[Order]
The judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Seoul High Court.
[Reasoning] The grounds of appeal are examined.
1. Overview of the Case
According to the reasoning of the judgment below and the record, the following facts may be known.
A. The Plaintiff's Establishment Report and Its Acceptance
1) The Plaintiff was established on May 28, 1989, at a time when teachers' labor unions were not permitted, with teachers of national, public, and private schools nationwide as its members. At the time of establishment, Article 6 of the Plaintiff's bylaws provided that "the members of this union shall be faculty and staff engaged at kindergartens, elementary schools, middle and high schools, universities, the Ministry of Education, and other educational institutions nationwide, excluding those who work on behalf of employers" (Paragraph 1), and "faculty and staff who have been dismissed (removal, discharge, ex officio dismissal, etc.) or excluded from appointment due to unjust treatment by the Ministry of Education, provincial and metropolitan offices of education, or school foundations may also become members" (Paragraph 2), thereby including not only "incumbent teachers" but also "dismissed teachers" within the scope of union membership eligibility.
2) Thereafter, in order to comply with universalized international labor standards by guaranteeing teachers' fundamental labor rights, which had been restricted until then, and to determine the scope of such guarantees and the structure of collective bargaining in a manner that respected the plan for guaranteeing teachers' fundamental labor rights agreed upon by the Tripartite Commission (노사정위원회), the Act on the Establishment and Operation of Teachers' Labor Unions (교원의 노동조합 설립 및 운영 등에 관한 법률, hereinafter the "Teachers' Union Act") was enacted as Act No. 5727 on January 29, 1999, and took effect on July 1, 1999, thereby permitting the establishment of teachers' labor unions under positive law. While the Teachers' Union Act set forth certain special provisions concerning teachers' labor unions, it provided that the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act (노동조합 및 노동관계조정법, hereinafter the "Trade Union Act") shall govern all other matters (Article 14, Paragraph 1). Since the proviso of Article 2, Subparagraph 4 of the Trade Union Act provides that an organization shall not be deemed a labor union where it "permits the membership of persons who are not workers [Item (라)]," the membership of dismissed teachers and other "persons who are not teachers" in a teachers' labor union was not permitted [Article 2 of the Teachers' Union Act limits "teachers" under the Act to "incumbent teachers" (main text), provided, however, that "a person who has been dismissed and who has filed an application with the Labor Relations Commission for remedy against unfair labor practices pursuant to the Trade Union Act shall be deemed a teacher until the National Labor Relations Commission renders a decision on reexamination" (proviso). Meanwhile, the main text of Article 2 of the Teachers' Union Act was partially amended by Act No. 17430 on June 9, 2020, in accordance with the purport of the Constitutional Court's decision of incompatibility with the Constitution (Constitutional Court en banc Decision 2015Hun-Ga38, decided August 30, 2018); hereinafter, "Article 2 of the Teachers' Union Act" refers to the provision prior to such amendment].
3) As the Teachers' Union Act with the above content was enacted and took effect, the Plaintiff held a national delegates' assembly on June 27, 1999, and resolved to basically maintain Paragraph 1 of Article 6 of its bylaws while deleting Paragraph 2. On July 1, 1999, the Plaintiff submitted the bylaws as amended above while filing an establishment report with the Defendant (at the time, the "Minister of Labor," which was changed to the current "Minister of Employment and Labor" upon amendment of the Government Organization Act by Act No. 10339 on June 4, 2010). The Defendant, having determined based on the amended bylaws submitted by the Plaintiff that there was no violation of the establishment requirements under the Teachers' Union Act and the Trade Union Act, accepted the establishment report on July 2, 1999, and issued a report certificate to the Plaintiff.
B. The First Corrective Order
1) After the acceptance of the above establishment report, the Defendant confirmed that Article 5 of the Addendum to the Plaintiff's bylaws contained the following provisions: "Notwithstanding Article 6, Paragraph 1 of the bylaws, a teacher who has been unfairly dismissed may become a member" (Paragraph 1), and "Among dismissed teachers who held membership eligibility under the former bylaws, those members who have not been reinstated and members who are unfairly dismissed after the effective date of these bylaws shall retain membership eligibility notwithstanding Article 6, Paragraph 1 of the bylaws" (Paragraph 2).
2) On February 12, 2010, the Defendant requested the Seoul Regional Labor Relations Commission to resolve on a corrective order concerning matters in the Plaintiff's bylaws that the Defendant deemed to be in violation of labor relations statutes, and on March 10, 2010, the Seoul Regional Labor Relations Commission resolved that Article 9 and Article 5 of the Addendum, among other provisions, of the Plaintiff's bylaws violated Article 2 of the Teachers' Union Act (Seoul 2010 Resolution No. 6). Accordingly, on March 31, 2010, the Defendant ordered the Plaintiff, pursuant to Article 14, Paragraph 1 of the Teachers' Union Act and Article 21, Paragraphs 1 and 3 of the Trade Union Act, to correct certain provisions, including Article 55, Paragraph 4 and Article 5 of the Addendum, of the Plaintiff's bylaws by May 3, 2010 (hereinafter the "First Corrective Order").
3) On June 29, 2010, the Plaintiff filed a lawsuit seeking revocation of the First Corrective Order, asserting that it was unlawful; the court rendered a judgment revoking only the portion of the First Corrective Order concerning Article 55, Paragraph 4 of the Plaintiff's bylaws, and dismissing the claim as to the remaining portions, including Article 5 of the Addendum. This judgment became final and conclusive as both the Plaintiff's appeal and further appeal were dismissed (Seoul Administrative Court Decision 2010Guhap27110, decided November 5, 2010; Seoul High Court Decision 2010Nu43725, decided September 9, 2011; and Supreme Court Decision 2011Du24231, decided January 12, 2012).
C. The Second Corrective Order
1) On August 14, 2010, the Plaintiff amended its bylaws, deleting Paragraph 1 of Article 5 of the Addendum and amending Paragraph 2 to read: "A member who has been unfairly dismissed shall retain membership eligibility notwithstanding Article 6, Paragraph 1 of the bylaws" (hereinafter, Article 5 of the Addendum as thus amended is referred to as the "Addendum Provision at Issue").
2) On August 3, 2012, the Defendant requested the Seoul Regional Labor Relations Commission to resolve on a corrective order concerning the Plaintiff's bylaws, and on September 3, 2012, the Seoul Regional Labor Relations Commission resolved that the portion of the Plaintiff's bylaws constituting the Addendum Provision at Issue violated Article 2 of the Teachers' Union Act (Seoul 2012 Resolution No. 7). Accordingly, on September 17, 2012, the Defendant ordered the Plaintiff, for the same reasons as the First Corrective Order, to correct the Addendum Provision at Issue by October 18, 2012 (hereinafter the "Second Corrective Order").
D. The Notice of Being an Extra-Statutory Union
1) On September 23, 2013, on the grounds that "the Plaintiff was twice ordered to correct bylaws permitting the membership of dismissed persons but failed to comply, and it was found that dismissed persons had in fact joined as members and were engaging in activities," the Defendant, pursuant to Article 14, Paragraph 1 of the Teachers' Union Act, Article 12, Paragraph 3, Subparagraph 1 and Article 2, Subparagraph 4, Item (라) of the Trade Union Act, Article 9, Paragraph 1 of the Enforcement Decree of the Act on the Establishment and Operation of Teachers' Labor Unions (교원의 노동조합 설립 및 운영 등에 관한 법률 시행령, hereinafter the "Enforcement Decree of the Teachers' Union Act"), and Article 9, Paragraph 2 of the Enforcement Decree of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act (노동조합 및 노동관계조정법 시행령, hereinafter the "Enforcement Decree of the Trade Union Act"), demanded that the Plaintiff, by October 23, 2013, correct the Addendum Provision at Issue to conform to Article 2 of the Teachers' Union Act and take measures to ensure that dismissed persons ineligible for membership would not join or engage in activities (hereinafter the "Demand for Correction"). In the written demand for correction, the Defendant specifically identified nine dismissed teachers who had joined as members of the Plaintiff and were engaging in activities, and stated: "Please be advised that if the demand for correction is not complied with by the above deadline, notice will be given that [the Plaintiff] shall not be deemed a labor union under the Teachers' Union Act."
2) However, the Plaintiff did not comply with the Demand for Correction, and accordingly, on October 24, 2013, the Defendant, pursuant to Article 14, Paragraph 1 of the Teachers' Union Act, Article 12, Paragraph 3, Subparagraph 1 and Article 2, Subparagraph 4, Item (라) of the Trade Union Act, Article 9, Paragraph 1 of the Enforcement Decree of the Teachers' Union Act, and Article 9, Paragraph 2 of the Enforcement Decree of the Trade Union Act, notified the Plaintiff that it "shall not be deemed a labor union under the Teachers' Union Act" (hereinafter, for brevity, a labor union established under the Trade Union Act or the Teachers' Union Act is referred to as a "statutory labor union," and a labor union that is not a statutory labor union is referred to as an "extra-statutory union"; and a notice that an entity shall not be deemed a labor union under the Trade Union Act or the Teachers' Union Act is referred to as a "Notice of Being an Extra-Statutory Union," with the Notice of Being an Extra-Statutory Union issued to the Plaintiff on October 24, 2013 referred to as the "Notice at Issue in This Case").
3) On October 25, 2013, the Minister of Education sent an official document to each Metropolitan and Provincial Office of Education entitled "Request for Cooperation in Notifying the Extinguishment of Grounds for Leave of Absence and Implementing Follow-up Measures Pursuant to the Notice of 'Not Being a Union' Issued to the Korean Teachers and Education Workers' Union." Its main content was that, as a result of the Notice at Issue in This Case, the Plaintiff had lost its status and authority as a labor union, such as the use of the name "labor union" and the ability to engage in collective bargaining, and accordingly requested each Metropolitan and Provincial Office of Education to implement the following follow-up measures and to report the results of implementation to the Ministry of Education by December 2, 2013: (1) revocation of approved leaves of absence for full-time union officials and orders for their return to work; (2) requests for vacating office space provided to the Plaintiff and for repayment of office support funds; (3) the loss of effect, as of October 24, 2013, of existing collective agreements and the suspension of ongoing collective bargaining; (4) prohibition of withholding union dues from salaries; and (5) among various committees, the loss of committee membership status held by the Plaintiff's members pursuant to collective agreements, resulting from the loss of effect of such collective agreements.
2. Whether the Notice at Issue in This Case Is Lawful (Grounds of Appeal Nos. 1 and 2)
A. Relevant Statutes
1) Under the Teachers' Union Act, a person who intends to establish a teachers' labor union must submit a report of establishment to the Defendant (Article 4, Paragraph 2), and matters concerning teachers' labor unions not provided for in the Teachers' Union Act shall be governed by the Trade Union Act, except as provided in Article 14, Paragraph 2 (Article 14, Paragraph 1).
2) Under the Trade Union Act, a "labor union" means "an organization or federation of organizations formed autonomously and voluntarily by workers acting as the principal body, for the purpose of maintaining and improving working conditions and otherwise enhancing the economic and social status of workers" (Article 2, Subparagraph 4, main text), provided, however, that an organization shall not be deemed a labor union where it "permits the membership of persons who are not workers [Item (라)]" (proviso to Article 2, Subparagraph 4; hereinafter, the proviso to Article 2, Subparagraph 4 of the Trade Union Act, which reads "provided, however, that where any of the following items applies, [the organization] shall not be deemed a labor union," is referred to as the "Statutory Provision at Issue," and the portion including Item (라), reading "provided, however, that where [the organization] permits the membership of persons who are not workers, it shall not be deemed a labor union," is referred to as "Item (라) of the Statutory Provision at Issue"). Where a labor union to be established falls under any of the items of the proviso to Article 2, Subparagraph 4, the administrative agency shall return the report of establishment (Article 12, Paragraph 3, Subparagraph 1).
3) Article 9, Paragraph 1 of the Enforcement Decree of the Teachers' Union Act provides that matters concerning teachers' labor unions not provided for in the Enforcement Decree of the Teachers' Union Act shall be governed by the Enforcement Decree of the Trade Union Act, except as provided in Article 9, Paragraph 2.
4) Article 9, Paragraph 2 of the Enforcement Decree of the Trade Union Act provides: "Where, after a labor union has been issued a certificate of report of establishment, a ground for return of the report of establishment under Article 12, Paragraph 3, Subparagraph 1 of the Trade Union Act arises, the administrative agency shall demand correction, setting a period of 30 days, and if such correction is not made within that period, shall notify the relevant labor union that it shall not be deemed a labor union under the Trade Union Act" (hereinafter the "Provision of the Enforcement Decree at Issue").
B. The Constitutional Principle of Statutory Reservation and the Limits of Administrative Legislation
1) Article 37, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution (헌법) provides: "The freedoms and rights of citizens may be restricted by Act only when necessary for national security, the maintenance of law and order, or for public welfare, and even when such restriction is imposed, no essential aspect of the freedom or right shall be violated." The constitutional principle of the rule of law has, as its core content, the principle of statutory reservation, i.e., the principle that administrative action requires the basis of a formal statute enacted by the National Assembly. Furthermore, today the principle of statutory reservation is understood to encompass not merely the requirement that administrative action have some basis in statute, but also the principle of parliamentary reservation, i.e., the requirement that in areas of fundamental and important significance to the national community and its members—particularly areas related to the realization of citizens' fundamental rights—the essential matters thereof must be determined by the legislature itself, as the representative of the people, rather than being entrusted to the administration. Whether a given matter falls within the essential matters that the National Assembly must itself provide for by formal statute must be determined individually in each specific case, taking into account the importance of the interests or values involved, and the degree and method of regulation or infringement; however, the greater the importance the subject matter of regulation has in relation to citizens' fundamental rights, and the greater the need for open discussion thereon or for the adjustment of conflicting interests, the greater the need for it to be directly regulated by an Act of the National Assembly. Accordingly, basic and essential matters concerning the rights and duties of citizens must be determined by the National Assembly, and when restricting freedoms or rights of citizens guaranteed under the Constitution, the National Assembly must itself regulate, by Act, at least the essential aspects of such restriction (see Supreme Court Decision 2006Du14476, decided October 12, 2007; Supreme Court en banc Decision 2012Du23808, decided August 20, 2015; and Constitutional Court en banc Decision 2008Hun-Ma370 and others, decided February 26, 2009, etc.).
2) Article 75 of the Constitution provides: "The President may issue presidential decrees concerning matters delegated to him by Act with the scope specifically defined and matters necessary to enforce Acts." Accordingly, the President may issue presidential decrees only concerning matters delegated by Act with the scope specifically defined, and matters necessary to enforce Acts; thus, an enforcement decree of an Act may provide only for matters delegated by the parent Act or detailed matters necessary for the actual enforcement of the Act within the scope prescribed by the Act, and may not, absent delegation by the Act, alter or supplement the content of individual rights and duties prescribed by the Act, nor prescribe new content not provided for in the Act (see Supreme Court Decision 89Nu2493, decided September 28, 1990; Supreme Court en banc Decision 93Da37342, decided January 24, 1995, etc.).
C. Unconstitutionality of the Provision of the Enforcement Decree at Issue
A Notice of Being an Extra-Statutory Union is a serious, adverse administrative disposition that deprives a lawfully established labor union of its legal status, and, in principle, is a matter that the legislature, as the representative of the people, must itself provide for by formal statute; in order to provide for such a matter by administrative legislation, there must necessarily be an explicit and specific delegation by statute. However, the Provision of the Enforcement Decree at Issue, by providing for the Notice of Being an Extra-Statutory Union—a matter not provided for by statute—without statutory delegation, essentially restricts the constitutional right to collective labor action (노동3권, the "three labor rights"), and is therefore void in itself. The specific reasons are as follows.
1) A Notice of Being an Extra-Statutory Union must be regarded as a formative administrative disposition that determines, with respect to a labor union that has been lawfully established and is actively operating, that it is no longer a labor union under the Trade Union Act.
The Trade Union Act establishes a system of reporting the establishment of labor unions, and in order to become a statutory labor union, an organization must not only meet the establishment requirements prescribed by the Act but must also complete the report of establishment; accordingly, a labor union under the Trade Union Act comes into existence upon submission of a report of establishment to the competent administrative agency and receipt of a certificate of report from that agency (see Supreme Court Decision 76Nu189, decided December 11, 1979; Supreme Court Decision 93Do855, decided June 28, 1996, etc.). For example, an organization does not immediately acquire the status of a statutory labor union merely because it does not permit the membership of persons who are not workers, nor can it immediately be deemed not to be a statutory labor union merely because it permits the membership of persons who are not workers. The provision in the Statutory Provision at Issue that an organization "shall not be deemed a labor union" does not itself produce a legal effect, but merely states the criterion for determining whether an organization is a labor union under the Trade Union Act.
The administrative agency returns the report of establishment of an organization that does not satisfy the statutory establishment requirements, and such return, being a refusal to accept the report of establishment, is an administrative disposition that directly affects the legal status of the organization concerned. That is, while an organization with a disqualifying ground is, pursuant to the Statutory Provision at Issue, not deemed a labor union, such legal effect is realized only through the return of the report of establishment as described above.
A Notice of Being an Extra-Statutory Union is an administrative disposition by which the administrative agency, exercising sovereign authority, determines that a labor union which has been lawfully established through the above procedure and is actively operating is no longer a labor union under the Trade Union Act; it is not merely an act of subsequently notifying or confirming that the organization has already become an extra-statutory union by operation of statute, but is a formative act by which the organization becomes an extra-statutory union as a result of the notice itself. That is, where a disqualifying ground arises with respect to a statutory labor union, the union does not immediately become an extra-statutory union by operation of the Statutory Provision at Issue; rather, it becomes an extra-statutory union only upon the issuance of a Notice of Being an Extra-Statutory Union based on such ground.
2) The Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act (노동조합법) provides special protections for trade unions established under the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act. That is, a trade union under the Act may acquire legal personality (Article 6), may apply to the Labor Relations Commission for mediation of labor disputes and remedies for unfair labor practices (Article 7, Paragraph 1), and may be exempted from taxation (Article 8). Above all, only a trade union under the Act may use the title "trade union" (Article 7, Paragraph 3). Acceptance of a trade union's report of establishment recognizes a trade union that meets the statutory requirements for establishment as a trade union under the Act, thereby granting it the legal status to enjoy the rights and benefits prescribed by the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, whereas a notification of being outside the law (법외노조 통보, "notification of non-conforming union status") deprives an already lawfully established trade union of such legal status on the ground that a disqualifying event has occurred with respect to that trade union.
A trade union that has received a notification of non-conforming union status can no longer use the title "trade union," and is hindered in its activities as a trade union, such as being unable to appropriately respond even if the employer commits unfair labor practices such as refusing collective bargaining. Of course, even if a union becomes a non-conforming union, it does not thereby lose its status as a trade union itself, so it may be considered that the general exercise of the three labor rights remains possible (see Supreme Court Decision 96Nu2125 delivered on February 11, 1997; Supreme Court Decision 2011Du921 delivered on December 27, 2016; and Constitutional Court en banc Decision 2011Hun-Ba53 delivered on March 29, 2012, etc.), but even so, real-world constraints and disadvantages cannot be avoided. This is because the three labor rights can be substantively guaranteed only through a trade union, and it is difficult to expect that an organization that cannot even use the title "trade union" could effectively exercise the three labor rights. Ultimately, while a notification of non-conforming union status appears formally to merely remove the special protections under the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, it in substance results in an essential restriction on the three labor rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
Article 33, Paragraph 1 of the Constitution provides that "workers shall have the right to independent association, collective bargaining, and collective action for the purpose of improving working conditions," thereby guaranteeing the three labor rights as fundamental rights. The three labor rights should be understood not as rights that can be realized only through state intervention by way of enactment of statutes, but as concrete rights that can directly take effect as legal norms based solely on the constitutional provision, even without a statute. Article 1 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, which provides that "this Act aims to guarantee workers' rights to organize, to bargain collectively, and to act collectively under the Constitution" for the purpose of maintaining and improving working conditions and enhancing workers' economic and social status, can also be understood in this light. In particular, among the three labor rights, the right to organize is a concretization of the freedom of association in the sphere of labor (see Constitutional Court en banc Decision 2011Hun-Ba53 delivered on March 29, 2012, etc.), and historically and conceptually possesses the essential nature of a liberty right; therefore, "freedom from the state" should be emphasized more than "freedom through the state." Accordingly, when enacting labor-related statutes, the constitutional significance and direct normative force of these three labor rights, particularly the right to organize, must be respected, and in the enforcement and interpretation of statutes so enacted, care must be taken not to undermine the essence and value of the right to organize.
Meanwhile, unlike Paragraph 1 above, Article 33, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution provides that "public officials who are workers shall have the right to organize, to bargain collectively, and to act collectively only to the extent prescribed by statute," and the exercise of the three labor rights is restricted not only for teachers at national and public schools who are educational public officials, but also for teachers at private schools (Article 55 of the Private School Act (사립학교법); see Constitutional Court en banc Decision 89Hun-Ga106 delivered on July 22, 1991, etc.). Accordingly, Article 5 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, while providing in its main text that "workers may freely organize or join a trade union," provides in its proviso that "provided, however, that matters concerning public officials and teachers shall be separately prescribed by statute." Ultimately, the three labor rights of teachers can be substantively guaranteed only where there is a special statutory provision on the matter (see Supreme Court Decision 2011Du921 delivered on December 27, 2016; Constitutional Court en banc Decision 2005Hun-Ma971, etc. delivered on December 26, 2008, etc.), and the statute concerning this is the Act on the Establishment, Operation, etc. of Teachers' Labor Unions (교원노조법, "Teachers' Union Act"). Article 1 of the Teachers' Union Act provides that "notwithstanding Article 66, Paragraph 1 of the State Public Officials Act and Article 55 of the Private School Act, this Act aims to prescribe matters concerning the establishment of trade unions by teachers pursuant to the proviso of Article 5 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, and to provide special exceptions to the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act as applied to teachers." Therefore, notifying a teachers' trade union that it "shall not be deemed a trade union under the Teachers' Union Act" is not merely a matter of depriving it of the status of "a trade union under the Act," but may in fact amount to a denial of its very existence as a "trade union."
3) As such, whether an organization is recognized as a trade union under the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act is an essential precondition for the substantive exercise of the three labor rights guaranteed by the Constitution, and a notification of non-conforming union status issued to a trade union that has already been lawfully established through due process is even more injurious than the return of a report of establishment to an organization that is not yet a trade union under the Act. Therefore, it accords with the constitutional principle of statutory reservation (법률유보원칙) that a notification of non-conforming union status, which bears such a strong connection to fundamental rights, must have a clear basis in statute. However, the current Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act (enacted as Act No. 5310 on March 13, 1997, and most recently amended as Act No. 17432 on June 9, 2020) has, from the time of its enactment to the present, directly provided for the return of a report of establishment, while containing no provision whatsoever regarding the more injurious notification of non-conforming union status, and has not even delegated the matter to be prescribed by presidential decree.
