Workbear재주넘는곰
대법원 94다42082

Confirmation of Invalidity of Dismissal해고무효확인

Decided1995. 03. 24. Court대법원Employer won
AI-generated English translation (summary, key points, decision summary and full text) for reference only — not an official translation and without legal effect. The Korean original below is authoritative.
AI Easy read — AI summary of this decision
AI-generated summary for reference only — the Korean original below is authoritative.

This case concerns the validity and interpretation of an 'automatic retirement (당연퇴직)' clause applied to a worker who was detained and received a prison sentence (실형판결). The Supreme Court (대법원) ruled that such automatic retirement clauses are not designed to circumvent the Labor Standards Act's (근로기준법) dismissal restrictions, and that the term 'conviction' in this context refers specifically to a prison sentence that keeps the worker in continued detention. The Court held that once the grounds for automatic retirement arise, they do not disappear even if the worker is later released, and ruled in favor of the employer.

Key takeaways
  • CaseA detained worker received a prison sentence and was treated as automatically retired under the company's workplace rules; after later being released, the worker claimed the dismissal was invalid.
  • OutcomeThe Supreme Court (대법원) ruled that the automatic retirement clause was reasonable and valid, and that once the grounds for automatic retirement arose, subsequent release from detention did not retroactively nullify the effect.
  • LessonAutomatic retirement (당연퇴직) clauses in workplace rules can be valid within reasonable limits, so workers should be aware that a criminal conviction resulting in imprisonment may lead to termination of employment even before the case is fully resolved.
Issues
  • Whether the automatic retirement (당연퇴직) clause is invalid as an unlawful attempt to circumvent the dismissal restrictions under the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법)
  • The specific meaning of 'receiving a conviction for a criminal offense' as a trigger for automatic retirement
  • Whether the automatic retirement clause violates the presumption of innocence (무죄추정의 원칙)
  • Whether the grounds for automatic retirement disappear if circumstances later change, such as the worker's release from detention
Key reasoning

The Court reasoned that automatic retirement clauses in workplace rules are not inherently invalid attempts to evade the dismissal protections under the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법). Rather, such clauses are a reasonable response to a situation where the worker is physically unable to perform their job duties due to ongoing detention. The Court clarified that 'receiving a conviction for a criminal offense' in this context specifically means a prison sentence (실형판결) that results in continued physical confinement, not merely any criminal conviction. Because the automatic retirement clause is premised on the worker's inability to provide labor, once the triggering event (a prison sentence causing continued detention) occurs, the retirement takes legal effect at that point. Importantly, the Court held that this effect is not retroactively canceled even if the worker is later released from detention, since the cause for retirement had already legally materialized.

Summary of Decision (English, AI translation)

가. Where an employer has designated the occurrence of a certain event as a cause for automatic retirement (당연퇴직) and has established a procedure for such retirement different from that of ordinary dismissal or disciplinary dismissal, the disposition of automatic retirement based on such a cause shall, except where the cause for automatic retirement is deemed to be a cause for the automatic extinction of the employment relationship — such as the employee's death, retirement age, or expiration of the employment contract term — constitute a dismissal subject to the restrictions set forth in Article 27 of the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법). Accordingly, for a disposition of automatic retirement to be valid, there must be justifiable cause as prescribed in Article 27(1) of the Labor Standards Act. Therefore, the mere fact that a collective agreement or similar instrument does not require the procedures applicable to other disciplinary dismissals to be followed with respect to causes for automatic retirement does not render such provision invalid as an attempt to circumvent the dismissal restriction provisions of the Labor Standards Act. Furthermore, where, unlike in the case of ordinary disciplinary dismissal, no procedural provisions whatsoever are established for automatic retirement, it cannot be said that the other general disciplinary procedures must be followed in effecting a disposition of automatic retirement, except where the cause for automatic retirement is also identically prescribed as a cause for disciplinary action. This conclusion is not to be interpreted otherwise even where the cause for automatic retirement is substantively viewed as a ground for disciplinary action.

