[Defendant] Defendant 1 and 10 others
[Appellant] The Defendants and the Prosecutor (as to Defendant 1, Defendant 2, Defendant 3, Defendant 4, Defendant 5, Defendant 7, Defendant 8, Defendant 9, Defendant 10, and Defendant 11)
[Defense Counsel] Attorney Kwon Yu-rim and 18 others
[Judgment Below] Seoul High Court Decision 2020No486, 2018No3185 dated August 31, 2020
[Order]
The guilty portion of the judgment below as to Defendant 2 (including the portion not guilty in the reasoning), the not-guilty and dismissal portions concerning violations of the Act on the National Intelligence Service (국가정보원법) due to abuse of authority against employees of the National Intelligence Service, the guilty portion as to Defendant 7 (including the portion not guilty in the reasoning) and the not-guilty portion concerning violations of the Act on the National Intelligence Service due to abuse of authority against employees of the National Intelligence Service, and the guilty portion as to Defendant 9 and the not-guilty portion concerning violations of the Act on the National Intelligence Service due to abuse of authority against employees of the National Intelligence Service, are all reversed, and this portion of the case is remanded to the Seoul High Court. The appeals by Defendant 1, Defendant 3, Defendant 4, Defendant 5, Defendant 6, Defendant 10, and Defendant 11, the Prosecutor's appeals as to Defendant 1, Defendant 3, Defendant 4, Defendant 5, Defendant 10, and Defendant 11, and the remaining appeals as to Defendant 2, Defendant 7, and Defendant 9 are all dismissed. The prosecution against Defendant 8 is dismissed.
[Reasoning] The Court determines the grounds for appeal (as for documents submitted after the deadline for submission of the grounds for appeal, only to the extent that they supplement the grounds for appeal), among other matters.
1. Determination on Defendant 1's grounds of appeal
A. The part concerning violation of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes (hereinafter “Specific Crimes Aggravated Punishment Act”) (Loss of National Treasury, etc.)
1) An appeal to the Supreme Court is a post-trial review of the judgment of the appellate court, and the Supreme Court must review only the propriety of matters that were the subject of adjudication in the appellate court, within the scope of the grounds of appeal. As a result, grounds other than those asserted by the appellant as grounds of appeal or those which the appellate court took up ex officio as the subject of adjudication and ruled upon cannot be raised as grounds for appeal to the Supreme Court, and to include such matters again within the scope of review of the Supreme Court would be contrary to the post-trial review structure of the Supreme Court (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 2017Do16593-1, decided March 21, 2019).
2) Defendant 1's grounds of appeal are not matters that he asserted as grounds of appeal or that the court below took up ex officio as the subject of adjudication and ruled upon with respect to this part of the charges against Defendant 1. Therefore, Defendant 1's grounds of appeal cannot be regarded as lawful grounds of appeal.
B. The part concerning perjury
Defendant 1 appealed against the entirety of the judgment below, but did not state any grounds of objection concerning the perjury part in either the petition of appeal or the appellate brief.
2. Determination on Defendant 2's grounds of appeal
A. Whether there was an abuse of the power to prosecute due to separate indictment
1) Where it appears that a prosecutor exercised the power to prosecute arbitrarily, thereby causing substantial prejudice to the defendant and significantly departing from the discretionary power of prosecution, this may be regarded as an abuse of the power to prosecute, and the effect of the institution of prosecution may be denied. However, "arbitrary exercise of the power to prosecute" here requires more than mere negligence in the performance of official duties; at least some conditional intent must be present (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2018Do10447, decided September 28, 2018).
2) The court below determined, for the reasons stated in its judgment, that even though the institution of prosecution against Defendant 2 was made sequentially in nine separate indictments, such institution of prosecution did not constitute an arbitrary exercise of the power to prosecute that significantly departed from the discretionary power of prosecution.
Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the above legal principles and the record, there is no error in the lower court's determination that misapprehended the legal principles concerning abuse of the power to prosecute and thereby affected the judgment.
B. Whether there was a misapprehension of the legal principles concerning the meaning of a person prescribed in Article 2, Subparagraph 1 of the Act on the Responsibilities of Accounting Personnel, etc. (hereinafter “Accounting Personnel Responsibility Act”)
The court below determined, for the reasons stated in its judgment, with respect to each part of the violation of the Specific Crimes Aggravated Punishment Act (Loss of National Treasury, etc.) against Defendant 2 (limited to the guilty parts), that the Defendant fell under "a person who otherwise handles the accounting affairs of the State" as prescribed in Article 2, Subparagraph 1, Item (k) of the Accounting Personnel Responsibility Act, and thus satisfied the status requirement for the establishment of the crime of violation of the Specific Crimes Aggravated Punishment Act (Loss of National Treasury, etc.).
Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the relevant legal principles and the evidence lawfully adopted, there is no error in the lower court's determination that misapprehended the legal principles concerning the meaning of a person prescribed in Article 2, Subparagraph 1 of the Accounting Personnel Responsibility Act and thereby affected the judgment.
C. The part concerning violation of the Specific Crimes Aggravated Punishment Act (Loss of National Treasury, etc.) related to the online activities of the Psychological Warfare Unit (hereinafter “Psychological Warfare Unit”) under the Third Deputy Director of the National Intelligence Service (hereinafter “NIS”)
The court below found Defendant 2 guilty on this part of the charges, for the reasons stated in its judgment, on the premise that the entire budget paid in the name of activity expenses to the so-called "outer teams" linked to the cyber team of the Psychological Warfare Unit constituted the amount of loss to the national treasury.
Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the relevant legal principles and the evidence lawfully adopted, there is no error in the lower court's determination that misapprehended the legal principles concerning the calculation of the amount of loss to the national treasury and thereby failed to conduct the necessary examination.
D. Whether the finding of a reduced fact was unlawful
The court below found Defendant 2 guilty, for the reasons stated in its judgment, of occupational embezzlement as a reduced fact within the part concerning violation of the Specific Crimes Aggravated Punishment Act (Loss of National Treasury, etc.) related to the offline activities of the Psychological Warfare Unit against Defendant 2.
Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the relevant legal principles and the evidence lawfully adopted, there is no error in the lower court's determination that misapprehended the legal principles concerning the principle prohibiting analogical interpretation, which is a derivative principle of the principle of legality, and thereby affected the judgment.
E. The part concerning violation of the National Intelligence Service Act due to acts of political involvement through the incorporated foundation Non-Indicted Party 1 (hereinafter “Non-Indicted Party 1 Foundation”)
The court below found Defendant 2 guilty of this part of the charges against Defendant 2, for the reasons stated in its judgment, having determined that Defendant 2 engaged in acts of involvement in political activities through Non-Indicted Party 1 Foundation.
Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the relevant legal principles and the evidence lawfully adopted, there is no error in the lower court's determination that violated the rules of logic and experience and thereby exceeded the limits of free evaluation of evidence, or that misapprehended the legal principles concerning the meaning of "acts of involvement in political activities" prescribed in Article 9 of the former National Intelligence Service Act (before amendment by Act No. 12266, January 14, 2014) and thereby affected the judgment.
F. The part concerning violation of the Specific Crimes Aggravated Punishment Act (Loss of National Treasury, etc.) related to the activities of Non-Indicted Party 1 Foundation
The court below found Defendant 2 guilty of this part of the charges, for the reasons stated in its judgment, on the premise that the entire budget paid for the activities of Non-Indicted Party 1 Foundation constituted the amount of loss to the national treasury.
Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the relevant legal principles and the evidence lawfully adopted, there is no error in the lower court's determination that misapprehended the legal principles concerning the calculation of the amount of loss to the national treasury and thereby failed to conduct the necessary examination.
G. The part concerning violation of the Specific Crimes Aggravated Punishment Act (Loss of National Treasury, etc.) due to the delivery of 200 million won to Non-Indicted Party 2, Senior Secretary for General Affairs and Planning at the Blue House
The court below found this part of the charges guilty, for the reasons stated in its judgment, having determined that Defendant 2, in conspiracy with former President Non-Indicted Party 3, used the special project expenses of 200 million won—whose purpose was strictly limited to the scope of the NIS's duties—for the purchase of Blue House commemorative gifts, which fell outside the scope of the NIS's duties.
Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the relevant legal principles and the evidence lawfully adopted, there is no error in the lower court's determination that violated the rules of logic and experience and thereby exceeded the limits of free evaluation of evidence, or that misapprehended the legal principles concerning the legal nature of NIS special project expenses and the intent of unlawful acquisition, and thereby affected the judgment.
H. The part concerning occupational embezzlement due to the delivery of 50 million won to Non-Indicted Party 4, Deputy Senior Secretary for Civil Affairs II at the Blue House
The court below found guilty this part of the charges, for the reasons stated in its judgment, premised on the fact that Defendant 2 delivered 50 million won to Non-Indicted Party 4, Deputy Senior Secretary for Civil Affairs II at the Blue House.
Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the relevant legal principles and the evidence lawfully adopted, there is no error in the lower court's determination that violated the rules of logic and experience and thereby exceeded the limits of free evaluation of evidence, and thereby affected the judgment.
I. The part concerning violation of the Specific Crimes Aggravated Punishment Act (Loss of National Treasury, etc.) and bribery due to the delivery of 100 million won to National Assembly member Non-Indicted Party 5
1) The court below determined, for the reasons stated in its judgment, that the institution of prosecution on this part did not constitute an arbitrary exercise of the power to prosecute that significantly departed from the discretionary power of prosecution.
Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the relevant legal principles and the record, there is no error in the lower court's determination that misapprehended the legal principles concerning abuse of the power to prosecute and thereby affected the judgment.
2) The court below found guilty this part of the charges, for the reasons stated in its judgment, premised on the fact that Defendant 2 delivered 100 million won to National Assembly member Non-Indicted Party 5.
Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the relevant legal principles and the evidence lawfully adopted, there is no error in the lower court's determination that violated the rules of logic and experience and thereby exceeded the limits of free evaluation of evidence, and thereby affected the judgment.
J. The part concerning violation of the Specific Crimes Aggravated Punishment Act (Loss of National Treasury, etc.) and bribery due to the delivery of USD 100,000 to President Non-Indicted Party 3
The court below found guilty this part of the charges, for the reasons stated in its judgment.
Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the relevant legal principles and the evidence lawfully adopted, there is no error in the lower court's determination that violated the rules of logic and experience and thereby exceeded the limits of free evaluation of evidence, and thereby affected the judgment.