Originally, the former Trade Union Act (구 노동조합법) (enacted as Act No. 280 on March 8, 1953, and repealed by Act No. 5244 on December 31, 1996) provided, in Article 32, for a system of ordering the dissolution of a trade union, whereby an administrative agency could, after issuing an order to revoke or amend the union's bylaws, order the dissolution of a trade union that failed to comply, upon resolution of the Labor Relations Commission (at the time of enactment, only "resolution of the Labor Relations Commission" was required as a limiting condition, but through the amendment of December 31, 1986, the additional limiting condition of "failure to comply with an order to revoke or amend bylaws" was added). However, on the ground that allowing an administrative agency to arbitrarily dissolve an already lawfully established and operating trade union would infringe upon workers' right to organize and the autonomy of trade unions, this system was abolished on November 28, 1987 (Act No. 3966).
However, a mere approximately five months after the abolition of the above trade union dissolution order system, on April 15, 1988, on the ground of preventing the continued existence of trade unions lacking the statutory requirements, the system of notification of non-conforming union status was newly introduced in Article 8, Paragraph 2 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Trade Union Act (구 노동조합법 시행령) (enacted as Presidential Decree No. 782 on April 20, 1953, and repealed by Presidential Decree No. 15321 on March 27, 1997) (Presidential Decree No. 12429), and this system has been maintained to this day, unchanged, through the enforcement decree provision at issue in this case. However, this system of notification of non-conforming union status is, in substance, identical to the trade union dissolution order system in terms of the entity involved, the subject matter, the procedure, and the effect, in that it allows an administrative agency, upon demanding correction of the bylaws and the union's failure to comply, to deprive the trade union of its status as a trade union under the Act by issuing a notification of non-conforming union status. If anything, unlike the former Act, by omitting the procedure for resolution by the Labor Relations Commission, the possibility of internal administrative control has been reduced, thereby merely expanding the scope for arbitrary intervention by the administrative agency.
In other words, the system of notification of non-conforming union status was originally provided for in statute, and after being abolished pursuant to the decision of the legislature—representative of the people—the administration revived it through administrative legislation without any statutory basis or delegation. In determining the unconstitutionality of the enforcement decree provision at issue in this case, this history of the system must duly be taken into account.
4) In sum, a notification of non-conforming union status is not an act that retroactively announces or confirms that a union has already become a non-conforming union by operation of statute, but is a formative administrative disposition that, by virtue of the notification itself, causes the union to become a non-conforming union for the first time. Such a notification of non-conforming union status does not merely remove the statutory protections afforded to a trade union, but substantively restricts the three labor rights guaranteed by the Constitution. However, while the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act provides for the return of a report of establishment submitted by an organization that does not meet the statutory requirements for establishment, it contains no provision whatsoever regarding the even more injurious notification of non-conforming union status issued to a trade union that has already been established and is operating, nor does it contain any express provision delegating this matter to the enforcement decree. Moreover, the system of notification of non-conforming union status is, in substance, no different from the trade union dissolution order system that the legislature abolished upon reflective consideration. Ultimately, the enforcement decree provision at issue in this case, with respect to a matter not prescribed by statute and without any specific and express statutory delegation, provides for an essential restriction on the three labor rights guaranteed by the Constitution, and thus violates the principle of statutory reservation.
D. Illegality of the Notification of Non-Conforming Union Status at Issue in This Case
Defendant issued the notification of non-conforming union status at issue in this case on the premise that the enforcement decree provision at issue in this case was valid, and on the basis thereof. As discussed above, the enforcement decree provision at issue in this case violates the constitutional principle of statutory reservation and is void in itself. Accordingly, the notification of non-conforming union status at issue in this case, which is based on the enforcement decree provision at issue in this case, has lost its legal basis and must be deemed unlawful.
Nevertheless, the court below held the enforcement decree provision at issue in this case to be valid and determined that the notification of non-conforming union status at issue in this case was lawful. This determination by the court below contains an error that misapprehends the legal principle concerning the constitutional principle of statutory reservation, thereby affecting the judgment. The grounds of appeal pointing out this error are well-founded.
3. Conclusion
Accordingly, without examining the remaining grounds of appeal, the judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court below for further hearing and determination, and it is so decided as set forth in the Order. The opinions of the Justices participating in this judgment were unanimous except for the separate opinion of Justice Kim Jae-hyung, the separate opinion of Justice Ahn Cheol-sang, and the dissenting opinion of Justice Lee Ki-taek and Justice Lee Dong-won, and there is a supplementary opinion by Justice Park Jung-hwa, Justice Min Yu-sook, Justice Noh Jeong-hee, Justice Kim Sang-hwan, and Justice Noh Tae-ak concerning the majority opinion.
4. Separate Opinion of Justice Kim Jae-hyung
A. The difficulty in this case lies not in the enforcement decree, but in the statute itself.
The Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act provides that where a union permits persons who are not workers to join, it "shall not be deemed a trade union" [Item (Ra) of the statutory provision at issue in this case]. The Enforcement Decree of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act provides that in such a case, the administrative agency shall "notify" the union that it is not a trade union (the enforcement decree provision at issue in this case). The Teachers' Union Act and its enforcement decree apply the above provisions of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act and its enforcement decree, as they are, to teachers' trade unions as well.
According to these statutory and enforcement decree provisions, the interpretation that where a union permits persons who are not teachers to join, it must be notified that it is not a teachers' trade union appears to be a matter of course [however, since the mere fact that a union, after being lawfully established, permitted the membership of persons who are not workers, cannot negate the very existence of the union as a trade union, the term "non-conforming union" (법외노조) is used in the sense of a union not recognized by statute]. If Plaintiff permits the membership of dismissed teachers as union members, then, pursuant to the Teachers' Union Act, Plaintiff cannot be regarded as a teachers' trade union, leading to the conclusion that Defendant's issuance of the notification of non-conforming union status to Plaintiff was lawful. Such reasoning can be seen as a legal syllogism that directly applies the statutory and enforcement decree provisions to this case.
However, is a statute providing that a lawfully established trade union shall not be deemed a trade union merely because it includes even a single dismissed worker as a member, a legitimate one? Is it reasonable, in this case, to deprive Plaintiff of its status as a teachers' trade union solely on the ground that a mere 9 out of approximately 60,000 union members are dismissed teachers? Should Plaintiff be deemed not to be a teachers' trade union merely because it did not exclude from its membership those who lost their status as teachers while acting as union members? Should Defendant's measure be considered justified because Plaintiff, rather than merely tolerating the union activities of dismissed teachers, expressly provided for this in its bylaws? This is precisely where the difficulty of this case lies. The question arises as to whether an interpretation based on the literal text of the statute, and its application, truly leads to a legitimate conclusion.
The majority opinion holds that since the system of notification of non-conforming union status, which causes a serious restriction on the three labor rights guaranteed by the Constitution, is prescribed not by statute but by enforcement decree, without any special statutory basis or delegation, it violates the principle of statutory reservation and is void, and that therefore, the notification of non-conforming union status at issue in this case has lost its legal basis and is unlawful. However, if a trade union that, under the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, permits the membership of persons who are not workers is not a lawful trade union but merely a non-conforming union, then the notification of non-conforming union status at issue in this case, being one that informs of the effect arising from the above statutory provision, would have to be deemed lawful.
The crux of this case is not the propriety of the "notification" of non-conforming union status. If Plaintiff does indeed fall under the category of "non-conforming union," then notifying it of that fact is something that Defendant is naturally obliged to do, and indeed necessary. The core of the issue lies in whether Plaintiff is a trade union under the Act—that is, whether it is a non-conforming union.
Should Plaintiff be deemed a non-conforming union pursuant to Item (Ra) of the statutory provision at issue in this case? Is the question of whether to permit dismissed persons to join as union members a matter that determines the very essence and fate of the trade union? Is this an issue to be resolved not through statutory interpretation but through a constitutional review of the statute's constitutionality by the Constitutional Court, or through legislation by the National Assembly? The Constitutional Court held constitutional Article 2 of the Teachers' Union Act, which excludes dismissed teachers from membership in teachers' trade unions (see Constitutional Court en banc Decision 2013Hun-Ma671, etc. delivered on May 28, 2015). Legislation in the National Assembly to permit dismissed persons to join trade unions has remained stalled for several years, and the government maintains its position that Plaintiff is a non-conforming union. Even though this matter now awaits only the judgment of the courts, must the courts conclude that there is no way to grant relief to Plaintiff?
This case is what Ronald Dworkin termed a "hard case." A hard case requires deliberation commensurate with its difficulty. To this end, this case was examined over a long period of time, and a public hearing was also held. There are cases in which a conclusion cannot be reached by circumventing the core of the issue. This is precisely such a case.
In the following section, I will examine the interpretive difficulties presented by the statutes and enforcement decree at issue in this case, and present the essential nature of this case and a proper solution thereto.
B. The meaning of the enforcement decree provision at issue in this case is clear.
1) The enforcement decree provision at issue in this case provides: "Where, after a trade union has been issued a certificate of report of establishment, a ground for return of the report of establishment falling under Article 12, Paragraph 3, Item 1 of the Act arises, the administrative agency shall demand correction within a fixed period of 30 days, and if the union fails to comply within that period, the administrative agency shall notify the relevant trade union that it is not deemed a trade union under the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act."
Its meaning is clear. If a disqualifying event arises with respect to a trade union that has already completed its report of establishment, the administrative agency must demand correction, and if correction is not made within the deadline, must notify the union that it "shall not be deemed a trade union under the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act." In this case, where it is discovered that a teachers' trade union that has already completed its report of establishment permits the membership of persons who are not teachers, the administrative agency must demand correction, and if correction is not made within the deadline, must notify the union that it is a non-conforming union. This is a very natural and self-evident provision requiring notification that a trade union "lacking the establishment requirements required by statute" is "not a trade union under the Act." Such notification is merely informing of that fact and has no particular formative significance. Rather, the significance of the notification should be found in the fact that it clarifies the legal relationships of the relevant parties and interested persons by clearly confirming the legal status of the union in question. The view that "a union that is not a trade union under statute cannot be notified that it is not a trade union under statute" is inherently self-contradictory. This is ultimately no different from saying "it is not a lawful trade union, but it is a lawful trade union." Therefore, the enforcement decree provision at issue in this case should be deemed lawful and valid, as it is directly based on the statutory provision at issue in this case and concretizes the purpose and meaning of the statute. In fact, the enforcement decree provision at issue in this case can be viewed as a provision to which it is difficult to attach any particular independent significance. This is because, even without the "notification" of non-conforming union status, a trade union in which a statutory disqualifying event has arisen can no longer be regarded as "a trade union under the Act."
This legal principle does not change even though the Enforcement Decree provision in this case makes non-compliance with a certain corrective procedure a condition for the notification of exclusion from union status. The corrective demand procedure prescribed by the Enforcement Decree provision in this case grants an opportunity for autonomous correction to a labor union in which illegal matters have arisen, by giving prior notice regarding the notification of exclusion from union status and providing an opportunity to submit opinions, in accordance with the general legal principles of administrative law or the Administrative Procedures Act (행정절차법). Making a corrective demand prior to the notification of exclusion from union status and non-compliance therewith a condition for such notification merely reinforces the legitimacy of the notification of exclusion from union status.
2) The majority opinion states that the notification of exclusion from union status is a formative administrative disposition that, for the first time, makes a labor union in which disqualifying grounds have arisen into a union excluded from legal status, and that since such a serious detrimental disposition must necessarily have a basis in statute or delegation by statute, the Enforcement Decree provision in this case, which independently provides for the notification of exclusion from union status without such basis or delegation, is void as contrary to the principle of statutory reservation.
However, as seen above, the notification of exclusion from union status merely informs that a union "is not a labor union under the statute," and therefore, even if this is regarded as an administrative disposition, it is merely a confirmatory administrative act, not a formative administrative act that creates new rights and obligations. In other words, once a labor union has become excluded from legal status under the statute, that union remains excluded from legal status even without necessarily being notified of this fact, and as long as the disqualifying grounds are not resolved, even if the notification of exclusion from union status is issued and then revoked or withdrawn, the fact that the union is excluded from legal status does not change.
The majority opinion states that the part of the statutory provision in this case reading "shall not be regarded as a labor union" does not itself have a legal effect but merely serves as a standard for determining whether a union is a labor union under the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act (노동조합 및 노동관계조정법, hereinafter "Trade Union Act"), yet provides no basis for this. However, there is no precedent interpreting a deeming provision in this manner. Although a report of establishment must be accepted for a labor union to be established under the Trade Union Act, this cannot serve as a basis for the view that when disqualifying grounds arise in a labor union, it becomes excluded from legal status only upon the notification of exclusion from union status. This is because the Trade Union Act expressly provides for the report of establishment of a labor union, while containing no provision at all regarding the notification of exclusion from union status. Therefore, even if the report of establishment of a labor union is regarded as a requirement for the establishment of the union, it cannot be said that a separate requirement, namely the notification of exclusion from union status, is necessarily required to deny such a union's status.
For example, if a labor union filed a report of establishment by means such as forging documents or deceiving the administrative agency, the administrative agency should be able to take measures to deny the union's legal status. In such cases, viewing it as permissible for the administrative agency to only issue a corrective order and, for non-compliance therewith, impose criminal punishment of a fine not exceeding 5 million won (Articles 93 and 21 of the Trade Union Act), is needless to say insufficient to sanction such a labor union. Even if the Enforcement Decree provision in this case were void or did not exist at all, the administrative agency should be able to take measures such as the notification of exclusion from union status against a labor union in which disqualifying grounds under the statute have arisen.
The majority opinion, apart from declaring the Enforcement Decree provision in this case void, fails to properly explain what the legal status of a labor union in which disqualifying grounds have arisen is, or how the specific legal relationship in this case unfolds. This sidesteps the core of the problem and avoids a substantive determination.
3) Even if the Enforcement Decree provision in this case is void, it is questionable whether that circumstance alone immediately renders the notification of exclusion from union status in this case unlawful, or whether it becomes unlawful only pursuant to the legal principle restricting the ex officio revocation or withdrawal of a beneficial administrative disposition.
Originally, the agency that issued an administrative act may revoke it by itself where there is a defect in the disposition, even without a separate legal basis, and even where there was no particular defect at the time of the disposition and there is no separate legal basis for withdrawing it after the disposition, the agency may withdraw it through a separate administrative act extinguishing its effect where a change of circumstances has arisen making it unnecessary to maintain the original disposition, or where a serious public interest necessity has arisen. However, where the original administrative act was beneficial, there is only a certain limitation requiring consideration of the vested rights of the party to whom the disposition was addressed (see Supreme Court Decision 85Nu664, decided February 25, 1986; Supreme Court Decision 2003Du10251, 10268, decided November 26, 2004, etc.). The acceptance of a labor union's report of establishment is a beneficial administrative disposition that grants special protection under the Trade Union Act by recognizing, as a lawful labor union, a union that has met the statutory requirements for establishment; therefore, the notification of exclusion from union status ultimately corresponds to the subsequent ex officio revocation or withdrawal of such acceptance of the report of establishment. Accordingly, the administrative agency may issue the notification of exclusion from union status in the sense of ex officio revoking or withdrawing the existing acceptance disposition even without a separate legal basis, subject only to a certain limitation requiring consideration of the vested rights of the union concerned in that process.
However, the Enforcement Decree provision in this case provides that if a corrective demand is not complied with, the notification of exclusion from union status must be issued. Since the Trade Union Act clearly prescribes the lawful requirements for a labor union, it mandates that the notification of exclusion from union status be issued in cases of violation thereof. This should be understood as an intent to disallow the exceptional limitation on ex officio revocation or withdrawal. Where there is an express provision denying the limitation on ex officio revocation or withdrawal in this manner, the general legal principle concerning the limitation on ex officio revocation or withdrawal of a beneficial administrative disposition cannot be applied, apart from the separate issue of whether that provision is unconstitutional or unlawful. Moreover, as seen above, the Enforcement Decree provision in this case is directly based on the statutory provision in this case and may be seen as intended to grant the relevant labor union an opportunity for autonomous correction, and thus there is no reason to regard it as void.
4) In sum, the Enforcement Decree provision in this case provides that the notification of exclusion from union status shall be issued to a labor union with disqualifying grounds. There is no exception to this. The provision prescribes this in binding terms only, leaving no room for discretion. Therefore, under the Enforcement Decree provision in this case, with respect to a labor union that permits the membership of persons who are not workers, the administrative agency must go through the corrective demand procedure but, if not corrected, must necessarily issue the notification of exclusion from union status.
The meaning of the Enforcement Decree provision in this case is, as stated above, very clear, and as it concretizes what the statute prescribes, it is constitutional and legitimate. The crux of the matter lies not in the Enforcement Decree provision in this case but in how the meaning of the statutory provision in this case should be understood.
C. How should the statutory provision in this case be interpreted?
1) Item (라) of the statutory provision in this case provides: "Where membership is permitted for persons who are not workers, [the organization] shall not be regarded as a labor union."
"Shall not be regarded as a labor union" is a so-called deeming provision, and unlike a presumption provision, it should be understood as not permitting rebuttal (see, regarding Article 28 of the Civil Act (민법), Supreme Court Decision 94Da52751, decided February 17, 1995, etc.). Both provisions using the expression "shall be regarded as" and those using the expression "shall not be regarded as" constitute deeming provisions, and there is no reason to treat the two differently. Therefore, where membership is permitted for persons who are not workers, [the organization] cannot be regarded as a labor union.
The majority opinion states that the statutory provision in this case is a standard for determining a labor union under the statute, and that the notification of exclusion from union status is issued according to that standard, while stating that even if disqualifying grounds arise, the union is not yet excluded from legal status unless the notification of exclusion from union status is issued. However, a deeming provision, once the prescribed prerequisites are met, recognizes the existence or occurrence of the fact or effect prescribed by the statute without exception, and this holds true even if it does not conform to the actual fact or legal state. Rather, the essence of a deeming provision lies precisely in this unconditional fiction. Since the meaning and effect of a statutory provision do not vary depending on where in the statute it is located, it cannot be said that the meaning and effect of a deeming provision vary simply because it is located in the definitions section of terms used in the statute. Therefore, under item (라) of the statutory provision in this case, where membership is permitted for persons who are not workers, that labor union is no longer a lawful labor union.
This situation does not change depending on whether it occurs before or after the report of establishment. No provision of the Trade Union Act treats the concept of a labor union differently depending on whether it is before or after the report of establishment. Article 2 of the Trade Union Act is a definitional provision concerning labor unions, according to which the scope of application of the statute is determined, and it should therefore be understood as applying regardless of whether a report of establishment has been made.
Meanwhile, Article 2 of the Trade Union Act provides: "The definitions of terms used in this Act shall be as follows," and in item 1 provides: "'Worker' means a person who lives on wages, salary, or other income equivalent thereto, regardless of the type of occupation," and in the proviso to item 4-(라) [item (라) of the statutory provision in this case] provides: "Where membership is permitted for persons who are not workers: Provided, That where a discharged person has filed an application for remedy for unfair labor practices with a Labor Relations Commission, such person shall not be construed as not being a worker until a decision on reexamination is rendered by the National Labor Relations Commission." According to these provisions of the Trade Union Act, a discharged person is a worker "until a decision on reexamination is rendered by the National Labor Relations Commission" upon filing an application for remedy for unfair labor practices with a Labor Relations Commission, but is no longer a worker after the decision on reexamination.
In conclusion, under item (라) of the statutory provision in this case, even a labor union that has already completed a report of establishment can no longer be regarded as a labor union under the statute if it permits discharged persons to join as union members. This may be said to be the interpretation according to the text of the Trade Union Act.
2) As seen above, a deeming provision does not permit rebuttal. Ultimately, under item (라) of the statutory provision in this case, which takes the form of a deeming provision, if a lawfully established labor union accepts even a single discharged person as a union member, the conclusion follows that the union is not a labor union as referred to in the Trade Union Act. But is this conclusion truly valid? This is where the problem begins.
There is a view that the problem in this case is not that the Plaintiff merely tacitly permitted some discharged persons to join as union members, but that the Plaintiff expressly permitted this through its bylaws. However, whether a labor union has provided in its bylaws for accepting discharged persons as union members is not the essential issue. If a labor union, without having bylaws permitting discharged persons to join as union members, in fact has discharged persons as union members, is such a union not excluded from legal status? Conversely, what if a union has bylaws permitting discharged persons to join as union members but in fact has no discharged union members? In determining whether a labor union permitting the membership of discharged persons is excluded from legal status, whether this is provided for in the bylaws is not decisive. The conclusion may vary depending on how the permission by a labor union for discharged persons to join is normatively evaluated.
One might consider resolving this issue from the perspective of the "autonomy" of a labor union. That is, at the stage of a labor union's report of establishment, if it is revealed that membership for discharged persons is permitted, the report of establishment must be rejected (see Supreme Court Decision 2011Du6998, decided April 10, 2014, etc.), but where a labor union that has already completed its report of establishment permits discharged persons to join as members, the existence of disqualifying grounds is to be determined only in cases where the autonomy of the labor union is thereby undermined. However, this approach not only runs counter to the purpose of the statute but also lacks practicality. First, the fact that the Trade Union Act, without exception, does not permit the membership of persons who are not workers should be understood as a preventive measure taken in consideration of the significant risk that, if membership of persons who are not workers is permitted, the autonomy of the labor union is likely to be undermined immediately or at least in the near future. There is no reason to view this differently for a labor union that has completed its report of establishment. Moreover, it is a very difficult matter for the administrative agency to examine and determine the autonomy of a labor union. Furthermore, unlike at the stage of the report of establishment, the administrative agency having jurisdiction over the report of establishment of a labor union has no separate investigative authority or special investigative methods for examining autonomy after the report of establishment. Having the administrative agency separately examine and determine the autonomy of a labor union for purposes of the notification of exclusion from union status is neither what the Trade Union Act contemplated nor consistent with the realities of labor administration.
One might also consider a method of strictly interpreting the term "membership" (가입) in item (라) of the statutory provision in this case. This provision may be understood as intended only to prohibit the new admission of persons who are not workers, including discharged persons, as union members, but not to prohibit a person who was already a union member from maintaining union membership status after being discharged. This may be seen as consistent with the dictionary meaning of "membership" (가입), which refers to entering an organization or group. Nor is it necessarily the case that the requirements for joining and withdrawing from an organization must be regarded as identical. Following this view, one could easily reach the conclusion that the Plaintiff is not excluded from legal status, since the Plaintiff merely allowed discharged persons to maintain their union membership status without permitting the new admission of discharged persons as union members.
However, item (라) of the statutory provision in this case is generally understood to encompass not only the new admission of persons who are not workers but also cases of permitting persons who are not workers to maintain their union membership status. As seen above, since the proviso to item (라) of the statutory provision in this case provides: "Provided, That where a discharged person has filed an application for remedy for unfair labor practices with a Labor Relations Commission, such person shall not be construed as not being a worker until a decision on reexamination is rendered by the National Labor Relations Commission," a discharged person is a worker only until a decision on reexamination is rendered by the National Labor Relations Commission upon filing an application for remedy for unfair labor practices, and in other cases cannot be regarded as a worker; therefore, where a discharged person who is not a worker is a member, the requirements of item (라) of the statutory provision in this case are met. The same holds true under Article 2 of the Act on the Establishment and Operation of Teachers' Unions (교원노조법), and the Constitutional Court has rendered its determination on the premise that this provision excludes discharged teachers from membership in teachers' unions (Constitutional Court Decision 2013Hun-Ma671, etc.). In light of these circumstances, an interpretation limiting the term "membership" in the main text of item (라) of the statutory provision in this case to new admission is difficult to adopt, as it cannot explain the existence and meaning of the proviso to the same item.