나. The meaning of "where a conviction has been rendered for a criminal offense," as prescribed as a cause for automatic retirement in a labor-management agreement or similar document, must be reasonably determined in light of the purport of the provision and the content of the other causes for automatic retirement. In a case where the other causes for automatic retirement or automatic dismissal prescribed in the labor-management agreement or the rules of employment (취업규칙) consist of situations such as ① where the employee has indicated an intention not to provide labor, ② where, by the nature of the circumstance, the employee is unable to provide labor, and ③ where the prescribed period of employment has expired, the court held that, in light of these provisions, the purport of the above provision is properly construed to mean a state in which, based on the fact that "a state of inability to perform the employee's fundamental obligation under the employment contract, namely the obligation to provide labor, has continued for a long period of time," there would be no room for the employee to raise an objection even if the employer were to place the employee on automatic retirement — that is, a case where an employee who has been detained due to a criminal offense receives a conviction (e.g., a sentence of actual imprisonment) of such content that the state of physical detention rendering actual provision of labor impossible is not resolved.

다. So long as the meaning of "where a conviction has been rendered for a criminal offense," as a cause for automatic retirement, is construed as set forth in item 나 above, the automatic retirement provision of the labor-management agreement or the automatic dismissal provision of the rules of employment cannot be said to violate the principle of presumption of innocence.

라. Once the cause for automatic retirement set forth in item 나 has arisen, it cannot be said that the cause for automatic retirement is extinguished merely because of a subsequent change in circumstances, such as the release of the detained employee from custody, absent circumstances such as the cause having been rescinded.

Full text (English, AI translation) 13,836 chars

[Plaintiff, Appellant]

[Defendant, Appellee] Daewoo Kijeon Industrial Co., Ltd., Attorneys Park Eun-su and 1 other, Counsel for the Defendant

[Judgment of Remand]

Supreme Court Decision 92Da54210, decided October 26, 1993

[Order]

The appeal is dismissed.
The costs of the appeal are to be borne by the Plaintiff.

[Reasoning]

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. As to Grounds 1 and 5

Where an employer stipulates the occurrence of a certain event as a ground for automatic retirement (당연퇴직) and treats the procedure differently from an ordinary dismissal or disciplinary dismissal, the disposition of automatic retirement based on such ground shall be deemed a dismissal subject to the restrictions under Article 27 of the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법), except where the ground for automatic retirement is regarded as a cause for the automatic extinction of the employment relationship, such as the employee's death, retirement age, or expiration of the term of the employment contract. Accordingly, for a disposition of automatic retirement to be valid, there must be a justifiable reason as provided in Article 27, Paragraph 1 of the Labor Standards Act. Therefore, the mere fact that a collective agreement or the like does not require that the procedures applicable to other disciplinary dismissals be followed with respect to grounds for automatic retirement does not render such provision void as an attempt to circumvent the dismissal-restriction provisions of the Labor Standards Act. Where, as in the case of automatic retirement, no procedural provisions are established that differ from those for ordinary disciplinary dismissal, it cannot be said that the other general disciplinary procedures must be followed in effecting the automatic retirement disposition, except where the ground for automatic retirement is also identically stipulated as a ground for disciplinary action.

This conclusion is not to be interpreted otherwise even where the ground for automatic retirement is substantively regarded as a ground for disciplinary action.

Article 23 of the Labor-Management Agreement (노사합의서) concluded between the Defendant Company and the Defendant Company's labor union, which was in effect at the time of the automatic retirement disposition in this case, stipulates grounds for automatic retirement separately from grounds for disciplinary action, and Article 9 of the Defendant Company's Rules of Employment (취업규칙) likewise stipulates grounds for automatic dismissal (당연면직) and dismissal by administrative authority (직권면직), among others, separately from grounds for disciplinary action and dismissal grounds; while it provides procedures, etc. with respect to disciplinary action, it contains no provisions whatsoever regarding procedures for automatic retirement, etc.

