[Defendant] Defendant
[Appellant] Defendant
[Defense Counsel] Attorney Jo Ye-gyeong
[Judgment Below] Seoul Western District Court Decision 2020No868, decided November 5, 2020
[Order]
The judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Seoul Western District Court.
[Reasoning] The Court determines the grounds for appeal.
1. Outline of the Case and the Issue
A. Summary of the count of the indictment regarding violation of the Road Traffic Act (도로교통법) (driving under the influence) (hereinafter “this part of the indictment”)
Despite having been punished four times previously for violation of the Road Traffic Act (driving under the influence), the Defendant, on January 5, 2020, drove an electric kickboard while intoxicated with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.209%.
B. Judgment of the court below
The court below applied Article 148-2(1) of the former Road Traffic Act (before amendment by Act No. 17371 on June 9, 2020, and before enforcement on December 10, 2020; hereinafter the same) and Article 44(1) of the Road Traffic Act, and found this part of the indictment guilty.
C. Amendment of the relevant statute in this case
The former Road Traffic Act was amended by Act No. 17371 on June 9, 2020, and the amended Road Traffic Act took effect on December 10, 2020, after the judgment below was rendered. Through this amendment, new definitional provisions were introduced in Article 2, Subparagraphs 19-2 and 21-2, defining “personal mobility devices,” such as the electric kickboard at issue in this case, and “bicycles, etc.,” which includes such devices. As a result, personal mobility devices came to fall under the category of “bicycles, etc.” Accordingly, driving a personal mobility device was excluded from the scope of application of Article 148-2, which punishes driving under the influence of motor vehicles, etc., while Article 156(11), which punishes driving under the influence of bicycles, etc., was made applicable to driving personal mobility devices under the influence (hereinafter “the amendment at issue in this case”).
As a result, conduct such as that alleged in this part of the indictment—namely, a person with a prior conviction for violating Article 44(1) of the Road Traffic Act again driving an electric kickboard while intoxicated—was, prior to the amendment at issue in this case, punishable under Article 148-2(1) of the former Road Traffic Act by imprisonment for not less than 2 years and not more than 5 years, or a fine of not less than 10 million won and not more than 20 million won; however, after the amendment at issue in this case, such conduct became punishable under Article 156(11) of the Road Traffic Act by a fine of not more than 200,000 won, or a minor imprisonment (구류), or a minor fine (과료). The amendment at issue in this case does not contain any separate transitional provision regarding whether the previous statute should continue to apply to violations of Article 148-2(1) of the former Road Traffic Act committed before the new law, with this content, took effect.
D. The issue in this case
The issue in this case is whether, in a case such as the amendment at issue here, where a statutory amendment occurring after the commission of a crime causes the conduct to no longer constitute a crime or the punishment to be reduced, Article 1(2) of the Criminal Act (형법) and Article 326(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act (형사소송법) should be applied so that the new statute, which is more favorable to the defendant, governs.
The Supreme Court has traditionally taken the position, in resolving this issue, of restrictively interpreting the scope of application of Article 1(2) of the Criminal Act and Article 326(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act by considering the legislature’s motive for the statutory amendment. That is, the Court has long maintained and applied the legal doctrine that Article 1(2) of the Criminal Act and Article 326(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act apply only where the statute was amended out of a reflective consideration that the previous punishment itself was unjust or that the previously prescribed punishment was excessive, due to a change in the legal philosophy underlying the enactment of the penal provision; and that where the amendment was made merely to address a particular need arising at a given time, rather than for such reasons, these provisions do not apply, and the violation should be punished under the penal provision in force at the time of the act (see Supreme Court Decision 62Do257 rendered on January 31, 1963; Supreme Court Decision 77Do1280 rendered on February 28, 1978; Supreme Court Decision 79Do2953 rendered on July 22, 1980; Supreme Court Decision 82Do1861 rendered on October 26, 1982; Supreme Court Decision 84Do413 rendered on December 11, 1984; Supreme Court Decision 97Do2682 rendered on December 9, 1997; Supreme Court Decision 2003Do2770 rendered on October 10, 2003; Supreme Court Decision 2009Do12930 rendered on March 11, 2010; Supreme Court Decision 2013Do4862, 2013Jeondo101 rendered on July 11, 2013; Supreme Court Decision 2016Do9954 rendered on October 27, 2016, among others; hereinafter “the prior Supreme Court precedents”). In the end, the issue in this case is whether such legal doctrine established by the prior Supreme Court precedents should be maintained as is.
2. Determination on the Issue in this Case
A. Where, after the commission of a crime, the law has been amended such that the conduct no longer constitutes a crime, or the punishment has become lighter than under the former law, the new law shall govern (Article 1(2) of the Criminal Act), and where the punishment has been abolished due to an amendment or repeal of a statute or ordinance after the commission of a crime, a judgment of acquittal for dismissal of prosecution (면소) shall be rendered (Article 326(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act). These provisions of Article 1(2) of the Criminal Act and Article 326(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act must be applied as written, unless the legislature has established a separate transitional provision to the effect that criminal punishment for violations of the previous statute is to be maintained even after the statutory amendment.
Accordingly, where an amendment of the penal provision itself, which prescribes the elements and punishment of a crime, or of a statute or ordinance to which the penal provision delegates or grants authority, results in the conduct no longer constituting a crime or the punishment becoming lighter, Article 1(2) of the Criminal Act and Article 326(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act shall, in principle, apply regardless of whether the amendment was made out of a reflective consideration that the previous statute’s treatment of the conduct as a crime was unjust or that the prescribed punishment was excessive. Even where a penal provision delegates or grants authority over part of the elements of a crime not to a subordinate statute such as a Presidential Decree, Prime Minister’s Decree, or Ministerial Decree, but to a public notice or other administrative rule, administrative order, municipal ordinance, etc. (hereinafter “public notice, etc.”), so long as such public notice, etc. does not exceed the limits of delegated legislation, it functions, in combination with the penal provision, to supplement the statute; therefore, where an amendment thereof results in the conduct no longer constituting a crime or the punishment becoming lighter, Article 1(2) of the Criminal Act and Article 326(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act shall likewise apply.
However, where a statute other than the penal provision itself or a statute to which the penal provision delegates or grants authority is amended, in order to apply Article 1(2) of the Criminal Act and Article 326(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act, the amendment must be one that is based primarily on a change in the criminal-law perspective directly related to the establishment of the crime and its punishment under the relevant penal provision; accordingly, where the punishability of the relevant penal provision is affected merely indirectly by an amendment of a statute unrelated to such matters, Article 1(2) of the Criminal Act and Article 326(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act do not apply.
Meanwhile, where a statute is not amended or repealed, but rather a statute that itself specified, by a specific date or period, the expiration of its validity ceases to have effect upon the lapse of that period of validity, such a case likewise does not constitute an “amendment of statute or ordinance” within the meaning of Article 1(2) of the Criminal Act and Article 326(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act.
B. The specific reasons are as follows.
1) Proper interpretation according to the statutory language
A) Article 1(2) of the Criminal Act provides: “Where, after the commission of a crime, the law has been amended such that the conduct no longer constitutes a crime, or the punishment has become lighter than under the former law, the new law shall govern.” Article 326(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act provides that where “the punishment has been abolished due to an amendment or repeal of a statute or ordinance after the commission of a crime,” a judgment of dismissal of prosecution shall be rendered. As such, it is clear from the text of these provisions that Article 1(2) of the Criminal Act and Article 326(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act are intended to apply, where the law has been amended after the commission of a crime in a manner favorable to the defendant, not the law in force at the time of the act but the law in force at the time of trial, which is favorable to the defendant.
As law is, in principle, a universally valid norm of society that has the same binding force on an unspecified number of people, it must be interpreted so as to clarify its standard meaning and ensure objective validity, and consistency acceptable to all persons, as far as possible, must be maintained so that legal stability is not undermined. To this end, the principle should be to interpret, as far as possible, faithfully to the ordinary meaning of the language used in the statute. Meanwhile, where the language of a statute itself is composed of relatively clear concepts, in principle there is no need to resort to other methods of interpretation, or their use should be limited; and even where one seeks to interpret a term used in a statutory provision differently from its ordinary meaning by placing weight on the legislative purpose and objective of the statute and provision, there are inevitable limits to such interpretation, since the systematic relationship with other provisions within the statute and with other statutes, and harmony with the overall legal system, cannot be disregarded (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 2018Du47264 rendered on March 18, 2021, among others).