K. The part concerning preparation of false official documents and uttering of falsely prepared official documents
The court below found guilty this part of the charges (excluding the part found not guilty in the reasoning), for the reasons stated in its judgment.
Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the relevant legal principles and the evidence lawfully adopted, there is no error in the lower court's determination that violated the rules of logic and experience and thereby exceeded the limits of free evaluation of evidence, or that misapprehended the legal principles concerning joint principal offenders through conspiracy, and thereby affected the judgment.
L. The part concerning each violation of the Specific Crimes Aggravated Punishment Act (Loss of National Treasury, etc.) and occupational embezzlement due to misappropriation of funds related to sham business entities (excluding the alternative charges)
1) Article 7 of the National Treasury Funds Management Act (「국고금 관리법」) provides that "the head of a central government agency shall pay its revenue under its jurisdiction into the national treasury and shall not use it directly, except where otherwise provided by other statutes." This may be evaluated as a further specification, from the revenue side, of the principle of comprehensive budgeting declared in Article 17 of the National Finance Act. Meanwhile, Article 2, Subparagraph 2 of the National Treasury Funds Management Act defines "revenue" as national treasury funds under Subparagraph 1, Item (a) of the same Article, such as taxes, being paid into the government revenue account or into a fund; and Subparagraph 1, Item (a) of the same Article defines "national treasury funds" as all cash, and things having the same value as cash as prescribed by Presidential Decree (hereinafter "cash, etc."), which are paid into the government revenue account or into a fund (referring to a fund under Article 3, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 2) pursuant to statutes or contracts, etc. Pursuant to Articles 5 and 6 of the same Act, revenue must be collected or received as prescribed by statute, and the head of a central government agency manages the affairs of collecting and receiving its "revenue under its jurisdiction."
Comprehensively considering the wording and purpose of the above statutory provisions, it is reasonable to interpret "revenue under its jurisdiction," the direct use of which is prohibited under Article 7 of the National Treasury Funds Management Act, as meaning cash, etc. that has been paid into the State pursuant to statutes or contracts, etc. and that is managed by the head of a central government agency through collection and receipt procedures.
2) The court below, for the reasons stated in its judgment, found that both the profits earned from the leasing business by the sham business entities that the NIS established and managed and operated (hereinafter "profits in the narrow sense") and the money received as support from the NIS and managed under the name of "provisional receipts" (hereinafter "the provisional receipts in this case") constituted "revenue under its jurisdiction," the direct use of which is prohibited under Article 7 of the National Treasury Funds Management Act; and on that basis, found that Defendant 2 used funds related to the sham business entities, whose direct use was prohibited, for projects falling outside the scope of the NIS's duties, and thus found this part of the charges guilty.
3) The Court examines the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the above legal principles, etc.
A) First, with respect to "profits in the narrow sense," among the funds related to the NIS's sham business entities, the profits in the narrow sense substantially constitute revenue earned by the NIS pursuant to lease contracts, etc., and thus constitute "revenue under its jurisdiction" as prescribed in Article 7 of the National Treasury Funds Management Act.
B) Next, with respect to "the provisional receipts in this case," considering all of the circumstances of the establishment and operational status of the sham business entities, the relationship between the NIS and the sham business entities, and the actual managing entity and method of managing the provisional receipts in this case, it is reasonable to view that the provisional receipts in this case merely retained the nature of budget allocated to the NIS while only the formal holder or form of custody thereof changed. If so, the provisional receipts in this case are not cash, etc. acquired by the State pursuant to "statutes or contracts, etc.," nor can they easily be regarded as "returned disbursements" that must be incorporated into "revenue" under Article 29, Paragraph 2 of the National Treasury Funds Management Act. Therefore, the lower court's determination that the provisional receipts in this case constituted "revenue under its jurisdiction" as prescribed in Article 7 of the National Treasury Funds Management Act cannot be readily accepted.
However, even if the provisional receipts in this case do not constitute "revenue under its jurisdiction," the direct use of which is prohibited, using the provisional receipts in this case—which have the character of NIS budget—for purposes falling outside the scope of the NIS's duties may still constitute the crime of violation of the Specific Crimes Aggravated Punishment Act (Loss of National Treasury, etc.) and the crime of occupational embezzlement. Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the relevant legal principles and the evidence lawfully adopted, the lower court's determination recognizing Defendant 2's intent of unlawful acquisition, premised on the fact that each project Defendant 2 pursued in relation to this part of the charges fell outside the scope of the NIS's duties, is justified.
4) In conclusion, although there is a partially inappropriate aspect in the lower court's reasoning as to whether the provisional receipts in this case constitute "revenue under its jurisdiction" under Article 7 of the National Treasury Funds Management Act, the lower court's conclusion finding this part of the charges guilty is justified, and there is no error therein, as alleged in the grounds of appeal, that violated the rules of logic and experience and thereby exceeded the limits of free evaluation of evidence, or that misapprehended the legal principles concerning the intent of unlawful acquisition, the scope of the NIS's duties, etc., and thereby affected the judgment.
M. The part concerning violation of the Specific Crimes Aggravated Punishment Act (Loss of National Treasury, etc.) due to fund support related to the "Third Federation of Trade Unions"
The court below found this part of the charges against Defendant 2 guilty, for the reasons stated in its judgment, having determined that Defendant 2 directed fund support related to the Third Federation of Trade Unions.
Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the relevant legal principles and the evidence lawfully adopted, there is no error in the lower court's determination that violated the rules of logic and experience and thereby exceeded the limits of free evaluation of evidence, and thereby affected the judgment.
N. The remaining parts
Defendant 2 appealed against the entirety of the guilty parts of the judgment below, but did not state any grounds of objection concerning the remaining parts in either the petition of appeal or the appellate brief.
3. Determination on Defendant 3's grounds of appeal
The court below, for the reasons stated in its judgment, upheld the first-instance judgment, which found guilty the part of the charges against Defendant 3 concerning violation of the Specific Crimes Aggravated Punishment Act (Loss of National Treasury, etc.) related to the online activities of the Psychological Warfare Unit and the part concerning occupational embezzlement related to the offline activities of the Psychological Warfare Unit.
Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the relevant legal principles and the evidence lawfully adopted, there is no error in the lower court's determination that misapprehended the legal principles concerning the intent of joint principal offenders through conspiracy and functional control over the act, or that violated the rules of logic and experience and thereby exceeded the limits of free evaluation of evidence, or that failed to conduct the necessary examination.
4. Determination on Defendant 4's grounds of appeal
Among Defendant 4's grounds of appeal, apart from the assertion of unreasonable sentencing, the remaining grounds are not matters that he asserted as grounds of appeal or that the appellate court took up ex officio as the subject of adjudication and ruled upon, and thus cannot be regarded as lawful grounds of appeal.
Pursuant to Article 383, Subparagraph 4 of the Criminal Procedure Act (「형사소송법」), an appeal to the Supreme Court on the ground of unreasonable sentencing is permitted only in cases where the death penalty, life imprisonment, or imprisonment with or without labor for ten years or more has been imposed. In this case, where a sentence lighter than the foregoing has been imposed on Defendant 4, the assertion that the sentence is too heavy and unreasonable cannot constitute a lawful ground of appeal.
5. Determination on Defendant 5's appeal
Defendant 5 did not submit an appellate brief within the period for submission of the grounds of appeal, and did not state any grounds in the petition of appeal.
6. Determination on Defendant 6's grounds of appeal
The court below, for the reasons stated in its judgment, upheld the first-instance judgment, which found the charges against Defendant 6 guilty.
Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the relevant legal principles and the evidence lawfully adopted, there is no error in the lower court's determination that violated the rules of logic and experience and thereby exceeded the limits of free evaluation of evidence, or that misapprehended the legal principles concerning the establishment of joint principal offenders, and thereby affected the judgment.
7. Determination on Defendant 7's grounds of appeal
A. The part concerning violation of the National Intelligence Service Act due to acts of political involvement against opposition-party politicians such as Non-Indicted Party 6 and Non-Indicted Party 7 in connection with the debate over universal welfare and the opposition party's assertion of halving tuition fees
The court below found this part of the charges against Defendant 7 guilty, for the reasons stated in its judgment, having determined that Defendant 7's functional control over the act with respect to this part of the offense could be recognized.
Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the relevant legal principles and the evidence lawfully adopted, there is no error in the lower court's determination that violated the rules of logic and experience and thereby exceeded the limits of free evaluation of evidence, or that misapprehended the legal principles concerning the requirements for the establishment of joint principal offenders through conspiracy, and thereby affected the judgment.
B. The part concerning occupational embezzlement due to expenditure of opinion poll costs
The court below found this part of the charges against Defendant 7 guilty, for the reasons stated in its judgment, having determined that Defendant 7's functional control over the act with respect to this part of the offense could be recognized.
Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the relevant legal principles and the evidence lawfully adopted, there is no error in the lower court's determination that violated the rules of logic and experience and thereby exceeded the limits of free evaluation of evidence, or that misapprehended the legal principles concerning the requirements for the establishment of joint principal offenders through conspiracy, and thereby affected the judgment.
C. The part concerning violation of the National Intelligence Service Act due to acts of political involvement against Non-Indicted Party 8 in connection with the document titled "Actual State of the Seoul Mayor's Left-Leaning Municipal Administration and Direction of Response"
The court below found this part of the charges against Defendant 7 guilty, for the reasons stated in its judgment, having determined that Defendant 7's functional control over the act with respect to this part of the offense could be recognized.
Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the relevant legal principles and the evidence lawfully adopted, there is no error in the lower court's determination that violated the rules of logic and experience and thereby exceeded the limits of free evaluation of evidence, or that misapprehended the legal principles concerning the requirements for the establishment of joint principal offenders through conspiracy, and thereby affected the judgment.
[Reasoning] (continued)
d. Violation of the National Intelligence Service Act (국가정보원법) due to political involvement in connection with the checking of Non-indicted 9's political activities
The lower court, citing the reasons stated in its judgment, found that Defendant 7's functional control over the act (기능적 행위지배) with respect to this part of the offense could be recognized, and thus found the facts charged in this part guilty.
Examining the reasoning of the lower court's judgment in light of the relevant legal principles and the evidence lawfully adopted, there is no error in the lower court's determination that violated the principles of logic and experience so as to exceed the limits of free evaluation of evidence, or that misapprehended the legal principles concerning the requirements for establishing joint principal offenders through conspiracy (공모공동정범), thereby affecting the judgment.
e. Violation of the National Intelligence Service Act due to political involvement through Non-indicted Corporation 1
The lower court, citing the reasons stated in its judgment, found Defendant 7 guilty of the facts charged in this part.