Therefore, in this case, the provisions of the aforementioned Labor-Management Agreement, collective agreement, and Rules of Employment, which designate "having been convicted of a criminal offense" as a ground for automatic retirement, cannot be deemed void as an attempt to circumvent the dismissal-restriction provisions of the Labor Standards Act, and the disciplinary procedure provisions are not to be applied to the automatic retirement disposition made pursuant thereto. Accordingly, the arguments premised on a contrary view are all without merit.

2. As to Ground 2

A. As stated above, the meaning of "having been convicted of a criminal offense," as stipulated as a ground for automatic retirement in the Labor-Management Agreement and the like, must be reasonably determined in light of the purpose of the provision and the content of the other grounds for automatic retirement.

In this case, the grounds for automatic retirement or automatic dismissal stipulated in the Labor-Management Agreement or the Rules of Employment, aside from "having been convicted of a criminal offense," consist of: (1) cases where the employee has expressly or implicitly indicated the absence of any intention to provide labor (where the employee has submitted a letter of resignation; where, upon expiration of the prescribed period of leave of absence or extinction of the ground for such leave, the employee fails to submit a request for reinstatement despite there being no impediment to reinstatement, such that the employee is deemed to have no intention to return to work; where the employee fails to respond to the company's request to return to work following unauthorized absence; where a person drafted into military service converts to a career soldier); (2) cases where, by their nature, the employee is unable to provide labor (death, adjudication of quasi-incompetency or incompetency, or adjudication of bankruptcy); and (3) cases where the anticipated period of labor has expired (retirement age, expiration of the employment contract term). In light of the content of these provisions, it is reasonable to interpret the purpose of designating "having been convicted of a criminal offense" as a ground for automatic retirement as likewise being grounded in "the fact that a state of inability to perform the fundamental obligation of providing labor under the employment contract has continued for a long period," such that the employer may effect automatic retirement of the employee without the employee having any room to raise an objection—that is, as referring to a case where an employee who has been detained for a criminal offense receives a guilty verdict of a nature such that the state of physical detention, which renders actual provision of labor impossible, is not resolved (e.g., a sentence of actual imprisonment without suspension).

Therefore, so long as the meaning of "having been convicted of a criminal offense," as stipulated as the ground for automatic retirement in this case, is interpreted as above, the automatic retirement provision of the Labor-Management Agreement or the automatic dismissal provision of the Rules of Employment cannot be said to violate the principle of presumption of innocence.

The Plaintiff argues that, since a leave of absence due to an employee's extended detention lasts only until the finalization of the judgment, the above ground for automatic retirement means "the case of having received a finalized guilty judgment for a criminal offense." However, the Labor-Management Agreement or Rules of Employment applicable at the time of the automatic retirement disposition in this case contained no separate provision granting a leave of absence to a person detained for a criminal offense; rather, such a case was merely treated as one in which there existed an unavoidable circumstance recognized by the company (see Article 21, Paragraph 1, Item (c) of the Labor-Management Agreement; Article 10.1, Item (1), Sub-item (d) of the Rules of Employment), permitting the company to grant a leave-of-absence disposition, provided that even in such a case, the period thereof could not exceed three months. Moreover, the separate provision the Plaintiff refers to, granting a leave of absence to a person detained for a criminal offense, first appeared in Article 22, Paragraph 1, Item (c) of the collective agreement concluded in May 1991, after the automatic retirement disposition in this case; and even under that provision, it merely states that the period of leave of absence may not exceed the period until the finalization of the sentence, not that the period of leave of absence must extend until the finalization of the sentence.

The Plaintiff further argues that, pursuant to the Agreement dated June 12, 1990, it was agreed that no personnel action would be taken against detained employees whose sentences had not yet been finalized, and that therefore the meaning of "having been convicted of a criminal offense," as the ground for automatic retirement, must be interpreted as "when a finalized guilty judgment has been received." However, as will be discussed below, the said Agreement merely provides, in connection with the 1990 wage negotiations, that the timing at which personnel action may be taken against a detained employee is to be deferred until the finalization of the sentence; accordingly, the meaning of "having been convicted of a criminal offense," as the ground for automatic retirement, cannot be interpreted, on the basis of the said agreement, as meaning "when a finalized guilty judgment has been received."