3) Under the conventional view concerning item (라) of the statutory provision in this case, there appears to be no room, as a matter of interpretation, to reach a different conclusion regarding the notification of exclusion from union status issued to the Plaintiff. From this perspective, there is no small number of views holding that the issue of discharged persons' union membership status, even if there are unreasonable aspects in the current statute, is a matter to be improved through legislation, not a matter that can be resolved through statutory interpretation.
The Constitutional Court, in determining that Article 2 of the Act on the Establishment and Operation of Teachers' Unions, which excludes discharged teachers from membership in teachers' unions, is constitutional, held that the notification of exclusion from union status issued to a teachers' union that recognizes discharged persons as union members may be determined on a discretionary basis by the administrative agency and the courts, comprehensively considering factors such as "the number of ineligible union members active in the teachers' union, the influence such members have on the activities of the teachers' union, whether the administrative authorities have taken appropriate measures to prohibit or restrict the union activities of ineligible members, and whether the labor union in question has the possibility of making corrections" (the aforementioned Decision 2013Hun-Ma671, etc.). However, if excluding discharged persons from union membership is constitutional, then a labor union that permits discharged persons to be union members cannot be said to be a lawful labor union. The proposition that the notification of exclusion from union status may be issued to such a union on a discretionary basis does not accord with the fact, as seen above, that the Enforcement Decree provision in this case provides that the notification of exclusion from union status "shall be issued" to a labor union that permits the membership of discharged persons. Moreover, legislation in the National Assembly to permit discharged persons to join labor unions has remained stagnant for several years. Even as the Government itself has submitted to the National Assembly a bill amending the statute to permit discharged persons to join labor unions, it has not withdrawn its position in this case that the Plaintiff is excluded from legal status. This issue now awaits only the determination of the Supreme Court.
[Reasoning] (continued)
As a matter of principle, statutes should be interpreted faithfully to the wording of the statutory provisions, but there are cases in which exceptions must be recognized. There are cases in which, at the time of enactment, the legislature entirely failed to anticipate certain situations, so that the statute either did not address them or addressed them insufficiently, and there are also cases in which, although the statute contains explicit provisions, a gap inevitably arises between the statute and actual life as times change and society transforms. If one were to insist solely on the strict application of the explicit provisions, legal stability might be maintained, but a problem could arise in that adaptability to social change and development would be diminished; therefore, it is necessary to interpret the statute in a manner consistent with actual life. In such cases, the court should not be bound by a formalistic interpretation of the wording, but should consider what legislative purpose the statute seeks to realize and should give meaning to the law in a direction that realizes that legislative purpose, and, to the extent necessary for its realization, should exercise a substantive law-forming function by interpreting the explicit provisions so as to expand, or to reduce and limit, their meaning. It is necessary, to the extent that this does not amount to changing the meaning and essence of the statutory provision, to reasonably interpret it so as to adapt a lagging statute to advancing social phenomena, and one must not resign oneself to following the traditional interpretation and application of a lagging statutory provision, even while knowing that it produces unjust results, merely waiting until the legislature takes action by amending the statute (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 78Do246 delivered on April 25, 1978; Supreme Court en banc Decision 95Da36466 delivered on April 23, 1998, etc.).
Legal norms cannot perfectly regulate every matter that arises in reality. Because of its general and abstract character, law inherently contains gaps. Accordingly, the interpretation of statutes is not simply a matter of recognizing and discovering an existing statute. In certain cases, it is necessary to actively form the law by clarifying the scope of application of a statute through analogy or teleological reduction. This is what substantive rule of law requires. The court must declare not merely the "statute" but the "law."
In interpreting and applying the law, the results must be taken into consideration. If the result of an interpretation leads to a conclusion that is extremely unreasonable or unjust, measures must be devised to exclude such an interpretation. Ordinarily, for this purpose, various methods of interpretation are employed in addition to literal interpretation, including logical and systematic interpretation, historical interpretation, and teleological interpretation. If, despite such attempts, the unreasonableness and injustice are not corrected, the court must adopt an interpretation that goes beyond the wording of the law, and at times a legitimate interpretation that runs counter to the wording of the law.
Such a method of interpretation is by no means novel. The Supreme Court, with respect to the language of Article 55(1)(vi) of the Criminal Act (형법), which provides that "when a fine is to be mitigated, it shall be reduced to one half of the maximum amount," interpreted "one half of the maximum amount" as meaning "one half of the amount," holding that both the upper and lower limits are mitigated to one half (Supreme Court en banc Decision 78Do246 delivered on April 25, 1978). Likewise, although Article 75(vi) of the Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes Act (어음법) provides "the date and place of issuance" as requirements of a bill, the Supreme Court interpreted that "even if the place of issuance is not stated on the face of the bill, if it is recognized from the remaining statements on the face of the bill that the bill was issued to generate its effect within the country, it cannot be regarded as an invalid bill" (Supreme Court en banc Decision 95Da36466 delivered on April 23, 1998).
The interpretation of statutes must reflect the provisions and purport of the Constitution (헌법). Where multiple interpretations of a statutory provision are possible, one must first adopt the meaning that conforms to the Constitution among them, thereby removing unconstitutionality through a constitutionally conforming interpretation, and, further, among interpretations that conform to the Constitution, adopt the meaning that best realizes the principles and values of the Constitution through a constitutionally oriented interpretation. If interpreting a statutory provision in light of its wording, structure, and legislative history leads to an unreasonable or unjust conclusion, this can be corrected through such a constitutionally considerate interpretation.
4) Then, is this case indeed one requiring an interpretation that goes beyond the statutory text, or even one that runs counter to the statutory text, in consideration of the Constitution?
A) Article 33(1) of the Constitution provides that "workers shall have the right to independent association, collective bargaining, and collective action for the purpose of improving working conditions," thereby guaranteeing workers' right to organize. To this end, Article 1 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act (노동조합법) provides: "The purpose of this Act is to guarantee workers' right to organize, right to collective bargaining, and right to collective action under the Constitution, to maintain and improve working conditions and enhance the economic and social status of workers, and to prevent and resolve labor disputes by fairly adjusting labor relations, thereby contributing to the maintenance of industrial peace and the development of the national economy." Furthermore, Article 37(2) of the Constitution provides: "The freedoms and rights of citizens may be restricted by statute only when necessary for national security, the maintenance of law and order, or public welfare, and even when such restriction is imposed, no essential aspect of the freedom or right may be violated," thereby clearly establishing the limits on the restriction of fundamental rights.
The right to organize includes not only the individual right to organize, whereby an individual worker may organize or join a labor union or other workers' organization and engage in activities therein, but also the collective right to organize, whereby a workers' organization may exist and engage in activities (see Constitutional Court en banc Decision 95Hunma154 delivered on November 25, 1999, etc.). Accordingly, a labor union's right to organize may be restricted only when necessary for national security, the maintenance of law and order, or public welfare, and even in such cases, the essential content of the right to organize may not be violated. When legislating labor-related statutes such as the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, the legislature must respect these constitutional provisions and principles, and the courts, too, in interpreting labor-related statutes, must ensure that such constitutional provisions and principles are realized to the fullest extent possible.
The formation of and joining a labor union is the very exercise of the right to organize, and since a labor union constitutes an essential foundation for exercising fundamental labor rights, the establishment and continued existence of labor unions must be guaranteed to the maximum extent. The Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act must be interpreted and applied in a direction that maximally guarantees the right to organize of labor unions, and care must be taken to ensure that the Act, which exists to guarantee fundamental labor rights, does not instead result in the unjust outcome of restricting labor unions' right to organize.
Meanwhile, the matter at issue in this case involves an important issue even at the level of freedom of association, prior to the above-discussed right to organize. Article 21 of the Constitution guarantees freedom of association to all citizens in paragraph (1), while providing in paragraph (2) that permission for association shall not be recognized. Here, "association" means an organization in which a plurality of natural persons or juristic persons voluntarily combine for a common purpose for a considerable period of time and are capable of organized will formation (see Constitutional Court en banc Decision 2000Hunba84 delivered on September 19, 2002, etc.). Freedom of association is neutral as to the purpose of the organization, and thus the formation of any organization is protected regardless of its purpose. Determining the scope and form of the association is likewise free, and it is not a matter for the State to intervene in as to who will form an organization and in what form. Restrictions based on the purpose, scope, or form of an association are permissible only within the strict limits on the restriction of fundamental rights under Article 37(2) of the Constitution and only to the extent that the essential content thereof is not violated. Among the three labor rights, the right to organize is a concretization, in the sphere of labor, of this freedom of association (see Constitutional Court en banc Decision 2006Hunma518 delivered on December 26, 2008, etc.). Accordingly, permission cannot be required for workers' association, and its purpose, scope, and form likewise may not be arbitrarily restricted so long as they do not exceed the constitutional limits.
The labor union establishment reporting system under the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act cannot be regarded as a permit system for association (see Constitutional Court en banc Decision 2011Hunba53 delivered on March 29, 2012, etc.). However, item (라) of the statutory provision at issue in this case ultimately prohibits incumbent workers and dismissed workers from forming a labor union together. Prohibiting "incumbent workers and dismissed workers from forming an organization in the form of a labor union for the purpose of maintaining and improving working conditions and enhancing the economic and social status of workers" in this manner may constitute an unjust restriction on freedom of association. This is because freedom of association may not, absent special circumstances, be restricted according to its purpose, scope, or form.
One might think that item (라) of the statutory provision at issue in this case is not unjust, since it merely prohibits incumbent workers and dismissed workers from forming a "labor union," not from forming "an organization that is not a labor union." However, the fact that the Constitution places special provisions such as the three labor rights to separately guarantee the right to organize means that it intends to give special protection to workers' association, distinct from the general case of association (see the above Decision 2011Hunba53, etc.). To hold that an association which, in substance, can only be "an organization for the maintenance and improvement of working conditions and the enhancement of the economic and social status of workers" cannot be the object of protection under the right to organize and can be protected only under freedom of association, merely because dismissed workers, in addition to incumbent workers, are included among its members, runs counter to the above purport of the Constitution. Furthermore, such an interpretation, despite its outward appearance of restricting only the right to organize, may in substance render freedom of association meaningless. Restricting, without exception, the association of incumbent workers and dismissed workers is tantamount to restricting the purpose, scope, and form of association.
Freedom of association means that anyone may form an organization for any purpose and in a form of their own choosing. Individuals must be free to form organizations, and the organization itself must be able to determine its own activities and continued existence. This ensures the purpose and activities pursued through the association. To recognize the association while disallowing the purpose that the association pursues is tantamount to not recognizing the association at all. If an organization seeking to act as a labor union is not recognized as a labor union, the ultimate result is a restriction on freedom of association. Such a restriction, unless it is proven to be absolutely necessary for "national security, the maintenance of law and order, or public welfare" as provided in Article 37(2) of the Constitution, constitutes an excessive restriction on freedom of association and threatens the essential content of freedom of association. It must not be permitted that the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, which exists to faithfully guarantee the three labor rights under the Constitution, results, through item (라) of the statutory provision at issue in this case, in infringing even freedom of association.
B) Considering the raison d'être of labor unions, uniformly excluding dismissed persons from union membership is inconsistent with the essential nature of a labor union. Generally, a dismissed person is merely a temporarily unemployed person or a job seeker, and does not fall under the category of "employer." Whether a person qualifies as a "worker" under the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act must be judged from the perspective of "whether it is necessary to guarantee the right to organize, etc. among those who supply labor," and a person who is temporarily unemployed or seeking employment must be included within that scope so long as there is a need to guarantee the three labor rights to that person. The Supreme Court, by restrictively interpreting the proviso to item (라) of the statutory provision at issue in this case ("provided, however, that where a dismissed person has filed an application for remedy for unfair labor practices with the Labor Relations Commission, such person shall not be interpreted as not being a worker until the National Labor Relations Commission renders its decision on reexamination") as not applying to industry-wide, occupation-wide, or region-wide labor unions as opposed to enterprise-based labor unions, recognized the membership of dismissed persons in industry-wide, occupation-wide, or region-wide labor unions (see Supreme Court Decision 2001Du8568 delivered on February 27, 2004, etc.), and this may be understood in the same context.
In particular, it is difficult to recognize the legitimacy of a rule that disqualifies a worker who was originally a union member from continuing as a union member simply because the worker has been dismissed. This holds true even where the statute provides for certain exceptions in connection with applications for remedy for unfair labor practices, etc. The disallowance of union membership for dismissed persons is not something directly derived from the Constitution, but is merely a legislative policy choice made under the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act. If the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act did not exist, a labor union that permits dismissed persons to join as members could still be established as a legitimate labor union. However, because of the existence of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, a labor union that permits dismissed persons to join as members ends up having its status denied. Such a conclusion must not be tolerated as it stands. This is fundamentally at odds with the raison d'être of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, which exists to guarantee the three labor rights under the Constitution.
Even viewed in light of universal international standards, it is unjust to disallow union membership for dismissed persons. Major countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, Germany, and France do not prohibit or restrict dismissed or retired persons from joining labor unions. Moreover, it is historically difficult to find legislative examples that go beyond denying the membership status of a dismissed person who has joined as a union member, to the point of entirely denying the legal status of the labor union itself on that ground. Even in Japan, which has a system most similar to ours, while it is held, similarly to items (가), (나), (다), and (마) of the proviso to Article 2(4) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, that an organization does not constitute a labor union where it "permits the participation of a person representing the interests of the employer," "receives financial assistance from the employer for expenditures for the operation of the organization," "has as its purpose only mutual aid projects or other welfare projects," or "has as its main purpose political or social movements," item (라) of the statutory provision at issue in this case, namely, "permitting the membership of a person who is not a worker," is not excluded from the concept of a labor union. Thus, recognizing union membership for dismissed persons can be said to be an international standard, not only at the level of international labor organizations but also at the level of the domestic law of individual states.
Taking the foregoing circumstances together, it is necessary to restrictively interpret item (라) of the statutory provision at issue in this case, namely, "permitting the membership of a person who is not a worker," as not including "a case in which a person who was originally a union member is allowed to retain union membership even after being dismissed."
This interpretation may appear to depart from the wording of the proviso to item (라) of the statutory provision at issue in this case and the proviso to Article 2 of the Act on the Establishment, Operation, etc. of Teachers' Unions (교원노조법). However, at this point, it is necessary to take into account the purport of Constitutional Court Decision 2013Hunma671, etc., discussed above. While that decision held constitutional Article 2 of the Act on the Establishment, Operation, etc. of Teachers' Unions, which excludes dismissed teachers from union membership, it also held that a notice of denial of legal union status cannot unconditionally be given merely because a dismissed teacher who does not fall under the proviso to Article 2 of that Act has joined as a union member, and that issuing a notice of denial of legal union status on that ground alone is unconstitutional. This ultimately means that union membership by a dismissed teacher who does not fall under the proviso to Article 2 of the Act on the Establishment, Operation, etc. of Teachers' Unions may be permitted. Although the above decision, on its face, appears to say that "there are cases in which a notice of denial of legal union status cannot be given even to a union that lacks legal status," it must be understood that its fundamental purport lies in the proposition that "a union must not be deemed to lack legal status merely because a dismissed person has joined as a union member." This is because the proposition that "a notice of denial of legal union status cannot be given to a union that already lacks legal status" is itself self-contradictory and plainly unjust. Meanwhile, since the proviso to Article 2 of the Act on the Establishment, Operation, etc. of Teachers' Unions constitutes a special provision in relation to item (라) of the statutory provision at issue in this case, the foregoing legal principle may be applied equally to the interpretation of item (라) of the statutory provision at issue in this case. Accordingly, it must be interpreted that it is permissible for a labor union to allow a dismissed person to retain union membership. This is an interpretation that excludes an unconstitutional result without undermining the foundation of the legal system.
C) In the case of a general labor union, "worker" means a person who lives on wages, salary, or other equivalent income, regardless of the type of occupation (Article 2(i) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act), and where an organization permits the membership of a person who is not a "worker," it is not regarded as a labor union [main text of the proviso to Article 2(iv)(라) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act]; provided, however, that where a dismissed person has filed an application for remedy for unfair labor practices with the Labor Relations Commission, such person shall not be interpreted as not being a worker until the National Labor Relations Commission renders its decision on reexamination [proviso to the proviso to Article 2(iv)(라) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act].
In the case of a teachers' labor union, "teacher" means a teacher as provided in Article 19(1) of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (초·중등교육법) (main text of Article 2 of the Act on the Establishment, Operation, etc. of Teachers' Unions); provided, however, that a dismissed person who has filed an application for remedy for unfair labor practices with the Labor Relations Commission shall be regarded as a teacher until the National Labor Relations Commission renders its decision on reexamination (proviso to Article 2 of the Act on the Establishment, Operation, etc. of Teachers' Unions), and where an organization permits the membership of a person who is not a "teacher," it is not regarded as a teachers' labor union [Article 14(1) of the Act on the Establishment, Operation, etc. of Teachers' Unions, main text of the proviso to Article 2(iv)(라) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act].
[Reasoning] (continued)
The above provisions concerning general trade unions and teachers' trade unions appear identical but differ. In the case of a general trade union, a dismissed person is not excluded from the definition of "worker" itself, but is excluded in the course of defining "a person who is not a worker." In the case of a teachers' trade union, however, a dismissed person is excluded outright from the definition of "teacher." In other words, the Act on the Establishment, Operation, etc. of Teachers' Labor Unions (교원노조법, hereinafter "Teachers' Labor Union Act") provides more unfavorable treatment regarding the union membership of dismissed persons than the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act (노동조합법, hereinafter "Trade Union Act"). In the case of a general trade union, even a dismissed person may, depending on interpretation, be permitted to join the union in certain circumstances (an example being the above Supreme Court Decision 2001Du8568, delivered February 27, 2004, which recognized the union membership of a dismissed person in the case of an industry-wide, occupation-wide, or region-wide trade union, as opposed to an enterprise-based trade union; moreover, the former Trade Union Act, abolished on December 31, 1996, provided that "a person who is contesting the validity of a dismissal shall not be interpreted as a person who is not a worker," so there was even greater room for various interpretations). In the case of a teachers' trade union, however, since a dismissed person is deemed to be a person who is not a teacher, the possibility of such interpretation is in principle foreclosed.
Such discrimination is unjust discrimination without reasonable grounds. Insofar as teachers' trade unions are recognized, it may be a separate matter that, in consideration of the constitutional importance of education or the special nature of teachers' status, the right to collective action, etc., may be restricted differently from general trade unions; however, there is no particular reason or basis for regulating the membership qualifications of dismissed persons differently from general trade unions. There is a need to seek ways to resolve this problem. It should not be interpreted, by emphasizing the above differences in statutory language, that while the union membership of a dismissed general worker may be permitted, the union membership of a dismissed teacher cannot be permitted. Rather, the interpretive method that can rectify this unjust discrimination is to interpret that, notwithstanding such differences in statutory language, the union membership of a dismissed teacher may likewise be permitted, just as the union membership of a dismissed general worker may be permitted. A teachers' trade union may be viewed as corresponding not to an enterprise-based trade union but to an industry-wide, occupation-wide, or region-wide trade union. Therefore, an interpretation permitting dismissed teachers to join teachers' trade unions is necessary, similar to the provisions of the Trade Union Act and the legal principles of the related precedents concerning such unions.
(라) Treating a certain trade union as an "extra-legal union" ultimately amounts to depriving that union of its legal status. However, even if it were valid to deny union membership qualification to dismissed persons, it must be held that this cannot go so far as to deprive the trade union of its legal status, beyond merely prohibiting the membership of dismissed persons or imposing certain sanctions on the union concerned.
Generally, a corporation or an unincorporated association becomes a subject of rights and obligations independently of its individual members, and continues to exist as an entity in itself regardless of changes due to the joining or withdrawal of members (see Supreme Court Decision 92Da2431, delivered July 10, 1992; Supreme Court Decision 97Nu11027, delivered December 12, 1997; Supreme Court Decision 2003Du5754, delivered July 15, 2005, etc.). Pursuant to Article 6 of the Trade Union Act, a trade union may acquire corporate status (the Plaintiff completed its establishment registration and acquired corporate status on July 7, 1999), and considering Article 2, Subparagraph 4, Article 10, and Article 11, etc. of the Trade Union Act together, a trade union that has not acquired corporate status has the substance of an unincorporated association (in light of the definition of trade union, the matters required for the establishment report, the matters to be stated in the bylaws, etc., there is no room for doubt as to the collective and independent nature of a trade union). Depriving a trade union of its status as such on the ground of the membership of dismissed persons runs contrary to these general legal principles applicable to corporations or unincorporated associations.
(마) It is necessary to reconsider once more the actual meaning of the phrase, in the statutory provision at issue in this case, that where a disqualifying ground exists, the entity "shall not be regarded as a trade union." This provision is generally the basis on which a workers' organization with a disqualifying ground is referred to as an "extra-legal union" (법외노조), in the sense that it is not a trade union under the law. However, strictly according to the statutory language, a workers' organization with a disqualifying ground is not a "trade union"; it is not an "extra-legal union." The very use of the concept and term "extra-legal union" may be seen as already departing from the statutory language "shall not be regarded as a trade union," in order to prevent the harmful consequences of a strict application of the statutory provision at issue in this case.
(바) Rendering a trade union an extra-legal union on the ground of the existence of a disqualifying ground is a far harsher, more onerous disposition than imposing criminal punishment under Articles 93 and 21 of the Trade Union Act for failure to comply with a corrective order regarding the disqualifying ground concerned. Therefore, a stricter interpretation is required in order to issue a notice of extra-legal union status on the ground of the membership of dismissed persons. It should not be accepted as an unavoidable conclusion that an unreasonable and unjust result follows from simply interpreting Item (라) of the statutory provision at issue in this case in accordance with its literal language.
Item (라) of the statutory provision at issue in this case must be construed as inapplicable to "cases in which a worker who was originally a union member is allowed to retain union membership qualification even after being dismissed." Such a teleological reduction accords with the constitutional provisions and legal principles, and constitutes a constitutionally conforming interpretation that realizes them to the fullest extent. Conversely, interpreting that "cases in which a worker who was originally a union member is allowed to retain union membership qualification even after being dismissed" likewise fall under "cases permitting the membership of persons who are not workers," and that on this ground the legal status of the trade union may be fundamentally deprived, would not only fundamentally infringe upon the right to organize of trade unions and unjustly discriminate between general trade unions and teachers' trade unions, but would also run contrary to the general legal principles concerning associations or corporations.
5) In light of the foregoing legal principles, I now turn to the present case. The Addendum provision at issue in this case merely provides that "a union member who has been unjustly dismissed shall retain union membership qualification notwithstanding the provisions of Article 6, Paragraph 1 of the bylaws." The Plaintiff is not admitting, without limitation, third parties who are not teachers as union members, nor is it permitting union membership unconditionally merely on the ground of having previously been a teacher. It only allows a teacher who was originally a union member to retain union membership qualification in cases limited to unjust dismissal. To be sure, there is some ambiguity in the meaning of "unjust dismissal," and the dismissed teachers at issue in this case are persons who either lost their positions pursuant to judicial determinations or whose dismissals were finally determined not to be unjust dismissals. However, in light of the legal principles set forth above, the fact that the Plaintiff allowed the dismissed teachers at issue in this case to retain union membership qualification should not result in depriving the Plaintiff of its status as a trade union. Notwithstanding the Addendum provision at issue in this case and the presence of some dismissed teachers among its members, the Plaintiff must still be regarded as a trade union under the Teachers' Labor Union Act.
