed from the company from 4% per annum to 22% per annum, whereupon some employees, fearing the resulting interest burden, offset their loans against their severance pay and received the remaining severance pay; and that, as for employees who did not receive their severance pay, the company unilaterally offset the loans against the severance pay and remitted the remaining severance pay to the employees' bank accounts. Based on these findings, the court below determined that it is reasonable to view that the Plaintiffs merely received the severance pay for fear of the disadvantages that might otherwise befall them; and further, comprehensively considering the circumstances before and after the Plaintiffs' dismissal, including the fact that the dismissed employees gathered on several occasions and raised objections with Kookmin Life, protesting that the company's unilateral acceptance of the resignations was unjust, the mere fact that some of the Plaintiffs temporarily worked at other workplaces after retirement, or that the Plaintiffs filed the instant lawsuit for invalidation of dismissal approximately 9 months to 1 year and 8 months after their dismissal, cannot be deemed to constitute ratification of the dismissal or to render the filing of the lawsuit contrary to the principle of good faith. Upon examination in conjunction with the record, the lower court's determination as above is acceptable in light of the aforementioned legal principles, and it cannot be said that there was any illegality due to misapprehension of the legal principles concerning ratification of a void act and the principle of good faith. Accordingly, this ground of appeal is likewise not accepted.
4. Conclusion
Therefore, all appeals are dismissed, and the costs of appeal are to be borne by the losing party. This judgment is rendered as set forth in the Order by the unanimous opinion of the Justices participating in the judgment.
Justice Kim Yong-dam (Presiding Justice), Yoo Ji-dam, Bae Ki-won (Justice in charge)