B. The Plaintiff further contends that even if the meaning of "having been convicted of a criminal offense" is interpreted, on the basis of the practical impossibility of providing labor, as referring to a case of having received a sentence of actual imprisonment in the first instance, the Plaintiff, at the time of the automatic retirement disposition against him in this case, had already been released after being sentenced to a suspended sentence in the appellate court, and thus the ground for automatic retirement had ceased to exist. However, once a ground for automatic retirement has arisen, the ground for automatic retirement cannot be said to be extinguished merely because of a subsequent change in circumstances, absent circumstances such as the ground being rescinded; nor can circumstances such as those asserted by the Plaintiff be said to result in the extinguishment of the ground for automatic retirement. Moreover, in this case, as will be discussed below, with respect to employees detained in connection with the 1990 wage negotiations, as in the Plaintiff's case, a labor-management agreement had been reached to defer personnel action until the finalization of the sentence; thus, although a ground for automatic retirement had already arisen (in the Plaintiff's case, he was detained on June 13, 1990 due to his own unlawful act, and approximately four months later, on September 8 of the same year, was sentenced in the first instance to one year of imprisonment without suspension, and approximately four months and sixteen days thereafter, on January 25, 1991, was sentenced to one year of imprisonment with a two-year suspension of execution), if it were held that the ground for automatic retirement was extinguished merely because the detainee's body was released in the course of deferring the personnel action pursuant to the aforementioned labor-management agreement, this would defeat the purpose of designating "having been convicted of a criminal offense" (i.e., having received a sentence of actual imprisonment in the first instance) as a ground for automatic retirement on the basis of a prolonged failure to provide labor; therefore, such an interpretation cannot be adopted.

Although there are aspects of the court below's interpretation of the meaning of "having been convicted of a criminal offense" that are not appropriate, its conclusion that the meaning thereof refers, as stated above, to a case of having received a sentence of actual imprisonment in the first instance is, in the end, justified; therefore, the arguments premised on a contrary view are likewise without merit.

3. As to Ground 3

Although a ground for automatic retirement under the Labor-Management Agreement and Rules of Employment had arisen with respect to the Plaintiff, who had been detained for an extended period for a criminal offense and had failed to provide labor, following the rendering of a guilty judgment of actual imprisonment in the first instance, the Defendant, pursuant to the Labor-Management Agreement dated June 12, 1990 between the Defendant Company's labor union and the Defendant Company, did not effect an automatic retirement disposition against the Plaintiff, whose body remained detained and was not released; however, upon the rendering of a judgment in the appellate court on January 25, 1991, sentencing the Plaintiff to one year of imprisonment with a two-year suspension of execution, and upon his release, the Defendant immediately effected an automatic retirement disposition against the Plaintiff on the 29th of the same month. This is to be deemed a justified act in accordance with the aforementioned agreement.

Although there is an error in the court below's judgment in that it interpreted the content of the aforementioned agreement differently, its conclusion in rejecting the Plaintiff's argument that the automatic retirement disposition in this case violates the aforementioned Agreement dated June 12, 1990 is justified; therefore, this argument is without merit.

4. As to Ground 4

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below held that the Defendant Company's automatic retirement disposition against the Plaintiff was lawful, and it is thus clear that the court below rendered its judgment with respect to the Defendant's automatic retirement disposition against the Plaintiff dated January 29, 1991. However, while so holding, the court below erred in determining, on the one hand, that the date on which the ground for automatic retirement against the Plaintiff arose was June 26, 1991, and that the Defendant was therefore obligated to pay wages to the Plaintiff from January 29 of that year until June 26 of that year. Nevertheless, in this case, in which only the Plaintiff has appealed, the argument that the aforementioned error of the court below constitutes an unlawfulness in violation of the principle of party presentation (변론주의) and the principle of party autonomy (당사자주의) does not constitute a lawful ground for appeal.

