[Plaintiff, Appellee] Plaintiff (Attorneys Han Seong-ho and 1 other, Counsel for the plaintiff)
[Defendant, Appellant] Chairperson of the National Labor Relations Commission
[Intervenor for the Defendant] Republic of Korea
[Judgment Below] Seoul High Court Decision 2020Nu34591 dated October 30, 2020
[Order]
The judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Seoul High Court.
[Reasoning] The grounds of appeal are examined.
1. Case Overview
According to the reasoning of the judgment below and the records, the following facts are established.
A. On August 20, 2014, the Plaintiff entered into an employment contract (hereinafter "the instant contract") with the Commander of the Army ○○○○○ Division, representing the Intervenor for the Defendant (hereinafter "the Intervenor"), including the following terms, and performed hairdressing duties for officers affiliated with the Headquarters Support Company of the Army ○○○○○ Division located at (address omitted).
(1) Employment contract period: from August 20, 2014 to August 19, 2015
(2) Type of work (occupation): Division Officers' Barbershop (Hairdresser)
(3) Place of work and department: Division Officers' Barbershop/Headquarters Support Company
(4) Duties to be performed during the employment period: Hairdressing services for division officers
(5) The above place of work and duties to be performed may be changed with the consent of the employee according to the employer's business circumstances, and the employee shall faithfully comply with such changes.
B. The Plaintiff continued to work while renewing the instant contract each year, and on August 20, 2016, upon renewal, changed it to an employment contract without a fixed term.
C. On April 27, 2018, the Plaintiff was notified by the Army ○○○○○ Division of dismissal (effective May 31, 2018) on the ground that it had been decided to close the Officers' Barbershop due to deteriorating profitability (hereinafter "the instant dismissal"), and the Army ○○○○○ Division closed the Division Officers' Barbershop on May 31, 2018.
D. On June 15, 2018, the Plaintiff filed an application for remedy with the Gyeongnam Regional Labor Relations Commission against the Army ○○○○○ Division, asserting that the instant dismissal was unfair, and on July 20, 2018, amended the respondent to the Intervenor. On August 27, 2018, the Gyeongnam Regional Labor Relations Commission dismissed the Plaintiff's application for remedy on the ground that the interest in relief had been extinguished because there was no workplace to which the Plaintiff could be reinstated. On December 31, 2018, the National Labor Relations Commission dismissed the Plaintiff's application for reexamination on the same grounds as the initial decision (hereinafter "the instant reexamination decision").
2. Judgment of the Court Below
The court below, for the reasons stated in its judgment, determined that the entire Officers' Barbershop business of the Army ○○○○○ Division had been abolished, and then, for the following reasons, granted the Plaintiff's claim seeking revocation of the instant reexamination decision.
Even where an employee, having filed an application for remedy for unfair dismissal and disputing the validity of the dismissal, becomes unable to be reinstated to his or her original position due to reasons such as reaching the retirement age or expiration of the employment contract term, if there remains a need for the employee to receive an amount equivalent to wages for the period of dismissal, the interest in obtaining a remedy order for payment of an amount equivalent to wages should be deemed to continue. Therefore, even if the Plaintiff has become unable to be reinstated to his original position because the Officers' Barbershop where he worked was closed and no workplace remains to which he could be reinstated, if the instant dismissal is void and the Plaintiff has a need to receive from the Intervenor an amount equivalent to wages for the period of dismissal, the interest in obtaining a remedy order for payment of an amount equivalent to wages continues to exist.
3. Judgment of the Supreme Court
The judgment of the court below cannot be accepted, for the following reasons.
A. Relevant Legal Principles
Where, at the time an employee files an application for remedy for unfair dismissal, the employment relationship has already terminated and the employee has already ceased to hold the status of an employee due to reasons such as reaching the retirement age, expiration of the employment contract term, or business closure, it is proper to hold that the interest in obtaining a remedy order from the Labor Relations Commission has been extinguished. The reasons are as follows.
(1) The system of remedy orders for unfair dismissal, etc., as provided in Article 28 and subsequent provisions of the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법, hereinafter, when abbreviated, "the Act"), is institutionally intended to provide a more prompt, simple, economical, and flexible means of relief, compared to the ordinary means of relief through civil litigation, for status-related and economic disadvantages suffered by an employee as a result of the employer's exercise of disciplinary or personnel authority, such as dismissal, suspension without pay, disciplinary suspension, reassignment, wage reduction, and other punitive measures. Therefore, if an employee has already ceased to hold employee status at the time of filing an application for remedy for unfair dismissal, etc., using the administrative remedy procedure for the purpose of being compensated for damages arising from a past unfair dismissal, etc., must be regarded as exceeding the original scope of protection intended by the remedy order system for unfair dismissal, etc.
(2) Article 28(1) of the Act provides that "if an employer commits an unfair dismissal, etc. against an employee, the employee may apply to the Labor Relations Commission for remedy," thereby granting the right to apply for remedy to an "employee." Since an employee refers to a person who provides labor to a business or workplace for the purpose of earning wages, regardless of the type of occupation (Article 2(1)(1) of the Act), where the employment contract relationship has already terminated for other reasons at the time of filing an application for remedy for unfair dismissal, etc., such a person can no longer be regarded as holding the status of an employee as defined by the Act, and it is difficult to interpret that the mere fact that an employment contract relationship existed with the employer prior to filing the application for remedy for unfair dismissal, etc. is sufficient to include such a person within the scope of "employee."