D. Conclusion
This case is a so-called "hard case" that raises questions about the methodology of existing legal interpretation. The difficulty lies not in obscure statutory language or complex structure. The crux of the problem is that interpreting a simple and clear provision according to its language and structure produces a result contrary to common sense.
The interpretation of a statute must also take into account the consequences of that interpretation. If interpreting a statute according to its literal language produces an unjust conclusion, one should question whether that is truly a proper interpretation. The Majority Opinion, without touching upon the core of the problem inherent in this case, reaches its conclusion solely on the ground that the Enforcement Decree provision at issue in this case is invalid. However, this amounts to avoiding a substantive judgment on the issue.
The true issue in this case does not lie in the Enforcement Decree provision requiring notice of extra-legal union status. The essential problem of this case lies in Item (라) of the statutory provision at issue in this case, which provides that "where the membership of persons who are not workers is permitted, [the organization] shall not be regarded as a trade union" — that is, a statutory provision providing that even after a trade union has already been lawfully established, the moment it permits the membership of persons who are not workers, it is no longer a lawful trade union.
The Constitution (헌법) guarantees the three labor rights as fundamental rights, and the Trade Union Act exists to realize these rights to the fullest extent possible. However, Item (라) of the statutory provision at issue in this case, by undermining the fundamental basis for the substantive exercise of the three labor rights, runs contrary to the very reason for the existence of the Trade Union Act. In such a case, the court should rectify this unjust result through a proper interpretation in accordance with constitutional norms and legal principles.
Permitting the membership of third parties who have nothing whatsoever to do with the trade union cannot be allowed. Nor can all dismissed persons be admitted as union members merely on the ground that they were once workers. However, in light of the meaning and purport of the three labor rights under the Constitution, in particular the right to organize, the union membership qualification of a worker who was dismissed while active as a union member should not be denied, nor should the legal status of the trade union concerned be deprived on that ground.
This case should not be judged by moral standards. This case does not involve a comprehensive social evaluation of the Plaintiff's overall activities as a teachers' trade union. The only issue is what constitutes a proper interpretation, from the standpoint of the entire legal order including the Constitution, of the statutory provision that would prevent the Plaintiff from maintaining its status as a trade union.
The Plaintiff is not permitting the membership of third parties unrelated to teachers, nor is it recognizing, without limitation, the union membership qualification of all dismissed teachers. It is merely allowing the union membership qualification of teachers who were dismissed while active as union members to be maintained. Such conduct by the Plaintiff should not be regarded as exceeding the scope of protection of fundamental rights under the Constitution. To interpret Item (라) of the statutory provision at issue in this case as prohibiting even such conduct would be an interpretation contrary to constitutional norms.
In sum, prior to determining whether the "notice" of extra-legal union status issued to the Plaintiff was proper, there is an error in regarding the Plaintiff as an "extra-legal union" in the first place; therefore, the notice of extra-legal union status at issue in this case, premised on that erroneous view, is unlawful. The judgment below, which held otherwise, should be reversed.
As stated above, while I reach the same conclusion as the Majority Opinion, I present a separate opinion because my reasoning and grounds differ.
5. Separate Opinion of Justice Ahn Cheol-sang
A. The Legal Nature of the Notice of Extra-Legal Union Status at Issue in This Case
1) The gist of the Majority Opinion is that the Enforcement Decree provision at issue in this case violates the constitutional principle of statutory reservation and is therefore invalid, and accordingly the notice of extra-legal union status at issue in this case, which was based on the Enforcement Decree provision at issue in this case, has lost its legal basis and is unlawful. This approach of the Majority Opinion, in that it reaches its conclusion by invoking a general constitutional principle rather than squarely confronting and adjudicating the issue of the notice of extra-legal union status at issue in this case, which has long been a matter of social controversy, appears to be a "retreat into constitutional principle." In other words, it is difficult to say that the Majority Opinion has provided a fundamental answer to the problem that has been the subject of controversy.
The national governance order, expressed as the democratic basic order founded on the principle of separation of powers, presupposes the existence of "rational law made by representatives of the people through democratic procedures." It is a widely recognized principle that taking an administrative disposition restricting the freedom and rights of citizens based solely on the provisions of a Presidential Decree, without grounds in a statute enacted by the National Assembly, the representative body of the people, runs contrary to the principle of administration by law and is therefore invalid. Based on this general principle, the position that an administrative disposition restricting citizens' freedom and rights cannot be taken without a statutory basis is entirely valid, and there is no room for doubt on this point. However, I believe there is room for examination, in relation to the nature of the Enforcement Decree provision at issue in this case, as to whether this constitutional principle should be applied to the question of the validity of that provision.
In particular, the Majority Opinion cites the "strong" relevance to fundamental rights and the "significant" onerous nature as grounds for the unconstitutionality of the Enforcement Decree provision at issue in this case. However, the freedom and rights of citizens may only be restricted by statute, and any restriction of citizens' freedom and rights not based on statute is impermissible no matter how trivial it may be. That is, if an Enforcement Decree provision violates the constitutional principle of statutory reservation, it should be held invalid regardless of whether its relevance to fundamental rights is strong or not, and regardless of whether its onerous nature is significant or not. The Majority Opinion, by treating what is a matter of degree (量) — namely, that the conclusion may differ depending on the degree of restriction on citizens' freedom and rights — as a matter of kind (質), namely whether the constitutional principle of statutory reservation has been violated, is difficult to regard as appropriate. Moreover, even if the disposition at issue in this case is revoked as unlawful pursuant to the Majority Opinion, since Article 2 of the Teachers' Labor Union Act is not unconstitutional (see Constitutional Court en banc Decision 2013Hun-Ma671, etc., delivered May 28, 2015), the Plaintiff's problem of statutory violation remains unresolved.
2) Where a report of trade union establishment has been filed, the administrative agency must accept it so long as it meets the statutory requirements for establishment. According to the Majority Opinion, once a report of trade union establishment has been accepted, its status as a trade union can never be denied under any circumstances under current law. However, considering that even a political party, whose establishment is constitutionally free, may be dissolved when its purposes or activities violate the democratic basic order (Article 8, Paragraph 4 of the Constitution), the rights of a trade union should likewise be held to be guaranteed under the constitutional order, including the democratic basic order. Therefore, it is difficult to accept the position that, under current law, a trade union's legal status can never be denied no matter what unlawful act it commits. For example, even where a trade union has intentionally deceived the administrative agency into accepting its establishment report despite the existence of a serious disqualifying ground, should it be held that, once the report has been accepted, the effect of that acceptance disposition can never be excluded? What of a case where a trade union is composed principally of persons representing the interests of the employer and relies entirely on financial assistance from the employer, or where a trade union, setting aside the maintenance and improvement of working conditions, devotes itself solely to pursuing political ideology through political party activities, election campaigning, and the like — that is, cases where the illegality of the trade union concerned is manifest? It is not appropriate to hold that, however serious the disqualifying ground may be, a status once granted can never be withdrawn. This is analogous to the proposition that it would likewise be inappropriate to hold that, even where only a very trivial disqualifying ground exists, that status may unconditionally be deprived simply because some illegality exists.
A notice of extra-legal union status is a disposition unfavorable to the trade union, and this is all the more true in the case of the Plaintiff in this case, which has existed as a lawful trade union for more than ten years. However, a notice of extra-legal union status is not a sanction for violation of, or failure to comply with, a corrective order or a demand for correction by the administrative agency. It is merely a matter of reverting to the state prior to the disposition accepting the trade union establishment report, on the ground that the union has come to lack the statutory requirements for a trade union. Even though the term "notice of extra-legal union status" is used, in substance it may be viewed as equivalent to an ex officio revocation or withdrawal of the disposition accepting the trade union establishment report (since the ground for the disposition at issue in this case is that a statutory disqualifying ground arose after the acceptance of the establishment report, the discussion below focuses on withdrawal). Viewed in this way, the Enforcement Decree provision at issue in this case is not a provision constituting the "basis" for a notice of extra-legal union status, but rather a provision prescribing the "procedure" for withdrawal of the disposition accepting the trade union establishment report. That is, the Enforcement Decree provision at issue in this case should be regarded as an enhanced procedural provision that restricts the withdrawal of a trade union establishment report acceptance disposition — which could otherwise be effected in accordance with general principles of administrative law — by providing, through a "demand for correction," the prior notice and opportunity to state opinions required under the Administrative Procedures Act for unfavorable dispositions, thereby affording the trade union concerned an opportunity for voluntary correction. Ultimately, it is appropriate to view the question of whether the disposition at issue in this case is lawful not as a question of the validity or invalidity of the Enforcement Decree provision at issue in this case, but as a question of the lawfulness of such withdrawal.
3) The question arises whether, where an administrative agency has issued a certain disposition, it may subsequently withdraw that disposition on the ground that new circumstances have arisen making it impossible to maintain the effect of the disposition — in particular, whether withdrawal is possible even absent an explicit statutory basis. Even where what is involved is merely reverting a status originally granted by the initial disposition to its original state, arbitrarily withdrawing an existing disposition without any legal basis is, in principle, impermissible. However, while it is desirable that such a legal basis be provided by express statutory language wherever possible, it is not an easy matter, amid the complex and diverse administrative actions of a modern state, to provide express statutory provisions for every conceivable case.
On this point, Supreme Court precedent holds that even if there was no particular defect at the time of the original disposition, and even if there is no separate legal basis for revoking it after the disposition, where circumstances have changed such that there is no longer a need to maintain the original disposition, or where a significant need in the public interest has arisen, the original disposition may be revoked by way of a separate administrative disposition that extinguishes its effect; however, since revocation of a beneficial administrative disposition infringes upon vested rights already granted to the person subject to the disposition, such revocation is permitted only where, after weighing the significant public interest need for revoking the beneficial administrative disposition against the disadvantages the person subject to the disposition would suffer as a result of the revocation—including infringement of vested rights, protection of reliance, and stability of legal life—the public interest need is strong enough to justify the disadvantage suffered by the person subject to the disposition (see Supreme Court Decision 85Nu664, decided February 25, 1986; Supreme Court Decision 2003Du10251, 10268, decided November 26, 2004, etc.).
However, the majority opinion emphasizes that the legislature abolished the system of ordering the dissolution of labor unions out of reflective consideration, and states that the provision of the Enforcement Decree at issue in this case is void, and that therefore notification of exclusion from legal union status is impossible. In light of the fact that the Constitution guarantees workers' right to organize as a fundamental right, there is something persuasive in the majority opinion's stance of disallowing notification of exclusion from legal union status.
However, it cannot be said that the disposition accepting a labor union establishment report has inviolable, absolute effect, and thus, even considering the purport of abolishing the system of ordering dissolution of labor unions, it should not be held that the disposition accepting a labor union establishment report cannot be revoked ex officio or withdrawn. The legal doctrine of ex officio revocation/withdrawal of administrative acts presupposes cases where there is no explicit legal basis, and there is no reason to treat differently the case where there was no basis from the outset and the case where a basis that originally existed has since disappeared. This is because the doctrine is not intended to supplement "deficiencies in legislation" but rather to ensure "administrative conformity with law." The fact that precedent has held that, even where individual statutes explicitly specify grounds for cancellation/withdrawal, ex officio cancellation/withdrawal is possible on grounds other than those statutory grounds, based on other public interest needs, can likewise be understood in this context (see Supreme Court Decision 2001Du2874, decided November 26, 2002; Supreme Court Decision 2006Du6505, decided February 8, 2007; Supreme Court Decision 2013Du7025, decided July 10, 2014, etc.).
Meanwhile, the majority opinion holds that because the system of notification of exclusion from legal union status is provided for in an "Enforcement Decree" rather than a "statute," it is void. According to the majority, the statute nowhere provides for notification of exclusion from legal union status, nor does it delegate this matter to the Enforcement Decree.
However, it is doubtful whether all problems would be resolved simply by having the statute itself directly provide for notification of exclusion from legal union status. Considering that the majority opinion emphasizes the constitutional principle of statutory reservation and the legislative history of the abolition of the labor union dissolution order system, it appears as though notification of exclusion from legal union status pursuant thereto would be possible if it were provided for in a statute. On the other hand, in light of the fact that the majority opinion emphasizes the serious detrimental nature of notification of exclusion from legal union status, stating that this ultimately constitutes an essential restriction on the three labor rights guaranteed under the Constitution, it also appears that even if provided for in a statute, notification of exclusion from legal union status that infringes upon the right to organize could not be permitted.
Herein lies the difficulty with the majority opinion. At first glance, it may seem that the fundamental problem is that notification of exclusion from legal union status is provided for in an "Enforcement Decree" rather than a "statute," but even if it were directly provided for in a statute, the substantive constitutional problem inherent in the notification of exclusion from legal union status itself would remain entirely intact. Given that the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act (노동조합 및 노동관계조정법, hereinafter referred to as the "Trade Union Act") establishes an establishment reporting system while specifying the lawful requirements and disqualifying grounds for labor unions, whether the direct basis for notification of exclusion from legal union status lies in a statute or an Enforcement Decree is not an important issue. The real issue lies in determining under what circumstances notification of exclusion from legal union status may be issued, and what is clear here is that it cannot be held that such notification may be issued uniformly without any consideration whatsoever of the substance and degree of the disqualification, the existence and nature of the public interest being pursued, and the vested rights and legal stability of the labor union being infringed upon. It is precisely this point that the legal doctrine restricting ex officio cancellation/withdrawal of beneficial administrative acts emphasizes. The problem is not resolved merely by providing for notification of exclusion from legal union status in a statute. What must be clarified is under what circumstances such notification may be permitted. Even if notification of exclusion from legal union status were provided for in a statute, if its content required uniform notification solely upon the occurrence of a disqualifying ground, without any limiting conditions whatsoever, the majority opinion, too, would presumably find such a statute unconstitutional.
In sum, insofar as the statute defines the concept of a labor union and clearly specifies its lawful requirements together with disqualifying grounds, and establishes an establishment reporting system to give effect to these, it must be held that notification of exclusion from legal union status may be issued, as an ex officio cancellation/withdrawal of the disposition accepting a labor union establishment report, whenever the occurrence of a disqualifying ground is established, even though the legislature abolished the statutory system of labor union dissolution orders without separately enacting a statutory provision regarding notification of exclusion from legal union status. However, since the acceptance of a labor union establishment report is a beneficial administrative disposition, certain restrictions apply pursuant to the legal doctrine restricting ex officio cancellation/withdrawal of beneficial administrative acts. The issue is not the "possibility" of notification but rather its "propriety." That is, the question is precisely under what circumstances notification of exclusion from legal union status may be issued.
4) Ultimately, regardless of the validity or invalidity of the provision of the Enforcement Decree at issue in this case, even without this provision of the Enforcement Decree, notification of exclusion from legal union status, in the sense of withdrawing the disposition accepting a labor union establishment report, could be issued in accordance with the current statutory provisions and general principles of administrative law. Accordingly, the significance of holding the provision of the Enforcement Decree at issue in this case to be void, as the majority opinion does, is either lost or diminished, and the dispute can be resolved only by substantively determining whether the notification of exclusion from legal union status at issue in this case is lawful. Viewed in this way, I believe the sound approach is to interpret the nature of the provision of the Enforcement Decree at issue in this case affirmatively, holding that it establishes a procedure for the subsequent withdrawal of the disposition accepting a labor union establishment report, which is a beneficial administrative disposition, and is therefore not void. In other words, the provision of the Enforcement Decree at issue in this case, being based on the provision of the statute at issue in this case that states "shall not be regarded as a labor union" where a disqualifying ground exists, should properly be understood as establishing a procedural requirement mandating that the administrative agency issue a demand for corrective action before it may issue notification of exclusion from legal union status. Holding the provision of the Enforcement Decree at issue in this case to be void would merely produce an even more unfavorable result for the labor union by eliminating the aforementioned procedure for demanding corrective action.
If, in this manner, the legal nature of the notification of exclusion from legal union status at issue in this case is understood as a withdrawal of the disposition accepting a labor union establishment report, then the issue in this case shifts from whether the provision of the Enforcement Decree at issue in this case is valid, to whether the notification of exclusion from legal union status at issue in this case is lawful when the public interest need sought to be achieved through the notification is weighed against the disadvantage that would be suffered by the Plaintiff as a result. This weighing of public and private interests is expressed through the principle of proportionality, and it goes without saying that the principle of proportionality must be observed even when issuing the notification of exclusion from legal union status at issue in this case, which is an adverse disposition. Therefore, the mere fact that the Plaintiff permits dismissed teachers to remain as union members should not be regarded as immediately satisfying the requirements for notification of exclusion from legal union status. Ultimately, the lawfulness of the notification of exclusion from legal union status at issue in this case must be determined by comprehensively considering various circumstances, including the number of dismissed teachers within the Plaintiff and the influence such dismissed teachers have on the Plaintiff's activities, whether the Plaintiff's acceptance of dismissed teachers as union members contravenes the constitutional order or undermines the essential nature of a labor union, the public interest achieved through the notification of exclusion from legal union status issued to the Plaintiff, and the disadvantage the Plaintiff would suffer as a result of the notification.
B. Whether the Notification of Exclusion from Legal Union Status at Issue in This Case Is Lawful
1) The Constitution guarantees freedom of association, and in particular guarantees workers' right to organize. The right to organize, the right to collective bargaining, and the right to collective action, which together constitute the three labor rights, each carry independent significance, while pursuing the shared goal of maintaining and improving working conditions and operating as an organically integrated whole. The formation and operation of a labor union constitutes the very exercise of this right to organize, and serves as the practical foundation for the substantive guarantee of fundamental labor rights. Accordingly, absent special circumstances, workers' free organization of, or affiliation with, labor unions should not be prohibited or restricted, and the establishment reporting system provided for under the Trade Union Act must be understood and operated within a scope that does not unduly infringe upon the constitutional significance and function of labor unions in this respect.
If the right to organize of a labor union is excessively restricted, resistance to this restriction becomes the organization's immediate primary objective, and militant individuals devoted to ideology come to seize control of the organization's leadership, with the result that all of its policy directions may become radicalized. When a powerful obstacle looms directly ahead, the diverse views of the organization's members tend to disappear, and all efforts become concentrated solely on removing that obstacle. In order to prevent an organization from becoming consumed by ideology, it is necessary to eliminate the very grounds upon which ideological issues might become subject to contention. Providing room for reasonable opinions to take hold also helps establish a culture of dialogue and discussion characterized by diversity and flexibility.
2) Excluding dismissed persons from union membership contravenes the following universally accepted global standards.
Advanced countries and the international community permit dismissed persons to join labor unions, and do not deny the status of a labor union on the ground that dismissed persons are among its members. It is difficult to find, aside from our country, any legal system that compels the exclusion from a labor union of a person who was, until then, a fellow union member, merely on the ground that the person was dismissed by the employer. This runs directly counter to the essential nature and spirit of a labor union. Such universally accepted global standards may be temporarily obstructed, but any healthy society will eventually arrive at them.
As of June 2020, the International Labour Organization (ILO) has designated 8 conventions across 4 areas concerning the most fundamental labor rights, out of a total of 190 conventions, as "Fundamental Conventions," and strongly recommends that all member states ratify and comply with them. Among these, the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention (Convention No. 87) provides in Article 2 that "Workers and employers, without distinction whatsoever, shall have the right to establish and, subject only to the rules of the organisation concerned, to join organisations of their own choosing without previous authorisation." This may be understood as establishing, as an international labor standard, the principle of universal guarantee of the right to organize free of any discrimination and free of prior governmental authorization.
Indeed, at its 320th session held on March 26, 2014, the ILO Governing Body adopted the 371st Report of the Committee on Freedom of Association, which contained recommendations concerning our government's violation of freedom of association; in that report, the Committee expressed the view that "the prohibition on dismissed persons joining labor unions under item (라) of the proviso to Article 2, Subparagraph 4 of the Trade Union Act [item (라) of the provision of the statute at issue in this case] is contrary to freedom of association." Furthermore, in its 382nd Report of June 17, 2017, the Committee on Freedom of Association expressed the same view directly in relation to this case, and recommended that "the Government take the necessary measures to repeal without delay the relevant statutory provision prohibiting dismissed persons from becoming union members, and once again strongly requests the Government of Korea to provide detailed information in this regard."
Meanwhile, the European Union (EU), based on the Free Trade Agreement between the Republic of Korea, of the one part, and the European Union and its Member States, of the other part, which entered into force in 2011, has continuously raised issues with our government concerning the guarantee of fundamental labor rights, including by initiating dispute settlement procedures on the ground that our country's efforts to ratify the ILO's Fundamental Conventions have been insufficient. Most recently, on July 4, 2019, the EU officially requested that our government convene a panel of experts pursuant to Article 14(1) of Chapter 13 (Trade and Sustainable Development) of the aforementioned Free Trade Agreement, asserting that our government has violated the Free Trade Agreement by infringing upon fundamental labor rights; here too, one of the principal violations cited was the fact that "under item (라) of the proviso to Article 2, Subparagraph 4 of the Trade Union Act [item (라) of the provision of the statute at issue in this case], the status of the relevant labor union is denied on the ground that dismissed persons are among its members."
Since joining the ILO in 1991, our country has ratified conventions in stages, taking into account their relationship with domestic law, but has still not ratified 4 of the aforementioned 8 Fundamental Conventions relating to freedom of association and the prohibition of forced labor (Nos. 29, 87, 98, and 105). However, the Government (competent ministry: Ministry of Employment and Labor) announced on May 22, 2019 that it would commence ratification procedures for 3 of these 4 conventions, including Convention No. 87, and follow-up work on this is currently underway. Furthermore, the Government submitted, during the 20th National Assembly, a bill to amend the relevant statute to recognize the right of unemployed persons and dismissed persons to join labor unions, and has again submitted a bill with the same content during the 21st National Assembly.
3) On the premise of the foregoing discussion, the specific circumstances of this case are as follows.
The membership of dismissed teachers is a matter that should be promptly recognized through legislative and policy measures, in light of the aforementioned established international standards and the value of the constitutionally guaranteed right to organize, and is not a matter to be resolved by dismantling the very existence of a labor union through formalistic application of the law. Insofar as the relevant legislative and policy improvements have been delayed, a resolution to this problem must be sought through judicial determination in this case.
The dismissed teachers at issue in this case number 9, an extremely small fraction of the Plaintiff's total membership of approximately 60,000, and there is no material to establish that these 9 dismissed teachers have had, or are likely to have, any effect on the Plaintiff's activities or autonomy. On the contrary, according to the record, none of the 9 dismissed teachers at issue in this case appears to be a member of the Plaintiff's principal decision-making bodies, namely the Delegates' Assembly, the Central Committee, or the Central Executive Committee. Meanwhile, the Plaintiff is not an enterprise-level labor union but corresponds to an industry-wide, occupation-wide, or region-wide labor union. In the case of ordinary workers who are not teachers, industry-wide, occupation-wide, or region-wide labor unions may include dismissed persons among their membership (see Supreme Court Decision 2001Du8568, decided February 27, 2004, etc.). This is because there is a need to guarantee the right to organize in the context of collective labor relations. In light of these circumstances, it is difficult to conclude that the Plaintiff's inclusion of dismissed teachers among its membership contravenes the constitutional order or undermines the essential nature of a labor union.