5. Accordingly, all of the grounds of appeal are without merit, and the appeal is hereby dismissed, with the costs of the appeal to be borne by the losing party, the Plaintiff. This judgment is rendered as set forth in the Order, the opinions of the participating Justices being unanimous.

Justices Kim Hyeong-seon (Presiding Justice), Park Man-ho (Justice in Charge), Park Jun-seo, Lee Yong-hun

【판결요지】

가. 사용자가 어떤 사유의 발생을 당연퇴직사유로 규정하고 그 절차를 통상의 해고나 징계해고와 달리 한 경우에 그 당연퇴직사유가 근로자의 사망이나 정년, 근로계약기간의 만료 등 근로관계의 자동소멸사유로 보여지는 경우를 제외하고는 이에 따른 당연퇴직처분은 근로기준법 제27조 소정의 제한을 받는 해고라고 할 것이고, 따라서 당연퇴직처분이 유효하려면 근로기준법 제27조 제1항 소정의 정당한 이유가 있어야 하는 것이므로, 단체협약 등에서 당연퇴직사유에 대하여 다른 징계해고에 관한 절차 등을 거치도록 규정하고 있지 않다 하여 그것이 근로기준법상의 해고제한 규정을 회피하려는 것으로서 무효라고 할 수 없고, 이처럼 당연퇴직에 대하여 일반의 징계해고와 달리 아무런 절차규정을 두고 있지 아니한 경우에는 당연퇴직사유가 동일하게 징계사유로도 규정되어 있는 경우를 제외하고는 당연퇴직처분을 함에 있어서 다른 일반의 징계절차를 거쳐야 한다고 할 수 없으며, 이는 당연퇴직사유가 실질적으로 징계사유로 보여지는 경우에도 달리 해석할 것은 아니다.

나. 노사합의서 등에 당연퇴직사유로 규정된 “형사상의 범죄로 유죄판결을 받았을 경우”의 의미는 그 규정취지나 다른 당연퇴직사유의 내용 등에 비추어 합리적으로 판단하여야 할 것인데, 노사합의서나 취업규칙에 규정된 다른 당연퇴직사유나 당연면직사유가 ① 근로자가 근로제공의사가 없음을 표시한 경우, ② 그 성질상 근로자가 근로제공을 할 수 없는 경우, ③ 예정된 근로기간이 만료된 경우 등인 점에 비추어 위 규정의 취지는 “근로계약에 따른 근로자의 기본적인 의무인 근로제공의무를 이행할 수 없는 상태가 장기간 계속되어 왔음”을 근거로 하여 사용자가 근로자를 당연퇴직시켜도 근로자측에서 이의를 제기할 여지가 없을 정도의 상태, 즉 형사상 범죄로 구속되어 있는 근로자가 현실적인 근로제공이 불가능한 신체의 구속상태가 해소되지 아니하는 내용의 유죄판결(예컨대, 실형판결)을 받은 경우를 의미한다고 풀이함이 상당하다고 한 사례.

다. 당연퇴직사유로 규정되어 있는 “형사상의 범죄로 유죄판결을 받았을 경우”의 의미를 ‘나’항과 같이 풀이하는 한 이와 같은 노사합의서의 당연퇴직규정이나 취업규칙의 당연면직규정이 무죄추정의 원칙에 반하는 것이라고 할 수 없다.

라. ‘나’항의 당연퇴직사유가 일단 발생한 이상 그것이 취소되는 등의 사정이 없는 한 그 후에 구속된 근로자의 신병이 석방되는 사정의 변화가 있다고 하여 당연퇴직사유가 소멸한다고 할 수 없다.