Examining the reasoning of the lower court's judgment in light of the relevant legal principles and the evidence lawfully adopted, there is no error in the lower court's determination that violated the principles of logic and experience so as to exceed the limits of free evaluation of evidence, or that misapprehended the legal principles concerning the prohibition of political involvement or the requirements for establishing joint principal offenders through conspiracy, thereby affecting the judgment.
f. Violation of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes (특정범죄 가중처벌 등에 관한 법률, hereinafter the "Specific Crimes Aggravated Punishment Act") (Loss to the National Treasury, etc.) in connection with the activities of Non-indicted Corporation 1
The lower court, citing the reasons stated in its judgment, found Defendant 7 guilty of the facts charged in this part.
Examining the reasoning of the lower court's judgment in light of the relevant legal principles and the evidence lawfully adopted, there is no error in the lower court's determination that violated the principles of logic and experience so as to exceed the limits of free evaluation of evidence, or that misapprehended the legal principles concerning joint principal offenders through conspiracy or the calculation of the amount of loss to the national treasury, thereby affecting the judgment.
g. Whether There Was Illegality in the Sentencing Hearing and the Method of Sentencing Determination
1) The matters set forth in Article 51 of the Criminal Act (형법) concerning the conditions for sentencing are construed as broadly falling within the discretionary authority of the court regarding the determination of punishment. Therefore, unless the Supreme Court, pursuant to Article 383, Subparagraph 4 of the Criminal Procedure Act (형사소송법), is reviewing a ground of appeal concerning the propriety of the sentence in a case where the death penalty, life imprisonment, or imprisonment with or without labor for ten years or more has been imposed, an argument that the court of fact-finding erred in its findings of fact regarding the basic facts for sentencing, or failed to properly examine the circumstances constituting the conditions for sentencing, cannot constitute a legitimate ground of appeal (see Supreme Court Decision 87Do1410 delivered on January 19, 1988; Supreme Court Decision 90Do1940 delivered on October 26, 1990; Supreme Court Decision 2020Do8358 delivered on September 3, 2020, etc.).
2) The argument raised as a ground of appeal in this part merely asserts that the lower court erred in its findings of fact regarding the basic facts for sentencing, and thus cannot constitute a legitimate ground of appeal in this case, where Defendant 7 was sentenced to imprisonment for 2 years and 6 months, among other punishments. The Supreme Court decisions cited in the grounds of appeal concern different facts from this case and are thus inappropriate to invoke in this case.
8. Determination on the Prosecution against Defendant 8
According to the record, it is recognized that Defendant 8 died on December 11, 2020, after the filing of the appeal in this case. Accordingly, pursuant to Articles 382 and 328(1)(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act, the prosecution against Defendant 8 is dismissed.
9. Determination on the Grounds of Appeal by Defendant 9
a. Violation of the National Intelligence Service Act due to political involvement with respect to opposition-party politicians such as Non-indicted 6 and Non-indicted 7, in connection with the debate on universal welfare and the opposition party's claim for halving university tuition
The lower court, citing the reasons stated in its judgment, found that Defendant 9's functional control over the act with respect to this part of the offense could be recognized, and thus found Defendant 9 guilty of the facts charged in this part.
Examining the reasoning of the lower court's judgment in light of the relevant legal principles and the evidence lawfully adopted, there is no error in the lower court's determination, such as failing to conduct the necessary examination while misapprehending the legal principles concerning the establishment of a conspiratorial relationship, or violating the principles of logic and experience so as to exceed the limits of free evaluation of evidence, thereby affecting the judgment.
b. Violation of the National Intelligence Service Act due to political involvement with respect to Non-indicted 8, in connection with the document titled "Status of the Left-leaning Administration of the Seoul Mayor and Countermeasures"
The lower court, citing the reasons stated in its judgment, found that Defendant 9's functional control over the act with respect to this part of the offense could be recognized, and thus found Defendant 9 guilty of the facts charged in this part.
Examining the reasoning of the lower court's judgment in light of the relevant legal principles and the evidence lawfully adopted, there is no error in the lower court's determination that violated the principles of logic and experience so as to exceed the limits of free evaluation of evidence, thereby affecting the judgment.
c. Violation of the Specific Crimes Aggravated Punishment Act (Loss to the National Treasury, etc.) due to financial support related to the Third Federation of Trade Unions
The lower court, citing the reasons stated in its judgment, found that Defendant 9's functional control over the act with respect to this part of the offense could be recognized, and thus found Defendant 9 guilty of the facts charged in this part.
Examining the reasoning of the lower court's judgment in light of the relevant legal principles and the evidence lawfully adopted, there is no error in the lower court's determination that violated the principles of logic and experience so as to exceed the limits of free evaluation of evidence, or that misapprehended the legal principles concerning the establishment of a conspiratorial relationship, thereby affecting the judgment.
10. Determination on the Grounds of Appeal by Defendant 10
The lower court, citing the reasons stated in its judgment, found Defendant 10 guilty of the primary facts charged (excluding the part found not guilty in the reasoning).
Examining the reasoning of the lower court's judgment in light of the relevant legal principles and the evidence lawfully adopted, there is no error in the lower court's determination that violated the principles of logic and experience so as to exceed the limits of free evaluation of evidence, or that misapprehended the legal principles concerning the requirements for establishing co-principals, thereby affecting the judgment.
11. Determination on the Grounds of Appeal by Defendant 11
The lower court, citing the reasons stated in its judgment, upheld the first instance judgment which found Defendant 11 guilty of the primary facts charged.
Examining the reasoning of the lower court's judgment in light of the relevant legal principles and the evidence lawfully adopted, there is no error in the lower court's determination that violated the rules of evidence, thereby affecting the judgment.
12. Determination on the Grounds of Appeal by the Prosecutor
a. Whether the First Instance Court's Measures Regarding the Amendment of the Indictment Were Lawful
1) According to the record, the following circumstances may be ascertained.
(a) On October 7, 2017, the prosecutor indicted Defendant 1 for perjury and violation of the Specific Crimes Aggravated Punishment Act (Loss to the National Treasury, etc.) in connection with the online activities of the Psychological Warfare Team (Seoul Central District Court Case No. 2017Gohap1008), and on December 7, 2017, indicted Defendant 2 and Defendant 3 for violation of the Specific Crimes Aggravated Punishment Act (Loss to the National Treasury, etc.) in connection with the online and offline activities of the Psychological Warfare Team (Seoul Central District Court Case No. 2017Gohap1241).
(b) On December 19, 2017, in Seoul Central District Court Case No. 2017Gohap1008, the prosecutor applied for an amendment of the indictment to add, to the facts charged against Defendant 1 for violation of the Specific Crimes Aggravated Punishment Act (Loss to the National Treasury, etc.), an offense of budget misappropriation related to the offline activities of the Psychological Warfare Team, and the court granted the amendment of the indictment on the same day.
(c) While the trial proceeded with the two cases consolidated, on December 31, 2018, the prosecutor applied for an amendment of the indictment to add, to the facts charged against Defendant 1, Defendant 2, and Defendant 3 for violation of the Specific Crimes Aggravated Punishment Act (Loss to the National Treasury, etc.), an offense of budget misappropriation related to offline activities concerning issues different from the offline activities of the Psychological Warfare Team in the existing facts charged, and the court granted the amendment of the indictment on September 23, 2019.
(d) On February 7, 2020, in pronouncing the first instance judgment, the court found, among other things, that "the offenses of budget misappropriation related to the offline activities of the Psychological Warfare Team are in a relationship of a single comprehensive crime (포괄일죄) only among the same issues, and otherwise are in a relationship of substantive concurrent crimes (실체적 경합범) with each other, and are also in a relationship of substantive concurrent crimes with the offense of budget misappropriation related to the online activities of the Psychological Warfare Team," and on this and other grounds, deemed the above respective decisions granting the amendment of the indictment to be unlawful and revoked them.
2) Examining the above circumstances in light of the relevant legal principles, the lower court's determination that the first instance court's measure of revoking the decisions granting the amendment of the indictment was justified can be affirmed, and there is no error therein, as argued in the grounds of appeal, of misapprehending the legal principles concerning the number of crimes (죄수), thereby affecting the judgment.
b. Whether There Was an Omission of Confiscation Equivalent (추징)
1) With respect to the parts concerning violation of the Specific Crimes Aggravated Punishment Act (Loss to the National Treasury, etc.) and occupational embezzlement related to the online and offline activities of the Psychological Warfare Team by Defendant 1, Defendant 2, and Defendant 3, the lower court, citing the reasons stated in its judgment, found that it had not been proven that the proceeds of the crime had actually accrued to the said defendants, and accordingly did not pronounce a confiscation equivalent corresponding to the amount of loss to the national treasury against the said defendants.
Examining the reasoning of the lower court's judgment in light of the relevant legal principles and the evidence lawfully adopted, there is no error in the lower court's determination of misapprehending the legal principles concerning confiscation equivalent.
2) With respect to the part concerning violation of the Specific Crimes Aggravated Punishment Act (Loss to the National Treasury, etc.) related to Defendant 2's activities in Non-indicted Corporation 1, the lower court, citing the reasons stated in its judgment, found that it had not been proven that the proceeds of the crime had actually accrued to the said defendant, and accordingly did not pronounce a confiscation equivalent corresponding to the amount of loss to the national treasury against Defendant 2.
Examining the reasoning of the lower court's judgment in light of the relevant legal principles and the evidence lawfully adopted, there is no error in the lower court's determination of misapprehending the legal principles concerning confiscation equivalent, thereby affecting the judgment.
3) With respect to the part concerning violation of the Specific Crimes Aggravated Punishment Act (Loss to the National Treasury, etc.) due to financial support related to the Third Federation of Trade Unions by Defendant 2, Defendant 9, Defendant 10, and Defendant 11, the lower court, citing the reasons stated in its judgment, found that it had not been proven that the proceeds of the crime had actually accrued to the said defendants, and accordingly did not pronounce a confiscation equivalent corresponding to the amount of loss to the national treasury against the said defendants.
Examining the reasoning of the lower court's judgment in light of the relevant legal principles and the evidence lawfully adopted, there is no error in the lower court's determination of misapprehending the legal principles concerning confiscation equivalent.
c. The Parts Concerning Violation of the National Intelligence Service Act Due to Abuse of Authority by Defendant 2 and Defendant 4 against the Production Staff of "(Program Name 1 Omitted)," the Production Staff of "(Program Name 2 Omitted)," Non-indicted 10, and Non-indicted 11
The lower court, citing the reasons stated in its judgment, upheld the first instance judgment which found the facts charged in this part not guilty.