The public interest achieved through the notification of exclusion from legal union status at issue in this case is also unclear. While the Defendant refers to the constitutional principle of statutorily determining teachers' status under Article 31(6) of the Constitution and to teachers' status as servants of the entire citizenry, and cites, in light of the special nature of teachers' status and the importance of their duties, the special morality and social trust required of teachers and teacher labor unions, there is not a little doubt as to whether excluding an existing union member from the labor union solely on the ground of dismissal is truly consistent with such values. On the other hand, the disadvantage the Plaintiff would suffer as a result of the notification of exclusion from legal union status at issue in this case is extremely significant. Even considering only what is explicitly provided under the Trade Union Act, a labor union that has received notification of exclusion from legal union status may no longer use the designation "labor union" (Article 7(3)), may not maintain corporate status (Article 6), may not apply to the Labor Relations Commission for mediation of a labor dispute or remedy for an unfair labor practice (Article 7(1)), and may not be exempted from taxation (Article 8). Under these circumstances, it goes without saying that the Plaintiff could not properly function as a labor union. It may be said that the Plaintiff has, in effect, lost its very significance and value of existence as a labor union as a result of the notification of exclusion from legal union status at issue in this case.
Meanwhile, with respect to the legitimacy of the notification of exclusion from legal union status at issue in this case, while such notification is undoubtedly a system provided for under current statutes and regulations, there is room for reflection as to whether this system actually functions in practice, and whether it has secured normative legitimacy. Even according to the Defendant's own assertions, it appears that the only instances in which the Defendant has actually issued a notification of exclusion from legal union status, up to now, are the notification of October 20, 2009 issued to the Korean Government Employees' Union, and the notification of October 24, 2013 at issue in this case. However, considering that the system of notification of exclusion from legal union status was introduced on April 15, 1988 (Presidential Decree No. 12429) for the reason of "preventing the continued existence of a labor union lacking statutory requirements," the fact that, more than 30 years since then, the Defendant has issued only 2 such notifications suggests that this system has fallen into disuse or is being applied arbitrarily and selectively. It appears that there are quite a few labor unions in our industrial sector in which persons who are not current employees, but rather dismissed persons, remain as members, and thus one cannot but doubt whether the notification of exclusion from legal union status at issue in this case is consistent with the principles of proportionality and equality.
4) The Constitution has as its ideology that the people of our nation shall achieve a free and cultural democratic welfare state and thereby contribute to the permanent peace of the world and the common prosperity of mankind. In order to realize this constitutional ideology, Article 2 of the Framework Act on Education (교육기본법) provides: "Education shall aim, under the ideology of hongik ingan (benefiting all humanity), to enable all citizens to cultivate their character, to acquire the capacity for independent living and the qualities necessary as democratic citizens, thereby leading a life worthy of human dignity, and to contribute to the development of a democratic state and the realization of the ideal of common prosperity of mankind." In particular, Article 6, Paragraph 1 provides: "Education shall be operated so as to fulfill its function in accordance with the original purpose of education, and shall not be used as a means of propagating political, factional, or personal bias."
However, in today's world, education is centered on organized and institutionalized school education, and since it is teachers who carry out school education, teachers have characteristics that differ from ordinary workers who are employed by an employer, provide labor, and receive wages and other consideration in return. Accordingly, the Act on the Establishment and Operation, etc. of Teachers' Unions (교원노조법, "Teachers' Union Act") prohibits all forms of industrial action by teachers' unions and their members (Article 8), and prohibits all political activities by teachers' unions (Article 3). In addition, Article 51, Paragraph 1 of the Public Educational Officials Act (교육공무원법), Article 78, Paragraph 1 and Article 65 of the State Public Officials Act (국가공무원법), Articles 55 and 58, Paragraph 1 of the Private School Act (사립학교법), Article 6 of the Political Parties Act (정당법), and Article 60, Paragraph 1 of the Public Official Election Act (공직선거법), among others, broadly prohibit political activities by teachers, such as joining political parties or engaging in election campaigning. In light of this current statutory framework, the activities of teachers' unions are in fact limited to collective bargaining for the improvement of teachers' working conditions, and it can be said that the risk of teachers' unions becoming politicized, or of the public nature of education or the people's right to receive education being undermined as a result, has already been forestalled.
In light of the foregoing, the question of the legality of the notice of exclusion from union status (법외노조 통보) in this case, based on the ground that dismissed teachers joined the teachers' union, should not be reframed as, or judged primarily in terms of, the importance of education or the special nature of teachers' status. Our legal system has sufficiently institutionalized teachers' unions so that they do not run counter to the interests of the public as a whole, and our society, in this Court's view, has sufficient capacity to accommodate the membership of dismissed teachers in teachers' unions.
5) This is not to encourage violations of law. As long as positive law exists, it is naturally to be obeyed, and it is only proper that sanctions be imposed on those who violate it. However, it is a different matter if such sanctions go beyond an appropriate level and restrict the very right to organize of the relevant organization. Law is always lawful, but that alone does not make it just. Law cannot be an end in itself; its validity must be subject to scrutiny. Nor can law be eternal. We commonly experience that laws are sometimes flawed from the outset, and sometimes become flawed with the changing times.
The people have the freedom to express opposition to unreasonable statutes or systems. To demand improvement, one may petition for repeal or bring a lawsuit seeking repeal, but it is not so rare that, in the course of contesting liability arising from a violation of law committed in that process, the flawed law itself comes to be corrected.
In this case as well, it may be seen that the Plaintiff, as an expression of protest against an unjust trade union legal regime, has not amended the Addendum provision at issue and has not excluded the nine dismissed teachers. Had the Plaintiff sought merely to avoid the immediate sanction, it could have amended its bylaws in form only, or temporarily excluded the dismissed teachers. However, the Plaintiff did not do so. Rather, the Plaintiff, accepting serious disadvantages both in the lawsuit contesting the corrective order and in the present case, has asserted the value of trade unions and the need to improve the relevant legal regime. The Plaintiff is asserting not "statute" but "law" (in the broader, normative sense). In such a case, rather than denying the very existence of the organization on this ground, the situation can be corrected through an appropriately calibrated legal sanction directed at the problematic conduct. Even if the radical tendencies or ideological bias of teachers' organizations pose a problem in connection with education, which has a profound effect on the lives of future generations, it is desirable that such matters find their proper place through the free marketplace of ideas and on the basis of the sound common sense and balanced judgment of the public, rather than being resolved by restricting the right of the organization to organize. Judicial determinations should aim to resolve disputes and conflicts and to achieve social integration through legal peace.
(c) Conclusion
Since a notice of exclusion from union status constitutes the ex officio revocation or withdrawal of the acceptance of a report on the establishment of a trade union, which is a beneficial administrative disposition, the legality of the notice of exclusion from union status at issue in this case must be determined irrespective of whether the Enforcement Decree provision at issue is void. In other words, it must be examined whether the Plaintiff's unlawful conduct is of such a degree as to warrant depriving the Plaintiff of its very status as a trade union. This is the core issue in this case, and it is here that the normative significance of this judgment is to be found.
The Constitution guarantees the right to organize of workers as a fundamental right. Trade unions form the basic foundation for the exercise of the three labor rights, and since dismissed workers, unless they themselves become employers, cannot escape the status of worker, the guarantee of the three labor rights is necessary for them as well. There is, worldwide, hardly any precedent—whether at present or when looking back over history—for a legal system that requires the exclusion of dismissed persons from trade unions. Allowing dismissed persons to join trade unions has already become a firmly established international standard, and our country, too, is moving in the same direction. If so, the issue in this case lies in how to evaluate the fact that, notwithstanding item (라) of the statutory provision at issue in this case, the Plaintiff has maintained the union membership eligibility of dismissed teachers.
In this case, there is a view worth heeding to the effect that, since it is clear that the law was violated and the Plaintiff has refused to comply even with the corrective order and corrective request regarding that violation, the notice of exclusion from union status issued to the Plaintiff is lawful, and that this cannot be deemed unlawful merely because such notice amounts to a withdrawal of the disposition accepting the report of trade union establishment. However, as noted above, the universally accepted global standard has come to permit dismissed teachers to join teachers' unions. This shows that, even taking into account the importance of education and the special nature of teachers' status, there is no inevitable reason to disallow dismissed teachers from joining teachers' unions. The mere fact that the Plaintiff has admitted dismissed teachers as members does not, by itself, warrant depriving the Plaintiff of its legal status as a trade union. The legitimacy of the Plaintiff as a trade union is a matter to be evaluated according to its activities, not a matter to be determined by whether dismissed teachers are enrolled as members.
In sum, the notice of exclusion from union status in this case is unlawful not because the Enforcement Decree provision at issue is void, but because it is excessive in relation to the Plaintiff's unlawful conduct. Therefore, the court below's determination, which, on a different premise, held the notice of exclusion from union status in this case lawful, erred by misapprehending the legal principles concerning restrictions on the withdrawal of beneficial administrative dispositions, and this error affected the judgment. The judgment below should be reversed.
While the conclusion that the judgment below should be reversed, as stated above, coincides with that of the Majority Opinion, the reasons for reversal differ, and this is accordingly set forth as a Separate Opinion.
6. Dissenting Opinion of Justice Lee Ki-taek and Justice Lee Dong-won
(a) Regarding the legitimacy of the notice of exclusion from union status in this case (Grounds of Appeal Nos. 1 and 2)
The main text of item (라) of the statutory provision at issue in this case, which applies to teachers' unions pursuant to Article 14, Paragraph 1 of the Teachers' Union Act, provides that where a union permits the membership of a person who is not a worker, "it shall not be deemed a trade union." The Enforcement Decree provision at issue in this case provides that in such a case, the competent administrative agency shall demand correction, and if the trade union fails to comply within the prescribed period, the agency "shall notify [the union] that it is not deemed a trade union."
With respect to the foregoing provisions, the Majority Opinion holds that a notice of exclusion from union status deprives or restricts the legal protection afforded to a trade union that has already been lawfully established, and that, in principle, this must be provided for by statute; that in order for it to be provided for by subordinate legislation, there must necessarily be an explicit and specific delegation by statute; and that since the Enforcement Decree provision at issue in this case provides for a notice of exclusion from union status without any statutory delegation and without any statutory basis, it is void, and the notice of exclusion from union status in this case, being based on this void Enforcement Decree provision, is unlawful.
However, according to the provisions set forth above, even a trade union that has already completed the report of establishment can no longer be regarded as a trade union if it permits the membership of a person who is not a worker, and unless this is corrected, the administrative agency must notify the union that it is not deemed a trade union. There is no room to interpret this clear and unambiguous statutory provision otherwise. In this case, the Plaintiff, from the time of its report of establishment, had permitted, through its bylaws, the unrestricted membership of dismissed teachers, and thus falls under the main text of item (라) of the statutory provision at issue in this case, and it failed to comply with the Defendant's corrective request in this regard. Accordingly, the Defendant's issuance of the notice of exclusion from union status to the Plaintiff pursuant to the aforementioned provisions was lawful. The detailed reasons are as follows.
1) Law is a universally valid social norm that has identical binding force upon an unspecified number of persons; therefore, in interpreting it, the standard meaning of the law must be clarified so as to ensure objective validity, and consistency that can be accepted by as many people as possible must, so far as possible, be maintained so that legal stability is not undermined. Even when systematic and logical methods of interpretation are employed—taking into account the legislative purpose and intent of the statute, its history of enactment and amendment, its harmony with the legal order as a whole, and its relationship with other statutes—the principle should be, so far as possible, to interpret the statute faithfully to the ordinary meaning of the language used therein, and where the language of the statute itself is composed of relatively clear concepts, in principle there is no need to resort to other methods of interpretation, or such methods must necessarily be limited (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2006Da81035, decided April 23, 2009; Supreme Court en banc Decision 2011Da83431, decided January 17, 2013).
Article 75 of the Constitution provides: "The President may issue presidential decrees concerning matters delegated to him by statute with the scope specifically defined and matters necessary to enforce statutes." The purport of this provision is not that a statutory delegation is required for the enactment of every presidential decree; rather, it means that, except for matters which the Constitution requires to be regulated only by statute, such as restrictions on the fundamental rights of citizens, the President may enact presidential decrees concerning the specific methods and procedures for enforcing a statute (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2004Du10432, decided January 11, 2007, etc.). Furthermore, while an enforcement decree or enforcement rule of a statute cannot, absent delegation by that statute, alter or supplement the content of individuals' rights and obligations or establish new matters not provided for by the statute, where the content of an enforcement decree or enforcement rule merely specifies what is interpretively possible under the parent statute, examined organically and systematically in light of the legislative purpose of the parent statute and the relevant provisions as a whole, or serves to concretize matters based on the purport of a provision of the parent statute, it cannot be regarded as exceeding the regulatory scope of the parent statute; accordingly, even if the parent statute contains no provision directly delegating such matters, the enforcement decree or rule cannot be deemed void on that account (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2012Du19526, decided August 20, 2014; Supreme Court en banc Decision 2015Do16014, decided February 16, 2017, etc.).
2) The main text of Article 2, Subparagraph 4 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act (노동조합 및 노동관계조정법, "Trade Union Act") defines a "trade union" as "an organization or federation of organizations formed autonomously by workers, with workers as the principal body, for the purpose of maintaining and improving working conditions and otherwise promoting and enhancing the economic and social status of workers." While thus specifying that workers are the principal body of a trade union, the Trade Union Act separately defines, in Article 2, Subparagraph 1, a "worker" as a person who lives on wages, salary, or other income equivalent thereto, regardless of the type of occupation. Accordingly, a "worker" under the Trade Union Act refers to a person who is in a relationship of subordination to an employer, performs labor, and lives on wages or the like received in return therefor, and it does not matter whether the contract for the provision of labor takes the form of employment, contract for work, mandate, an innominate contract, or otherwise, so long as a relationship of subordination to the employer exists (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2019Du33712, decided June 13, 2019, etc.); it follows that a person who is not a worker under the Trade Union Act cannot organize a lawful trade union as defined by the Trade Union Act (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 90Nu9438, decided May 26, 1992, etc.).
Furthermore, the phrase "organization formed autonomously," as used in the main text of Article 2, Subparagraph 4 of the Trade Union Act, means that internally the organization must be formed by workers of their own free will, and externally its operation must be free from interference or intervention by the employer or any other third party. In this connection, the statutory provision at issue in this case enumerates as instances of organizations not to be deemed a trade union under the Trade Union Act: "where participation of the employer or a person who always acts in representation of the employer's interests is permitted [item (가)]"; "where the union is subsidized for the major part of its operating expenses by the employer [item (나)]"; and "where membership of a person who is not a worker is permitted [main text of item (라)]."
Meanwhile, the main text of Article 5 of the Trade Union Act permits workers to freely organize and join trade unions, but its proviso provides that matters concerning public officials and teachers shall be separately determined by statute. Accordingly, the Teachers' Union Act sets forth matters concerning the establishment of teachers' unions and provides special exceptions to the Trade Union Act applicable to teachers, and defines "teacher" in Article 2 thereof; this provision is a mandatory provision that both defines the scope of teachers to whom the Teachers' Union Act applies and, at the same time, restricts the persons entitled to establish a teachers' union and to be eligible for membership therein. Accordingly, teachers eligible for membership in a teachers' union are limited to those who are actually working as teachers, or those who, although dismissed, have filed an application for relief from unfair labor practices with the Labor Relations Commission and for whom the National Labor Relations Commission has not yet rendered a decision on reexamination (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2011Du6998, decided April 10, 2014; Supreme Court Decision 2012Do10066, decided January 14, 2016, etc.), and persons other than these cannot be members of a teachers' union. Where a teachers' union permits the membership of persons who lack such membership eligibility as described above, this falls under "where membership of a person who is not a worker is permitted" under the main text of item (라) of the statutory provision at issue in this case. Whether "teacher" under the Teachers' Union Act should, in principle, be limited to currently employed teachers as described above, or whether the door should be opened broadly to include holders of teaching certificates who have not yet been appointed as teachers, or dismissed teachers, may ultimately be a matter of legislative policy; however, as noted above, the current statutory scheme clearly takes the position of granting membership eligibility only to "currently employed teachers," who have a direct and substantial interest in the activities of the teachers' union. The purpose of this is to prevent persons who are not teachers from intervening in the decision-making process of the teachers' union, thereby affecting the working conditions of currently employed teachers and undermining the autonomy of the teachers' union; accordingly, at least in interpreting and applying the provision as it currently stands, "dismissed teachers" must be regarded as "third parties" who, if permitted to join as members, could instead undermine the autonomy of the teachers' union through unjust interference or intervention.
3) The statutory provision at issue in this case provides that, in cases falling under statutory grounds for disqualification, "it shall not be deemed a trade union," and lists, in the main text of item (라), "where membership of a person who is not a worker is permitted." Here, the phrase "shall not be deemed a trade union" is tantamount to "shall be regarded as not being a trade union." In legislative usage, a provision stating that something "shall be deemed" to be the case generally signifies, unlike a presumption, a conclusive legal fiction that does not permit rebuttal, or at the very least signifies that the provision directly has external legal effect. Accordingly, a trade union that permits the membership of a person who is not a worker can no longer, notwithstanding its name, constitute a trade union under the Trade Union Act, and falls merely into the category of a so-called "union outside the law" ("법외노조"). Even if the administrative agency, overlooking this, accepted the report of establishment, the legal effect of being regarded as not having been a trade union from the outset arises and continues to exist by operation of the statutory provision at issue in this case; conversely, where membership of a person who is not a worker is permitted after the report of establishment has already been accepted, the effect of being regarded as not being a trade union arises retroactively from that point, and it must be held that the union's status as a trade union under the Trade Union Act is lost as of that time. This effect derives not from the fact that the statutory provision at issue in this case is a "definitional provision," but from the fact that it is a "deeming provision." That is, where the requirements set forth in the statutory provision at issue in this case are satisfied, the corresponding legal relationship is formed immediately, and this is precisely the significance of a deeming provision. The fact that the statutory provision at issue in this case may also be characterized as a definitional provision does not alter the aforementioned deeming effect.
As stated above, the reason why the statutory provision at issue in this case must be interpreted as having direct external effect is all the more evident when one considers that the proviso, in conjunction with the main text of the same subparagraph, is a provision designed to effectively prevent employees from losing their status as the constituent members of a trade union or a trade union from losing its independence. If a trade union falls under the case of "permitting the participation of an employer or a person who always acts on behalf of the employer's interests [item (a)]" or "receiving the main portion of its operating expenses from the employer as assistance [item (b)]," this in itself constitutes a serious deficiency in independence, which is an essential requirement for becoming a trade union under the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act (노동조합법; hereinafter the "Trade Union Act"), and such a union must not be granted the status of a trade union under the Act; nor should the fact that the administrative agency has already accepted the union's report of establishment be treated any differently from a situation in which such report has not yet been accepted. The interpretation derived with respect to cases falling under item (a) or (b) of the statutory provision at issue in this case must apply equally to the case set forth in the main text of item (d), namely, "permitting persons who are not employees to join." As noted earlier, item (d), like items (a) and (b), is likewise a provision designed to prevent third parties who are not employees from undermining the independence of a trade union through unjust interference or intervention. This is also the context in which one should understand the Supreme Court's holding in Supreme Court Decision 96Nu9829, decided October 14, 1997, to the effect that, where the report of establishment of a disqualified trade union has been accepted, the company concerned does not have standing to bring an appeal suit directly challenging the acceptance disposition itself, but where the trade union that has received a certificate of report specifically participates in a procedure permitted under the Act, such as filing an application for remedy against unfair labor practices, the company may directly assert and contest the union's lack of qualification in that procedure.
Furthermore, the Trade Union Act makes clear that protection under the Act is limited to "trade unions established under the Trade Union Act" (Article 7, Paragraphs 1 and 3), and provides as follows: ① where a report of establishment of a trade union or its rules require supplementation due to omissions in the matters to be entered, the administrative agency must, as prescribed by Presidential Decree, set a period of no more than twenty days and demand supplementation (Article 12, Paragraph 2); ② the administrative agency shall return the report of establishment of any organization that has a disqualifying reason under any item of the proviso to Article 2, Subparagraph 4 (Article 12, Paragraph 3, Subparagraph 1); and ③ where the rules of a trade union violate labor relations statutes, the administrative agency may, upon resolution of the Labor Relations Commission, order correction thereof (Article 21, Paragraph 1); a trade union that has received such a corrective order must, in principle, comply within thirty days (Article 21, Paragraph 3); and a violation thereof is punishable by a fine not exceeding five million won (Article 93, Subparagraph 2). Thus, under the Trade Union Act, the administrative agency must return the report of establishment of an organization with a disqualifying reason, and may order correction with respect to a trade union in which a disqualifying reason has arisen. Pursuant to the delegation under Article 12, Paragraph 2 of the Trade Union Act, the Enforcement Decree of the Trade Union Act (노동조합법 시행령) lists, as one of the grounds on which the administrative agency must demand supplementation with respect to a trade union's report of establishment, "where the rules are not attached to the report of establishment, or where there is an omission or false statement among the matters to be entered in the report of establishment or the rules" (Article 9, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 1). In addition, the portion of the text of Article 9, Paragraph 2 of the Enforcement Decree of the Trade Union Act, which is the enforcement decree provision at issue in this case, reading "...where, after a trade union has received a certificate of report of establishment, a ground for returning the report of establishment under Article 12, Paragraph 3, Subparagraph 1 of the Act arises, the administrative agency shall set a period of thirty days and demand correction..." may be viewed as simply repeating, or as accurately carrying forward, the content of Article 12, Paragraph 3, Subparagraph 1 and Article 21, Paragraphs 1 and 3 of the Trade Union Act discussed above.
Considering the content and structure of these related provisions as a whole, the Trade Union Act makes clear that, just as in the case of a trade union at the stage of establishment, a trade union that is already active after its report of establishment has been accepted is likewise not permitted to allow persons who are not employees to join. Accordingly, in order to become a trade union under the Trade Union Act, the requirements prescribed by the Act must be satisfied not only at the time of establishment but also thereafter, and there is no room for doubt that, even where a trade union has already completed its report of establishment, if it permits persons who are not employees to join, it ceases to be a lawful trade union from that point onward. In such a case, just as, under the holding of the aforementioned Supreme Court Decision 96Nu9829, the company concerned may directly assert that the trade union is a disqualified trade union, the administrative agency likewise must not regard an organization that permits persons who are not employees to join as a trade union, and indeed, treating it as a trade union may itself be regarded as unlawful.
4) In this way, the effect whereby an organization ceases to be regarded as a trade union when it permits persons who are not employees to join may be said to arise directly from the provision at issue in this case itself, namely the provision stating, "shall not be regarded as a trade union."