(3) When the Labor Relations Commission concludes the examination following an application for remedy for unfair dismissal, etc. and determines that unfair dismissal, etc. has occurred, it must issue a remedy order to the employer (Article 30(1) of the Act). Once a remedy order is issued, the employer bears a public law obligation to comply with it, and if the employer fails to comply, a compulsory performance charge of up to KRW 30 million may be imposed (Article 33 of the Act), and an employer who fails to comply with a finalized remedy order is subject to criminal punishment (Article 111 of the Act).
Since an administrative disposition that is disadvantageous to a party restricts the rights and interests of, or imposes obligations on, the counterpart, the administrative statutes forming its basis must be interpreted and applied more strictly in accordance with the constitutionally required principle of clarity, and expansive interpretation or analogical interpretation unfavorable to the counterpart of the administrative disposition is not permissible (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2021Du43491 decided November 11, 2021). Accordingly, recognizing an employee's interest in relief even where the employment contract relationship had already terminated at the time of filing an application for remedy for unfair dismissal, etc., thereby expanding the scope of the employer's public law obligations or criminal liability, may be contrary to the aforementioned principles of interpretation of administrative statutes.
(4) The Supreme Court en banc Decision 2019Du52386 decided February 20, 2020 held that even where an employee, having filed a lawsuit challenging a reexamination decision dismissing an application for remedy for unfair dismissal and disputing the validity of the dismissal, becomes unable to be reinstated to the original position due to reasons such as reaching the retirement age or expiration of the employment contract term, if there remains a need for the employee to receive an amount equivalent to wages for the period of dismissal, the interest in the lawsuit for obtaining a remedy order for payment of an amount equivalent to wages continues to exist. Therefore, it cannot be said that the above legal principle applies as is to a case where the employee had already ceased to hold employee status even before filing the application for remedy for unfair dismissal, etc.
(5) Even from the perspective of employee protection or procedural economy, while it would not be desirable to exclude an applicant from the remedy procedure or to render meaningless the investigation conducted by the Labor Relations Commission and the decision made based on the results of such investigation, merely because the employment contract relationship terminated in the middle of the process after the employee sought prompt relief through the administrative remedy procedure, such considerations carry little weight where the employment contract relationship had already terminated at the time of filing the application for remedy. It is sufficiently reasonable to differentiate the determination of the interest in seeking a remedy order depending on whether the termination of the employment contract relationship occurred before or after the filing of the application for remedy.
(6) The Labor Standards Act (as amended by Act No. 18176 on May 18, 2021) newly established Article 30(4), which provides: "The Labor Relations Commission shall issue a remedy order or a dismissal decision under paragraph (1) even where reinstatement to the original position (or restoration to the original state, in cases other than dismissal) is impossible for the employee due to the expiration of the employment contract term, arrival of the retirement age, etc. In such cases, if the Labor Relations Commission determines that unfair dismissal, etc. has occurred, it may order the employer to pay the employee money or goods equivalent to the wages the employee would have received had he or she provided labor during the period of dismissal (or money or goods equivalent to restoration to the original state, in cases other than dismissal)." This provision is intended to recognize an employee's interest in obtaining a remedy order for payment of an amount equivalent to wages even where reinstatement to the original position becomes impossible during the remedy procedure for unfair dismissal, etc. due to the expiration of the employment contract term, arrival of the retirement age, etc., and it should not be interpreted to mean that the interest in relief must also be recognized where the employment contract relationship had already been extinguished, and the employee had already ceased to hold employee status, at the time of filing the application for remedy.
B. As to the Instant Case
The Plaintiff was dismissed on May 31, 2018, and filed an application for remedy for unfair dismissal with the Gyeongnam Regional Labor Relations Commission on June 15, 2018; however, the Intervenor had already closed the Army ○○○○○ Division Officers' Barbershop on May 31, 2018. In light of the legal principles set forth above, if the employment contract relationship between the Plaintiff and the Intervenor had already terminated due to business closure at the time the Plaintiff filed the application for remedy for unfair dismissal, the Plaintiff's interest in obtaining a remedy order cannot be recognized. Accordingly, the court below should have examined whether there were circumstances sufficient to recognize that the Intervenor's abolition of the Army ○○○○○ Division Officers' Barbershop business was equivalent to a business closure, and if such circumstances existed, whether the timing of the business closure preceded the Plaintiff's application for remedy, and thereby determined whether the Plaintiff had an interest in obtaining a remedy order. However, the court below, based solely on the reasons stated in its judgment, premised that the abolition of the entire Officers' Barbershop business of the Army ○○○○○ Division constituted a ground for termination of the employment contract relationship equivalent to the closure of the entire business, and then determined that even if the Division Officers' Barbershop was closed on May 31, 2018, rendering the Plaintiff's reinstatement to the original position impossible, the Plaintiff had an interest in obtaining a remedy order if the instant dismissal was void and the Plaintiff had a need to receive from the Intervenor an amount equivalent to wages for the period of dismissal. This judgment of the court below contains an error of misapprehending the legal principles concerning the interest in obtaining a remedy order without conducting the necessary examination. The ground of appeal pointing this out is well-founded.
4. Conclusion
Therefore, without examining the remaining grounds of appeal, the judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court below for further hearing and determination. This judgment is rendered by the unanimous opinion of the Justices participating in the decision, as set forth in the Order.
Justice Park Jeong-hwa (Presiding Justice), Kim Seon-su, Noh Tae-ak (Justice in charge), Oh Kyung-mi