The prior Supreme Court precedents restrictively interpreted the scope of application of Article 1(2) of the Criminal Act and Article 326(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act by classifying the motive for the amendment of the relevant statute in individual cases into two categories, and applying the law in force at the time of trial only where the motive for the amendment was a reflective consideration that the previous punishment itself was unjust or the prescribed punishment was excessive. However, in light of the legal principles set out above, it is difficult to find a basis for determining, as under the prior Supreme Court precedents, whether an amendment falls within the meaning of “amendment of statute or ordinance” under Article 1(2) of the Criminal Act and Article 326(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act differently depending on whether it was made out of reflective consideration, in a manner that departs from the clear concept of the statutory language.
B) The interpretive approach of applying Article 1(2) of the Criminal Act and Article 326(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act only where the motive for the statutory amendment was a reflective consideration ultimately amounts to establishing an additional requirement for application not found in the statutory text, and may be regarded as a teleological restrictive interpretation.
However, the principle of strict interpretation based on the statutory text is a fundamental principle of criminal-law interpretation that must be respected to the greatest extent possible, and teleological interpretation, too, must not depart from the ordinary meaning of the text. In particular, whether Article 1(2) of the Criminal Act and Article 326(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act apply is an important matter that directly determines, in an individual case, whether the defendant is to be criminally punished and the statutory range of punishment. Restrictively interpreting Article 1(2) of the Criminal Act and Article 326(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act, which are favorable to the defendant, ultimately leads to an expansion of the scope of punishment; therefore, caution must be exercised in restrictively interpreting these provisions from a teleological standpoint.
Furthermore, the issue in this case concerns the temporal scope of application of a penal provision, that is, the question of determining, as between the law in force at the time of the act and the law in force at the time of trial, which provision of law is to apply in a criminal trial; this is a matter fundamental to ensuring the clarity, stability, and predictability of criminal procedure. Accordingly, this is an area within the criminal-law system where the need for interpretation faithful to the statutory text is greatest, and therefore any teleological restrictive interpretation of Article 1(2) of the Criminal Act and Article 326(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act must be limited, as far as possible, to the unavoidable and reasonable scope based on the possible meaning of the statutory language.
C) In Germany, Article 2(4) of the German Criminal Code contains an express provision recognizing, in principle, the continued applicability (Nachwirkung) of temporary statutes (한시법), and accordingly, the case law and the majority of scholarly opinion regarding its interpretation and application have taken a position similar to the prior Supreme Court precedents. However, since Article 1 of our Criminal Act contains no such provision, the statutory text underlying the interpretation differs, making it difficult to directly apply the German discussion to the interpretation of our criminal law.
2) The possibility of transitional provisions realizing legislative intent
A) Even where the law has been amended after the commission of a crime in a manner favorable to the defendant, the legislature may, by enacting a transitional provision, exclude the application of the law in force at the time of trial and instead apply the law in force at the time of the act. Even where, in amending a penal provision favorably to the defendant, the supplementary provisions (부칙) stipulate that the former penal provision shall apply to crimes committed before the new law takes effect, this cannot be said to violate the constitutional principle of non-retroactivity of punishment or the principle of priority of the new law (see Supreme Court Decision 99Do1695 rendered on July 9, 1999; Supreme Court Decision 2011Do1303 rendered on July 14, 2011, among others).
Accordingly, where the legislature wishes to maintain punishment for violations of the previous statute even after the statutory amendment, legal means for taking corresponding measures are already available. The legislature may establish a transitional provision in the supplementary provisions of the penal provision itself prescribing the elements of the crime, or, where the penal provision delegates or grants authority over part of the elements of the crime to a subordinate statute, establish a transitional provision within that subordinate statute, within the scope of such delegation, and may otherwise take transitional measures utilizing various legislative techniques, so long as the limits of delegated legislation are not exceeded.
B) It appears that the background to the prior Supreme Court precedents’ restrictive interpretation of the scope of application of Article 1(2) of the Criminal Act and Article 326(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act also included a practical concern that, in the process of amending or repealing the vast body of penal statutes, a substantial portion of which are prescribed through delegation to subordinate statutes, an appropriate transitional provision might be omitted, creating a gap in punishment.
However, since the 1960s, when the prior Supreme Court precedents were first rendered, considerable legal, institutional, and technical development has occurred throughout our society as a whole; substantial improvements and refinements have been made in the legislative procedures and environment of the National Assembly and the administrative branch; and the opportunity for legal experts to assist in and participate in the legislative process has significantly expanded. It thus appears that conditions are now sufficiently in place for the legislature to deliberate on whether to maintain punishment for violations of the previous statute and to establish appropriate and lawful transitional provisions in a form suited to the purpose and format of the statute being amended.
C) The legislature can fully foresee that, in the process of amending the penal provision itself or a statute to which it delegates or grants authority, if the amendment results in the conduct no longer constituting a crime under the relevant penal provision or the punishment becoming lighter, the new law, which is favorable to the defendant, will apply pursuant to Article 1(2) of the Criminal Act and Article 326(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act, and that conduct which constituted a crime at the time it was committed will consequently go unpunished or receive a lighter punishment. Accordingly, the legislature must itself carefully examine, in the course of amending the statute, whether there is a need to maintain punishment under the previous statute, and if such a need is recognized, must take appropriate transitional measures simultaneously with the statutory amendment.
Nevertheless, if the legislature has not established a separate transitional provision, then, absent special circumstances, the legislature’s intent may be interpreted as being to no longer punish violations of the previous statute, or to apply the new law with its lighter punishment, in accordance with the express provisions of Article 1(2) of the Criminal Act and Article 326(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act.
3) The meaning of “amendment of statute or ordinance”
A) Article 1(1) of the Criminal Act provides: “The establishment and punishment of a crime shall be governed by the law in force at the time of the act,” thereby establishing the principle of the law in force at the time of the act. Article 1(2) of the Criminal Act provides: “Where, after the commission of a crime, the law has been amended such that the conduct no longer constitutes a crime, or the punishment has become lighter than under the former law, the new law shall govern,” thereby establishing, as an exception to the principle of the law in force at the time of the act, the principle of the law in force at the time of trial. Considering the text and legislative purpose of Article 1 of the Criminal Act as a whole, the “amendment of statute or ordinance” referred to in Article 1(2) of the Criminal Act and Article 326(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act must be directly related to the establishment and punishment of a crime under the relevant penal provision, which ultimately means an amendment of statute or ordinance premised on a change in the criminal-law perspective regarding the punishability of the relevant penal provision.
B) Where an amendment of the penal provision itself prescribing the elements of the crime, or of a statute to which it delegates or grants authority, results in the conduct no longer constituting a crime or the punishment becoming lighter, this may naturally be recognized as being based on a change in the criminal-law perspective directly related to the establishment and punishment of the crime under the relevant penal provision, so that Article 1(2) of the Criminal Act and Article 326(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act apply as is.
Even where a penal provision delegates or grants authority over part of the elements of the crime to public notices, etc., rather than to a subordinate statute enumerated under the Constitution, so long as such public notice, etc. does not exceed the limits of delegated legislation, it combines with the parent penal provision to serve as the basis for criminal punishment; accordingly, where such public notice, etc. is amended, this likewise constitutes an “amendment of statute or ordinance” within the meaning of Article 1(2) of the Criminal Act and Article 326(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act.
C) However, where a statute other than the relevant penal provision itself or a statute to which it delegates or grants authority is amended, and as a result the crime under the relevant penal provision no longer arises or the punishment becomes lighter, it must be carefully examined whether the amendment of the statute at issue is based primarily on a change in the criminal-law perspective directly related to the establishment and punishment of the crime under the relevant penal provision.
Whether there has been a change in the criminal-law perspective directly related to the punishability of the relevant penal provision is distinct from the presence or absence of reflective consideration, which was the criterion adopted by the prior Supreme Court precedents. This is not a matter of inferring whether the legislature had a reflective consideration that the previous punishment was unjust, but rather a matter of determining whether the amendment of the statute is based on a normative value judgment to the effect that the criminal punishment at issue will no longer be imposed going forward. This does not involve probing the legislature’s subjective motive, but rather means interpreting the statute based on objectively manifested circumstances.
That is, Article 1(2) of the Criminal Act and Article 326(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act may be applied when, upon comprehensive consideration of the requirements and structure for the establishment of the crime under the relevant penal provision, the relationship between the penal provision and the amended statute, and the content, background, protective purpose, and legislative intent of the statutory amendment, it can be interpreted that the amendment is based primarily on a change in the criminal-law perspective directly related to the establishment and punishment of the crime under the relevant penal provision. Accordingly, where the effect is merely an indirect one resulting from an amendment of a civil or administrative regulation that is not in a delegation or authorization relationship with the relevant penal provision and has a different protective purpose and legislative intent, or from an amendment of a highly technical regulation devoid of any element of normative value judgment concerning criminal punishment, such cases do not constitute an “amendment of statute or ordinance” within the meaning of Article 1(2) of the Criminal Act and Article 326(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act.