【참조조문】

가.나.다.라. 근로기준법 제27조 제1항 / 다. 헌법 제27조 제4항

【참조판례】

가.나.다. 대법원 1992.11.13. 선고 92누6082 판결(공1993상,135), 1993.5.25. 선고 92누12452 판결(공1993하,1893) / 가. 대법원 1993.10.26. 선고 92다54210 판결(공1993하,3160) / 나. 대법원 1993.5.11. 선고 92다20712 판결(공1993하,1672)

【주문】·【이유】 전문 4,661자 · 펼쳐 보기

【원고, 상고인】

【피고, 피상고인】 대우기전공업 주식회사 소송대리인 변호사 박은수 외 1인

【환송판결】 대법원 1993.10.26. 선고 92다54210 판결

【주 문】

상고를 기각한다.

상고비용은 원고의 부담으로 한다.

【이 유】 상고이유를 본다.

1. 제1점, 제5점에 대하여

사용자가 어떤 사유의 발생을 당연퇴직사유로 규정하고 그 절차를 통상의 해고나 징계해고와 달리 한 경우에 그 당연퇴직사유가 근로자의 사망이나 정년, 근로계약기간의 만료 등 근로관계의 자동소멸사유로 보여지는 경우를 제외하고는 이에 따른 당연퇴직처분은 근로기준법 제27조 소정의 제한을 받는 해고라고 할 것이고, 따라서 당연퇴직처분이 유효하려면 근로기준법 제27조 제1항 소정의 정당한 이유가 있어야 하는 것이므로, 단체협약 등에서 당연퇴직사유에 대하여 다른 징계해고에 관한 절차등을 거치도록 규정하고 있지 않다 하여 그것이 근로기준법상의 해고제한 규정을 회피하려는 것으로써 무효라고 할 수 없고, 이처럼 당연퇴직에 대하여 일반의 징계해고와 달리 아무런 절차규정을 두고 있지 아니한 경우에는 당연퇴직사유가 동일하게 징계사유로도 규정되어 있는 경우를 제외하고는 당연퇴직처분을 함에 있어서 다른 일반의 징계절차를 거쳐야 한다고 할 수 없다.

이는 당연퇴직사유가 실질적으로 징계사유로 보여지는 경우에도 달리 해석할 것은 아니다.

이 사건 당연퇴직처분 당시 적용되던 피고 회사와 피고 회사 노동조합 사이에 체결된 노사합의서 제23조에는 징계사유와는 별도로 당연퇴직사유를 규정하고 있고, 피고 회사의 취업규칙 제9조에도 징계사유 및 해고사유와는 별도로 당연면직 및 직권면직사유 등을 규정하고 있으면서 징계에 관하여는 그 절차 등을 규정하고 있으나 당연퇴직절차 등에 대하여는 아무런 규정을 두고 있지 아니하다.

따라서 이 사건의 경우 “형사상의 범죄로 유죄판결을 받았을 경우”를 당연퇴직사유로 삼고 있는 위 노사합의서, 단체협약, 취업규칙 등의 규정이 근로기준법의 해고제한 규정을 회피하기 위한 것으로써 무효라고 할 수 없고, 이에 따른 당연퇴직처분에 징계절차규정이 적용될 것은 아니라 할 것이므로 이와 다른 견해에 선 논지는 모두 이유가 없다.

2. 제2점에 대하여

가. 위와 같이 노사합의서 등에 당연퇴직사유로 규정된 “형사상의 범죄로 유죄판결을 받았을 경우”의 의미는 그 규정취지나 다른 당연퇴직사유의 내용 등에 비추어 합리적으로 판단하여야 할 것이다.

