[Plaintiff, Appellee]
[Defendant, Appellant] Minister of the National Court Administration (Litigation representative: Attorneys Kim Jae-bang and 3 others of the Government Legal Service)
[Judgment Below] Seoul High Court Decision 2012Nu24469 decided June 27, 2013
[Order]
The judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Seoul High Court.
[Reasoning]
1. The Court determines this matter ex officio.
A. (1) In a party litigation (당사자소송) concerning a legal relationship under public law, the lawsuit must be filed against one of the parties to that legal relationship as the defendant (Article 3, Item 2 and Article 39 of the Administrative Litigation Act (행정소송법)). However, where a plaintiff, without intent or gross negligence, mistakenly files a suit as an appeal-type litigation (항고소송) which should have been filed as a party litigation, the court must, unless it is clear that the requirements for a party litigation are lacking such that the suit would in any event be unlawful even if filed as a party litigation, allow the plaintiff to amend the suit into a party litigation and proceed to examine and adjudicate the case (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 97Da42250, decided November 26, 1999).
(2) Article 74-2 of the former State Public Officials Act (국가공무원법) (before its amendment by Act No. 11489 of October 22, 2012; hereinafter the "State Public Officials Act") provides that a public official who has served for 20 years or more may be paid an honorary retirement allowance within the budget if he or she voluntarily retires before reaching the retirement age (Paragraph 1), and delegates matters necessary for the scope of eligible recipients, the amount of payment, and payment procedures, etc., to be prescribed by Supreme Court Regulations, etc. (Paragraph 4). Pursuant to this delegation, the former Rules on Payment of Honorary Retirement Allowances, etc. for Judges and Court Officials (법관 및 법원공무원 명예퇴직수당 등 지급규칙) (before its amendment by Supreme Court Regulation No. 2320 of January 31, 2011; hereinafter the "Honorary Retirement Allowance Rules") provide that certain judges, general service public officials, and skilled service public officials who voluntarily retire may become recipients of the honorary retirement allowance (Article 3, Paragraph 1); the Defendant may, where inevitable due to budgetary reasons, limit the scope of recipients (Article 3, Paragraph 2); upon receiving an application for the honorary retirement allowance under Article 6, the Defendant is to examine it within 30 days after the application period expires and determine the recipients of the honorary retirement allowance in consideration of the budget, etc. (Article 7, Paragraph 1); and in the examination and determination under Paragraph 1, priority is to be given to higher-ranking public officials and long-serving public officials (Article 7, Paragraph 2). Meanwhile, [Attached Table 1] to Article 4 of the Honorary Retirement Allowance Rules specifically provides the calculation standards for the amount of the honorary retirement allowance: where the remaining period until retirement age is one year or more but not more than five years, the amount is [half of the monthly salary at the time of retirement × the number of remaining months until retirement age]; where the remaining period until retirement age exceeds five years but is not more than ten years, the amount is [half of the monthly salary at the time of retirement × (60 + (remaining months until retirement age − 60) / 2)]; provided that the number of remaining months until retirement age may not exceed seven years (84 months).
In light of the content and purport of the relevant statutes concerning the determination of recipients of the honorary retirement allowance and the calculation of the allowance amount as set forth above, the honorary retirement allowance may be paid only after the Defendant, following a certain examination among applicants for the honorary retirement allowance, determines the applicant to be a recipient of the honorary retirement allowance; however, since the calculation standards for the amount of the allowance to be paid to a judge determined to be a recipient of the honorary retirement allowance are set forth in [Attached Table 1] to Article 4 of the Honorary Retirement Allowance Rules, such judge holds a specific right to receive the amount of the honorary retirement allowance calculated in accordance with the proper calculation standards set forth in the above provision. Therefore, even if the Defendant expresses an intent to refuse a judge's request for payment of the difference on the ground that the amount of allowance already received by the judge falls short of the proper amount of the honorary retirement allowance set forth in the above provision, such expression of intent is not an administrative disposition that forms or finalizes the amount of the honorary retirement allowance, but is merely an expression of the Defendant's own opinion, as one party to the public-law legal relationship, regarding the existence and scope of its payment obligation, and thus cannot be regarded as an administrative disposition. Ultimately, the right that a judge who has retired on honorary grounds holds with respect to the unpaid amount of the honorary retirement allowance is a right concerning a public-law legal relationship that has been finalized under the Honorary Retirement Allowance Rules through the procedure for determining recipients of the honorary retirement allowance, and a lawsuit seeking payment thereof constitutes a party litigation under the Administrative Litigation Act (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2004Du244, decided July 8, 2004), and such lawsuit must be filed against the State, which is the party to that legal relationship.