Meanwhile, even when amending another statute not directly related to the relevant penal provision, the legislature may establish a transitional provision to the effect that the new law is to apply to the establishment and punishment of the crime under the relevant penal provision. By doing so, the legislature can make clear that the statutory amendment is based on a change in the criminal-law perspective concerning the relevant penal provision, thereby ensuring that the new law applies; thus, the legislature itself can fully achieve its legislative purpose in this manner as well.
D) Where a statute that, from the time of its enactment or before its repeal, itself specified, by a specific date or period, the expiration of its validity, ceases to have effect upon the lapse of that period of validity, this likewise does not constitute an “amendment of statute or ordinance” subject to Article 1(2) of the Criminal Act and Article 326(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act.
The loss of effect due to the lapse of a period of validity expressly specified by the statute itself is difficult to regard as an amendment of the original statute in the same manner as an ordinary amendment or repeal, and cannot be viewed as based on any change in criminal-law perspective or any change in normative value judgment concerning criminal punishment. Considering the legislature’s intent in specifying the period of validity, if sanctions such as criminal punishment were not maintained after the lapse of that period, it would be difficult to secure the normative force and effectiveness of the statute even during the period of validity; therefore, absent special circumstances, it is reasonable to view the legislative intent as being to continue punishing violations of the statute committed before the lapse of the period of validity, even after that period has lapsed.
3. Change of Precedent
Accordingly, the Supreme Court decisions cited in Section 1.D above and other Supreme Court decisions to the same effect, which hold that Article 1(2) of the Criminal Act and Article 326(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act apply only where the statute was amended out of a reflective consideration that the previous punishment itself was unjust or that the prescribed punishment was excessive, due to a change in the legal philosophy underlying the enactment of the penal provision, are all hereby changed to the extent that they conflict with the views expressed in this Judgment.
4. Specific Determination on this Case
Examining the judgment below in light of the legal principles set out above:
Conduct such as that alleged in this part of the indictment—namely, a person with a prior conviction for violating Article 44(1) of the Road Traffic Act again driving an electric kickboard while intoxicated—was, prior to the amendment at issue in this case, punishable under Article 148-2(1) of the former Road Traffic Act by imprisonment for not less than 2 years and not more than 5 years, or a fine of not less than 10 million won and not more than 20 million won; however, after the amendment at issue in this case, such conduct became punishable under Article 156(11) of the Road Traffic Act by a fine of not more than 200,000 won, or a minor imprisonment, or a minor fine.
Since this amendment at issue in this case clearly constitutes a case where the punishment has become lighter due to an amendment of the penal provision itself prescribing the elements of the crime, Article 1(2) of the Criminal Act must be applied without regard to whether the previous statute was amended out of reflective consideration. Ultimately, the conduct described in this part of the indictment cannot be punished under Article 148-2(1) of the former Road Traffic Act and Article 44(1) of the Road Traffic Act, which were the laws in force at the time of the act, pursuant to Article 1(2) of the Criminal Act, and can only be punished, reflecting the amendment at issue in this case which took effect after the judgment below was rendered, under Article 156(11) and Article 44(1) of the Road Traffic Act, which is the new law. Accordingly, the portion of the judgment below concerning this part of the indictment falls within “where there has been a change in punishment after the judgment” under Article 383(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act, and can no longer be maintained.
Therefore, the portion of the judgment below concerning this part of the indictment must be reversed; and since this part is in a concurrent-crime relationship under the first clause of Article 37 of the Criminal Act with the remainder of the case that was found guilty, and a single sentence was imposed, the judgment below must be reversed in its entirety.
5. Conclusion
Accordingly, without ruling on the remaining grounds of appeal, the judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court below for further examination and judgment, as set forth in the Order. This Judgment reflects the unanimous opinion of the participating Justices, except for the separate opinion of Justice Cho Jae-yeon and Justice Ahn Cheol-sang, and the separate opinion of Justice Noh Tae-ak and Justice Cheon Dae-yeop; and there is a concurring opinion of Justice Lee Dong-won supplementing the majority opinion.
6. Separate Opinion of Justice Cho Jae-yeon and Justice Ahn Cheol-sang
A. Summary of the Separate Opinion
Since the legal doctrine of the prior Supreme Court precedents had unclear standards and was susceptible to arbitrary judgment, the majority opinion’s abandonment of that doctrine and its proposal of “change in criminal-law perspective” as the standard for determining “amendment of statute or ordinance” under Article 1(2) of the Criminal Act and Article 326(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act is, in principle, sound, and we concur therein. However, we find it difficult to accept that the majority opinion, rather than merely presenting a basic legal doctrine that may, in principle, apply where a penal provision is amended as in the issue in this case, goes further to construct detailed doctrines for subdivided categories—including categories not at issue in this case—and to set forth uniform conclusions for each category, for the following reasons.
First, it is sufficient for the Supreme Court to present a basic legal doctrine replacing the prior Supreme Court precedents, to the effect that Article 1(2) of the Criminal Act may be applied, as an exception to the principle of the law in force at the time of the act, when the amendment of the statute can be interpreted as premised on a change in the criminal-law perspective, and to resolve this case accordingly. It would be desirable for this basic legal doctrine to develop, in future individual cases, through concrete argument, into doctrines that are applied or judged differently by category, or even differently within the same category; and it is sufficient for the Supreme Court to play the role of opening a new path by confirming the basic legal doctrine to the extent necessary to resolve the case at hand.
Second, since the fundamental function and role of criminal law is to maintain the order of the social community by punishing and preventing crime, a balanced interpretation is required that recognizes an exception to the principle of the law in force at the time of the act within an appropriate scope, so as not to excessively undermine this function. Although the majority opinion sets forth uniform conclusions by category, there is insufficient basis for concluding that the relative concept of a change in criminal-law perspective is always present or always absent in a particular category; moreover, this results in limiting the possibility of a balanced interpretation in specific individual cases, and thus cannot be regarded as reasonable.
Third, although this case falls under the most basic category, namely, where the penal provision itself has been amended, it is inappropriate for the majority opinion to set forth, as obiter dicta, doctrines concerning exceptional categories that are unnecessary for resolving this case. This has the effect of the Supreme Court predetermining conclusions that should be reached, through sufficient deliberation, by the panel handling future cases in which the relevant issue arises, and this cannot be regarded as reasonable; in particular, there is concern that this may cause the unreasonable result of the practical normative force of the legal order being lost in the area of administrative penal provisions.
B. The Protective Function of Criminal Law and the Interpretation of Penal Provisions
1) The most important and fundamental function and role of criminal law is to maintain the order of the social community and protect the legal interests of its members, such as life, body, liberty, and property, by punishing and preventing crime. Accordingly, when developing interpretive theories concerning criminal law, this fundamental function and purpose of criminal law must not be disregarded. Those who commit punishable acts and should be punished must receive commensurate punishment, and innocent persons must not be punished. This is the most basic attitude that must be maintained in interpretive theories of criminal law for the purpose of maintaining the order of social community life.
The same holds true for the interpretation of Article 1(1) and (2) of the Criminal Act concerning the temporal scope of application of criminal law. Article 1(1) of the Criminal Act provides that “the establishment and punishment of a crime shall be governed by the law in force at the time of the act,” thereby declaring the principle that conduct constituting a crime at the time of the act is to be punished according to the law in force at that time. That a law in effect at the time of an act is applied to that act and legal effects are accordingly attached thereto is the principal form of the temporal scope of application not only of criminal law but of all statutes and rules, and this is no different from the general public’s sound legal expectations and legal consciousness.
2) Meanwhile, it is a basic principle of criminal law that penal provisions must be strictly interpreted, and that interpretation departing from the possible meaning of the text in a direction unfavorable to the defendant is not permitted under the prohibition of expansive interpretation inherent in the principle of legality (죄형법정주의). Between this principle and the protective function of criminal law, a balanced interpretation may recognize a reasonable exception to Article 1(2) of the Criminal Act, which itself recognizes an exception to the principle of the law in force at the time of the act; and the majority opinion, too, recognizes such an exception for certain categories.
That is, the majority opinion states that “amendment of statute or ordinance” under Article 1(2) of the Criminal Act and Article 326(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act means an amendment of statute or ordinance premised on a change in criminal-law perspective concerning the punishability of the relevant penal provision, and that where a statute other than the relevant penal provision itself or a statute to which it delegates or grants authority is amended, there are cases falling within, and cases not falling within, the meaning of “amendment of statute or ordinance” referred to here. Further, the majority opinion states that where a statute that, from the time of its enactment or before its repeal, itself specified, by a specific date or period, the expiration of its validity, ceases to have effect upon the lapse of that period, this does not constitute the “amendment of statute or ordinance” referred to here. By contrast, the majority opinion states that where a penal provision delegates or grants authority over part of the elements of the crime to public notices, etc., rather than to a subordinate statute enumerated under the Constitution, and such public notice, etc. is amended, this does constitute the “amendment of statute or ordinance” referred to here.