이 사건의 경우 노사합의서나 취업규칙에 규정된 당연퇴직사유나 당연면직사유는 “형사상의 범죄로 유죄판결을 받았을 경우”를 제외하고는 ① 근로자가 명시적 또는 묵시적으로 근로제공의사가 없음을 표시한 경우(사직원을 제출한 경우, 소정의 휴직기간이 종료하거나 휴직사유가 소멸하여 복직함에 아무런 지장이 없음에도 근로자가 복직원을 제출하지 아니하여 복직의사가 없는 것으로 인정되는 경우, 무단결근 후 회사의 취업요구에 응답하지 아니한 경우, 군입대자가 직업군인으로 전환한 경우) ② 그 성질상 근로자가 근로제공을 할 수 없는 경우(사망하거나 한정치산 및 금치산, 파산 선고를 받은 경우) ③ 예정된 근로기간이 만료된 경우(정년, 근로계약기간의 만료) 등으로 되어 있는바, 이러한 규정내용 등에 비추어 “형사상의 범죄로 유죄판결을 받았을 경우”를 당연퇴직사유로 한 취지도 “근로계약에 따른 근로자의 기본적인 의무인 근로제공의무를 이행할 수 없는 상태가 장기간 계속되어 왔음”을 근거로 하여 사용자가 근로자를 당연퇴직시켜도 근로자측에서 이의를 제기할 여지가 없을 정도의 상태, 즉 형사상 범죄로 구속되어 있는 근로자가 현실적인 근로제공이 불가능한 신체의 구속상태가 해소되지 아니하는 내용의 유죄판결(예컨대, 실형판결)을 받은 경우를 의미한다고 풀이함이 상당하다 할 것이다.

따라서 이 사건 당연퇴직사유로 규정되어 있는 “형사상의 범죄로 유죄판결을 받았을 경우”의 의미를 이와 같이 풀이하는 한 이와 같은 노사합의서의 당연퇴직규정이나 취업규칙의 당연면직규정이 무죄추정의 원칙에 반하는 것이라고 할 수는 없다.

원고는 근로자의 장기구속에 따른 휴직은 판결확정시까지이므로 위 당연퇴직사유는 “형사상의 범죄로 유죄의 확정판결을 받은 경우”를 의미한다고 주장하나 이 사건 당연퇴직처분 당시 적용되던 노사합의서나 취업규칙에는 형사상 범죄로 구속된 자에 대하여 휴직한다는 별도의 규정을 두고 있지 아니하고 단지 그러한 경우에는 회사가 인정하는 부득이한 사유가 있는 경우{노사합의서 제21조 제1항의 다., 취업규칙 제10.1조의 (1)의 (라) 참조}로 보아 회사가 휴직처분을 할 수 있으나 이와 같은 경우에도 그 기간은 3개월을 초과할 수 없다고 되어 있다. 그리고 원고가 주장하는 형사상 범죄로 구속된 자에 대하여 휴직한다는 별도의 규정을 둔 것은 이 사건 당연퇴직처분 후인 1991.5.에 체결된 단체협약 제22조 제1항 다.의 규정이 처음이고, 이에 따르더라도 그 휴직기간은 형확정시까지의 기간을 초과할 수 없다는 것일뿐 휴직기간을 형확정시까지 하여야 한다는 것은 아니라 할 것이다.

원고는 다시 1990.6.12.자 합의서에 의하여 구속자 중 형이 확정되지 아니한 인원은 인사상 조치를 취하지 아니하도록 합의하였으므로 당연퇴직사유로 되어 있는 “형사상의 범죄로 유죄판결을 받았을 경우”의 의미는 “유죄의 확정판결을 받은 때”라고 해석하여야 한다고 주장하나 위 합의서는 뒤에서 보는 바와 같이 1990년도 임금협상과 관련하여 구속중인 근로자에 대하여 인사조치를 할 수 있는 시기를 형확정시까지 유보한다는 내용에 불과하므로 위 합의에 근거하여 당연퇴직사유로 되어 있는 “형사상의 범죄로 유죄판결을 받았을 경우”의 의미가 “유죄의 확정판결을 받았을 때”를 의미하는 것으로 해석할 수는 없다.