However, although the statutory provision is, as described above, very clear, it may not be readily apparent, in specific terms, which trade union is currently a union outside the law (hereinafter a "law-outside union"), or when and for what reason it became a law-outside union, and this may cause unnecessary confusion not only for the trade union itself but also for related interested parties. Accordingly, there arises a need for the administrative agency, which bears the responsibility of no longer treating a trade union in which a disqualifying reason has arisen as a lawful trade union, to give notification of law-outside union status in order to clarify the relevant legal relationships, and the provision governing this is precisely the enforcement decree provision at issue in this case. In other words, the enforcement decree provision at issue in this case is a provision concerning the specific method and procedure for realizing the effect of becoming a law-outside union under the Trade Union Act, and constitutes a perfectly natural executory order.
However, the Trade Union Act and its Enforcement Decree not only establish a system for ordering the correction of unlawful rules and the like, but also provide that a procedure for demanding correction of unlawful rules and the like must be undergone prior to giving notification of law-outside union status. This too may be regarded as consistent with sound reasoning, in that it is designed to give the administrative agency's opportunity to a trade union in which a disqualifying reason has arisen to voluntarily make corrections and thereby return to being a lawful trade union. Accordingly, it is only where such an opportunity for correction has been given but the violation nonetheless continues without ultimately being corrected that the effect under the statutory provision at issue in this case arises in a definitive manner; and at that point, it goes without saying that not only interested parties such as the company concerned but also the administrative agency may take the position that protection under the Trade Union Act is no longer afforded to the trade union with the disqualifying reason. In other words, a trade union in which a disqualifying reason under the Act has arisen becomes a law-outside union pursuant to the provision stating, "shall not be regarded as a trade union," but such effect remains abstract and latent while the procedures for a corrective order and a demand for correction remain available, and becomes concrete and definitive only when the union fails to comply with the corrective order or demand for correction concerning the disqualifying reason. It is upon this finalization of the effect of no longer being regarded as a trade union that the administrative agency gives, to the trade union that has thereby become a law-outside union, notification of law-outside union status to the effect that it will no longer be regarded as a trade union under the Trade Union Act.
Viewed in this light, the portion of the enforcement decree provision at issue in this case stating, "where the trade union fails to comply within that period, notification shall be given to the trade union concerned that it shall not be regarded as a trade union under this Act," cannot be said to violate the Trade Union Act or be invalid, even though no specific delegation was made in the Trade Union Act, the parent statute. As already mentioned above, while it is, in principle, true that an enforcement decree of a statute may not, without delegation by the parent statute, alter or supplement matters concerning the rights and obligations of individuals, or establish new content not provided for in the parent statute, an enforcement decree may nevertheless provide not only for matters specifically delegated within a defined scope by the parent statute, but also for matters necessary to implement the parent statute; and where a provision of the enforcement decree does not directly alter or supplement matters concerning the rights and obligations of individuals, it is not subject to the above-mentioned restriction. Accordingly, establishing provisions that are necessary to enforce or implement the parent statute, or that serve as guidelines or standards, is permissible without limitation so long as they do not exceed the scope of regulation of the parent statute; and furthermore, where the content of the enforcement decree merely specifies what is possible under an interpretation of the parent statute, examined organically and systematically in light of the legislative intent of the parent statute and the entirety of the related provisions, or where it is intended to give concrete form to such content based on the purport of the provisions of the parent statute, it cannot be regarded as exceeding the scope of regulation of the parent statute.
Specifically, examined in light of the content and structure of the related provisions discussed in item 3) above, the fact that the enforcement decree provision at issue in this case requires notification, to the effect that a union shall not be regarded as a lawful trade union under the statutory provision at issue in this case, to be given where the administrative agency has demanded correction and the like from a trade union having a disqualifying reason under the Act but the union has ultimately failed to make the correction, is part of a measure intended to officially inform the union that the legal effect of no longer being regarded as a trade union under the statutory provision at issue in this case has already arisen, and that the administrative agency has also come to take that position. This is not only necessary for the administrative agency to efficiently organize and manage the organizational structure of trade unions, but is also desirable from the standpoint of protecting and fostering trade unions so that they may continue to exist as organizations equipped with independence and democratic character. If it were held that, even where an organization that has completed its report of establishment falls under a disqualifying reason under any item of the statutory provision at issue in this case such that it runs counter to the essential nature of a trade union or lacks the independence and democratic character required of a trade union, the administrative agency could take no measure other than issuing a corrective order or a demand for correction, it would become impossible to prevent a situation in which organizations that are not qualified to receive, and should not receive, legal protection under the Trade Union Act nevertheless proliferate while claiming to be trade unions. Accordingly, even though the Trade Union Act does not contain a provision directly delegating to the Enforcement Decree the authority to provide for notification of law-outside union status, there is no reason why the administrative agency should not be permitted to give notice of the fact that the effect under the aforementioned provision has arisen, so that the effect arising under the statutory provision at issue in this case may be actually enforced, and it may be said that the enforcement decree provision at issue in this case was established precisely for this purpose.
However, the majority opinion takes the view that, since the statutory provision at issue in this case is merely a standard for determining whether a trade union is lawful, the enforcement decree provision at issue in this case, in providing for notification of law-outside union status, newly establishes a matter that the Act does not provide for or delegate, and is therefore invalid. However, as discussed above, the statutory provision at issue in this case provides that, where a disqualifying reason exists, the organization is not a lawful trade union, and is itself a complete provision that specifies both the requirements and the effect. Accordingly, giving notification of that fact to a trade union that has become a law-outside union by operation of this statutory provision is a matter that involves nothing new whatsoever, and is not a matter requiring any special delegation. Nevertheless, the majority opinion proceeds on the premise that the statutory provision at issue in this case suffers from some deficiency or defect, and on that basis concludes that the enforcement decree provision at issue in this case is an entirely new provision lacking any statutory basis or delegation. This position taken by the majority opinion either overlooks the fact that the statutory provision at issue in this case is itself a complete provision, or amounts to nothing more than a convenient interpretation that arbitrarily narrows the meaning of the statutory provision in order to reach the conclusion that the enforcement decree provision at issue in this case is invalid.
5) Meanwhile, under Article 12, Paragraph 1 of the Trade Union Act, upon receiving a report of establishment, the administrative agency must issue a certificate of report within three days, except in cases such as where the report of establishment or the rules require supplementation due to omissions in the matters to be entered, or where the trade union to be established has a disqualifying reason prescribed by the Act. Accordingly, even if a trade union receives notification of law-outside union status, the possibility remains open for it to recover the status of a lawful trade union within three days at the latest, by correcting the disqualifying reason and filing a new report of establishment. Generally, a disposition revoking a beneficial administrative act, such as the revocation of a building permit, produces its effect only upon the revocation disposition itself, and the effect of the disposition is final, such that even if the party subject to the disposition eliminates the ground for the disposition, there is no guarantee that the same beneficial disposition as before will be granted again; hence such a disposition may cause irrecoverable harm to the party subject thereto. However, in the case of notification of law-outside union status, the effect of no longer being regarded as a trade union under the statutory provision at issue in this case has already arisen as an established fact, and the notification merely informs the trade union that it cannot be recognized as a lawful trade union until it has reorganized its rules and organization in conformity with the Act, while urging it to return to lawful status; accordingly, it has characteristics different from those of an ordinary disposition revoking a beneficial administrative act, and the same holds true in the case of withdrawal. In light of these circumstances, it is not appropriate to become fixated on the view that notification of law-outside union status has an infringing character, and to lean toward the position that such notification should be refrained from as much as possible. This is so even bearing in mind, as noted above, that where a trade union falls under the case of "permitting the participation of an employer or a person who always acts on behalf of the employer's interests [item (a)]" or "receiving the main portion of its operating expenses from the employer as assistance [item (b)]" among the categories under the statutory provision at issue in this case, it is only proper for the administrative agency to take the affirmative measure of notifying such an organization, which lacks the independence and democratic character required of a trade union, that it is a law-outside union.
The infringing aspect of notification of law-outside union status under the Trade Union Act arises solely from the self-contradiction of an organization that, having failed to satisfy the requirements prescribed by the Trade Union Act and, moreover, having ultimately failed to comply with the administrative agency's corrective order and demand for correction in that regard, has thereby become subject to the effect of no longer being regarded as a trade union under the statutory provision at issue in this case, yet nonetheless refuses the path that remains fully open to it of recovering the status of a lawful trade union by once again satisfying the requirements prescribed by the Trade Union Act on its own. In other words, this problem arises because such an organization, intending to selectively receive only the protection of the law prescribed by the Trade Union Act, makes the contradictory demand to be treated as a trade union under the Trade Union Act as though the statutory provision at issue in this case did not exist; it is not a matter of a nature that should be examined by converting it into the question of how to protect the public from infringing administrative dispositions.
6) As discussed above, the Plaintiff became a law-outside union by operation of the statutory provision at issue in this case, and not by virtue of the notification of law-outside union status under the enforcement decree provision at issue in this case; accordingly, no special significance need be attached to the notification of law-outside union status itself. Nevertheless, even if this were viewed otherwise, the notification of law-outside union status given by the Defendant to the Plaintiff may still be regarded as lawful.
As is well known, the administrative agency that issued an administrative act may, where the act contains a defect, revoke it on its own even in the absence of a separate legal basis; and even where no particular defect existed at the time the act was issued and there is no separate legal basis for withdrawing it thereafter, the agency may withdraw the act by means of a separate administrative act that extinguishes its effect, where circumstances have changed such that there is no longer any need to maintain the original act, or where a significant need arising from the public interest has occurred. However, if the original administrative act was a beneficial one, there may be room, in certain cases, for such revocation or withdrawal to be impermissible under the doctrine limiting the revocation or withdrawal of beneficial administrative dispositions (see Supreme Court Decision 85Nu664, decided February 25, 1986; Supreme Court Decision 2003Du10251, 10268, decided November 26, 2004, among others).
[Reasoning]
Acceptance of a report on the establishment of a trade union is, broadly speaking, a beneficial administrative disposition that grants a trade union satisfying the establishment requirements set forth in Article 2, Subparagraph 4 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act (노동조합법, hereinafter the “Trade Union Act”) the legal status of a trade union under the Act, thereby allowing it to enjoy the rights and benefits provided under the Act. Accordingly, even in the absence of a separate statutory basis, the Defendant may, absent any special limiting grounds, issue a notice of "non-union status" (법외노조 통보) with respect to a teachers' union for which grounds for withdrawal have arisen, in the sense of retroactively withdrawing the acceptance of the report on establishment of the trade union; and it may be concluded that the provision of the Enforcement Decree at issue in this case (이 사건 시행령 조항) merely restates, in a confirmatory manner, the administrative agency's authority to withdraw such acceptance, which naturally flows from these general principles of administrative law. This is also consistent with the fact, as noted above, that Article 12(3)(1) of the Trade Union Act provides that, with respect to an organization that has submitted a report of establishment, the administrative agency shall examine whether the organization falls under any of the items of the statutory provision at issue in this case (이 사건 법률 규정), and shall return the report of establishment if it does so fall. The purpose of the above provision is to guarantee workers' autonomous and democratic exercise of the right to organize by preventing the proliferation of unions that do not satisfy the substantive requirements of a trade union, and accordingly the administrative agency is vested with the authority to substantively examine whether the organization concerned falls under any of the items of the statutory provision at issue in this case (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2011Du6998, decided April 10, 2014; provided, however, that according to the above Supreme Court Decision 2011Du6998, the substantive examination authority at the stage of the report of establishment is not unlimited but is subject to certain restrictions). This substantive examination authority continues to be reserved to the administrative agency even after the report of establishment of a trade union has been accepted, as provided in Article 21 of the Trade Union Act, such that where, as a result of examination, a trade union is found to have grounds for disqualification under any of the items of the statutory provision at issue in this case, the administrative agency may take measures, such as issuing a corrective order, to have the union restored to lawful trade union status. The provision of the Enforcement Decree at issue in this case, which requires the administrative agency to issue a notice of non-union status where the union ultimately refuses to be restored to lawful trade union status, merely provides for the manner in which the administrative agency's above-described substantive examination authority is realized in practice.
The same conclusion follows even upon a normative comparison and evaluation of the respective situations before and after the administrative agency accepts a report of establishment of a trade union filed by an organization that has grounds for disqualification. If, in the course of substantively examining whether an organization falls under any of the items of the statutory provision at issue in this case after the report of establishment has been received, the administrative agency discovers that a ground for disqualification under one of the items exists, and the deficiency is ultimately not cured, such that the report of establishment is returned or its acceptance is refused, such measure is lawful as being based on Article 12 of the Trade Union Act discussed above; accordingly, the organization whose report of establishment has been refused would not be given the legal effect of being granted the legal protection under the Trade Union Act or the status of a so-called lawful trade union (법내노조). Now suppose that, in the same case, the administrative agency failed to discover the ground for disqualification and simply accepted the report of establishment, but immediately thereafter discovered the ground for disqualification and, following the procedure set forth in the provision of the Enforcement Decree at issue in this case, issued a notice of non-union status: this is substantively the same situation as one in which the ground for disqualification is discovered before the report of establishment is accepted, and therefore must be regarded as a lawful and appropriate measure taken to achieve a balanced result consistent with that situation. It would not be correct, contrary to this, to set a far stricter standard of judicial review on the view that the mere fact that the report of establishment was accepted somehow changed the substance of the organization concerned, rendering it essentially different in character from what it was before acceptance, or that it should be afforded special legal protection. Even if it were considered that significant weight should be given to the very fact that the administrative agency accepted the report of establishment, such that the vested rights of, or reliance interest in, the acceptance of the report of establishment held by the organization concerned should be protected, the provision of the Enforcement Decree at issue in this case does not allow the administrative agency to issue a notice of non-union status immediately upon discovering a ground for disqualification; rather, it provides that the agency shall first demand correction within a fixed period of 30 days, and only if the union fails to comply within that period shall a notice of non-union status be issued. Accordingly, this measure preceding the notice of non-union status must be regarded as already providing sufficient procedural guarantees to protect the vested rights or prior reliance interest of the organization concerned.
Moreover, in the case of revocation of a beneficial administrative disposition, if the defect in the disposition arose from the party's application made by concealment of facts or other fraudulent means, the party must be deemed to have known that the benefit obtained through the disposition was unlawfully acquired and to have anticipated the possibility of its revocation; accordingly, the party itself cannot invoke a reliance interest in the disposition, and it does not constitute a deviation from or abuse of discretion even if the administrative agency failed to take such reliance interest into account (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 90Nu9520, decided April 12, 1991). According to the facts found by the court below, the Plaintiff, at the time of filing its report of establishment, possessed bylaws (규약) permitting the membership of dismissed teachers, yet submitted, together with its report of establishment, a false version of the bylaws from which such content had been deleted, whereupon the report of establishment was accepted; it can also be seen that, after the Defendant subsequently confirmed this fact and issued a corrective order and a demand for correction, the Plaintiff failed to comply. Furthermore, according to the record, the Plaintiff has clearly stated that it has no intention of satisfying the requirements for a trade union prescribed by the Trade Union Act in the future either. In other words, the Plaintiff did not satisfy the requirements prescribed by the Trade Union Act from the outset, deliberately deceived the administrative agency to obtain acceptance of its report of establishment, and, when this became an issue, refused to make corrections despite receiving two corrective orders and one demand for correction, and has expressed no intention whatsoever of making corrections in the future. In light of these circumstances, the Plaintiff cannot argue, on the basis of the grounds for the disposition constituting the notice of non-union status at issue in this case, that its reliance on the administration or legal stability has been undermined. On the contrary, where, as in this case, the original report of establishment was made from the outset by false or wrongful means, the administrative agency, upon discovering this after having accepted the report, must issue a notice of non-union status pursuant to the wording of the provision of the Enforcement Decree at issue in this case; and since the union may at any time be restored to lawful trade union status even after such notice, provided it satisfies the requirements prescribed by law, there is from the outset no room for any discussion of restrictions on the revocation or withdrawal of a beneficial administrative disposition, or of deviation from or abuse of discretion.
The separate opinion of Justice Ahn Cheol-sang, to the effect that the system of notice of non-union status should not be abused, is worthy of consideration as a matter of legislative discussion, but cannot be accepted as an interpretation of the current law. The statutory provision at issue in this case does not provide for any exception whereby a union may be recognized as a lawful trade union despite having a ground for disqualification. Accordingly, the provision of the Enforcement Decree at issue in this case provides that, while an opportunity for correction shall be afforded, a trade union that fails to comply "shall" be given a notice of non-union status. A notice of non-union status issued to a trade union having a ground for disqualification is, unless there is a problem with the underlying corrective order or demand for correction, an inevitable consequence. Turning to the present case, in the administrative litigation in which the lawfulness of the first corrective order at issue in this case was contested, the Supreme Court judgment affirming its lawfulness became final and conclusive (Seoul Administrative Court Decision 2010Guhap27110, decided November 5, 2010; Seoul High Court Decision 2010Nu43725, decided September 9, 2011; Supreme Court Decision 2011Du24231, decided January 12, 2012); the criminal conviction concerning non-compliance with the said first corrective order likewise became final and conclusive in the Supreme Court (Seoul Southern District Court Decision 2011Godan131, decided December 1, 2011; Seoul Southern District Court Decision 2011No1798, decided July 26, 2012; Supreme Court Decision 2012Do10066, decided January 14, 2016); and in the constitutional complaint case filed immediately after the demand for correction at issue in this case, the Constitutional Court rendered a decision of constitutionality (Constitutional Court en banc Decision 2013Hun-Ma671, decided May 28, 2015) with respect to Article 2 of the Act on the Establishment, Operation, etc. of Teachers' Unions (교원노조법, "Teachers' Union Act"), which limits the scope of teachers subject to the Teachers' Union Act to teachers currently serving at elementary, middle, and high schools, holding, among other things, that it does not infringe upon the right to organize of the petitioners, the Korean Teachers and Education Workers' Union and the dismissed teachers. In other words, it has already been confirmed repeatedly, on several occasions, that it is unlawful for the Plaintiff to permit dismissed teachers to join as members. To allow the Plaintiff's claim of vested rights under these circumstances would be to abandon regulation under the current law.
7) The grounds for the disposition at issue in this case are that the Plaintiff possesses bylaws permitting dismissed teachers to join as members, that nine dismissed teachers were in fact active as members of the Plaintiff union, and that the Plaintiff failed to comply despite a demand for correction from the Defendant, the competent administrative agency.
First, it is an established fact that, at the time of the notice of non-union status at issue in this case, nine dismissed teachers were active as members of the Plaintiff union, and the Plaintiff itself does not deny this; accordingly, this ground alone is sufficient to establish the lawfulness of the notice of non-union status at issue in this case.
Moreover, the Plaintiff has formalized, by way of bylaws, the membership of such dismissed teachers through the supplementary provision at issue in this case (이 사건 부칙 조항). The articles of association or bylaws of an organization constitute the most basic and important basis for its establishment, continued existence, and activities, and are a core matter in identifying the organization's identity and forming and maintaining its identity. It is in precisely such bylaws that the Plaintiff permits the membership of dismissed teachers. Moreover, this is not merely a matter of the past or a temporary current situation, but an expression of intent to continue permitting the membership of dismissed teachers into the future. For a trade union to permit persons who are not workers to join as members and to be active as members is a violation of the law. Where such a situation arises not temporarily due to mere clerical error but pursuant to the explicit decision of the trade union, such a trade union has itself abandoned being a trade union under the law. It is self-contradictory to seek only the benefits of a law while refusing to satisfy the requirements prescribed by that same law. This is not a problem unique to the Trade Union Act. The same holds true for all law, whether public or private, substantive or procedural. For example, a claim that an entity should be granted the status of a hospital under the Medical Service Act while refusing to satisfy the essential facilities required under that Act cannot be accepted. A legal order permitting such a contradictory position could not exist in the first place.
To emphasize once again, in this case the Plaintiff did not merely passively acquiesce in the membership of dismissed teachers. Nor did dismissed teachers act as members temporarily, contrary to the Plaintiff's genuine intent. The Plaintiff, through its official bylaws, explicitly permitted persons who are not teachers to join as members, thereby directly violating the establishment requirements under the Teachers' Union Act, and, despite the Defendant's repeated corrective orders and the final and conclusive court judgments affirming the lawfulness of those corrective orders, insisted that its possession of the unlawful bylaws was justified, and has clearly expressed that it has no intention whatsoever of correcting the issue of membership by persons who are not teachers in the future. Yet the Plaintiff simultaneously demands the status and protection of a trade union under the Teachers' Union Act. Such self-contradictory claims have consistently been rejected, and rightly so. An organization that has no intention of complying with the law cannot be recognized as a lawful organization under a law that it rejects, when it does not satisfy the requirements prescribed by that law.
The separate opinion of Justice Kim Jae-hyung, while it may be valid as a general proposition, is difficult to regard as an appropriate interpretation with respect to this case. The Trade Union Act and its Enforcement Decree (노동조합법 시행령), while explicitly denying that dismissed persons have worker status under the Trade Union Act, nonetheless recognize certain exceptions relating to unfair dismissal, and, in order to prevent unforeseen unjust results, provide even for post-hoc corrective opportunities through the systems of corrective orders and demands for correction. The situation arising despite this clear legislative intent and consideration is not an "unjust result contrary to common sense" as presupposed by the above separate opinion. That is, it is not "a situation in which the statutory protection of the right to organize is insufficient," but merely "a situation in which the trade union fails to comply with the current law." In this case, an interpretation departing from the statutory text is not necessary. Furthermore, even assuming that an interpretation departing from the statutory text were necessary in this case, the same conclusion as reached in the above separate opinion could equally be derived by, for example, interpreting the provision of the Enforcement Decree at issue in this case as conferring "discretion" rather than being "mandatory," mitigating the effect of the "deeming" provision under the statutory provision at issue in this case, judging the main text of item (라) of the statutory provision at issue in this case based on whether the trade union's "independence" (자주성) has been impaired, or limiting "joining" by non-workers to new membership only. Nevertheless, the above separate opinion rejects all such possible interpretations on the ground that they are "contrary to the clear statutory text," while asserting, uniquely with respect to the maintenance of membership status by dismissed union members, that "an interpretation departing from the statutory text is necessary." Such a view is difficult to defend against the criticism that it presupposes a conclusion and then interprets the law arbitrarily and selectively to fit that conclusion.
8) The Majority Opinion criticizes the current system of notice of non-union status as reviving, by means of a Presidential Decree, the former system of ordering the dissolution of trade unions under the former Act.
However, the law in effect at the time when the system of ordering dissolution of trade unions existed, in defining a trade union, provided, with respect to cases involving grounds for disqualification such as permitting the membership of non-workers, that "the foregoing shall not apply where the union falls under any of the following subparagraphs." This differs greatly from the current provision, which states that "where an organization falls under any of the following items, it shall not be considered a trade union." The phrase "the foregoing shall not apply" tends to have a merely negative meaning, and it is unclear whether any affirmative legal effect arises therefrom, whereas the phrase "shall not be considered a trade union" must be understood as itself conferring an affirmative legal effect.