This approach of the majority opinion means that whether something falls under the “amendment of statute or ordinance” subject to Article 1(2) of the Criminal Act and Article 326(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act is a relative matter that varies depending on the category.
3) However, rather than prescribing, in detail and uniformly as the majority opinion does, the method of treatment for each category, it is appropriate—and sufficient—to present a basic legal doctrine that may, in principle, apply where a penal provision has been amended. That is, it suffices to present, as a basic principle replacing the prior Supreme Court precedents, the doctrine that Article 1(2) of the Criminal Act may be applied, as an exception to the principle of the law in force at the time of the act, when the amendment of the statute can be interpreted as based primarily on a change in criminal-law perspective directly related to the establishment and punishment of the crime. This basic legal doctrine should be allowed to be concretized in future individual cases, in accordance with the issues raised therein, through the interpretation and application of the pre- and post-amendment statutes and the related provisions of Article 1(2) of the Criminal Act and Article 326(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act.
Where an amendment of the penal provision itself results in the conduct no longer constituting a crime or the punishment becoming lighter, this constitutes the most basic case in which the criminal-law perspective has changed, so that Article 1(2) of the Criminal Act and Article 326(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act naturally apply, and the law in force at the time of trial governs. Since the amendment at issue in this case clearly constitutes an amendment of the penal provision itself, the issue in this case can be sufficiently resolved by this basic legal doctrine alone.
C. The Need for a Balanced Interpretation Regarding the Exception to the Principle of the Law in Force at the Time of the Act
1) It must be borne in mind that Article 1(2) of the Criminal Act, which provides for the principle of the law in force at the time of trial by stating that “where, after the commission of a crime, the law has been amended such that the conduct no longer constitutes a crime, or the punishment has become lighter than under the former law, the new law shall govern,” establishes an exception to the principle of the law in force at the time of the act. That is, excluding the application of Article 1(2) of the Criminal Act means recognizing a further exception to the principle of the law in force at the time of trial—which is itself an exception to the principle of the law in force at the time of the act—thereby returning to the principal rule, namely, the principle of the law in force at the time of the act; this differs in character from a general case of simply excluding the application of a law favorable to the defendant without such a premise.
Therefore, in presenting the legal doctrine for distinguishing between cases in which the principal rule, Article 1(1) of the Criminal Act, applies and cases in which the exception, Article 1(2) of the Criminal Act, applies, it is not reasonable to take the view that one must adhere absolutely to the individual text of Article 1(2) of the Criminal Act alone, or that the area in which the principle of the law in force at the time of trial applies must unconditionally be maximally expanded. This is because, in resolving the important issue of determining the temporal scope of application of a penal provision, a balanced interpretation is needed that minimizes the scope of the defendant’s punishment without undermining the fundamental purpose of criminal law, namely its protective function.
2) The presence or absence of reflective consideration, the standard adopted by the prior Supreme Court precedents, had the problem, due to its conceptual limitations and the difficulty of judgment, of excessively narrowing the area in which the exception to the principle of the law in force at the time of the act should be recognized, and of undermining the predictability of the norm addressees as to which law, between the law in force at the time of the act and the law in force at the time of trial, applies. Accordingly, we can agree with the majority opinion’s abandonment of the prior Supreme Court precedents’ doctrine, which used the presence or absence of reflective consideration as its standard, and its presentation of a change in criminal-law perspective concerning the punishability of the penal provision as a new standard.
However, we find it difficult to accept the majority opinion’s method of interpretation, whereby, among what may be termed temporary statutes (한시법) in the narrow sense, statutes that specify their period of validity by a specific date or period are treated as having continued applicability (추급효), while subordinate statutes or public notices, etc. to which a penal provision delegates or grants authority are treated as always subject to the law in force at the time of trial when amended favorably to the defendant, thereby setting forth uniform and absolute conclusions by category and expanding or narrowing the scope of Article 1(2) of the Criminal Act in this manner. It cannot be said that the category-based conclusions presented by the majority opinion rest on a sufficient legal basis, nor can it be said that the categories presented by the majority opinion exhaustively cover all cases that may arise in the future in connection with statutory amendments. In particular, this approach, by uniformly and absolutely determining the conclusion for each category, excludes the function and role of a basic legal doctrine that would allow the exception to the principle of the law in force at the time of the act to be recognized within an appropriate scope through an interpretation that takes into account the protective function of criminal law across diverse and varied cases, and we therefore cannot agree with it. A change in criminal-law perspective is a relative concept that must be appropriately judged on a case-by-case basis; even amendments of penal provisions falling within the same category may be judged differently as to whether they reflect a change in criminal-law perspective, depending on the purpose and content of the relevant provision, and such matters cannot be determined uniformly and absolutely by category.
D. Problems with the Obiter Dicta Concerning the Exceptional Categories
1) Aside from the amendment of the penal provision itself, the legal doctrine presented by the majority opinion concerning the method of treatment of the exceptional categories it sets forth—namely, cases where a subordinate statute or public notice, etc. to which the penal provision delegates or grants authority is amended; cases where another statute not in such a delegation or authorization relationship is amended; and cases where a statute lapses upon expiration of a period of validity that it itself specified by a specific date or period—is mere obiter dicta with no direct relevance to the resolution of this case. It is inappropriate for the majority opinion, through obiter dicta, to enumerate exceptional categories one by one and predetermine specific conclusions, even though these matters are not directly related to the issue in this case, nor are they necessarily required for its resolution.
The effect of a judgment is, in principle, recognized with respect to the determinations that are directly related to, or necessary for the resolution of, the issue in the case at hand, and is not recognized with respect to obiter dicta falling outside that scope. This applies equally to en banc Supreme Court judgments; accordingly, with respect to portions of the opinions in an en banc Supreme Court judgment that set forth legal doctrine not directly related to the issue in the case or its resolution, precedential effect, in the strict sense, cannot be said to be recognized.
2) It is not appropriate to set forth, in advance, legal doctrine concerning other related issues beyond the scope directly related to, or indispensable for the resolution of, the issue in a specific case. Even if legal doctrine set forth by the Supreme Court as obiter dicta is not recognized, in the strict sense, as having precedential effect, it may, through its practical effect, influence how lower courts handle future cases falling within its scope. Accordingly, legal doctrine set forth by the Supreme Court as obiter dicta results in prematurely limiting the authority that the panel handling a future case involving the relevant issue should properly exercise in making its determination on that issue. Even if the Supreme Court intended, in setting forth such obiter dicta, to provide a useful approach for handling future cases, the possibility cannot be excluded that, in certain circumstances, this may become an obstacle to the panel handling the relevant case in reaching an appropriate legal construction and conclusion.
It is desirable that the exceptional categories set forth by the majority opinion be pronounced as legal doctrine resolving the issue of the relevant case only after the parties’ arguments and contentions regarding the applicability of Article 1(2) of the Criminal Act, etc. have been made at each level of the courts directly concerned with the relevant issue in the future, after the lower courts’ determinations based thereon have been sequentially made, and finally after grounds of appeal against the judgment below have been raised and a Supreme Court judgment resolving the issue of the case has been rendered thereon. Since the pronouncement of legal doctrine can fully secure its legitimacy and appropriateness only through such a process—involving the parties’ arguments on the relevant issue and the examination and determination at each level of the courts—it is not appropriate, even for the Supreme Court as the highest court, to unilaterally predict related issues in advance and determine conclusions through the pronouncement of obiter dicta.
3) Even considering the standard of change in criminal-law perspective, it is doubtful whether the uniform conclusions set by the majority opinion can be reached in all cases relating to the categories the majority opinion presents—such as cases where a subordinate statute or public notice, etc. to which the penal provision delegates or grants authority is amended favorably to the defendant, or cases where a statute lapses upon expiration of a period of validity that it itself specified. There is concern that, in the process of amendment or repeal of the complex and voluminous system of administrative statutes and public notices, etc., the area of exception to the principle of the law in force at the time of the act may be excessively expanded, resulting in the loss of the practical normative force of the legal order and infringement of the general public interest.