Examining the reasoning of the lower court's judgment in light of the relevant legal principles and the evidence lawfully adopted, there is no error in the lower court's determination of misapprehending the legal principles concerning the crime of violation of the National Intelligence Service Act due to abuse of authority, thereby affecting the judgment.
d. The Parts Concerning Obstruction of Business by Defendant 2 and Defendant 4 against Non-indicted 10, Non-indicted 11, Non-indicted 12, and Non-indicted 13
The lower court, citing the reasons stated in its judgment, upheld the first instance judgment which found the facts charged in this part not guilty.
Examining the reasoning of the lower court's judgment in light of the relevant legal principles and the evidence lawfully adopted, there is no error in the lower court's determination of misapprehending the legal principles concerning the crime of obstruction of business, thereby affecting the judgment.
e. The Part Concerning Defendant 5
The lower court, citing the reasons stated in its judgment, found that it was difficult to recognize Defendant 5's functional control over the acts with respect to the part of the offenses charged against Defendant 5 committed after his retirement from the position of Chairman of Non-indicted Corporation 1, and thus upheld the first instance judgment which found this part not guilty in its reasoning.
Examining the reasoning of the lower court's judgment in light of the relevant legal principles and the evidence lawfully adopted, there is no error in the lower court's determination of misapprehending the legal principles concerning withdrawal from a conspiratorial relationship in a single comprehensive crime and functional control over the act, thereby affecting the judgment.
f. The Part Concerning Budget Misappropriation Related to Defendant 2's Activities in Non-indicted Corporation 1
The lower court, citing the reasons stated in its judgment, found that it was difficult to recognize Defendant 2's functional control over the acts with respect to the part of the offenses committed after his retirement from the position of Director of the National Intelligence Service, among the primary facts charged of violation of the Specific Crimes Aggravated Punishment Act (Loss to the National Treasury, etc.) and the alternative facts charged of violation of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Economic Crimes (특정경제범죄 가중처벌 등에 관한 법률) (Embezzlement), and thus found all of these not guilty in its reasoning.
Examining the reasoning of the lower court's judgment in light of the relevant legal principles and the evidence lawfully adopted, there is no error in the lower court's determination of misapprehending the legal principles concerning withdrawal from a conspiratorial relationship in a single comprehensive crime and functional control over the act, thereby affecting the judgment.
g. The Remaining Parts, Excluding the Part Concerning Abuse of Authority against Non-indicted 15 in Connection with Monk Non-indicted 14 by Defendant 2, and the Part Concerning Abuse of Authority against NIS Employees in Connection with Non-indicted 16 and Non-indicted 8, among the Parts Concerning Violation of the National Intelligence Service Act Due to Abuse of Authority against NIS Employees by Defendant 2, Defendant 7, and Defendant 9
1) (a) The crime of obstruction of another's exercise of rights through abuse of authority (직권남용권리행사방해죄, hereinafter the "crime of abuse of authority") is established when a public official, with respect to matters falling within his or her general official authority, commits an act that is substantively and specifically illegal or unjust under the pretext of exercising official authority.
"Abuse of authority" as used here means a public official's illegal or unjust exercise of authority with respect to matters falling within his or her general official authority, that is, a case where, although it formally and externally appears to be the execution of official duties, the act is in substance one beyond legitimate authority. In order for a certain duty to be regarded as a matter falling within a public official's general official authority, a legal basis therefor is required. A legal basis does not necessarily require an express provision; even without an express provision, if, upon a comprehensive and substantive examination of the statutes and the system, it is construed that the matter falls within the relevant public official's official authority, and if it is recognized that, when such authority is abused, it would be sufficient to cause the other party to perform an act which he or she has no obligation to perform, or to obstruct the exercise of a right, such matter is included in the general official authority referred to in the crime of abuse of authority. Whether an act constitutes "abuse" of authority must be determined by considering various factors, such as the purpose of the specific act of duty, whether the act was necessary or reasonable under the circumstances at the time, and whether the statutory requirements permitting the exercise of authority were satisfied (see Supreme Court Decision 2014Do11441 delivered on February 13, 2018; Supreme Court Decision 2018Do18646 delivered on March 14, 2019; Supreme Court En Banc Decision 2018Do14303 delivered on August 29, 2019, etc.).
"Causing a person to perform an act which he or she has no obligation to perform," as used in the crime of abuse of authority, means a case where a public official, by abusing his or her authority, causes another person to perform an act which such person has no legal obligation to perform. Therefore, even if a public official causes a working-level staff member to perform a factual act assisting in the execution of duties with respect to matters falling within his or her own official authority, this merely results in the public official's own execution of duties, and thus, in principle, cannot be deemed to constitute causing another to perform an act which he or she has no obligation to perform. However, where the standards and procedures for the execution of duties are specifically set forth in statutes, and the working-level staff member is also vested with inherent authority and a role to apply such standards and to participate in such procedures, if the public official causes the working-level staff member to assist in the execution of duties in violation of such standards and procedures, this constitutes "causing a person to perform an act which he or she has no obligation to perform" (see Supreme Court Decision 2010Do13766 delivered on February 10, 2011, etc.). Whether a working-level staff member assisting a public official in the execution of duties is vested with inherent authority and a role to apply the standards for the execution of duties and to participate in the procedures, and whether the act performed by the working-level staff member due to the public official's abuse of authority was performed in violation of such standards or procedures and thus constitutes an act which such staff member has no legal obligation to perform, must be individually determined according to the content of the relevant statutes, etc. (see Supreme Court Decision 2019Do11698 delivered on January 9, 2020).
(b) The National Intelligence Service (NIS, 국가정보원) is an agency directly under the President, and while receiving the President's instructions and supervision (Article 2 of the National Intelligence Service Act), performs the role of supporting the President's conduct of state affairs. The duties performed by the NIS as an intelligence agency, such as the collection, production, and dissemination of information, are, due to the necessity of maintaining security and the special nature of the covert manner in which such duties are carried out, difficult to become the object of monitoring or checks by other state agencies, and for the smooth performance of such duties, it is necessary to maintain a strict chain-of-command system of superior-subordinate obedience within the NIS. Furthermore, until the enforcement of the current National Intelligence Service Act (국가정보원법, wholly amended by Act No. 17646 on December 15, 2020), the NIS also possessed the authority to investigate offenses prescribed in the National Security Act (국가보안법), etc., which could entail the exercise of coercive force against individual citizens. Due to the NIS's legal status and actual influence, and the special nature of its duties and the manner in which they are performed, there is a great risk that, if its authority is abused, it would infringe upon the fundamental rights of citizens across the entire spectrum of life, including politics, economy, society, and culture, and undermine public trust in the political neutrality of state agencies. In fact, from the era of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (중앙정보부) and the Agency for National Security Planning (국가안전기획부), the predecessor organizations of the NIS, various political manipulations and human rights violation incidents were perpetrated, obstructing the advancement of democracy.
When the former Agency for National Security Planning Act (국가안전기획부법, its title was changed to the National Intelligence Service Act on January 21, 1999) was amended by Act No. 4708 on January 5, 1994, and provisions prohibiting the abuse of authority by the Director, Deputy Director, and other employees of the Agency for National Security Planning (Article 11(1)) and punishing violations thereof more severely than the crime of abuse of authority under the Criminal Act (Article 19(1)) were newly established in the said Act, this too may be regarded as a reflective measure taken in light of such historical experience. In light of the legislative history, among other things, of the above provisions, the content of which has been maintained up to the current National Intelligence Service Act, the purpose of separately providing penal provisions on the crime of abuse of authority in the National Intelligence Service Act lies in preventing in advance the Director, Deputy Director, Director of Planning and Coordination, and other employees of the NIS from abusing the official authority vested in them so as to infringe upon the authority of other agencies or organizations, or the freedoms and rights of citizens.
Therefore, whether the crime of violation of the National Intelligence Service Act (국가정보원법) due to abuse of authority is established must be determined by comprehensively considering not only the legal principles generally applicable to the crime of abuse of authority, but also the legislative background and purpose of the aforementioned independent penal provision, the legal status and influence of the National Intelligence Service ("NIS"), the special nature of the duties handled by the NIS and the manner in which those duties are performed, and the NIS's strict internal chain-of-command system of superior-subordinate obedience.
2) The court below found all of the facts charged in this part not guilty for the following reasons, among others.
A) The following instructions, which were specified as acts of abuse of authority in the facts charged in this part—① the instruction by Defendant 2 and Defendant 7 to Non-Indicted 17, who belonged to the Regional Team of the National Interest Strategy Office of the NIS, to monitor trends concerning heads of local governments from the opposition party who opposed government policy, including local autonomy policies, and to formulate and report measures to check and suppress them (relating to the part on violation of the National Intelligence Service Act due to abuse of authority by Defendant 2 and Defendant 7 against Non-Indicted 17); ② the instruction by Defendant 2, Defendant 7, and Defendant 9 to employees belonging to the National Interest Information Bureau or the National Interest Strategy Office to collect information related to the political circles, including the opposition, in connection with various elections, and, based thereon, to formulate response logic for the ruling party's electoral victory (relating to the part on violation of the National Intelligence Service Act due to abuse of authority in connection with the instructions to prepare election countermeasures for the ruling party before and after the Seoul Mayoral by-election, given by Defendant 2, Defendant 7, and Defendant 9); ③ the instruction by Defendant 2 to Non-Indicted 18, an intelligence analyst belonging to the Public Opinion Team of the National Interest Strategy Office of the NIS, to collect and report on the misconduct and vulnerabilities of Non-Indicted 14, or to collect and report on the recent trends of Non-Indicted 14 and "(name of gathering omitted)" (a gathering meaning "those expelled under the Non-Indicted 3 government gather to drive out Non-Indicted 3"), and the instruction to Non-Indicted 19, Non-Indicted 20, and others belonging to the Defense Team of the Psychological Warfare Group to formulate and report on strategies to check the publication of Non-Indicted 14's book, or to mobilize conservative organizations to carry out activities such as holding rallies condemning Non-Indicted 14 and placing critical advertisements (relating to the parts on each violation of the National Intelligence Service Act due to abuse of authority by Defendant 2 against Non-Indicted 18, Non-Indicted 19, and Non-Indicted 20); ④ the instruction by Defendant 2 and others to Non-Indicted 21, the head of the Cyber Part of the Special Mission Team belonging to Bureau B in charge of counterintelligence, and Non-Indicted 22, a team member, and others, to conduct surveillance of the monk Non-Indicted 14 and report thereon (the part on violation of the National Intelligence Service Act due to abuse of authority by Defendant 2 against Non-Indicted 21 and Non-Indicted 22 in relation to the monk Non-Indicted 14); ⑤ the instruction by Defendant 2 and others to Non-Indicted 15, the head of the Internal Investigation Part of the Special Mission Team belonging to Bureau B in charge of counterintelligence, Non-Indicted 21, the head of the Cyber Part, Non-Indicted 22, a team member, and others, to conduct surveillance of Non-Indicted 9 and report thereon (relating to the part on violation of the National Intelligence Service Act due to abuse of authority by Defendant 2 against Non-Indicted 21, Non-Indicted 22, and Non-Indicted 15 in relation to Non-Indicted 9); and ⑥ the instruction by Defendant 2 and others to Non-Indicted 15, the head of the Internal Investigation Part of the Special Mission Team belonging to Bureau B in charge of counterintelligence, and others, to conduct surveillance of Non-Indicted 23 and report thereon (relating to the part on violation of the National Intelligence Service Act due to abuse of authority by Defendant 2 against Non-Indicted 15 and others in relation to Non-Indicted 23)—all constitute clear acts of political involvement (the foregoing instructions specified as acts of abuse of authority in the facts charged in this part are hereinafter collectively referred to as "the instructions in this case"), and therefore do not fall within the general scope of duties and authority of NIS employees (hereinafter "the first determination").
