[Plaintiff, Appellant] Korea Railroad Corporation (Legal Representative: Sejong LLC, Attorney Cho Yong-jun and 1 other)
[Defendant, Appellee] Chairman of the National Labor Relations Commission
[Intervenors for the Defendant] As listed in the attached list of Intervenors for the Defendant. (Legal Representative: Yeoneun Law Firm, Attorney Woo Ji-yeon and 10 others)
[Judgment Below] Seoul High Court Decision 2017Nu71958 rendered on April 10, 2019
[Order]
The appeal is dismissed. The costs of the appeal, including those arising from the intervention, shall be borne by the Plaintiff.
[Reasoning] The grounds of appeal are examined.
1. First Ground of Appeal
The court below determined that it was clear that wage issues, such as the 2013 wage negotiations, were one of the main purposes of the second strike, and that although there were circumstances suggesting that pending issues such as the withdrawal of disciplinary actions, damages claims, and provisional attachments against members of the Railway Workers' Union, and opposition to rotational transfers and single-person crewing, were included in the purpose of the second strike, it could not be found that the second strike would not have occurred if these had been excluded; therefore, the legitimacy of the purpose of the second strike could not be denied.
Upon examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the record, there is no error in the court below's determination as alleged in the grounds of appeal, such as a misunderstanding of the legal principles regarding the legitimacy of the purpose of industrial action.
2. Second Ground of Appeal
A. Whether the Second Strike Was Conducted Without a Member Vote
The court below determined that, considering the entire process from the Railway Workers' Union's proposal of the 2013 wage agreement, through the member vote and the second strike, to the conclusion of the wage agreement, a labor dispute had already arisen between the Plaintiff and the Railway Workers' Union due to disagreement over the 2013 wage negotiations at the time of the member vote, and that one of the main purposes of the second strike was also the 2013 wage negotiations; therefore, it was reasonable to view that a member vote had been held with respect to the second strike.
Upon examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the record, there is no error in the court below's determination as alleged in the grounds of appeal, such as a misunderstanding of the legal principles regarding the procedures for industrial action.
B. Whether There Was an Error Regarding the Timing of the Vote
1) Article 41(1) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act (노동조합 및 노동관계조정법, hereinafter the “Trade Union Act”), which requires that when a labor union engages in industrial action, it must go through the procedure of obtaining a majority approval by direct, secret, and unsigned voting of union members, was established to promote the autonomous and democratic operation of labor unions, and also to ensure greater prudence in the union's decision-making regarding the commencement of industrial action, so that workers who participate in the industrial action do not later suffer any disadvantage in relation to the legitimacy of that industrial action. Therefore, industrial action conducted in violation of this procedure loses its legitimacy unless there are objective circumstances recognized as making it impossible to follow the procedure (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 99Do4837, decided October 25, 2001, etc.).
However, the mere fact that a member vote on industrial action was conducted without going through the mediation procedure of the Labor Relations Commission as provided in Article 45 of the Trade Union Act is insufficient to find that the legitimacy of the industrial action is lost. The reasons are as follows.
A) The Trade Union Act merely restricts industrial action to being conducted after a member vote (Article 41(1)), but does not contain any provision restricting the timing of the member vote on industrial action. A labor union is an organization that workers themselves autonomously form in solidarity against the State and employers in order to "maintain and improve working conditions and otherwise enhance the economic and social status of workers," and thus must be guaranteed autonomy from the State, employers, and others (see Constitutional Court en banc Decision 2013Hun-Ma671, 2014Hun-Ga21 (consolidated), decided May 28, 2015, etc.). Accordingly, unless there are circumstances such as the timing of the member vote on industrial action being restricted by law, it is consistent with the purpose of the constitutional guarantee of the three labor rights for the labor union to determine the timing autonomously.
B) The purpose of Article 45 of the Trade Union Act, which provides for prior mediation as a precondition to industrial action, is to provide an opportunity to avoid the occurrence of industrial action by mediating disputes in advance, not to prohibit industrial action itself. Therefore, industrial action does not unconditionally lack legitimacy merely because it did not go through the procedure required under the prior mediation provisions (see Supreme Court Decision 99Do4812, decided October 13, 2000, etc.). In light of the content and purpose of Article 45 of the Trade Union Act, the legitimacy of industrial action should not be judged based on whether the labor dispute mediation procedure had been completed at the time of the member vote on the industrial action.
2) In the same vein, the court below determined that the mere fact that the member vote, conducted after the labor dispute had arisen, took place before the mediation procedure of the National Labor Relations Commission had concluded, was insufficient to deny the legitimacy of the second strike. There is no error in the court below's determination as alleged in the grounds of appeal, such as a misunderstanding of the legal principles regarding the procedural legitimacy of industrial action.
The Supreme Court decision cited by the Plaintiff in this part of the grounds of appeal concerns a case in which the member vote was conducted before a labor dispute had arisen, and is therefore not appropriately invoked in this case, where the facts differ.
3. Third Ground of Appeal
The court below determined that the disciplinary ground of "joint assault on the head of the Susaek Vehicle Business Office" against Intervenor for the Defendant (hereinafter "Intervenor") No. 36 was not unlawful because it did not violate social norms, or that there was no evidence establishing the responsibility of the said Intervenor; and that the disciplinary ground of "unauthorized occupation of the Seoul Headquarters Director's office" against Intervenor No. 4 was difficult to evaluate as infringing on the Plaintiff's facility management rights or disturbing organizational order, and on these and other grounds, determined that neither constituted a legitimate ground for disciplinary action. As for Intervenor No. 17, the court below determined that, although some of the disciplinary grounds as set forth in the judgment below were recognized, the imposition of dismissal, the most severe disciplinary measure, was an excessive disciplinary action out of proportion to the degree of the misconduct constituting the grounds for discipline, thereby violating the principle of proportionality or equity.
Upon examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the record, there is no error in the court below's determination as alleged in the grounds of appeal, such as a misunderstanding of the legal principles regarding grounds for discipline and the appropriateness of disciplinary measures, or a violation of the rules of logic and experience exceeding the limits of the principle of free evaluation of evidence.
4. Conclusion
Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of the appeal, including those arising from the intervention, are to be borne by the losing party. This judgment is rendered as stated in the Order, with the unanimous consent of the participating Justices.
[Attachment] List of Intervenors for the Defendant: Omitted
Justice Park Sang-ok (Presiding Justice), Ahn Cheol-sang, Noh Jeong-hee (Justice in Charge), Kim Sang-hwan