In particular, unreasonable or logically contradictory results may arise in the area of administrative penal provisions. So-called administrative offenses (행정범), which are statutory offenses (법정범), differ from natural offenses (자연범) such as murder, theft, and rape, in that the conduct itself is not inherently anti-social or immoral, but rather constitutes a crime only because it violates an obligation imposed by a statute enacted to achieve an administrative purpose. Accordingly, administrative penal provisions generally take the form of separately specifying an obligation provision or prohibition provision (hereinafter simply “obligation provision”) and then separately establishing a penalty provision punishing the violation thereof; this results in a structure in which the obligation provision, which is the norm of conduct, is separated from the penalty provision, which is the basis for criminal punishment. Under such a structure, an amendment of the obligation provision, which is the conduct norm imposed to achieve an administrative purpose, is, in many cases, difficult to regard as based on a change in criminal-law perspective, even though it is formally in a delegation or authorization relationship with the penalty provision within the statutory system. This is all the more so where the obligation provision delegates professional and technical details for achieving the administrative purpose to a subordinate statute or public notice, etc., so that such details may be amended or repealed from time to time as policy needs require, and such subordinate statute or public notice, etc. is then amended.
In light of the structure and particular characteristics of administrative legislation, it is often difficult, when amending or repealing subordinate statutes or public notices, etc. that prescribe details pursuant to delegation under the obligation provision, to establish, in every instance, a transitional provision concerning the application of the penalty provision; and in particular, public notices, etc. may take diverse forms outside the ordinary form of a statute, making them inherently ill-suited to transitional provisions premised on the ordinary form of statutes. Nevertheless, if, merely because no transitional provision was established simultaneously with the amendment of a subordinate statute or public notice, etc., the law in force at the time of trial were uniformly applied so as to exempt the conduct from punishment or reduce the punishment, this would result in significant impairment of the protective function of criminal law in maintaining the legal order in the area of administrative penal provisions. Furthermore, even if a transitional provision is established as a legislative solution to this problem, given the difficulty, in terms of legislative technique, of establishing detailed provisions suited to specific circumstances, a transitional measure recognizing uniform continued applicability may, considering the rigidity of such a legislative form, give rise to new problems, such as unreasonable results in individual cases involving amendments of subordinate statutes or public notices, etc.
E. Conclusion
It is sufficient for the Supreme Court, in this case, which involves the basic scenario of an amendment of the penal provision itself, to rule solely on whether Article 1(2) of the Criminal Act may be applied. Even in pronouncing new legal doctrine to replace the prior Supreme Court precedents, it is sufficient to present the basic legal doctrine in principle, and it is not appropriate to set forth, in advance and as obiter dicta, exceptional categories beyond that.
This case falls under the basic scenario of an amendment of the penal provision itself, and therefore the law in force at the time of trial must apply pursuant to Article 1(2) of the Criminal Act. Accordingly, the conduct described in this part of the indictment can only be punished under Article 156(11) and Article 44(1) of the Road Traffic Act, the law in force at the time of trial; and the judgment below, which applied the former law in force at the time of the act prior to the amendment, cannot be maintained.
[Reasoning] (continued)
For the reasons stated above, we agree with the majority opinion in concluding that the judgment below should be reversed, but we express a separate opinion because we differ as to the specific reasons and grounds for reaching this conclusion in this case, and as to the appropriate scope and necessity of the Supreme Court's determination.
7. Separate Opinion of Justice Roh Tae-ak and Justice Cheon Dae-yeop
A. Summary of the Separate Opinion
We agree with the majority opinion's basic position that "change of statute or regulation (법령의 변경)" as referred to in Article 1(2) of the Criminal Act (형법) and Article 326, Item 4 of the Criminal Procedure Act (형사소송법) must presuppose a change in the criminal-law perspective concerning the establishment and punishment of the crime under the relevant penal statute, and that, without inquiring into whether the change was made out of reflective consideration such as that the punishment under the former statute was unjust or excessive, Article 1(2) of the Criminal Act and Article 326, Item 4 of the Criminal Procedure Act should in principle apply whenever a change in the criminal-law perspective is recognized.
However, we cannot agree with the part of the majority opinion holding that, where a statute or regulation had specified a fixed date or period as its term of validity, thereby anticipating the loss of its effect, and that term of validity has expired, this does not constitute a "change of statute or regulation" under Article 1(2) of the Criminal Act and Article 326, Item 4 of the Criminal Procedure Act, and that accordingly the application of the law in effect at the time of trial, which is favorable to the defendant, should be uniformly excluded, with the continuing effect (추급효) of the law in effect at the time of the act being recognized instead.
From the standpoint that the penal statute has changed in a manner favorable to the defendant, there is no essential difference between a case where a statute or regulation has been amended or repealed and a case where the term of validity of a statute or regulation has expired. If "change of statute or regulation" as referred to in Article 1(2) of the Criminal Act and Article 326, Item 4 of the Criminal Procedure Act presupposes a change in the criminal-law perspective directly related to the punishability of the crime, then even where the term of validity of a statute or regulation has expired, the law in effect at the time of trial, which is favorable to the defendant, should in principle apply, unless there is a transitional provision concerning continuing effect. The specific reasons are as follows.
B. The unreasonableness of differential treatment from cases of amendment or repeal of statutes or regulations
1) There is no reason to treat "a case where a statute or regulation has been amended or repealed" differently from "a case where the term of validity of a statute or regulation has expired," in light of the literal meaning of "change of statute or regulation" and the fact that, in both cases, the penal statute capable of imposing criminal punishment has ceased to have effect.
The majority opinion, focusing on the fact that, in the case of a statute or regulation that specified a fixed date or period as its term of validity, the loss of effect was anticipated from the outset, holds that this does not constitute a change of statute or regulation. However, specifying a term of validity in a statute or regulation is merely, as a matter of legislative technique, a pre-announcement of a future change in the statute or regulation, and such a measure cannot serve as a basis for affirming continuing effect.
2) Where a statute or regulation lapses upon expiration of its anticipated term of validity, such that a violation committed at the time of the act can no longer be punished under the law in effect at the time of trial, this should naturally be regarded as presupposing a change in the criminal-law perspective concerning punishment under the relevant penal statute. If this were not so, it would be appropriate to have a separate transitional provision stating that punishment remains possible even after the term of validity has passed.
3) Even from the defendant's standpoint, there is no difference between a case where a statute or regulation has been amended or repealed and a case where its anticipated term of validity has expired, in that in both cases the penal statute violated by the defendant can no longer be applied at the time of trial. The fact that the loss of future effect was anticipated in advance in the penal statute at the time of the violation cannot serve as a factor increasing the defendant's culpability or the disvalue of the act.
4) The majority view in academic circles also treats temporary statutes (한시법) as a representative area in which the application of Article 1(2) of the Criminal Act and Article 326, Item 4 of the Criminal Procedure Act is at issue, and takes the position that, even considering the side effects of applying the principle of the law in effect at the time of trial, it is unjust to apply an expired statute or regulation as the norm of adjudication and impose punishment thereunder, absent an express provision recognizing continuing effect.
However, the majority opinion, without any particular theoretical basis or grounds, has created the concept of "a statute or regulation that specified a fixed date or period as its term of validity, thereby anticipating the loss of its effect," distinguishing it from the "temporary statute in the narrow sense" discussed in academic circles. This appears to be intended to distinguish, among temporary statutes in the narrow sense, those statutes or regulations that anticipated the extinction of effect on a specific date from those that anticipated the extinction of effect upon the occurrence of a certain event, and to affirm the continuing effect of the law in effect at the time of the act only for the former. However, since both types are essentially no different in that the statute or regulation itself anticipated the loss of effect even before the violation occurred, affirming continuing effect unconditionally only for the former lacks logical consistency, and is no different from the position of the previous Supreme Court precedent, which, in connection with the scope of interpretation and application of Article 1(2) of the Criminal Act, emphasized only the necessity of punishment without addressing the legislative gap.
C. The purpose and direction of the change in precedent
1) The main purpose of changing the Supreme Court's precedent is that Article 1(2) of the Criminal Act and Article 326, Item 4 of the Criminal Procedure Act should not be interpreted unfavorably to the defendant but should be interpreted and applied according to their literal terms, and thus any restrictive interpretation thereof is unavoidable and should be minimized within a reasonable scope.
Even under the previous position, where a statute or regulation had lapsed upon expiration of its own anticipated term of validity, it was theoretically possible to apply Article 1(2) of the Criminal Act and Article 326, Item 4 of the Criminal Procedure Act if the criterion of "reflective consideration" was satisfied, thereby exempting the defendant from punishment under the law in effect at the time of trial. Through this, it can be evaluated as having played a positive role in securing balance and concrete reasonableness among competing values such as law and reality, and the defendant's legal interests and the maintenance of criminal-law order.
However, the majority opinion holds that, so long as the term of validity is specified by a fixed date or period as a matter of legislative technique, Article 1(2) of the Criminal Act and Article 326, Item 4 of the Criminal Procedure Act are not applied at all, and the continuing effect of the law in effect at the time of the act is universally recognized. This eliminates the room for applying the law in effect at the time of trial that was partially recognized even under the previous Supreme Court precedent, and instead expands the scope of criminal punishment compared to before, thereby producing a result that runs counter to the direction of the change in precedent.