B) The NIS employees specified as the counterparts of the abuse of authority in the facts charged in this part were merely accomplices who participated in the political involvement conducted by Defendant 2, Defendant 7, Defendant 9, and others, and are difficult to regard as victims of the crime of violation of the National Intelligence Service Act due to abuse of authority (hereinafter "the second determination").
C) Even assuming that the instructions in this case fell within the general scope of duties and authority of NIS employees, Defendant 2, with respect to the collection, preparation, and dissemination of domestic security intelligence, which is a duty of the NIS that he oversaw, and Defendant 7 and Defendant 9, while assisting the Director of the NIS in the aforementioned duties, merely had the NIS employees who were the working-level staff perform factual acts assisting in the execution of the defendants' own duties; this cannot be regarded as a case where, although the standards and procedures of duty execution to be observed by the working-level staff were specifically set forth in laws and regulations, and although those staff were also vested with their own inherent authority and role in applying the standards of duty execution and participating in the procedures, the defendants nevertheless had the staff assist in the execution of duties in violation of such standards and procedures. Ultimately, the instructions in this case do not constitute "causing another to do an act that the other is not obligated to do" (hereinafter "the third determination").
3) However, the above determinations by the court below are difficult to accept as they stand, for the following reasons.
A) First, with respect to the first determination, examining the following circumstances, which can be ascertained from the reasoning of the judgment below and the evidence lawfully adopted, in light of the legal principles set out above, it is determined that the instructions in this case, formally and outwardly, took the form of an exercise of authority concerning matters falling within the general scope of duties and authority of the persons who issued them.
(1) It is reasonable to view that the persons who issued the instructions in this case possessed general duties and authority sufficient, if abused, to cause the recipients to perform acts they were not obligated to perform.
Pursuant to Article 3, Paragraph 1, Subparagraphs 1 and 3 of the former National Intelligence Service Act (referring to both the version before amendment by Act No. 11104 on November 22, 2011, and the version before amendment by Act No. 12266 on January 14, 2014; hereinafter collectively "the former National Intelligence Service Act"), the NIS performs duties such as "the collection, preparation, and dissemination of domestic security intelligence (concerning anti-communist activities, anti-government subversion, counterintelligence, counterterrorism, and international criminal organizations)" and "investigation of crimes prescribed in the National Security Act (국가보안법)." Defendant 2, as Director of the NIS, had the authority to oversee these duties of the NIS and to direct and supervise its employees (Article 7, Paragraph 2 of the former National Intelligence Service Act), and Defendant 7, as Second Deputy Director, and Defendant 9, as Director of the National Interest Information Bureau, had the authority, in assisting the Director of the NIS, to direct and supervise employees under their command regarding the aforementioned duties of the NIS. The accomplices who, having been delegated such authority by the above defendants, ultimately issued the instructions in this case to the NIS working-level staff also possessed, in the same manner as the above defendants, the general duties and authority to direct and supervise their subordinate working-level staff regarding duties such as "the collection, preparation, and dissemination of domestic security intelligence (concerning anti-communist activities, anti-government subversion, counterintelligence, counterterrorism, and international criminal organizations)" and "investigation of crimes prescribed in the National Security Act."
Considering the duty of public officials to obey the official orders of their superiors in the course of performing their duties as prescribed in Article 57 of the State Public Officials Act (국가공무원법), and the strict superior-subordinate chain-of-command system of the NIS, it can be viewed that the duties and authority of the above defendants and their accomplices, even though not accompanied by legal coercive force, were sufficient, when abused for an improper purpose or otherwise, to cause the NIS employees under their command to perform acts they were not obligated to perform.
(2) It is reasonable to view that the instructions in this case, in name, concerned matters falling within the general scope of duties and authority of NIS employees, who were the actors.
(A) While serving as Director of the NIS, Defendant 2 repeatedly instructed, at executive meetings and elsewhere, that active measures be taken to check persons and organizations who opposed government policy or were uncooperative in state administration, after first characterizing them as "pro-North Korea forces (forces that follow North Korea) or forces within their sphere of influence" (hereinafter "pro-North Korea forces, etc.").
The instructions in this case represent the concretization of the above guidelines of the Director of the NIS into instructions to collect information on, or check, specific targeted individuals. That is, it can be seen that the NIS leadership, including Defendant 2, having concluded that opposition-party local government heads and other politicians, as well as Non-Indicted 14, Non-Indicted 9, and Non-Indicted 23, were suspected pro-North Korea forces, etc., instructed the NIS working-level staff to collect related information and to formulate or implement countermeasures, under the pretext of taking measures to check such persons.
The above pretext put forward by the NIS leadership, even if merely superficial, may be taken into consideration in determining whether the instructions in this case, formally and outwardly, can be regarded as an exercise of authority by the persons who issued them.
(B) North Korea is a partner for dialogue and cooperation for the peaceful unification of the fatherland, but at the same time also possesses the character of an anti-state organization that adheres to a line of communization unification and schemes to overthrow our liberal democratic system (see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Decision 2003Do758, decided April 17, 2008). Considering North Korea's status as noted above and the pretext put forward by the NIS leadership for the instructions in this case, it can be seen that the instructions in this case, formally and outwardly, constituted instructions to check forces following an anti-state organization, and that the NIS leadership, including Defendant 2, thereby exercised their directing authority to carry out the collection of domestic security intelligence concerning anti-communist activities, anti-government subversion, counterintelligence, etc., or investigative activities concerning violations of the National Security Act.
(3) It is reasonable to view that the instructions in this case bore the appearance of instructions concerning the execution of duties by NIS employees.
(A) The instructions in this case were transmitted to the working-level staff through the official chain of command of the NIS, with the Director of the NIS at its apex.
The NIS working-level staff who carried out the instructions in this case had no way of knowing in specific terms what intent or purpose the NIS leadership had in instructing them to collect information, conduct analysis, and formulate strategies. Even if the NIS working-level staff could have suspected, at the time they received the instructions in this case, that the NIS leadership had a political intent or purpose, such circumstance alone is insufficient to alter the outward appearance of the instructions in this case.
(B) Article 3, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 1 of the former National Intelligence Service Act and Article 2, Subparagraph 2 of the former Regulation on the Planning and Coordination of Intelligence and Security Affairs (정보 및 보안업무기획ㆍ조정규정) (referring to the version before amendment by Presidential Decree No. 25751 on November 19, 2014; hereinafter "the former Regulation on the Planning and Coordination of Intelligence and Security Affairs") only prescribe the "fields" of intelligence to be handled by the NIS (anti-communist activities, anti-government subversion, counterintelligence, counterterrorism, and international criminal organizations) and the "purpose" for which such intelligence is handled (to safeguard national security against harmful acts by anti-state forces, etc.), without clearly limiting the scope of "targeted persons" for intelligence collection. Moreover, at the stage of intelligence collection, it may be difficult to clearly determine whether a given piece of intelligence constitutes security intelligence, and the collection of security intelligence may be completed through the combination of multiple pieces of information collected at different points in time.
The NIS, citing such abstract and comprehensive provisions concerning the scope of its duties and the special nature of security affairs, had been conducting, even prior to the occurrence of the instant case, wide-ranging intelligence collection activities across various domestic fields through its Intelligence Officers and others, unrelated to any specific suspicion of subversion, etc. Setting aside for the moment the legality and propriety of such activities, the fact that the NIS had actually carried out its domestic security intelligence collection duties in this manner may have influenced the working-level staff's perception of the scope of their own duties, and this may therefore be taken into consideration in determining whether the instructions in this case bore the appearance of an exercise of authority.
(4) It is difficult to conclude definitively that the instructions in this case constituted clear acts of political involvement, and even if Defendant 2 and others had a purpose of political involvement, etc., at the time they issued the instructions in this case, insofar as the instructions, formally and outwardly, constituted the execution of duties, it should not be hastily concluded, on the basis of such purpose, that there was no exercise of authority.
Based solely on the content and manner of the instructions in this case, it is difficult to say that it is objectively clear that such acts fell within any of the categories set forth in each subparagraph of Article 9, Paragraph 2 of the former National Intelligence Service Act—namely, "an act of supporting or obstructing the formation of or joining a political party or political organization (Subparagraph 1)"; "an act of using one's position to disseminate opinions supporting or opposing a specific political party or specific politician, or, for the purpose of forming such public opinion, disseminating opinions or facts praising or defaming a specific political party or specific politician (Subparagraph 2)"; "an act of supporting or obstructing the collection of donations for a specific political party or specific politician, or an act of using or causing the use of funds of the State, a local government, a government-invested institution (or a public institution under the Act on the Management of Public Institutions (공공기관의 운영에 관한 법률)) (Subparagraph 3)"; "an act of engaging in election campaigning for a specific political party or specific person, or participating in an election-related countermeasure meeting (Subparagraph 4)"; or "an act of demanding that a subordinate employee or another public official commit any of the acts under Subparagraphs 1 through 4, or of giving, promising, or notifying a benefit or detriment as a reward or reprisal in connection with any of the acts under the foregoing subparagraphs (Subparagraph 5)"—or that it was clearly an order to NIS employees to commit any of the aforementioned acts.