나. 원고는 다시 “형사상의 범죄로 유죄판결을 받았을 경우”의 의미를 현실적인 근로제공이 사실상 불가능한 상황을 근거로 하여 제1심에서 실형판결을 받은 경우라고 해석한다 하더라도 원고에 대한 이 사건 당연퇴직처분 당시에 원고는 항소심에서 집행유예의 판결을 선고받아 석방되었으므로 당연퇴직사유는 소멸하였다는 취지로 다투나 일단 당연퇴직사유가 발생한 이상 그것이 취소되는 등의 사정이 없는 한 그 후에 사정의 변화가 있다고 하여 당연퇴직사유가 소멸한다고 할 수 없고, 원고 주장과 같은 사유가 당연퇴직사유의 소멸을 초래하는 것이라고 할 수도 없다. 더욱이 이 사건의 경우 원고와 같이 1990년 임금협상과 관련하여 구속중인 근로자에 대하여는 뒤에서 보는 바와 같이 그 형의 확정시까지 인사조치를 유보하도록 노사합의가 이루어져 있었으므로 일단 당연퇴직사유가 발생하였음에도(원고의 경우 자신의 범법행위로 1990.6.13. 구속되어 4개월 가량 지난 같은 해 9.8.에 제1심에서 징역 1년의 실형선고를 받고 그로부터 4개월 16일 정도가 지난 1991.1.25.에 징역 1년에 집행유예 2년의 형을 선고 받았다.) 위 노사합의에 따라 그 인사조치를 유보하여야 하는 과정에서 구속자의 신병이 석방되었다고 하여 당연퇴직사유가 소멸한다고 하면 장기간 근로제공을 하지 아니하였음을 근거로 “형사상의 범죄로 유죄판결을 받았을 경우”(즉 1심에서 실형선고를 받은 경우)를 당연퇴직사유로 삼은 취지가 몰각되는 것이므로 그와 같이 해석할 수는 없다.

원심이 “형사상의 범죄로 유죄판결을 받았을 경우”의 의미를 해석함에 있어서 그 판시에 적절하지 아니한 점은 있으나 그 의미를 위와 같이 1심에서 실형선고를 받은 경우로 본 것은 결론적으로 정당하므로 이와 다른 견해에 선 논지도 이유가 없다.

3. 제3점에 대하여

피고가 형사상의 범죄로 장기간 구속되어 근로제공을 하지 아니한 원고에 대하여 제1심의 유죄실형판결이 선고되어 노사합의서 및 취업규칙 소정의 당연퇴직사유가 발생하였음에도 피고 회사 노동조합과 피고 회사 사이의 1990.6.12.자 노사합의에 따라 그 신병이 석방되지 아니하여 구속된 상태로 되어 있는 원고에 대하여 당연퇴직처분을 하지 못하다가 1991.1.25. 항소심에서 징역 1년에 2년간 집행유예의 판결이 선고되어 그 신병이 석방되자 곧바로 피고가 원고에 대하여 같은 달 29.에 당연퇴직처분을 한 것은 위 합의에 따른 것으로 정당한 것이라 할 것이다.

원심판결에 위 합의서 내용을 이와 다르게 해석한 잘못이 있기는 하나 이 사건 당연퇴직처분이 위 1990.6.12.자 합의에 반한다는 원고의 주장을 배척한 결론은 정당하므로 논지는 이유가 없다.

4. 제4점에 대하여

원심판결 이유에 의하면, 피고 회사의 원고에 대한 당연퇴직처분이 적법하다고 판시하고 있으므로 원심은 피고의 원고에 대한 1991.1.29.자 당연퇴직처분에 대하여 판단하고 있음이 분명하다. 다만 원심이 위와 같이 판시하면서도 한편으로는 원고에 대한 당연퇴직사유가 발생한 날을 1991.6.26.이라고 보아 피고는 원고에 대하여 같은 해 1.29.부터 같은 해 6.26.까지의 급료지급의무가 있다고 판단한 것은 잘못이라 할 것이나 원고만이 상고한 이 사건에 있어서 원심의 위와 같은 잘못을 들어 원심판결에 변론주의 및 당사자주의에 위배한 위법이 있다는 주장은 적법한 상고이유가 되지 못한다.

5. 따라서 상고논지들은 모두 이유가 없으므로 이를 기각하고 상고비용은 패소한 원고의 부담으로 하기로 관여 법관의 의견이 일치되어 주문과 같이 판결한다.

대법관 김형선(재판장) 박만호(주심) 박준서 이용훈

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