2) Under the majority opinion, the legislature or administrative agency can easily confer the powerful effect of continuing effect of the law in effect at the time of the act, without needing to establish transitional provisions, merely by specifying a term of validity. This does not accord with the purpose of the change in precedent, which is to require the legislature, in principle, to establish an express transitional provision concerning punishment where the necessity of punishment is recognized even after a certain term of validity has passed, so as to secure the public's predictability and legal stability regarding which statute or regulation applies as the norm of adjudication.
In particular, in areas where an administrative agency regulates violations in the form of subordinate statutes, notifications, or other regulations, the administrative agency would be able to arbitrarily determine the scope and duration of criminal punishment merely by setting a term of validity, which ultimately results in infringing upon the constitutional value of "criminal punishment by law." For example, where an administrative agency sets a short term of validity in a notification or other regulation but then extends or renews it continuously, thereby prolonging the term of validity or diluting its specificity, the court needs to determine whether Article 1(2) of the Criminal Act applies by examining the nature of the relevant regulation, the meaning of the expiration of the term of validity, and the circumstances before and after the expiration. Such an interpretation is precisely what is called for in light of the nature of notifications and other regulations and the purpose of Article 1(2) of the Criminal Act.
D. A reasonable approach to cases where a statute or regulation has anticipated a term of validity
1) If the legislature has specified the term of validity of a statute or regulation by a fixed date or period, anyone can anticipate that, even if a violation was committed before the term of validity expired, punishment may not be imposed if the term of validity has expired by the time of trial. Accordingly, the legislature should, in principle, establish a clear transitional provision as to whether punishment is to be maintained even after the term of validity has expired.
Where a statutory instrument such as a statute, Presidential Decree, Prime Minister's Decree, or Ministerial Decree is changed, such a transitional provision can be established, and this has already been utilized in various legislative examples. Even where a notification or other regulation that is not a statutory instrument is changed, there has not been sufficient discussion in academic circles and practice as to whether a transitional provision concerning criminal punishment can be established in the enabling statute or in the notification or other regulation itself; however, since it cannot theoretically be regarded as impossible, there is no need for special treatment.
2) However, there may be cases where, in light of the circumstances of the establishment of the term of validity of the relevant statute or regulation or notification or other regulation, its length, and its urgency and gravity, there is a need to punish the violation even after the expiration of the term of validity, and the language and purpose of the relevant statute or regulation or notification or other regulation can be seen as embodying legislative and social implications concerning the recognition of enforceability and continuing effect after the expiration of the term of validity in connection with the violation thereof. However, the existence of such exceptional circumstances does not justify uniformly excluding the application of Article 1(2) of the Criminal Act and Article 326, Item 4 of the Criminal Procedure Act across the board for the entire category of temporary statutes and regulations in the narrow sense that have set a term of validity; that would reverse the principle and the exception. Even in such cases, resolving the matter by establishing a transitional provision concerning criminal punishment should be the principle, while leaving room for applying the principle of the law in effect at the time of the act by comprehensively considering such exceptional circumstances from a criminal-law perspective, taking into account the particular nature of temporary statutes and regulations in the narrow sense — this suffices. This legal principle has been verified through the previous Supreme Court precedent and is not only the main basis for the change in precedent through this case but is also a perspective that the majority opinion itself still seeks to maintain in the area of "amendment of other statutes."
E. Sub-conclusion
Where a statute or regulation has been amended or repealed, and where its own anticipated term of validity has expired, both are the same from the defendant's standpoint in that the legal status has been changed favorably, and there is no basis for treating them differently. Nevertheless, we cannot agree with the majority opinion, which, by uniformly excluding cases where a statute or regulation's anticipated term of validity has expired from the scope of "change of statute or regulation" under Article 1(2) of the Criminal Act and Article 326, Item 4 of the Criminal Procedure Act, results in unjustly expanding the scope of punishment.
Since the restrictive interpretation of the scope of application of Article 1(2) of the Criminal Act and Article 326, Item 4 of the Criminal Procedure Act, which are favorable to the defendant, should be unavoidable and limited to the maximum extent within a reasonable scope, it suffices that, in the case of a statute or regulation or notification or other regulation that has anticipated a term of validity, absent a clear transitional provision, the literal terms of Article 1(2) of the Criminal Act and Article 326, Item 4 of the Criminal Procedure Act should in principle be applied as they are, while recognizing, as an exception, that the law in effect at the time of the act may be applied by evaluating the relevant statute or regulation or notification or other regulation from a criminal-law perspective.
This case does not involve a situation where a statute or regulation with an anticipated term of validity is at issue, but rather a case where the penal statute itself defining the elements of the offense was amended and the punishment was reduced; therefore, there is no need to apply the above exceptional legal principle. Accordingly, the act described in this portion of the indictment can only be punished under Article 156, Item 11 and Article 44(1) of the Road Traffic Act (도로교통법), the law in effect at the time of trial, pursuant to Article 1(2) of the Criminal Act and Article 326, Item 4 of the Criminal Procedure Act. Therefore, the judgment below, which applied the former Article 148-2(1) of the Road Traffic Act prior to the amendment at issue in this case and Article 44(1) of the Road Traffic Act, cannot be upheld.
For the reasons stated above, although we reach the same conclusion as the majority opinion in reversing the judgment below, we express a separate opinion because the specific reasons and grounds for reaching that conclusion differ.
8. Concurring Opinion of Justice Lee Dong-won Concerning the Majority Opinion
I wish to supplement the grounds of the majority opinion regarding the purpose of changing the previous Supreme Court precedent and setting forth new legal principles on the interpretation of Article 1(2) of the Criminal Act and Article 326, Item 4 of the Criminal Procedure Act, and to express my views on the grounds and positions presented in the two separate opinions (hereinafter, the separate opinion of Justice Cho Jae-yeon and Justice Ahn Cheol-sang is referred to as "Separate Opinion 1," the separate opinion of Justice Roh Tae-ak and Justice Cheon Dae-yeop is referred to as "Separate Opinion 2," and the two separate opinions are collectively referred to as the "Separate Opinions").
A. The main purpose of changing the previous Supreme Court precedent
1) The previous Supreme Court precedent was devised as an interpretive theory in the 1960s, when legislative procedures and the legislative environment were not sufficiently mature, in order to prevent a gap in punishment arising, contrary to legislative intent, from the absence of transitional provisions, and it has played a role in maintaining the normative force of the legal order.
However, there is insufficient basis for continuing to maintain the teleological restrictive interpretation of the previous Supreme Court precedent, which differs from the clear concept of the literal text. The majority opinion seeks to develop a correct interpretive theory by respecting the text of Article 1(2) of the Criminal Act and Article 326, Item 4 of the Criminal Procedure Act to the fullest extent possible, while also considering the legislative purpose of Article 1 of the Criminal Act, and it appears that the Separate Opinions generally agree with the overall purpose of this change in precedent.
2) The greatest problem with the previous Supreme Court precedent is that, from the standpoint of substantive rule of law, it fails to guarantee legal stability and predictability for the persons subject to the law following a change in statute or regulation. The principle of the rule of law under the Constitution requires that clear predictability be guaranteed to the persons subject to the law regarding the effect and applicability of legal norms. The persons subject to the law must be able to know in advance clearly whether a legal norm is effective and applicable, and at the same time, the administrative agencies or judicial bodies enforcing the law must be given objective criteria for judgment in this regard, so as to prevent discriminatory or arbitrary interpretation and enforcement of the law and to realize substantive rule of law.
However, the requirement presented by the previous Supreme Court precedent for applying Article 1(2) of the Criminal Act and Article 326, Item 4 of the Criminal Procedure Act — namely, whether the legislature's motive for changing the statute or regulation was "reflective consideration" — was an objectively unclear and difficult concept to judge. The legislature, through the change in statute or regulation, merely decided not to impose criminal punishment, or to impose lighter punishment, going forward from the effective date of the new law; yet determining whether the current legislature's subjective intent regarding the past legal state under the former law was "reflective" in nature was a very vague and difficult task.
As a result, from the standpoint of the persons subject to the law, it was difficult to properly know, even where the penal statute itself, or a statute, regulation, notification, or other regulation delegated authority thereunder, had been changed, whether the law in effect at the time of the act applies pursuant to Article 1(1) of the Criminal Act, or whether the law in effect at the time of trial applies pursuant to Article 1(2); in many cases, this could only be known after going through the court's determination. Moreover, since lower courts often reached divergent conclusions regarding the existence of reflective consideration, there were not a few cases that were only resolved after the Supreme Court's final determination was rendered. Accordingly, the majority view in academic circles has consistently criticized the fact that the distinguishing criterion of the previous Supreme Court precedent is relative and vague, undermining the legal stability of the persons subject to the law.