Furthermore, whereas the ground for an order of dissolution of a trade union was "a case where the union is found to have violated labor relations statutes or where there is a concern that it may harm the public interest" (former Trade Union Act (as amended by Act No. 3966 of November 28, 1987, prior to that amendment), Article 32), the ground for a notice of non-union status, as set forth in the provision of the Enforcement Decree at issue in this case, refers to "a case where a ground for return of a report of establishment under Article 12(3)(1) of the Act has arisen," that is, "a case falling under any of the items of the proviso to Article 2, Subparagraph 4 of the Act," which in turn ultimately means "a case where a ground for disqualification, such that the organization is not to be considered a trade union, has arisen" (Article 9(2) of the Enforcement Decree of the Trade Union Act; Article 12(3)(1) and Article 2, Subparagraph 4 of the Trade Union Act). Thus, while the system of ordering dissolution of a trade union allowed for an order of dissolution of the union concerned based on any violation of law whatsoever, regardless of its nature or severity, and even, indeed, merely on the ground that there was a concern that it might harm the public interest, the system of notice of non-union status strictly limits the grounds for such notice to cases where the organization cannot be recognized as a trade union under the definitional provision of the Trade Union Act, that is, cases where the organization could not, from the outset, be subject to the Act at all.
Adding to this the point, discussed above, that a notice of non-union status does not itself cause an organization to become a non-union entity, but merely subsequently informs the organization that it has already become a non-union entity by operation of the Trade Union Act, it follows that whereas under the former system of ordering dissolution of trade unions there was a risk that the administrative agency might arbitrarily and unjustly deprive or infringe upon the status of a lawful trade union, under the current system of notice of non-union status, the administrative agency merely, through a prescribed procedure, clearly informs an organization that has ceased to fall under the definition of a trade union under the Trade Union Act of the effect that has already arisen by operation of the law itself; accordingly, there is no room whatsoever for any unjust arbitrariness to intervene here.
The legislative purpose in abolishing the system of ordering dissolution of trade unions was to prevent unjust infringement of a trade union's right to organize, not to guarantee the permanent existence of an unlawful trade union. There is no reason whatsoever to conclude that, because the system of ordering dissolution of trade unions has been abolished, even the issuance of a notice of non-union status to a trade union lacking the requirements for lawful status is thereby prohibited.
Taking all of these circumstances together, the current system of notice of non-union status must be regarded as an essential device, already inherent in the Trade Union Act, for securing the effectiveness of the Act's definitional provision concerning trade unions. It cannot be placed on the same footing as the former system of ordering dissolution of trade unions under the former law, nor can it be dismissed as a system, abolished by the legislature, that has been arbitrarily revived by the administrative branch.
9) Based on what has been examined thus far, it can be seen that if an organization satisfies the requirements prescribed by the Trade Union Act (노동조합법), it becomes a lawful trade union, and if it fails to satisfy those requirements, it becomes a union outside the law, and this is a legal effect that arises directly from the statutory provision at issue in this case itself. An administrative agency must return the report of establishment of a trade union filed by an organization that does not satisfy the requirements prescribed by the Act, and if such circumstances come to light after the report of establishment has been accepted, the agency should induce correction through a corrective order and criminal punishment for failure to comply, but if, despite this, correction is ultimately not made, the agency must, after going through a request-for-correction procedure, issue a notice that the organization is a union outside the law.
This differs from a situation in which the law imposes a certain obligation while remaining silent as to how to deal with a violation of that obligation. The Trade Union Act and its Enforcement Decree clearly stipulate the effect of violation by providing that "it shall not be considered a trade union" where the requirements for being a trade union are not satisfied, and furthermore guarantee the realization of such legal effect by providing for the return of the report of establishment and the notice of union-outside-the-law status.
In this way, there is absolutely no gap in this part of the legal system. On the contrary, viewed on its own, the statute is a flawless provision with no problem whatsoever. Nevertheless, the majority opinion begins its interpretation on the basic premise that there is a gap in this legal system that is in fact entirely without gaps. However, this case is not a case for adjudication on the constitutionality of a statute, nor does it deal with legislative theory. What is at issue in this case is solely the exercise of judicial power. The court need only interpret and apply the completed legal system as it is and, where the requirements are satisfied, grant the legal effect attendant thereto. The majority opinion unnecessarily complicates the matter. If it is thought that the law lacks legitimacy, then a request for adjudication on the constitutionality of the statute should be made to the Constitutional Court, or a petition for legislative amendment should be submitted to the National Assembly.
Meanwhile, the majority opinion is also difficult to accept from the standpoint of legal methodology. The resolution of this case must begin with the interpretation of the statutory provision at issue in this case, namely the provision stating "it shall not be considered a trade union." This provision, however, is utterly clear in providing that where a disqualifying cause prescribed by the Trade Union Act applies, the organization is no longer a lawful trade union. That is, when the "requirement" of falling under a disqualifying cause prescribed by the Trade Union Act is satisfied, the "effect" that it is no longer a lawful trade union arises. There can be no further room for interpretation with respect to such a self-contained and complete provision. To view it otherwise exceeds the limits of statutory interpretation. Nevertheless, the majority opinion deliberately disregards this plain literal meaning, avoids a clear interpretation by treating the provision merely as a criterion for determining whether a trade union is lawful, and instead discusses the validity or invalidity of the enforcement decree provision at issue in this case. Where the Constitution, a statute, and a presidential decree exist with respect to a certain matter, and the legitimacy of the presidential decree is at issue, one should first examine whether the presidential decree violates the statute, and if there is no illegality, next examine whether the presidential decree violates the Constitution, and whether the statute itself is in the first place unconstitutional. Moreover, the notice of union-outside-the-law status at issue in this case (Evidence A No. 5) clearly cites, as its legal basis, both the enforcement decree provision at issue in this case (Article 9(2) of the Enforcement Decree of the Trade Union Act (노동조합법 시행령 제9조 제2항)) and item (ra) of the statutory provision at issue in this case [the proviso item (ra) of Article 2 Subparagraph 4 of the Trade Union Act (노동조합법 제2조 제4호 단서 (라)목)]. Therefore, whether the enforcement decree provision at issue in this case is invalid must basically be derived through interpretation of the statutory provision at issue in this case. The legitimacy of a presidential decree cannot be judged without first determining the meaning of the parent statute.
Furthermore, the majority opinion's position is also problematic in that it ultimately renders the statutory provision at issue in this case meaningless in cases where a disqualifying cause arises after the report of establishment. If a disqualifying cause is discovered at the stage of the report of establishment of a trade union, the organization cannot be recognized as a trade union under the Act by virtue of the provision "it shall not be considered a trade union," and accordingly the administrative agency must return the report of establishment; here, the above provision has a clear meaning. This remains largely unchanged even if, as the majority opinion holds, the provision is regarded merely as a criterion for determining whether a trade union is lawful. However, if a disqualifying cause arises after the report of establishment has been accepted, then under the majority opinion's interpretation, the above provision would have no meaning whatsoever. As previously discussed, under the general principles of administrative law, an administrative agency may, on its own authority, revoke or withdraw a prior administrative act, and this applies equally to the acceptance of a report of establishment of a trade union. That is, even without the provision "it shall not be considered a trade union," the administrative agency could, on its own authority, revoke or withdraw its prior disposition accepting the report of establishment with respect to a trade union in which a disqualifying cause has arisen. Even the majority opinion, whatever its objection to the revocation or withdrawal at issue in this case, would presumably not deny the general principles governing the revocation and withdrawal of administrative dispositions, nor the settled precedent of the Supreme Court based thereon. To deny, as the majority opinion does, the independent meaning of the above provision and to treat it merely as a criterion for determining whether a trade union is lawful amounts, in the end, to saying merely that "if a disqualifying cause arises in a trade union, the existing disposition accepting the report of establishment may be revoked or withdrawn," which is nothing more than a needless repetition of an obvious proposition, so that, as a result, the above provision would carry no substantive meaning at all. It goes without saying that interpreting a law contrary to its text is improper, but it should likewise go without saying that an interpretation that renders a law that plainly exists meaningless is equally improper.
In order to realize the principle of the rule of law under the Constitution, seeking the ideal legal order in a concrete case is the most important mission of the courts. However, this is not a task for the courts alone. Under the constitutional order, it is shared together with the National Assembly, the government, and the Constitutional Court. Accordingly, progress toward a more ideal legal order should be made in harmony with the National Assembly's legislation, the President's and the administration's enforcement of law and administrative legislation, and the Constitutional Court's adjudication on the constitutionality of statutes. If the National Assembly has not amended the statute, if the President and the administration have not withheld enforcement of the law or improved the administrative legislation, and if the Constitutional Court has recognized the constitutionality of such statutes and systems, then this state of affairs ought to be duly respected. For the courts to overturn, at a single stroke and based on their own independent judgment, the existing legal state formed and maintained by such statutes and systems is by no means desirable in its method, even if such an interpretation may ultimately point in the right direction. This is all the more so where it is done while disregarding the plain text of the statute and the complete structure of the system. For the courts to unilaterally declare their own sense of justice while ignoring the order established by constitutional statutes and systems, and to compel other state organs to comply therewith, far exceeds the limits of the judicial function and is closer to legislation. The majority opinion is not interpreting the law but is itself creating law. Even if the majority opinion ultimately points to where our society ought to go, at least for now, its reasoning and conclusion are difficult to accept.
10) In sum, since law is a universally valid norm of society, it must in principle be interpreted in accordance with its text so as to maintain objective validity and consistency. The Trade Union Act defines a trade union as an organization composed of workers, and the Teachers' Trade Union Act (교원노조법), which is a special act in relation to the Trade Union Act, defines "teacher," who may become a member of a teachers' trade union, in a manner that expressly excludes dismissed teachers. Furthermore, the statutory provision at issue in this case provides that where a person who is not a worker is permitted to join, "it shall not be considered a trade union," and this applies equally to a trade union in the process of being established as well as to a trade union already established; therefore, even a trade union that has already completed its report of establishment, if it permits the membership of a person who is not a worker, ceases by virtue of this very provision to be legally regarded as a lawful trade union. In this connection, the enforcement decree provision at issue in this case, for the purpose of enforcing the statutory provision at issue in this case, provides that the administrative agency shall request the trade union to make corrections and, if the trade union fails to comply, "shall give notice that it is not considered a trade union." Accordingly, if it is discovered that a trade union that has been established and is in operation has permitted the membership of a person who is not a worker, and the trade union fails to comply with the administrative agency's request for correction concerning that matter, the administrative agency must, without any room for discretion, give the trade union notice that it is a union outside the law; and if the agency fails to give such notice, it would in effect be abandoning its duty to guarantee workers' exercise of their autonomous and democratic right to organize, which would be unlawful. There is no room to interpret such a clear and complete statutory scheme otherwise, and if there is any part of the current regulatory system and its content with which one disagrees, that is a matter to be resolved through legislation. The majority opinion, while deliberately disregarding this complete legal system, breaks down the boundary between legislation and adjudication, and, while avoiding a clear interpretation of the statutory provision at issue in this case, denies the legitimacy of the enforcement decree provision at issue in this case. Meanwhile, under the general principles of administrative law, an administrative agency may, even without an express statutory basis, subsequently revoke or withdraw its acceptance of a report of establishment with respect to a trade union that has a disqualifying cause, and the enforcement decree provision at issue in this case, which merely provides for this in a cautionary and confirmatory manner, should be regarded as lawful and effective even without specific delegation from the parent statute, the Trade Union Act. Moreover, the Plaintiff expressly permitted, through its bylaws, the membership of dismissed teachers as union members, concealed the existence of such bylaws at the time of filing its report of establishment, thereby deceiving the administrative agency into accepting the report, and failed to comply with the Defendant's repeated corrective orders and requests for correction pointing this out; accordingly, the Plaintiff has never had, from the outset, any legally justifiable vested right or reliance interest. A legal system in which an unreasonable claim is accepted — one that seeks, while failing to comply with the requirements prescribed by law, only the legal status and protection that would be granted upon satisfying those requirements — has never existed in modern civilized society based on the rule of law, and should never come to exist. The Defendant's issuance of the notice of union-outside-the-law status to the Plaintiff was justified. This is the rightful demand of the law and the justice derived from the text of the relevant statutes and their constitutional interpretation.
B. As to the remaining grounds of appeal (Grounds of Appeal Nos. 3 through 7)
The court below, for the reasons stated in its judgment, held that the enforcement decree provision at issue in this case does not violate the principle of statutory definiteness of crimes and punishments (죄형법정주의), that the Plaintiff's grant of union membership eligibility to dismissed teachers through the addendum provision at issue in this case falls under item (ra) of the statutory provision at issue in this case, and that, since the Plaintiff was given prior notice and a sufficient opportunity to state its opinion before receiving the notice of union-outside-the-law status at issue in this case from the Defendant, there was no substantive or procedural defect in the notice of union-outside-the-law status at issue in this case; and, in light of the circumstances stated in its judgment, the court below determined that the notice of union-outside-the-law status at issue in this case could not be found to violate the principle of proportionality, the principle of protection of trust, or the doctrine of loss of rights (실권의 법리).
In light of the legal principles discussed above and the relevant legal principles, the above determination by the court below contains no error that misapprehends the legal principles concerning the principle of statutory definiteness of crimes and punishments, the negative requirements for the establishment of a trade union, prior notice and hearing of opinions under the Administrative Procedures Act (행정절차법), the principle of proportionality, the principle of protection of trust, and the doctrine of loss of rights, such as would have affected the judgment.
C. Conclusion
Therefore, it is proper that the court below, on the above basis, upheld the judgment of the first instance dismissing the Plaintiff's claim. The Plaintiff's appeal should be dismissed.
For the foregoing reasons, we express our dissent from the majority opinion.
7. Supplementary Opinion of Justice Park Jeong-hwa, Justice Min Yu-sook, Justice Roh Jeong-hee, Justice Kim Sang-hwan, and Justice Roh Tae-ak, Concurring with the Majority Opinion
Article 107(2) of the Constitution provides that "when the constitutionality or legality of an order, regulation, or disposition is at issue in a trial, the Supreme Court has the final authority to review it." The majority opinion, based on Article 107(2) of the Constitution, determined that the enforcement decree provision at issue in this case is unconstitutional and therefore invalid. This conclusion was reached by focusing on the fact that the constitutionality of the enforcement decree provision at issue in this case is a preliminary yet significant constitutional issue in this case, and by faithfully carrying out the control of administrative legislation, which is one of the Supreme Court's essential roles conferred by the Constitution. Below, while listening to the issues raised and arguments made in the separate opinion and the dissenting opinion, we wish to supplement the purport and meaning of the majority opinion.
A. The Importance of Constitutional Adjudication Conducted by the Courts
1) For a judge who is bound by law in adjudication, determining whether that law is unconstitutional and void is a very difficult task. The fact that Article 107(2) of the Constitution grants the courts the authority to review the constitutionality and legality of statutory orders enacted by the administration, such as presidential decrees, prime ministerial decrees, and ministerial ordinances (hereinafter "administrative legislation"), means, on the other hand, that the courts have been entrusted with a very difficult but important constitutional duty.
2) In order to properly carry out the above authority and duty given to the courts, it is necessary to understand and follow the constitutional meaning and function of the courts' control over administrative legislation.
a) The Constitution provides that all state actions — legislative, administrative, and judicial — operate within the system of separation of powers established by the Constitution. For instance, the principle of statutory reservation (법률유보원칙), as a control principle over administrative action, requires that administrative action be based on a statute enacted by the National Assembly, the representative of the people, through a democratic procedure. The provision that administrative legislation may be issued only with respect to matters specifically delegated within a defined scope by statute and matters necessary for the enforcement of statute (Articles 75 and 95 of the Constitution) is in the same vein. In this way, the Constitution, as the supreme norm, establishes the superiority of legislation enacted by the National Assembly (statute) in relation to administrative legislation.
b) In the end, the reason Article 107(2) of the Constitution allows the courts to declare administrative legislation invalid and exclude it from the legal order when it violates the Constitution or a statute is: (1) to uphold the supreme normative status of the Constitution and maintain the mutual relationship among legal norms based on the principle of superiority of higher-level law, thereby enhancing the unity and coherence of the law; (2) to eliminate situations in which the National Assembly's legislative power is infringed through administrative legislation, thereby restoring the relationship between the National Assembly and the administration to the relationship of checks and balances and separation of powers envisioned by the Constitution; and (3) ultimately, to ensure that constitutionally permissible restrictions on the freedom and rights of the people are determined through resolutions made by the National Assembly, the democratic legislature, after deliberation and debate, thereby preventing arbitrary administrative action and providing a solid foundation for the protection of the people's fundamental rights.
It is for these reasons that the courts' control of administrative legislation, that is, normative control, is said to have the characteristics of a kind of objective litigation that emphasizes the protection of the objective legal order.
Meanwhile, the constitutional importance of the courts' control of administrative legislation, as described above, needs to be emphasized all the more in the situation where, in the modern state, the role and function of the administration have expanded, and, correspondingly, the legislative function exercised by the administration has also strengthened, in that there is a growing possibility that the administration may disguise its own actions as administration based on law (administration governed by statute) while in fact violating the normative order envisioned by the Constitution.
c) The following point deserves particular attention. The process by which the courts control administrative legislation is a highly meaningful institutional space in which the people themselves, whose legal status is affected by administrative legislation, can directly voice, in an open court, their own views on the constitutional legitimacy of the administrative legislation, and hear the response of the courts as a neutral adjudicating body. The people, as the sovereign source of all state power, may be said to have a political possibility of participating in the process of enacting statutes and administrative legislation relating to their fundamental rights; through the aforementioned judicial process, however, they gain a further normative possibility of contesting, in more concrete terms, the constitutional legitimacy of administrative legislation, which is of no small practical significance.
This is because, when the courts heed the significant arguments raised by the parties to a case and, further, confirm the problems of administrative legislation based on a proper interpretation of the Constitution and statutes and exclude its effect, the people's reasonable opinions are, in effect, conveyed to state organs through the courts' adjudication, and thereby the norms affecting the people can be changed in a direction more consistent with constitutional values.
3) Then, on what basis and with what emphasis should the courts adjudicate cases involving the control of administrative legislation? In order for adjudication to be faithful to the constitutional meaning and function of the courts' control of administrative legislation, the courts must, above all, place emphasis on the people's fundamental rights and the values underlying fundamental rights, which are the core guaranteed by the Constitution, and must fulfill their role as "guardian of fundamental rights."
Article 10 of the Constitution provides, "All citizens shall be assured of human dignity and worth and have the right to pursue happiness. It shall be the duty of the State to confirm and guarantee the fundamental and inviolable human rights of individuals." There can be no dispute that the courts, having been vested with judicial power pursuant to Article 101 of the Constitution, bear the duty under Article 10 of the Constitution to confirm and guarantee the fundamental rights of citizens. Furthermore, Article 103 of the Constitution provides that "Judges shall rule independently according to their conscience and in conformity with the Constitution and laws," thereby requiring courts to take the Constitution as the paramount standard in adjudication. Moreover, since the Constitution, representatively in Chapter II titled "Rights and Duties of Citizens," enumerates various fundamental rights and guarantees the freedoms and rights of members of the community as a core constitutive element of the Constitution, the courts must ultimately regard "serious attention to and evaluation of fundamental rights and fundamental-rights-related values that legislation and administration are prone to overlook" as one of their important powers and duties.
B. The Preliminary Constitutional Issue in This Case
1) A major portion of the legal dispute between the Plaintiff and Defendant that has taken place from the time the notice of being an organization outside the scope of the Trade Union Act (hereinafter "notice of being an out-of-law union") was issued on October 24, 2013 to the present has concerned the fundamental problems of the Enforcement Decree provision at issue in this case (hereinafter "the Enforcement Decree provision at issue") itself.
2) Whether any particular administrative legislation is genuinely based on the law that constitutes the superior norm, whether it was enacted based on a legitimate understanding of the enabling statute, and further whether its content itself conforms to the purposes of the Constitution and the statute, may be evaluated differently depending on differing viewpoints and understandings. In this case as well, the Plaintiff has consistently contended that the Enforcement Decree provision at issue was legislated without statutory delegation and without properly considering fundamental-rights values such as the trade union's right to organize, and that the Defendant's measure based on such an Enforcement Decree provision therefore lacks constitutional legitimacy, while the Defendant has raised various counterarguments.
3) From the standpoint of normative control, separately from the question of whether the statutory provision at issue (item (라)), which was presented as one of the statutory bases for the disposition in this case, is unconstitutional, the question of whether the Enforcement Decree provision at issue is unconstitutional is a significant constitutional issue that the courts must weigh heavily and rule upon, and it is a preliminary issue determinative of the legality of the disposition in this case. Accordingly, the courts must, pursuant to Article 107, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution, examine the issue that constitutes a premise of this adjudication, namely, whether the Enforcement Decree provision at issue is unconstitutional.
4) While there may certainly be room to criticize, from the standpoint of "strict compliance with the law," the very fact that the Plaintiff, contrary to the text of the statutory provision at issue, retained as union members persons who had lost their status as teachers due to dismissal or otherwise, this does not mean that the Plaintiff's raising of the above issue on the basis of the Constitution and statutes can be evaluated, as the dissenting opinion points out, as a self-contradictory or inconsistent stance; the courts must still objectively determine the merits of the Plaintiff's argument. This is all the more so when one recalls that the courts' control of administrative legislation has the characteristics of a type of objective litigation that emphasizes the protection of the objective legal order.
C. Supplementation of the Reasons for Finding the Enforcement Decree Provision at Issue Unconstitutional
1) The Majority Opinion has explained in detail the reasons why the Enforcement Decree provision at issue violates the principle of statutory reservation. Below, I wish to emphasize by repetition, or to add, several circumstances that should be specially considered in the process of reaching such a determination.
2) First, I wish to emphasize the significance of the right to organize, which is a fundamental right under the Constitution.
A) Article 33, Paragraph 1 of the Constitution provides, "Workers shall have the right to independent association, collective bargaining, and collective action for the purpose of improving working conditions," thereby providing for the workers' three primary labor rights. Among these three primary labor rights, the right to organize is a priority right that must necessarily be a precondition for the realization of other fundamental labor rights, and it has the strongest character as a liberty right. Moreover, Article 33, Paragraph 1 of the Constitution must be understood as guaranteeing not only the individual worker's right to organize but also the right to organize of the organization itself. If only the individual worker's right to organize were guaranteed while the right to organize of an organized body were not recognized, the guarantee of the individual's right to organize could become meaningless.
That is, since the right to organize under Article 33, Paragraph 1 of the Constitution is also a right of an organized body, the above provision must be understood as protecting the existence, maintenance, development, and expansion, etc. of a workers' organization from unjust interference or intervention by state public power (the right to organizational existence), guaranteeing the autonomous determination, in the form of bylaws, of the organizational structure and procedures for forming the will of the workers' organization (the right to organizational autonomy), and protecting the activities of the workers' organization for the maintenance and improvement of working conditions, namely collective bargaining, the conclusion of collective agreements, collective action, and the organization's publicity and solicitation of membership (the right to organizational activity) (see Constitutional Court en banc Decision 95Hun-Ma154, decided November 25, 1999, etc.).
B) In this manner, the Constitution, by guaranteeing as a fundamental right the right to organize as a liberty right that is a special form of freedom of association, makes clear that the State must not unjustly interfere with or intervene in not only the formation but also the continued existence of trade unions, which are workers' organizations, through statutes, enforcement decrees, and the like, and that it must affirmatively guarantee that the formation and continued existence, etc. of trade unions be carried out according to the autonomous choice of the trade union and its members.