B. According to the reasoning of the judgment below and the record, the following facts may be found: the Plaintiff was appointed as a judge in March 1991 and retired on February 28, 2010, at which time the Plaintiff was determined to be a recipient of the honorary retirement allowance; around that time, the Plaintiff received an honorary retirement allowance of KRW 20,703,600, calculated on the premise that the remaining term was one year; around January 2012, the Plaintiff asserted that the main text of Article 3, Paragraph 5 of the Honorary Retirement Allowance Rules was invalid and that the proper amount of the honorary retirement allowance was KRW 153,360,000, and accordingly filed an application with the Defendant seeking payment of the difference between that amount and the amount already received (hereinafter "the difference at issue"); around January 17, 2012, the Defendant issued a notice stating that it could not pay the difference at issue (hereinafter "the instant notice"); and the Plaintiff filed the instant suit seeking revocation of the instant notice on the premise that it constituted an administrative disposition.
C. In light of the legal principles set forth above, since the Defendant's instant notice does not constitute an administrative disposition, the Plaintiff could not file an appeal-type litigation against the Defendant, but should have filed a party litigation against the State seeking payment of the difference at issue. However, in light of the protection of rights and judicial economy, it would be appropriate to give the Plaintiff an opportunity to amend the suit into a party litigation; thus, the court below should have appropriately exercised its right to seek clarification (석명권) as to whether to amend the suit from an appeal-type litigation to a party litigation, so as to ensure that the suit was in a lawful form.
D. Nevertheless, the court below failed to take such procedural steps and instead proceeded to adjudicate the merits on the premise that the instant suit was lawful as an appeal-type litigation. This judgment of the court below is erroneous in that it misapprehended the legal principles concerning party litigation, etc., and failed to conduct the necessary examination and procedures, thereby affecting the judgment.
2. The Court further examines the grounds of appeal.
A. Article 3, Paragraph 1 of the Honorary Retirement Allowance Rules, enacted pursuant to the delegation under Article 74-2, Paragraph 4 of the State Public Officials Act, provides that judges eligible to receive the honorary retirement allowance are those judges—excluding "judges of the rank of presiding judge of a division of a High Court or higher, and judges at salary step 16 or higher"—who have served for 20 years or more and voluntarily retire during the period of one year or more before their retirement date. Paragraph 5 provides: "In calculating the remaining period until retirement age, in the case of a judge, if the date of expiration of the term of office precedes the retirement date, the date of expiration of the term of office shall be deemed the retirement date. Provided that, in the case of a judge, such period may not exceed seven years." (hereinafter, the main text of Article 3, Paragraph 5 of the Honorary Retirement Allowance Rules is referred to as "the main text of the provision at issue").
Accordingly, under the calculation standards set forth in [Attached Table 1] to Article 4 of the Honorary Retirement Allowance Rules, the amount of the honorary retirement allowance for a judge is calculated as half of the monthly salary at the time of retirement multiplied by all or part of the number of remaining months of the term of office, within the scope of the remaining period until retirement age, and the number of remaining months of the term of office may not exceed seven years.
B. The court below, for the reasons stated in its judgment, made the following determination with respect to the instant notice.