Whether the instructions in this case constitute the aforementioned "act of engaging in political activity" or a preparatory act therefor is a matter that can only be determined by substantively and specifically examining all relevant circumstances, including not only the objective content of the relevant instructions but also their purpose and the status and past activities of the persons who were the subject of the information collection or checking measures under the instructions. The NIS employees who received the instructions in this case were in a position where, absent special circumstances, they had no choice but to comply with the instructions once they formally and outwardly constituted the execution of duties. Where Defendant 2 and others instructed NIS employees to perform acts that, while formally and outwardly constituting the execution of duties, in substance exceeded the scope of their duties and authority with the actual purpose of engaging in political activity, such concealed purpose, etc., of Defendant 2 and others should serve as material for determining whether the execution of duties constituted an abuse of authority, and it should not be hastily concluded, on the basis thereof, that there was no exercise of authority.
B) Next, with respect to the second determination, it is reasonable to view that the NIS employees who carried out the instructions in this case fall within the category of counterparts of the abuse of authority. The reasons are as follows.
(1) The "person" who is the object of the crime of violation of the National Intelligence Service Act due to abuse of authority refers to any other person besides the actor and the co-offenders, and therefore may include not only subordinate public officials of the actor but also other public officials. As noted above, since the authority (directing authority) possessed by the persons who issued the instructions in this case was sufficient to cause the recipients to perform acts they were not obligated to perform, the NIS working-level staff who received the instructions in this case can constitute counterparts of the abuse of authority.
(2) Joint principal offense under Article 30 of the Criminal Act (형법) is established upon satisfaction of the subjective and objective requirements of a shared intent to jointly carry out the offense and the commission of the crime through functional control of the act based on such shared intent; even a person among the co-conspirators who did not directly share in performing part of the constituent act may nevertheless bear liability as a joint principal offender, but for this to be the case, it must be recognized, upon comprehensive consideration of the person's status and role in the overall crime and their control or command over the course of the crime, that the person went beyond being a mere co-conspirator and possessed functional control of the act through an essential contribution to the crime (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2007Do4702, decided October 26, 2007). However, the NIS working-level staff who carried out the instructions in this case merely obeyed and followed the aforementioned directing authority of the NIS leadership; it is difficult to say that they reached a meeting of minds with the NIS leadership regarding political involvement, or that they exercised functional control of the act through an essential contribution to the acts of abuse of authority by Defendant 2 and others. Accordingly, the aforementioned working-level staff do not constitute co-offenders in the act of abuse of authority through the instructions in this case, and even if they could have suspected that the instructions in this case were tainted by a purpose of political involvement, they cannot be regarded as excluded from being counterparts of the abuse of authority.
C) Finally, with respect to the third determination, examining the following circumstances, which can be ascertained from the reasoning of the judgment below and the evidence lawfully adopted and examined, in light of the legal principles set out above, it is reasonable to view that Defendant 2 and others, through the instructions in this case, caused the NIS working-level staff who directly carried out the instructed matters to perform acts they were not legally obligated to perform, and it cannot be said that they merely had the NIS working-level staff perform factual acts assisting in the execution of duties.
(1) At the time of the instructions in this case, the standards and procedures of duty execution to be followed by the NIS working-level staff were specified in laws and regulations.
[Reasoning]
The Constitution imposes on employees of the National Intelligence Service (NIS) a duty to serve the entire people (Article 7), a duty not to discriminate against any citizen in political life (Article 11), and a duty not to infringe upon citizens' privacy and freedom of private life (Article 17). Article 56 of the State Public Officials Act (국가공무원법) provides that "all public officials shall comply with statutes and perform their duties faithfully," and Article 59 provides that "public officials, as servants of the entire people, shall perform their duties kindly and fairly." Under Article 3(1)(1) of the former National Intelligence Service Act (국가정보원법) and Article 2(2) of the former Regulation on Planning and Coordination of Intelligence and Security Affairs (정보 및 보안업무기획ㆍ조정규정), NIS employees may handle only domestic intelligence concerning "counter-espionage, counter-subversion, counterintelligence, counter-terrorism, and international criminal organizations" for the purpose of "safeguarding national security from harmful acts against the State committed by spies and other anti-State forces and their followers." The former Security Affairs Regulation (보안업무규정) (prior to its full amendment by Presidential Decree No. 26140 on March 11, 2015; hereinafter the "former Security Affairs Regulation"), enacted pursuant to the delegation under Article 3(2) of the former National Intelligence Service Act, limits the scope of persons subject to personal background investigations (Article 31(2)), and Article 9 of the former National Intelligence Service Act prohibits NIS employees from engaging in political activities.
The above provisions may be regarded as establishing the standards and procedures for the execution of duties that NIS working-level officials must follow.
(2) NIS working-level officials were also vested with their own inherent authority and role to apply the standards for the execution of duties and to participate in the relevant procedures, and the acts of implementing each of the instructions at issue in this case cannot be regarded as mere factual acts assisting the execution of duties by the NIS leadership.
Considering together the content of the aforementioned provisions concerning the standards and procedures for the execution of duties that NIS working-level officials must follow, and the fact that the NIS's duties themselves — such as "the collection, production, and dissemination of domestic security intelligence" and "investigation of crimes prescribed in the National Security Act (국가보안법)" — inherently carry the possibility of infringing upon citizens' fundamental rights, it is reasonable to view that the NIS working-level officials who implemented each of the instructions at issue in this case were also vested with their own inherent authority and role — with respect to the intelligence collection, analysis, and other tasks that each of them was to perform — to apply the standards for the execution of duties, such as by appropriately selecting the targets and methods thereof, and to participate in the relevant procedures. Moreover, in light of the circumstances surrounding the implementation of each of the instructions at issue in this case, it cannot be said that the act of implementation amounted to nothing more than a factual act assisting the execution of duties by the NIS leadership.
(3) The actors behind each of the instructions at issue in this case caused NIS working-level officials to perform tasks that, in violation of the standards for the execution of duties, effectively departed from the scope of legitimate duties.
The actors behind each of the instructions at issue in this case, through those instructions, caused NIS working-level officials to perform tasks such as collecting and analyzing intelligence unrelated to national security and devising countermeasures therefor, in violation of the duty of political neutrality, the duty not to infringe upon citizens' privacy and freedom of private life, the duty to comply with statutes, and the duty to perform duties fairly.
Moreover, considering comprehensively all relevant circumstances, including the purpose of the NIS leadership who ordered such acts and the status and activities of the persons who were the subjects of the intelligence collection, the acts performed by NIS working-level officials pursuant to each of the instructions at issue in this case amount to nothing more than surveillance of opposition politicians or private citizens and reporting thereon, the formulation and execution of measures to check and suppress them, and the devising of strategies for the ruling party's electoral victory; accordingly, such acts may be regarded as having departed from the scope of the NIS's legitimate duties as prescribed in Article 3 of the former National Intelligence Service Act.
Ra) Nevertheless, the court below, having reached a different conclusion, rendered a verdict of not guilty as to this portion of the charged facts without examining the remaining requirements for the establishment of the offense charged in this part, such as whether there was an "abuse" of authority. The judgment below, in this respect, erred by misapprehending the law concerning the offense of violation of the National Intelligence Service Act due to abuse of authority, and by failing to conduct the necessary examination. The prosecutor's ground of appeal pointing this out is well-founded.
A. The portion concerning the violations of the National Intelligence Service Act due to abuse of authority by Defendant 7 and Defendant 9 against Non-Indicted 24 and other persons associated with Non-Indicted Company 25
The court below found this portion of the charged facts not guilty for the reasons stated in its judgment.
Upon examination of the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the relevant legal principles and the evidence lawfully adopted, there is no error in the judgment below's determination that misapprehended the law concerning the offense of violation of the National Intelligence Service Act due to abuse of authority and thereby affected the judgment.
Ja. The portion concerning the attempted abuse of authority in violation of the National Intelligence Service Act by Defendant 2, Defendant 7, and Defendant 9 against Non-Indicted 26
The court below found this portion of the charged facts not guilty for the reasons stated in its judgment.
Upon examination of the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the relevant legal principles and the evidence lawfully adopted, there is no error in the judgment below's determination that misapprehended the law concerning the offense of violation of the National Intelligence Service Act due to abuse of authority and thereby affected the judgment.
Cha. The portion concerning the violations of the National Intelligence Service Act due to abuse of authority by Defendant 2, Defendant 7, and Defendant 9 against persons affiliated with business groups, companies, and economic organizations in connection with financial support for conservative organizations
The court below found this portion of the charged facts not guilty on grounds including that, while the act of the above defendants in requesting Non-Indicted Federation 27, a private enterprise and economic organization, to provide financial support to conservative organizations could be regarded as an unlawful act using the status of an NIS employee, it did not amount to the unlawful exercise of matters falling within the general scope of duties and authority of an NIS employee, i.e., an "abuse of authority."
Upon examination of the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the relevant legal principles and the evidence lawfully adopted, there is no error in the judgment below's determination that exceeded the limits of free evaluation of evidence in violation of the rules of logic and experience, or that misapprehended the law concerning the offense of violation of the National Intelligence Service Act due to abuse of authority, and thereby affected the judgment.
The Supreme Court has held that an "unlawful act using one's status," which is a case where a public official commits an unlawful act not falling within the scope of his or her general duties and authority by using his or her status, is not, unlike a case in which the official unlawfully or improperly exercises authority over matters falling within the scope of his or her general duties and authority, subject to punishment for the offense of abuse of authority (see Supreme Court Decision 90Do2800, decided December 27, 1991; Supreme Court Decision 2007Do9139, decided April 10, 2008; Supreme Court en banc Decision 2018Do14303, decided August 29, 2019, among others). This is because interpreting such "unlawful act using one's status" as falling within "abuse of authority" would constitute an extended or analogical interpretation exceeding the possible scope of the statutory text, in violation of the principle of legality in criminal law (죄형법정주의). It may be considered that when a public official commits an unlawful or improper act exceeding his or her duties and authority against a person who fears suffering disadvantage from the exercise of that authority, thereby causing that person to perform an act he or she is not obligated to perform or obstructing the exercise of that person's rights, this poses no less a risk of undermining public trust in the fair exercise of State functions and infringing upon individual freedom and rights than the unlawful or improper exercise of authority belonging to the official himself or herself. However, absent separate legislation, it is difficult to punish, as the offense of abuse of authority, an act not falling within the scope of a public official's duties and authority based solely on the interpretation of current law.