Although each person's actual understanding of and attitude toward trade unions may differ depending on their respective positions, the normative significance of the very fact that the Constitution, in Article 21, prohibits the requirement of authorization for association, and in Article 33, expressly guarantees the three primary labor rights including the right to organize, must never be treated lightly. Accordingly, in interpreting the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act (노동조합 및 노동관계조정법, hereinafter "the Trade Union Act") and its Enforcement Decree, which were enacted for the purpose of "guaranteeing workers' right to organize, right to collective bargaining, and right to collective action under the Constitution so as to promote the maintenance and improvement of working conditions and the enhancement of workers' economic and social status," care must be taken to ensure that the purpose of guaranteeing the right to organize as described above is not undermined, and the three primary labor rights, including the right to organize, must be respected to the maximum extent possible.
C) Meanwhile, Article 33, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution provides that only those public officials who are designated by law shall have the three primary labor rights. This is a provision that takes into account the special nature of the status of public officials and of the duties they perform, but it does not mean that the three primary labor rights of public officials are, in principle, denied under the Constitution; rather, it is a provision that, on the premise that public officials within a certain scope do have the three primary labor rights, delegates to statute the determination of the specific scope thereof (see Constitutional Court en banc Decision 88Hun-Ma5, decided March 11, 1993, etc.). This applies equally to teachers who are public officials.
The Act on the Establishment and Operation of Teachers' Unions (교원의 노동조합 설립 및 운영 등에 관한 법률, hereinafter "the Teachers' Union Act"), enacted pursuant to the above express delegation under the Constitution, is fundamentally a statute of the character of guaranteeing teachers' right to organize, etc. Indeed, the Teachers' Union Act applies the Trade Union Act mutatis mutandis except where the Teachers' Union Act contains special provisions (Article 14), and is thus understood to occupy the position of a special statute vis-à-vis the Trade Union Act, which exists to guarantee workers' three primary labor rights.
In conclusion, notwithstanding the special nature of the regulatory form under Article 33, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution, etc. as applied to teachers who are public officials, in interpreting the Teachers' Union Act and its Enforcement Decree as well, care must properly be taken to ensure that the purpose of guaranteeing the right to organize as described above is not undermined, and teachers' right to organize must be respected to the maximum extent possible.
D) The same applies when determining whether the Enforcement Decree provision at issue, which establishes the system of notice of being an out-of-law union that deprives a union of its status as a union under the statute and thereby impairs its right to organizational existence, complies with the principle of statutory reservation under the Constitution. This is because the notice of being an out-of-law union essentially restricts the right to organize of a union under the statute that has been lawfully established and is actively operating, and thus bears a strong connection to fundamental rights.
3) The disadvantage that the Enforcement Decree provision at issue inflicts on the fundamental right of the right to organize is extremely serious.
A) When the Enforcement Decree provision at issue is applied, the legal status of a trade union as provided under the Trade Union Act is entirely negated. Administrative agencies uniformly issue a notice of being an out-of-law union based on the Enforcement Decree provision at issue, without any consideration whatsoever of the severity of the disqualifying grounds or of other specific circumstances. It is clear that the disadvantage and harm suffered by the trade union and its members will be substantial.
B) Moreover, the Enforcement Decree provision at issue does not specifically stipulate when and under what circumstances an administrative agency is to exercise its investigative authority for the application of the Enforcement Decree provision at issue, what the effect of a notice of being an out-of-law union is, or by what method the effectiveness of such notice is to be secured.
As a result, it would not be an exaggeration to say that both the decision whether to exercise the authority to issue a notice of being an out-of-law union and its subsequent enforcement are left entirely to the arbitrary judgment of the administrative agency. While the fact that instances in which administrative agencies have issued a notice of being an out-of-law union based on the Enforcement Decree provision at issue have been very rare may be seen as showing that administrative agencies have exercised this authority with caution, it is also difficult to deny that the system of notice of being an out-of-law union inherently carries the risk of arbitrary or excessive abuse depending on the position or interpretation of the administrative branch.
4) Nevertheless, it is difficult to find any statutory basis of delegation that supports the Enforcement Decree provision at issue.
A) The greater and more significant the impact of an item of administrative legislation on fundamental rights, the more explicitly, in proportion thereto, such administrative legislation must be based on legislation enacted by the National Assembly. However, as the Majority Opinion points out, although the notice of being an out-of-law union provided for in the Enforcement Decree provision at issue is clearly a system that not only restricts the constitutional fundamental right of the right to organize held by each member of the union but also deprives the union under the statute, which is recognized as the subject enjoying the right to organize, of its status as such, there exists no express statutory provision delegating the matters regulated by the Enforcement Decree provision at issue.
B) Considering, in addition, the circumstances surrounding the enactment of the provision, it becomes even clearer that the Enforcement Decree provision at issue was enacted without statutory delegation. The system of orders for dissolution of a trade union under the former Trade Union Act, before its abolition, at least had an express basis in statute, and moreover provided that such authority was to be exercised with due caution upon obtaining a resolution of the Labor Relations Commission; by contrast, in the case of the system of notice of being an out-of-law union provided for in the Enforcement Decree provision at issue, not only is there no express basis in statute, but also, without any deliberation and resolution procedure by a neutral and fair committee, a mere declaration by the administrative agency produces effects equivalent to those of the former dissolution order.
The fact that the "administrative branch" newly enacted the Enforcement Decree provision at issue in 1988, thereby establishing the system of notice of being an out-of-law union, is strong circumstantial evidence that this may be regarded as effectively negating the clear intent of the "National Assembly," which, out of reflective consideration, had abolished the system of trade union dissolution orders in 1987.
5) It is difficult to agree with the dissenting opinion's view that the Enforcement Decree provision at issue is an executory order implementing a statute.
A) The executory order of the administrative branch contemplated under Article 75 of the Constitution refers to an order enacted merely to implement content already determined by statute, that is, administrative legislation that sets forth detailed rules such as the specific procedures or methods necessary for implementing a statute. An executory order may not stipulate new content not provided for in the statute, or new rights or duties of citizens. On the premise that the legislature has already provided the administrative branch with concrete guidelines for action in the statute, the administrative branch may only establish detailed rules for implementing such guidelines within their scope. In other words, the administrative branch is not afforded any room to independently supplement or concretize, through an executory order, the intent of the National Assembly as embodied in the statute.
Accordingly, in order for the Enforcement Decree provision at issue to be evaluated as a lawful executory order, there must first exist, in the statute, a concrete regulation concerning the content of the system of notice of being an out-of-law union. But is that truly the case? I wish to explain, in separate subsections, the reasons why this cannot be affirmed.
B) The dissenting opinion appears to take the position that the Enforcement Decree provision at issue may be understood as lawful administrative legislation implementing the "definitional provision concerning trade unions" set forth in the statute; however, this is difficult to accept, as it does not accord with the generally accepted understanding of the meaning of a definitional provision.
(1) Article 2 (Definitions) of the Trade Union Act, which contains the statutory provision at issue, provides, "The definitions of terms used in this Act shall be as follows." Subparagraph 4 of the same Article provides, "'Trade union' means an organization or federation of organizations formed autonomously by workers acting as the主体 [principal actors], on their own initiative, for the purpose of maintaining and improving working conditions and otherwise enhancing the economic and social status of workers: Provided, that in any of the following cases, it shall not be regarded as a trade union," thereby providing a "definition" of "trade union."
In general, a "definition" means "clearly determining and setting forth the meaning of a certain term or object." In legislative theory as well, a definitional provision is understood as a provision that serves the function of clarifying the meaning of terms used in the relevant statute, thereby preventing confusion and disputes in the interpretation and application of the statute, and of enabling concise expression of statutory text by explaining in advance, in a single provision, terms that are frequently used in the statute. In various statutes, definitional provisions that set forth the essential nature of the subject matter are not infrequently used alongside definitional provisions that affirmatively or negatively enumerate some or all of the subject matter.
That is, Article 2, Subparagraph 4 of the Trade Union Act, while concretizing the essential nature of a workers' organization whose collective right to organize is guaranteed pursuant to Article 33, Paragraph 1 of the Constitution, "defines" a trade union as a workers' organization eligible for protection under the Trade Union Act, thereby setting forth its substantive requirements. Among these, the main text provides, as one of the affirmative requirements that a union under the statute must satisfy, that workers must be the principal actors who have autonomously organized on their own initiative, while the statutory provision at issue enumerates, through items (가), (나), and (라) of the proviso, representative cases in which a workers' organization may be determined to lack the above status as principal actor or autonomy.
(2) The Trade Union Act, based on the standards, that is, the substantive requirements, set forth in this definitional provision, provides, in accordance with its legislative purpose, for matters such as the acceptance or return of a trade union's report of establishment, and orders to correct the bylaws with penalties for violation, etc. That is, the Trade Union Act contains provisions requiring the administrative agency to accept a report of establishment of a trade union that satisfies the substantive requirements, while returning the report of establishment where a negative requirement is confirmed (Article 10, Paragraph 1; Article 12, Paragraph 1; Article 12, Paragraph 3, Subparagraph 1), and allowing the administrative agency, upon obtaining a resolution of the Labor Relations Commission, to order correction of a union's bylaws or resolutions where such bylaws or resolutions are unlawful in that they contain content falling under a negative requirement (Article 21); these provisions, premised on the standards set forth in the definitional provision of Article 2, Subparagraph 4 of the Trade Union Act, including the statutory provision at issue, separately provide in the statute for the content, procedure, and effect, etc. of prior and subsequent review by the administrative agency, going beyond the definitional provision itself.
In conclusion, just as the status of a trade union under the statute cannot be immediately recognized solely on the basis of Article 2, Subparagraph 4 of the Trade Union Act, it likewise cannot be said that the loss of the legal status of a trade union under the statute is immediately determined solely by the statutory provision at issue itself, which is merely a part of the definitional provision concerning trade unions. Furthermore, just as the authority to accept or return a report of establishment of a trade union cannot be said to be conferred on the administrative agency solely by the statutory provision at issue, it is likewise difficult to view the administrative agency's authority to issue a notice of being an out-of-law union as being recognized on the basis of the direct legal effect of the statutory provision at issue. The Majority Opinion, which holds that the statutory provision at issue merely sets forth the criteria for determining whether an organization is a trade union under the statute, is correct in this respect.
C) As described above, since the Trade Union Act adopts a system of reporting establishment, in order to become a trade union under the statute, formal requirements, that is, acceptance of the report of establishment, are required in addition to the substantive requirements under the statutory provision at issue and other provisions. Accordingly, as the dissenting opinion notes, a trade union that satisfies the substantive requirements but has not completed the report of establishment cannot be said to be a trade union under the statute, while a trade union that does not satisfy the substantive requirements may not be recognized as a trade union under the statute even if it has been issued a certificate of report of establishment (see Supreme Court Decision 93Do855, decided June 28, 1996; Supreme Court Decision 96Nu9829, decided October 14, 1997, etc.). However, this only means that where matters such as eligibility to file an application for remedy for unfair labor practices under the Trade Union Act are at issue, the legal relationship may be determined after review of the substantive requirements by the Labor Relations Commission and, ultimately, by the courts. To conclude from this that the legal effect of being regarded as not a trade union under the statute pursuant to the statutory provision at issue arises immediately, such that an administrative agency may issue a notice of being an out-of-law union based on the statutory provision at issue alone at any time, disregards a systematic understanding of the requirements for the establishment of a trade union under the statute. Moreover, if an administrative agency could, through an order to correct or a demand to correct as a preliminary procedure to a notice of being an out-of-law union, transform the abstract and potential legal effect arising under the statutory provision at issue into something concrete and definite, this would ultimately not differ significantly from affirming that the notice of being an out-of-law union system constitutes a formative administrative disposition.
라) The dissenting opinion emphasizes that the provision of the Act at issue takes the form of a deeming provision using the expression "shall not be regarded as." However, the expression "shall not be regarded as" in the provision of the Act at issue is a change from the expression "shall not apply" that was used in the definitional provision concerning trade unions from the amendment of the former Trade Union Act (노동조합법) on April 17, 1963, until the enactment of the current Trade Union Act on March 13, 1997. It is not easy to ascertain the legislative intent embodied in this legislative transition.
However, it is difficult to accept, as being excessively formalistic, an interpretation whereby during the period when the definitional provision on trade unions was legislated using the expression "shall not be regarded as," a trade union that had been established and was operating would immediately and as a matter of course become a union outside the law upon meeting the negative requirements set forth in the provision of the Act at issue, whereas during the period when the expression "shall not apply" was used, such an effect of immediately becoming a union outside the law would not arise. Moreover, as noted above, the provision of the Enforcement Decree at issue already existed even before the definitional provision on trade unions took the form of "shall not be regarded as." Given this legislative history, it is not appropriate to interpret the provision of the Enforcement Decree at issue as a merely cautionary or confirmatory provision by placing excessive emphasis solely on the fact that the provision of the Act at issue takes the form of a deeming provision.
마) It is necessary to give due weight to the discriminatory situation in which, unlike the system of rejecting trade union establishment reports, which is specifically provided for by statute, the system of notification of a union's status as outside the law is not separately regulated. The gap in statutory regulation concerning the system of notification of union status as outside the law may be viewed as reflecting the intent of the legislature.
(1) There may be various legislative policies for realizing the legislative purpose embodied in a definitional provision. Since the grounds for violating a definitional provision, and the circumstances and degree of the violation, inevitably vary, and the extent to which the legislative purpose is impaired accordingly varies, the legislature devises legislative policies in response thereto. The fact that the system of rejecting trade union establishment reports is provided for by statute (Article 12, Paragraph 3 of the Trade Union Act) should also be regarded as the result of the legislature's policy deliberation aimed at realizing the legislative purpose of the definitional provision concerning trade unions. It is difficult to view the above rejection system as a mere execution of the definitional provision.
(2) Focusing on the fact that the legislature has thus specifically formed the system of rejecting trade union establishment reports through statute, it is natural to presume that if the legislature also had the intent to introduce a system of notification of union status as outside the law—especially if it had such legislative intent around the time it abolished the system of court-ordered dissolution of trade unions, which has a function similar to the above notification system—the legislature would probably have separately provided in the statute itself the basic outline of the system of notification of union status as outside the law, that is, the core elements of the requirements and limits for the exercise of the administrative authority to issue such notification, as well as the procedure and effects thereof. This is because there are meaningful differences between the system of rejecting trade union establishment reports and the system of notification of union status as outside the law in terms of the characteristics of the matters regulated.
(3) That is, at the stage of a trade union's establishment report, where the grounds set forth in item (라) of the provision of the Act at issue are found to exist, the administrative agency must reject the establishment report, and it is not required to separately examine whether the independence of the trade union has actually been undermined by the admission of a person who is not a worker (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2011Du6998, decided April 10, 2014). This is because, at this stage, the substance of the organization in question is still unclear, and it is difficult to set the specific object and scope of examination for determining independence; accordingly, the purpose is to clarify the object and scope of the administrative agency's examination and to prevent arbitrariness, thereby blocking the risk that the reporting system—premised on the free establishment of trade unions—might in practice be operated as a permit system under the pretext of examining independence. It should not be understood to mean that the independence of a trade union is itself negated simply because the admission of a person who is not a worker is permitted.
However, in the case of a trade union that has already been lawfully established and is in operation, since its substance has already been formed, it is fully possible to examine, through its specific organizational structure and activities, whether the trade union's independence has actually been undermined as a result of permitting the admission of a person who is not a worker. Even if disputes arise in the process or conclusion of such examination, since sufficient correction is possible through judicial review, the examination in this case does not pose a significant risk of undermining the purpose of the Constitution and the statutes concerning the independence of trade unions and the free establishment of trade unions.
(4) Given the foregoing, the gap in statutory regulation concerning the system of notification of union status as outside the law may be viewed as reflecting the clear intent or purpose of the legislature, and the courts need to give this significant weight.
6) The general legal principle concerning the ex officio revocation or withdrawal of beneficial administrative dispositions cannot serve as a sufficient basis for legislating the system of notification of union status as outside the law through an enforcement decree, without a clear statutory delegation.
가) The view that the ex officio revocation or withdrawal of a beneficial administrative disposition is possible even without a separate statutory basis does not mean recognizing an original administrative power free from statute; rather, it is the result of inferring the legislature's rational intent that, if the legislature has granted an administrative agency, by statute, the authority to issue a beneficial administrative disposition, the empowering provision implicitly includes the authority to revoke or withdraw ex officio a beneficial administrative disposition already issued, upon confirmation of circumstances making it difficult to maintain the disposition as it stands. In ordinary cases, it may be reasonable to infer the legislature's rational intent in this manner.
나) However, considering the various circumstances discussed above, including the history of the legislature's abolition of the system of court-ordered dissolution of trade unions out of reflective consideration, it is reasonable to conclude that the legislature did not grant authority whereby, merely because a ground for rejecting an establishment report exists, the status of a lawful trade union under the Act could be stripped through a unilateral decision of the administrative agency by way of a notification of union status as outside the law, as an ex officio revocation or withdrawal of the disposition accepting the establishment report.
라. The significance of evaluating the provision of the Enforcement Decree at issue as unconstitutional
1) While recognizing the constitutional importance of the courts' control over administrative legislation, the majority opinion, giving weight to the fact that the fundamental issue underlying this dispute lies in "whether, in light of the meaning of the constitutional fundamental rights asserted by the Plaintiff, the relationship between legislation by the National Assembly and administrative legislation has been established in conformity with the Constitution," focused its judgment on this issue based on Article 107, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution.
2) In a democratic constitutional state, state power must in principle be exercised pursuant to statutes—in which the will of the sovereign people is concentrated, having been enacted through democratic procedures by the people's representatives—that is, directly based on statute or based on administrative legislation that has been concretized pursuant to statutory delegation. It is only when this principle of statutory reservation is realized that "self-governance of the people," whereby the people, as sovereign, willingly submit to legitimate laws made by their elected representatives, becomes possible.
3) The system of notification of union status as outside the law under the provision of the Enforcement Decree at issue was introduced through administrative legislation without statutory delegation—that is, in a situation where the intent of the National Assembly supporting it has not been confirmed—despite the fact that the disadvantage it inflicts on the right of trade unions and their members to organize is extremely serious. This violates the hierarchical relationship between legislation by the National Assembly and administrative legislation as contemplated by the Constitution. In other words, regardless of whether its content is in fact legitimate, the provision of the Enforcement Decree at issue is administrative legislation that violates the constitutional principle of statutory reservation, and therefore it cannot serve as the legal basis for a measure restricting the fundamental rights of the people.
4) As the provision of the Enforcement Decree at issue, which violates the principle of statutory reservation, is declared void, the basis on which an "administrative agency" may examine the qualifications of a trade union and entirely negate the legal status of a trade union as defined under the Trade Union Act is lost. It is our view that it is now ultimately appropriate for the National Assembly, as the representative of the people, to address whether to provide a statutory basis for the system of notification of union status as outside the law as designed by the provision of the Enforcement Decree at issue. This is because matters such as whether it is indeed appropriate to introduce a system of notification of union status as outside the law at the statutory level, and if so, which state agency should make such a determination, upon what grounds, through what procedures, and what level of sanction against a union deemed outside the law would be proportionate, should ultimately be determined by the National Assembly through democratic procedures, after gathering the people's diverse opinions on the relevant constitutional provisions and after open discussion and deliberation among interested parties—this being what truly and fully conforms to the constitutional principle of statutory reservation.
5) We wish to reiterate the significance of the constitutional adjudication performed by the courts. Claims by the people that rely on the Constitution, particularly on fundamental rights, cannot be given effect unconditionally without any limitation whatsoever. However, if the courts always listen to and seriously examine, without exception, the people's claims based on fundamental rights—whether asserted loudly or faintly—and thereby give assurance that there is always a possibility that the people's fundamental rights will be guaranteed in the course of the courts' adjudication, we believe that the task of guaranteeing fundamental rights entrusted to the courts by the Constitution will thereby begin to be realized.
마. The lower court's misunderstanding of the legal principle concerning the limitation on addition or alteration of grounds for disposition
1) We wish to point out that the court below and the dissenting opinion have misunderstood the grounds for the notification of union status as outside the law at issue in this case. The "ex officio revocation" and "withdrawal" of a beneficial administrative disposition must be distinguished. The ex officio revocation of an administrative disposition refers to an administrative disposition that extinguishes, retroactively, the effect of an administrative disposition that had once validly come into existence, on the ground that the disposition contains an unlawful defect, whereas the withdrawal of an administrative disposition refers to an administrative disposition that extinguishes, for the future, all or part of the effect of an administrative disposition that had fully taken effect upon satisfying the requirements for legality at the time of the disposition. In principle, "grounds for revocation" of an administrative disposition refer to defects that existed at the time the administrative disposition came into existence, whereas "grounds for withdrawal" refer to grounds arising anew after the administrative disposition came into existence, such that the effect of the administrative disposition can no longer be maintained (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2015Du58195, decided June 28, 2018).
2) The provision of the Enforcement Decree at issue applies to "a case where, after a trade union has received a certificate of establishment report, a ground for rejection of the establishment report under Article 12, Paragraph 3, Item 1 of the Trade Union Act arises." In this case, the Defendant issued the notification of union status as outside the law to the Plaintiff by applying the provision of the Enforcement Decree at issue, on the ground that the grounds set forth in item (라) of the provision of the Act at issue arose only after the Plaintiff received the certificate of trade union establishment report (hereinafter referred to as the "original grounds for the disposition"). Accordingly, the notification of union status as outside the law at issue in this case constitutes a "withdrawal" that extinguishes, for the future, the disposition accepting the trade union establishment report, on the ground of a subsequently arising cause.
3) Nevertheless, the court below, accepting the Defendant's argument in the litigation as it stood, determined that the grounds set forth in item (라) of the provision of the Act at issue already existed at the time of the trade union establishment report, and that the establishment report was accepted because the Plaintiff submitted a false constitution (hereinafter referred to as the "added grounds for the disposition"); this amounts to construing the notification of union status as outside the law at issue in this case as a "revocation" that retroactively extinguishes the disposition accepting the trade union establishment report on the ground of an original defect. Since there is no identity of basic factual relations between the aforementioned original grounds for the disposition and the added grounds for the disposition, the addition or alteration of the grounds for disposition is not permitted from the standpoint of substantive rule of law and protection of the disposition recipient's trust, and the court may not examine or determine the propriety of the added grounds for disposition (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2000Du8684, decided September 28, 2001). Accordingly, the judgment of the court below also contains an error in misunderstanding the legal principle concerning the limitation on addition or alteration of grounds for disposition.
For the foregoing reasons, we set forth this concurring opinion supplementing the majority opinion.
Chief Justice Kim Myeong-su (Presiding Justice), Justice Kwon Soon-il, Justice Park Sang-ok, Justice Lee Ki-taek, Justice Kim Jae-hyung, Justice Park Jung-hwa, Justice Ahn Cheol-sang, Justice Min Yu-sook, Justice Lee Dong-won, Justice Noh Jeong-hee, Justice Kim Sang-hwan, Justice Noh Tae-ak (Justice in charge)