(1) The main purport of the honorary retirement allowance system for public officials is to induce public officials to retire before reaching the retirement age, thereby promoting the metabolism of the organization. On the other hand, the guarantee of a judge's status through the term-of-office system fundamentally means guaranteeing the status of a judge, during the term of service as a judge, through systems such as one under which a judge may not be removed from office except by impeachment or sentencing to imprisonment or a heavier punishment. In the case of a judge who voluntarily gives up the status guaranteed under the Constitution and statutes and retires, even if the honorary retirement allowance is calculated differently depending on the length of the remaining term of office at the time of retirement, this cannot be said to violate the essence of the constitutional term-of-office system for judges.
(2) However, in light of the Constitution and relevant statutes concerning the reappointment of judges, the expiration of a judge's term of office does not mean the expiration of the period during which the judge's status is guaranteed; rather, absent special circumstances such as impeachment or the occurrence of grounds restricting reappointment, the judge's status as a judge and the guarantee thereof are maintained until retirement age, and judges have an expectation or reliance interest that reappointment will be repeated so that they may serve until retirement age. However, the main text of the provision at issue, which, in paying the honorary retirement allowance to judges, applies the remaining term of office in preference to the remaining period until retirement age as the calculation standard, thereby creating a differential in the amount paid, results in a difference in the amount paid between retiring judges whose remaining period until retirement age is the same or similar, depending on whether the remaining period until the reappointment review is short or long, or whether a reappointment review is even upcoming. Moreover, because the periods of service as an active-duty soldier, military legal officer, or public-interest legal officer are added to the years of service, there are cases where a significant disparity arises even among judges retiring at the same time. There is a lack of a reasonable basis or reason to justify such a disparity in the amount paid; rather, based on the incidental circumstance of the timing of retirement or the aggregation of periods of service, this results in discrimination without reasonable grounds among retiring judges who are essentially in the same position, in violation of the constitutional principle of equality, and is therefore invalid. Accordingly, the instant notice, which, on a different premise, recognized the calculation of the honorary retirement allowance amount under the main text of the provision at issue as lawful, is unlawful.
C. However, this determination by the court below cannot be upheld, for the following reasons.
(1) The honorary retirement allowance under the State Public Officials Act is a system whereby, in cases where a public official whose retirement age is guaranteed terminates his or her status as a public official before reaching retirement age under strict requirements, the system seeks to provide for the public official's livelihood in recognition of the faithful performance of the special responsibilities and duties as a public official, and to induce voluntary honorary retirement, thereby promoting the metabolism and improving the efficiency of the public official organization, and ultimately providing better-quality administrative services to the people. In forming the specific requirements, methods, and amounts, etc. of the right to receive the honorary retirement allowance, the legislature is allowed relatively broad discretion (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2005Da24646, decided November 15, 2007; Constitutional Court en banc Decision 2001Heonba55, decided December 18, 2002; Constitutional Court en banc Decision 2010Heonba93, decided November 25, 2010, etc.), and such broad discretion in forming the right to receive the honorary retirement allowance is likewise recognized with respect to the Supreme Court Regulations enacted pursuant to the delegation under Article 74-2, Paragraph 4 of the State Public Officials Act.
Furthermore, the principle of equality based on Article 11, Paragraph 1 of the Constitution fundamentally prohibits arbitrarily treating what is essentially the same differently; it does not mean absolute equality that denies all differential treatment, but rather relative equality, meaning that discrimination without reasonable grounds must not be made in legislating and applying the law. Therefore, discrimination or inequality with a reasonable basis does not violate the principle of equality (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 99Do2309, decided October 12, 1999; Supreme Court en banc Decision 2005Du14417, decided October 29, 2007, etc.).