3) The majority opinion, in light of this awareness of the problem of unclear standards and methods of judgment under the previous Supreme Court precedent, presents a clearer and more predictable legal principle based on the text of the law. This is because the question of which statute, as between the law in effect at the time of the act and the law in effect at the time of trial, applies as the norm of adjudication in relation to criminal punishment is a matter forming the basis of the legal stability and predictability of the persons subject to the law, and establishing a clear legal principle in this regard is an essential prerequisite for realizing substantive rule of law.
B. Review of the views presented in the Separate Opinions
1) The views presented in the Separate Opinions appear to be aimed at securing greater room for the courts' judgment regarding whether there has been a "change of statute or regulation" as referred to in Article 1(2) of the Criminal Act and Article 326, Item 4 of the Criminal Procedure Act, so as to achieve concrete reasonableness in individual cases, and there is something worth heeding in this. However, I find it difficult to agree, since, ultimately, unclear standards that make it difficult to guarantee the predictability of the persons subject to the law would still remain in a broader area.
2) a) Separate Opinion 1 takes the position that only the basic principle of law should be presented, to the effect that Article 1(2) of the Criminal Act and Article 326, Item 4 of the Criminal Procedure Act apply where the change of statute or regulation can be interpreted as being based mainly on a change in the criminal-law perspective directly related to the establishment and punishment of the crime, and that, apart from cases where the penal statute itself has been changed, the remaining types should be individually determined in future cases according to a balanced interpretation based on the above basic principle of law, since the change in criminal-law perspective is a concept of relative value that must be appropriately judged on a case-by-case basis, such that a uniform conclusion cannot be presented by category. This ultimately merely replaces the previous criterion of "existence of reflective consideration" with "change in criminal-law perspective," while maintaining the judgment structure of the previous Supreme Court precedent's legal principle as is, and thus the unclarity of the legal principle remains as is in a broad area.
According to Separate Opinion 1, apart from cases where the penal statute itself has been changed, whether the change is based on a change in criminal-law perspective must be determined by the court in individual cases; therefore, even considering the specific standards and methods of judgment under the changed view, there remains the problem that, in many areas where a change of statute or regulation is at issue, the persons subject to the law cannot predict which of the former law and the new law will apply as the norm of adjudication. As a result, the purpose of the change in precedent, which is to secure legal stability and predictability for the persons subject to the law, largely disappears.
b) Nor can I agree with Separate Opinion 1's view that, apart from the principled case where the penal statute itself has been changed, the specific legal principles presented by the majority opinion are inappropriate as mere obiter dicta not at issue in this case.
The issues on which the majority opinion presents specific legal principles in connection with a change of statute or regulation — namely, cases where a statute, regulation, notification, or other regulation delegated authority from the penal statute has been changed, cases where another statute or regulation not in such a delegation relationship has been changed, and cases where a statute or regulation has passed its own anticipated term of validity specified by a fixed date or period — have repeatedly been at issue in the process of forming the previous Supreme Court precedent, and there are currently numerous cases pending in courts nationwide related thereto. Accordingly, in a situation where the Supreme Court is changing the previous Supreme Court precedent and presenting new legal principles, expressing an opinion on the specific legal principles to be applied to such representative cases where a change of statute or regulation is at issue is a necessary discussion in changing precedent. That is, even though there is no doubt that the statutory amendment at issue in this case constitutes a change of the penal statute itself and thus falls under "change of statute" under Article 1(2) of the Criminal Act, the Supreme Court, in declaring a new legal principle, needs to present standards sufficient to provide answers, at least regarding representative cases, as to what constitutes a "change of statute or regulation" under Article 1(2) of the Criminal Act and Article 326, Item 4 of the Criminal Procedure Act, and the presentation of such a legal principle should be regarded not as mere obiter dictum but as the declaration of the legal principle itself.
If, in a situation where the Supreme Court newly presents a framework of legal principles concerning a change of statute or regulation, it fails to present specific legal principles regarding the representative cases that inevitably arise, and instead confines itself only to the declaration of the abstract legal principle asserted by Separate Opinion 1, the persons subject to the law and judicial bodies would fall into confusion as to what specific conclusion should be reached in many cases where a change of statute or regulation is at issue. It would not be appropriate for the Supreme Court to leave the matter entirely to the judgment of the panel in individual cases, or to hold that judgment can only be made through a future appellate procedure, since this would result in leaving unaddressed the confusion and instability in criminal trial practice that would occur over a considerable period. It is consistent with the responsibility of the Supreme Court, as the highest court, to clarify the purpose behind changing the previous Supreme Court precedent and to express a clear opinion on the specific interpretation and application of the new legal principle replacing the previous Supreme Court precedent, based on the results of the review and discussion conducted in that process.
Furthermore, since the previous Supreme Court precedent thus changed and the new legal principle thus presented by the Supreme Court constitute an opinion concerning the interpretation and application of statutes and regulations, and thus would be subject to a change in precedent as provided in Article 7(1), Item 3 of the Court Organization Act (법원조직법) (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 2017Da257746, decided December 23, 2021), I also find it difficult to agree with Separate Opinion 1's view that the specific legal principles presented by the majority opinion, apart from the case where the penal statute itself has been changed, have no effect as precedent in the strict sense.
3) a) Separate Opinion 2 takes a position different from the majority opinion only with respect to the case where a statute or regulation that had specified a fixed date or period as its term of validity, thereby anticipating the loss of its effect, has passed that term of validity. Separate Opinion 2 takes the position that, in such a case, the law in effect at the time of trial should in principle apply pursuant to Article 1(2) of the Criminal Act and Article 326, Item 4 of the Criminal Procedure Act, but that, as an exception, if it can be seen, upon evaluating the relevant statute or regulation or notification or other regulation from a criminal-law perspective, that there is a need to punish the violation even after the expiration of the term of validity, and that this embodies legislative and social implications concerning the recognition of such enforceability and continuing effect, then the law in effect at the time of the act may be applied.
However, even examining the comprehensive considerations presented by Separate Opinion 2, it is not easy to find a standard of judgment between the above principle and exception that the persons subject to the law can clearly predict. In particular, under the legal principle presented by Separate Opinion 2, the persons subject to the law would expect that, once the term of validity has expired after the violation, they would in principle not be punished; however, since punishment could ultimately be imposed as a result of the court's judgment at the time of trial based on comprehensive consideration, applying the law in effect at the time of the act, there is also an aspect in which the legal stability and predictability of the persons subject to the law are further undermined.
b) Meanwhile, Separate Opinion 2 also criticizes this portion of the majority opinion's legal principle to the effect that it unjustly expands the scope of criminal punishment and runs counter to the direction of the change in precedent, but I find this difficult to agree with. According to the previous Supreme Court precedent, a statute or regulation that specifies a term of validity, thereby anticipating the loss of its effect, is a typical case of a statute or regulation enacted to address a particular need arising from time to time; therefore, it was logically impossible to recognize the expiration of such a statute or regulation's own anticipated term of validity as a change of statute or regulation based on reflective consideration. Accordingly, the criticism that the previous Supreme Court precedent recognized, even partially, room for applying Article 1(2) of the Criminal Act and Article 326, Item 4 of the Criminal Procedure Act in this regard, or that the majority opinion expands the scope of criminal punishment beyond that, is not appropriate. Furthermore, since the majority opinion presents a legal principle, based on the text of the law, that secures legal stability and predictability to the maximum extent possible even with respect to a case where the term of validity of a statute or regulation that specified a fixed date or period as its term of validity has expired, it cannot be said that this contradicts the purpose and direction of the change in precedent based on this awareness of the problem.
C. The specific meaning of "change of statute or regulation"
1) Since the previous Supreme Court precedent determined the applicability of Article 1(2) of the Criminal Act and Article 326, Item 4 of the Criminal Procedure Act based mainly on the abstract requirement of the existence of the legislature's reflective consideration, there was little need to accurately identify or establish the specific meaning of "change of statute or regulation" referred to in each of the above provisions.
However, since the majority opinion holds that, while it is inappropriate to set additional requirements for the application of Article 1(2) of the Criminal Act and Article 326, Item 4 of the Criminal Procedure Act themselves, as the previous Supreme Court precedent did, the "change of statute or regulation" referred to in each of the above provisions must, upon examining the text and legislative purpose of Article 1 of the Criminal Act, presuppose a change in the criminal-law perspective directly related to the establishment and punishment of the crime under the relevant penal statute, a more specific and clear legal principle is needed to distinguish cases that fall within this from cases that do not.