Ka. The portion concerning the violation of the National Intelligence Service Act due to political involvement and the violation of the Act on Promotion of Information and Communications Network Utilization and Information Protection, etc. (정보통신망 이용촉진 및 정보보호 등에 관한 법률) (defamation) by Defendant 7 in connection with the dissemination of composite (manipulated) photographs
The court below, for the reasons stated in its judgment, found that functional control over the act by Defendant 7 was not recognized with respect to this portion of the offense, and rendered a verdict of not guilty in its reasoning as to this portion of the charged facts.
Upon examination of the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the relevant legal principles and the evidence lawfully adopted, there is no error in the judgment below's determination that exceeded the limits of free evaluation of evidence in violation of the rules of logic and experience, or that misapprehended the law concerning the establishment of a conspiratorial relationship, and thereby affected the judgment.
Ta. The portion concerning the offering of a bribe by Defendant 2 to the Commissioner of the National Tax Service, Non-Indicted 28
The court below, for the reasons stated in its judgment, found that the receipt and payment of KRW 120 million between Defendant 2 and Non-Indicted 28 amounted to nothing more than an internal distribution, pursuant to conspiracy, of money obtained by the co-conspirators in the offense of misappropriating NIS funds, and thus upheld the first instance judgment finding this portion of the charged facts not guilty.
Upon examination of the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the relevant legal principles and the evidence lawfully adopted, there is no error in the judgment below's determination that exceeded the limits of free evaluation of evidence in violation of the rules of logic and experience, or that misapprehended the law concerning the offense of offering a bribe, and thereby affected the judgment.
Pa. The portion concerning the violation of the National Intelligence Service Act due to abuse of authority by Defendant 2 against Non-Indicted 15 in connection with the monk Non-Indicted 14
1) Where several acts falling under the same offense name are committed continuously over a certain period pursuant to a single and continuing criminal intent, and the legal interest infringed is also the same, all such acts must be treated collectively as a single comprehensive crime (포괄일죄), and in such a case, the statute of limitations runs from the time the final criminal act was completed (see Supreme Court Decision 2002Do2939, decided October 11, 2002, among others).
The offense of abuse of authority under the Criminal Act (형법) has as its principal purpose the protection of the State's legal interest in the fair exercise of State functions, and the same applies to the offense of violation of the National Intelligence Service Act due to abuse of authority. Accordingly, it is reasonable to view that where an NIS employee commits acts of abuse of authority continuously over a certain period pursuant to a single and continuing criminal intent in the course of a series of duty-execution processes concerning the same matter, a single comprehensive crime may be established even if there are multiple counterparts thereto. However, since whether the statute of limitations has run and the scope of res judicata, among other matters, may differ depending on whether each act of abuse of authority constitutes a single comprehensive crime or concurrent offenses, whether a single comprehensive crime is established in a given case must be determined by closely examining such factors as whether the subject matter of the duty execution is identical, the manner and motive of each offense, the time intervals between each offense, and whether there has been any severance or renewal of criminal intent.
2) The court below, on the premise that "where a person abuses authority against multiple victims, respectively, causing each of them to perform an act they are not obligated to perform or obstructing the exercise of their rights, even if the criminal intent is single and the method of commission is identical, the legal interest infringed with respect to each victim is independent, and thus this cannot be treated as a single comprehensive crime but rather an independent crime is established for each victim," determined that, with respect to the violations of the National Intelligence Service Act due to abuse of authority by Defendant 2 against Non-Indicted 21, Non-Indicted 22, and Non-Indicted 15 in connection with the monk Non-Indicted 14, an independent crime was established for each victim of the respective abuses of authority, and that these crimes were in a relationship of substantive concurrence. Based on this determination as to the number of offenses, the court below found that the prosecution of this portion, filed on June 25, 2018, was filed after the seven-year statute of limitations had run from July 13, 2010 — the date on which Non-Indicted 15, having received Defendant 2's instructions, formulated an investigation plan concerning Non-Indicted 14 and reported it to Defendant 2 and others — and accordingly rendered a verdict of dismissal (면소) as to the portion concerning the violation of the National Intelligence Service Act due to abuse of authority by Defendant 2 against Non-Indicted 15 in connection with the monk Non-Indicted 14.
3) However, the above determination of the court below is difficult to accept as it stands.
Ga) According to the record, the following facts may be ascertained:
(1) Around September 2009, Defendant 2 instructed Non-Indicted 29, the Third Deputy Director of the NIS, to establish a so-called "Special Mission Team" under the Third Deputy Director's office, with the top priority of eradicating pro-North Korean leftist forces and handling tasks ordered by the NIS leadership; pursuant to this instruction, Non-Indicted 29 caused Non-Indicted 30, the head of Bureau B under the Third Deputy Director's office in charge of counterintelligence, to establish a Special Mission Team consisting of an investigation section and a cyber section under Bureau B.
(2) Around July 2010, Defendant 2, at a meeting of all department heads, repeatedly instructed that unlawful acts or misconduct by Non-Indicted 14 be uncovered, and around that time, Non-Indicted 29, at a meeting of bureau and division heads under the Third Deputy Director's office, gave the same instruction to Non-Indicted 30.
(3) Accordingly, around that time, Non-Indicted 30 instructed Non-Indicted 15, the head of the investigation section of the Special Mission Team, to look closely into Non-Indicted 14; around July 13, 2010, Non-Indicted 15, through a report titled "Investigation Plan for Non-Indicted 14 on Suspicion of Unlawful Activities Connected with Pro-North Korean Leftist Forces," formulated a step-by-step investigation plan concerning Non-Indicted 14, and reported this to Defendant 2 via Non-Indicted 29.
(4) Thereafter, Non-Indicted 30 instructed Non-Indicted 21, the head of the cyber section of the Special Mission Team, to conduct "cyber surveillance" of Non-Indicted 14, and Non-Indicted 22, a member of the cyber section, from around April 11, 2011 to around May 12, 2011, prepared a report identifying the movements of Non-Indicted 14 based on internet search results and surveillance of persons around Non-Indicted 14, and organizing the content thereof.
Na) Examining the above facts in light of the legal principles set forth above, the acts of Defendant 2 and his co-conspirator Non-Indicted 30 against Non-Indicted 15, Non-Indicted 21, and Non-Indicted 22 were all directed at the same subject of intelligence collection, namely Non-Indicted 14, and were committed continuously over a certain period pursuant to a single and continuing criminal intent; accordingly, it is reasonable to view that a single, comprehensive crime of violation of the National Intelligence Service Act due to abuse of authority is established with respect to these acts as a whole. If so, the time of completion of the criminal act arising from the above acts should be regarded as "around May 12, 2011," when Non-Indicted 22 completed the implementation of the instructions given by Defendant 2 and others; and it is either clear from the record or a matter of common knowledge to this Court that on May 4, 2018, before the seven-year statute of limitations had run from that date, prosecution was brought against the co-conspirator Non-Indicted 30 (Seoul Central District Court Case No. 2018Gohap466), which also suspended the running of the statute of limitations as to Defendant 2 (Article 253(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act (형사소송법)), and that, before the statute of limitations resumed running, prosecution was brought against Defendant 2 in this portion of the case on June 25, 2018. Accordingly, it cannot be said that the statute of limitations had separately run to completion solely with respect to the portion concerning the violation of the National Intelligence Service Act due to abuse of authority by Defendant 2 against Non-Indicted 15 in connection with the monk Non-Indicted 14.
Da) Nevertheless, the court below, having reached a different conclusion, found that the statute of limitations had run to completion with respect to the portion concerning the violation of the National Intelligence Service Act due to abuse of authority by Defendant 2 against Non-Indicted 15 in connection with the monk Non-Indicted 14, and rendered a verdict of dismissal accordingly. This determination by the court below erred by misapprehending the law concerning the offense of violation of the National Intelligence Service Act due to abuse of authority and the law concerning a single comprehensive crime, thereby affecting the judgment. The prosecutor's ground of appeal pointing this out is well-founded.
Ha. The portion concerning the violations of the National Intelligence Service Act due to abuse of authority by Defendant 2 against NIS employees in connection with Non-Indicted 16 and Non-Indicted 8
1) The court below found all of this portion of the charged facts not guilty for the following reasons:
Ga) Defendant 2's act of instructing that the movements of Non-Indicted 16 and Non-Indicted 8 be monitored falls within the exercise of authority belonging to the general duties and authority of the Director of the NIS; however, since it is difficult to find that there was any specific basis or circumstance suggesting that Non-Indicted 16 was meeting with persons connected to North Korea, or that Non-Indicted 8 was meeting with an officer of the Japan Non-Indicted Federation 31, Defendant 2's act of giving such instructions falls within the category of an unlawful act exceeding legitimate authority.
Na) However, Defendant 2 merely caused Non-Indicted 32, Non-Indicted 33, Non-Indicted 34, and Non-Indicted 35 — working-level officials of Bureau A under the Third Deputy Director's office in charge of North Korea affairs — to perform factual acts assisting his own execution of duties with respect to the collection of domestic security intelligence or investigation of crimes prescribed in the National Security Act, matters falling within the duties of the NIS which he oversaw as a whole; this does not constitute a case where the standards and procedures for the execution of duties are specifically set forth in statutes, or where working-level officials, who are also vested with their own inherent authority and role to apply the standards for the execution of duties and to participate in the procedures, were caused to assist in the execution of duties in violation of such standards and procedures. Ultimately, this does not amount to a case where Defendant 2 caused the above NIS working-level officials "to perform an act they were not obligated to perform."
2) First, we examine the portion concerning the violations of the National Intelligence Service Act due to abuse of authority against Non-Indicted 32, the head of Division A-3.
Upon examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the record and relevant legal principles, there appears to be sufficient room to view that Non-Indicted 32, the head of Division A-3, who assisted the Director of Bureau A in charge of North Korea affairs and oversaw tasks handled by Division A-3, including the management of front companies, accepted Defendant 2's instructions to conduct surveillance and shadowing without reasonable grounds and transmitted them to his subordinates, thereby making an essential contribution to the act of instruction and participating as a co-conspirator in the offense of abuse of authority committed by Defendant 2 and others. Accordingly, although there are some inappropriate aspects in the reasoning set forth in the judgment below, the conclusion of the court below finding not guilty this portion of the charged facts — that Defendant 2 abused his authority to cause Non-Indicted 32 to perform an act he was not obligated to perform — is justified, and there is no error therein, as alleged in the grounds of appeal, that misapprehended the law concerning the offense of violation of the National Intelligence Service Act due to abuse of authority and thereby affected the judgment.