(2) In order for a judge to become a recipient of the honorary retirement allowance, the judge must, pursuant to Article 3 of the Honorary Retirement Allowance Rules, satisfy the requirements of: ① having served for 20 years or more; ② not falling under a judge of the rank of presiding judge of a division of a High Court or higher, or a judge at salary step 16 or higher; and ③ voluntarily retiring during the period of one year or more before the retirement date (or, if the date of expiration of the term of office precedes the retirement date, before the date of expiration of the term of office). Among these, the years of service are determined based not only on the period of service as a judge but also on the periods aggregated under Article 23, Paragraphs 1 through 3 of the Public Officials Pension Act (공무원연금법), such as periods of service as a public official or soldier, etc. before appointment as a judge; the salary step is determined in accordance with Articles 2 and 2-2 of the Rules on Standards for Salary Step Advancement of Judges (법관의 승급기준에 관한 규칙), under which a judge advances to a higher salary step in stages after serving as a judge for a certain period; and the remaining term of office is determined by the timing of appointment, the timing of reappointment, and the timing of retirement.
However, since the main text of the provision at issue calculates the amount of the honorary retirement allowance for a judge who satisfies the above requirements based on the number of remaining months of the term of office, even where other conditions such as years of service and age, etc. among retiring judges are the same, if there is a difference in the remaining term of office due to circumstances such as military service affecting the timing of appointment and reappointment, a difference arises in the amount of the honorary retirement allowance calculated under the main text of the provision at issue.
(3) However, in light of the fact that various standards are taken into account—such as the years of service, which is determined by whether periods of service as a judge and periods of service as a public official or in the military, etc. before appointment are aggregated, in determining whether one qualifies as a recipient of the honorary retirement allowance; the retirement age; the remaining period until retirement age depending on the timing of retirement; and the remaining term of office—and in light of the broad discretion permitted in forming the right to receive the honorary retirement allowance, it cannot be said to lack rationality even if the amount of the honorary retirement allowance is calculated by reflecting all of the various standards for recognizing recipients of the honorary retirement allowance.
Even if the amount of the honorary retirement allowance were calculated based on other standards, such as retirement age, excluding the term of office, it would be inevitable that certain differences would arise, within a certain range, in whether one is eligible for the honorary retirement allowance or in the amount thereof, depending on differences in the age and timing of appointment, etc. among judges retiring at the same time; and this is likewise true even among judges who completed the same class at the Judicial Research and Training Institute, which the court below took issue with.
(4) The Constitution provides that judges shall adjudicate independently in accordance with their conscience under the Constitution and statutes (Article 103), and, in order to institutionally guarantee the status of judges, sets the term of office of a judge at ten years while allowing reappointment within the retirement age as prescribed by statute (Article 105, Paragraph 3); furthermore, it provides that a judge may not be removed from office except by impeachment or sentencing to imprisonment or a heavier punishment, may not be subject to suspension from office, reduction of salary, or any other unfavorable disposition except by disciplinary action, and may be retired as prescribed by statute where the judge is unable to perform his or her duties due to a serious mental or physical disability (Article 106).
Accordingly, Article 45, Paragraph 3 of the former Court Organization Act (법원조직법) (before its amendment by Act No. 10861 of July 18, 2011) sets the term of office of a judge (판사) at ten years while allowing reappointment of a judge whose term has expired, and Article 45-2 provides the procedure whereby reappointment is made by an order of reappointment from the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court with the consent of the Justices' Council (Paragraph 1), while providing that a judge shall be excluded from an order of reappointment in cases falling under: "a case where the judge is unable to perform normal duties as a judge due to a physical or mental disability (Item 1); a case where the judge is unable to perform normal duties as a judge due to markedly poor performance evaluations (Item 2); and a case where it is markedly difficult for the judge to maintain the dignity befitting a judge (Item 3)."