2) First, where an act ceases to constitute a crime or the punishment is reduced due to a change in the penal statute itself, this is naturally based on a change in the criminal-law perspective directly related to the punishability of the relevant penal statute. Accordingly, the law in effect at the time of trial applies pursuant to Article 1(2) of the Criminal Act and Article 326, Item 4 of the Criminal Procedure Act. Furthermore, even where a statute, regulation, notification, or other regulation delegated authority from the penal statute has been changed, this too is based on a change in the criminal-law perspective directly related to the punishability of the relevant penal statute, and thus the law in effect at the time of trial should apply pursuant to Article 1(2) of the Criminal Act and Article 326, Item 4 of the Criminal Procedure Act. This is because such a statute, regulation, notification, or other regulation constitutes a supplementary norm forming part of the elements of the offense of the relevant penal statute, and, combined with the parent statute, becomes the basis for criminal punishment, such that it is clearly recognized, in terms of the system and content of the statute or regulation, that a part of the penal statute has been changed. Even if, in the case of administrative penal provisions, the duty-imposing provision and the penalty provision may be separated, so long as the relevant penalty provision expressly incorporates the duty-imposing provision as part of the elements of the offense, a change of the duty-imposing provision itself, or a change of a statute, regulation, notification, or other regulation delegated authority from the duty-imposing provision, should be regarded as a change of a part of the penal statute.
In such cases, the protective function of criminal law can be sufficiently achieved through the appropriate method of having the legislature establish an express transitional provision as to which statute, as between the former law and the new law, applies as the norm of adjudication, thereby guaranteeing the legal stability and predictability of the persons subject to the law. If the legislature determines that there is a need to maintain punishment under the former statute or regulation in the event that the penal statute itself, or a statute, regulation, notification, or other regulation delegated authority thereunder, has been changed, it may establish an appropriate transitional provision. The legislature can naturally foresee that, if the changed statute, regulation, notification, or other regulation is in a delegation relationship with the penal statute, such change will directly affect the punishability of the penal statute, and in such cases, it is also the legislature's duty to examine on its own the necessity of a transitional provision and to take the necessary measures.
3) However, where a statute or regulation other than the one delegated authority from the relevant penal statute has been changed, the relationship between the relevant penal statute and the changed statute or regulation within the overall legal system can appear in very diverse forms and aspects. Since changes in statutes or regulations can occur across many different and diverse areas of legal norms, cases based on a change in criminal-law perspective and cases not so based are intermixed. Accordingly, in such cases, it is unavoidable to examine, individually, considering the various factors of judgment presented by the majority opinion, whether the change of statute or regulation is based mainly on a change in the criminal-law perspective directly related to the punishability of the relevant penal statute.
If the content of the change in the statute or regulation is basically unrelated to criminal law, and is merely a change in the area of another statute not delegated authority from the relevant penal statute, it cannot, absent special circumstances, be regarded as based on a change in criminal-law perspective. Examples include cases where changes in civil statutes and regulations concerning the standard for minors, the ownership of property, or the scope of relatives cause a change in whether the elements of a criminal offense are satisfied or in the conditions for prosecution. Furthermore, there may be cases where a change in some administrative regulation causes a change in the applicability of a penal statute belonging to another law not directly related thereto.
As such, where a change in some non-criminal regulation arising under another statute or regulation results, indirectly, in an effect on the punishability of the penal statute, this does not, in principle, constitute a change of statute or regulation based on a change in criminal-law perspective that is subject to Article 1(2) of the Criminal Act and Article 326, Item 4 of the Criminal Procedure Act; accordingly, the law in effect at the time of the act should apply pursuant to Article 1(1) of the Criminal Act. However, even where the changed statute or regulation is another statute, if special circumstances are recognized such that it can be regarded as inseparably combined with the relevant penal statute and sharing the same protective purpose and legislative intent, there may be cases where it can be regarded as based on a change in criminal-law perspective.
4) a) Where a statute or regulation has passed its own anticipated term of validity specified by a fixed date or period, this also cannot be regarded as falling within the case where a statute or regulation has been changed or amended or repealed after the commission of a crime, as referred to in Article 1(2) of the Criminal Act and Article 326, Item 4 of the Criminal Procedure Act, and thus the law in effect at the time of the act should apply.
In this case, it is clear, in terms of the text, that this does not fall within the case where a statute or regulation has been amended or repealed, and since the original statute or regulation specifying the term of validity and the legislature's intent in this regard have simply been realized as they were, without change, there has been no change of statute or regulation or change in criminal-law perspective after the commission of the crime. Accordingly, including a case where a statute or regulation has passed its own anticipated term of validity within the "change of statute or regulation" referred to in Article 1(2) of the Criminal Act and Article 326, Item 4 of the Criminal Procedure Act constitutes a kind of analogical interpretation, and even though this would not be unfavorable to the defendant, it is, in principle, undesirable from the standpoint of legal stability.
It is also reasonable to view the legislature's intent as maintaining, as is, the existing criminal-law perspective that punishment is imposed even after the expiration of the term of validity, with respect to a violation of the statute or regulation committed within the term of validity. The legislature specified the term of validity of the statute or regulation by a specific date or period, in a manner clearly knowable to any person subject to the law, thereby specifying the norm of conduct to be observed by the persons subject to the law within that term of validity. Nevertheless, if, upon the expiration of the term of validity, violations committed within the term of validity are not punished, the statute or regulation would, in practice, be virtually unable to fulfill its role as a norm of conduct within the term of validity. This is because, considering the period required from the recognition and investigation of a crime, through prosecution, and through each level of court until the criminal judgment becomes final, a substantial number of cases would go unpunished due to the expiration of the effect of the statute or regulation before the criminal judgment becomes final, even where the statute or regulation has a term of validity of about one to two years. Considering that, in practice, notifications and other regulations that serve as supplementary norms of penal statutes often set terms of validity of only a few weeks to a few months, much shorter than this, the need for interpretation applying the principle of the law in effect at the time of the act to a statute or regulation that specifies a term of validity by a specific date or period becomes even greater.
b) However, it cannot be said that such a principle of the law in effect at the time of the act applies to a statute or regulation that does not specify its term of validity by a specific date or period but instead anticipates the extinction of its effect upon the occurrence of a certain event, or, more broadly, to statutes and regulations whose content and purpose are enacted to address temporary circumstances. This is because, for such statutes or regulations, the end point of their effect is unclear, making it difficult to regard them as having been established as norms requiring punishment to be carried through for violations committed within a specified period; and, depending on the interpretation, the scope that could be included in such statutes or regulations could be excessively expanded, blurring the boundary between the principle of the law in effect at the time of trial and the principle of the law in effect at the time of the act, which would again raise the problem of the predictability of the persons subject to the law. Accordingly, in such cases, it is reasonable to interpret that the principle of the law in effect at the time of the act applies only where the legislature has established a clear transitional provision providing for the application of the law in effect at the time of the act.
c) Basically, since the legislature can carry through punishment under the law in effect at the time of the act by means of a transitional provision, there is not much incentive to use the term-of-validity provision in an abnormal form for the same purpose. However, if a case arises where the legislature abusively sets or operates the term of validity of a statute or regulation, or sets a term-of-validity provision in a manner that exceeds the limits of delegated legislation or is inappropriate in light of the system of the statute or regulation, the court can exclude its application through the power of review over orders and regulations vested in the courts, and additional legal principles may also be presented, premised on the legal principle of this Supreme Court judgment, to resolve exceptional cases in which a term-of-validity provision has been abused.
D. Sub-conclusion
Establishing a clear legal principle regarding the standard for determining the norm of adjudication for criminal punishment is an essential condition for realizing substantive rule of law. The majority opinion does not weaken the function of criminal law in protecting the order and legal interests of the community, but seeks to achieve this on the foundation of substantive rule of law. Only when the persons subject to the law can clearly distinguish between punishment and non-punishment can the principle of the rule of law and the function of criminal law be substantively realized. The majority opinion, from the position that a clearer view should be presented regarding the standard for determining which statute or regulation constitutes the norm of adjudication in order to secure legal stability and predictability, changes the previous Supreme Court precedent and, upon examining the text and legislative purpose of the relevant provisions, presents the scope of "change of statute or regulation" more clearly and reasonably.
I hereby state the foregoing as my concurring opinion regarding the majority opinion.
Chief Justice Kim Myeong-su (Presiding Justice), Justice Cho Jae-yeon, Justice Park Jeong-hwa, Justice Ahn Cheol-sang, Justice Min Yu-sook, Justice Kim Seon-su, Justice Lee Dong-won (Justice in Charge), Justice Noh Jeong-hee, Justice Roh Tae-ak, Justice Lee Heung-gu, Justice Cheon Dae-yeop, Justice Oh Kyung-mi