3) Next, with respect to the portion concerning the violations of the National Intelligence Service Act due to abuse of authority against Non-Indicted 33, Non-Indicted 34, and Non-Indicted 35, the working-level officials of Division A-3, the determination of the court below on this point is difficult to accept as it stands.
(Ga) Examining the following circumstances, which can be ascertained from the reasoning of the judgment below and the evidence lawfully adopted therein, in light of the legal principles set forth above, it can be found that Defendant 2 caused Non-indicted 33, Non-indicted 34, and Non-indicted 35 to perform duties which they were not obligated to perform.
(1) The standards and procedures for the performance of duties that the above working-level officials of the National Intelligence Service (NIS, 국가정보원) were required to follow were specifically set out in statutes and regulations.
Article 7, Article 11, and Article 17 of the Constitution (헌법), which provide for public officials' duty to serve the entire people and for the guarantee of citizens' right to equality and the secrecy and freedom of their private life; Articles 56 and 59 of the State Public Officials Act (국가공무원법), which provide for public officials' duty to comply with statutes and to perform their duties fairly; Article 3(1)(1) of the former National Intelligence Service Act (구 국가정보원법) and Article 2(2) of the former Regulation on the Planning and Coordination of Intelligence and Security Affairs (구 정보 및 보안업무기획ㆍ조정규정), which provide for the NIS's duties concerning the collection, preparation, and dissemination of domestic security intelligence; Article 31(2) of the former Security Affairs Regulation (구 보안업무규정), which provides for the scope of persons subject to background checks; and Article 9 of the former National Intelligence Service Act, which prohibits NIS employees from engaging in acts involving political activities, may all be regarded as provisions concerning the standards and procedures for the performance of duties that NIS working-level officials such as Non-indicted 33, Non-indicted 34, and Non-indicted 35 were required to follow.
(2) The above NIS working-level officials also possessed their own inherent authority and role to apply the standards for the performance of duties and to participate in the relevant procedures, and the conduct of Non-indicted 33, Non-indicted 34, and Non-indicted 35 cannot be regarded as mere factual acts assisting the performance of duties by the NIS leadership.
Considering together the content of the above provisions concerning the standards and procedures for the performance of duties that NIS working-level officials were required to follow, and the fact that the NIS's duties themselves—such as "the collection, preparation, and dissemination of domestic security intelligence" and "investigation of crimes provided for in the National Security Act (국가보안법)"—inherently carry the possibility of infringing upon citizens' fundamental rights, it is reasonable to view that the NIS working-level officials who carried out Defendant 2's instructions to conduct tailing, surveillance, and the like were each granted their own inherent authority and role to apply the standards for the performance of duties—such as by appropriately selecting the targets and methods of the intelligence-gathering and analysis work they were each to perform—and to participate in the relevant procedures.
In fact, the acts of Non-indicted 33, Non-indicted 34, and Non-indicted 35 in tailing and surveilling Non-indicted 16 or Non-indicted 8 themselves constituted infringements of the fundamental rights of the above targets, such that legal responsibility therefor could be imposed directly on the above NIS working-level officials; such conduct cannot be regarded as merely factual acts assisting the performance of duties by the Director of the NIS. Moreover, since the reports prepared on the basis of information gathered through tailing and surveillance included, in addition to fragmentary information, comprehensive assessments reflecting the working-level officials' own individual capabilities, the act of preparing such reports likewise cannot readily be regarded as a mere auxiliary factual act.
(3) Defendant 2 caused NIS employees who were working-level officials to perform acts exceeding the scope of their legitimate duties, in violation of the standards and procedures for the performance of duties.
Defendant 2 caused Non-indicted 33, Non-indicted 34, and Non-indicted 35, who were working-level officials, to tail and surveil Non-indicted 16 or Non-indicted 8 and to report the results thereof, in violation of, among other things, their duty not to infringe upon citizens' secrecy and freedom of private life.
Moreover, considering comprehensively all relevant circumstances, including the intent or purpose of the NIS leadership who ordered such conduct, the status of the persons who were the targets of the intelligence-gathering, and the details of their activities, the acts of Non-indicted 33, Non-indicted 34, and Non-indicted 35 in tailing, surveilling, and reporting may be seen as nothing more than the surveillance of civilians or politicians and the reporting thereof, and thus as exceeding the scope of the NIS's legitimate duties as set forth in Article 3 of the former National Intelligence Service Act, such as the collection, preparation, and dissemination of domestic security intelligence and the investigation of crimes provided for in the National Security Act.
(Na) Nevertheless, the court below determined otherwise, finding that Defendant 2's conduct did not amount to causing Non-indicted 33, Non-indicted 34, and Non-indicted 35 to perform duties they were not obligated to perform, and accordingly found Defendant 2 not guilty as to the portions concerning violation of the National Intelligence Service Act by abuse of authority against Non-indicted 33, Non-indicted 34, and Non-indicted 35 in relation to Non-indicted 16 and Non-indicted 8. Such determination by the court below contains an error that misapprehended the legal principles concerning the crime of violation of the National Intelligence Service Act by abuse of authority, thereby affecting the judgment. The prosecutor's ground of final appeal pointing this out is well-founded.
(Geo) Whether the printed-out documents in this case have evidentiary capacity
The court below, for the reasons stated in its judgment, determined that the evidentiary capacity of the printed-out documents in this case could not be recognized based solely on the evidence submitted by the prosecutor.
Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the relevant legal principles and the evidence lawfully adopted, there is no error in the lower court's determination that misapprehended the legal principles concerning evidentiary capacity and thereby affected the judgment.
(Neo) The portion concerning Defendant 2's misappropriation of budget funds relating to the remodeling construction of the (name of building omitted) Building
The court below, for the reasons stated in its judgment, found Defendant 2 not guilty as to both the primary charge of violation of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment of Specific Crimes (Loss of National Treasury, etc.) (특정범죄가중법) by embezzlement, and the alternative charge of violation of the same Act by breach of trust, in this regard.
Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the relevant legal principles and the evidence lawfully adopted, there is no error in the lower court's determination that exceeded the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence in violation of the rules of logic and experience, or that misapprehended the legal principles concerning the intent of illegal acquisition, thereby affecting the judgment.
(Deo) The portion concerning Defendant 2's misappropriation of budget funds relating to the Korean Studies Fund
The court below, for the reasons stated in its judgment, found Defendant 2 not guilty as to both the primary charge of violation of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment of Specific Crimes (Loss of National Treasury, etc.) by embezzlement, and the alternative charge of violation of the same Act by breach of trust, in this regard.
Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the relevant legal principles and the evidence lawfully adopted, there is no error in the lower court's determination that exceeded the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence in violation of the rules of logic and experience, or that misapprehended the legal principles concerning the intent of illegal acquisition, thereby affecting the judgment.
(Reo) The portion concerning the misappropriation of budget funds arising from financial support related to the Third Federation of Trade Unions by Defendant 7
The court below, for the reasons stated in its judgment, found that the fact of Defendant 7's conspiracy in, or participation in, this offense had not been proven, and accordingly found Defendant 7 not guilty as to both the primary charge of violation of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment of Specific Crimes (Loss of National Treasury, etc.) and the alternative charge of occupational embezzlement, in this regard.
Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the relevant legal principles and the evidence lawfully adopted, there is no error in the lower court's determination that exceeded the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence in violation of the rules of logic and experience, thereby affecting the judgment.
(Meo) The portions, among the primary and alternative charges against Defendant 10, concerning the delivery of KRW 20,000,000 to Non-indicted 36 on December 19, 2011
The court below, for the reasons stated in its judgment, found Defendant 10 not guilty in its reasoning as to all of these charges.
Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the relevant legal principles and the evidence lawfully adopted, there is no error in the lower court's determination that misapprehended the legal principles concerning co-principals, thereby affecting the judgment.
(Beo) The remaining portions
The prosecutor filed a final appeal as to the entirety of the portions of the judgment below concerning Defendant 1, Defendant 2, Defendant 3, Defendant 4, Defendant 5, Defendant 7, Defendant 9, Defendant 10, and Defendant 11, but as to the remaining portions, no grounds of objection are stated in the petition of final appeal or the brief on the grounds of final appeal.
13. Scope of reversal
The portions of the judgment below finding Defendant 2, Defendant 7, and Defendant 9 not guilty, and dismissing the prosecution (면소), as to each violation of the National Intelligence Service Act by abuse of authority against NIS employees—being the portions as to which the prosecutor's grounds of final appeal are accepted, or portions that stand in a relationship of a single crime with such portions—must be reversed. Since the court below regarded the portions found guilty as to Defendant 2, Defendant 7, and Defendant 9 as being in a concurrent-crime relationship under the first part of Article 37 of the Criminal Act (형법) and accordingly imposed a single sentence for each of them, the guilty portions as to Defendant 2, Defendant 7, and Defendant 9 (including the portions acquitted in the reasoning) must also all be reversed.
14. Conclusion
Therefore, the guilty portion of the judgment below as to Defendant 2 (including the portion acquitted in the reasoning) and the portion finding him not guilty and dismissing the prosecution as to each violation of the National Intelligence Service Act by abuse of authority against NIS employees; the guilty portion as to Defendant 7 (including the portion acquitted in the reasoning) and the portion finding him not guilty as to each violation of the National Intelligence Service Act by abuse of authority against NIS employees; and the guilty portion as to Defendant 9 and the portion finding him not guilty as to each violation of the National Intelligence Service Act by abuse of authority against NIS employees, are all reversed, and this part of the case is remanded to the court below for further hearing and determination. The final appeals filed by Defendant 1, Defendant 3, Defendant 4, Defendant 5, Defendant 6, Defendant 10, and Defendant 11, the prosecutor's final appeals as to Defendant 1, Defendant 3, Defendant 4, Defendant 5, Defendant 10, and Defendant 11, and the remaining final appeals as to Defendant 2, Defendant 7, and Defendant 9 are all dismissed. The prosecution against Defendant 8 is dismissed. This judgment is rendered as set forth in the Order, by the unanimous opinion of the participating Justices.
Justice Lee Ki-taek (Presiding Justice)
Justice Park Jeong-hwa
Justice Kim Seon-su (Justice in Charge)