In this way, the Constitution sets the term of office of a judge at ten years, restricting removal, disciplinary action, and retirement during that term so as to guarantee that the judge may adjudicate independently, while, after the expiration of the term, requiring the reappointment procedure set forth in the Constitution and the Court Organization Act. Given that a judge's term of office is thus fixed, it is inevitable that the remaining term of office will vary depending on the timing of a judge's appointment and whether reappointment occurs. Moreover, voluntary retirement, which is a requirement for honorary retirement, means voluntarily giving up the status guaranteed under the Constitution and statutes, and the length of the remaining term of office is determined by whether and when voluntary retirement occurs. In light of the foregoing, the determination of the court below—that even if the recipients of the honorary retirement allowance are determined and the amount thereof is calculated differently depending on the length of the remaining term of office at the time of a judge's retirement, this cannot be said to violate the essence of the constitutional term-of-office system for judges—may be upheld. Furthermore, the main text of the provision at issue, which reflects the constitutional term of office, or remaining term of office, of a judge as a standard for calculating the amount of the honorary retirement allowance, cannot be conclusively deemed arbitrary and in violation of the principle of equality, and it is difficult to conclude otherwise merely on the ground that the remaining periods until retirement age of retiring judges are the same or similar.
(5) The court below cited, as a ground for violation of the principle of equality, the disparity arising, among judges with similar remaining periods until retirement age, from the system of aggregating active-duty military service periods into years of service. However, if the aggregation of active-duty military service periods into years of service enables a judge to be recognized as a recipient of the honorary retirement allowance even though the judge's period of service as a judge is less than 20 years, this means that such judge is given a greater opportunity to receive the honorary retirement allowance compared to other judges with the same period of service as a judge, and thus the aggregation of years of service cannot be said to be disadvantageous only to the judge concerned. Moreover, as noted above, since a judge voluntarily retiring can avoid the disadvantage cited by the court below by choosing the timing of retirement, such as after reappointment, and thereby selecting the remaining term of office, it is difficult to conclude that such a disparity is arbitrary and unreasonable discrimination merely because the retirement ages are similar or the reappointment procedure is guaranteed.
Furthermore, the court below compared the case of a judge who served as a military legal officer or public-interest legal officer, and whose period of such service is added to the years of service, such that the judge exceeds 20 years of service before the second reappointment and retires one year before the expiration of the term, with the case of a judge who completed the same class at the Judicial Research and Training Institute and was appointed immediately, and who retires with a substantial remaining term of office after the second reappointment; and found that there was a considerable disparity in the amount of the honorary retirement allowance between judges who completed the same class at the Judicial Research and Training Institute, exceeding the scope of reasonable discrimination. However, even among judges who completed the same class at the Judicial Research and Training Institute, given that the Constitution establishes the term-of-office system for judges, it is inevitable that the remaining term of office will differ, and the reappointment procedure will occur differently, depending on differences in the timing of appointment as a judge. Moreover, if a judge appointed later chooses the timing of retirement to be after the second reappointment, that judge may be recognized as having a considerably longer remaining term of office than other judges of the same class who were reappointed for the second time earlier, which is actually more favorable; in light of this, it is difficult to regard the calculation of the honorary retirement allowance based on the remaining term of office as a system markedly disadvantageous to judges appointed later. Ultimately, even in the above case, the disparity in the remaining term of office, or in the amount of the honorary retirement allowance resulting therefrom, arises from the result of the relevant judge's own decision as to the timing of voluntarily giving up the status guaranteed under the Constitution and statutes and retiring, and this is insufficient to recognize such disparity as arbitrary treatment markedly contrary to equity.
(6) Therefore, comprehensively considering the various circumstances examined above—including the discretionary nature of the honorary retirement system, the general legal principles concerning the principle of equality, the standards for calculating the amount of the honorary retirement allowance for judges, the constitutional term-of-office system for judges, and the results arising from a judge's voluntary retirement and the aggregation of military service periods into years of service—it cannot be said that the provision of the main text of the provision at issue, which, based on the broad discretion in forming the right to receive the honorary retirement allowance, provides that the amount of the honorary retirement allowance for judges is to be calculated by reflecting the remaining term of office together with, rather than solely based on, the remaining period until retirement age, arbitrarily discriminates without reasonable grounds among judges retiring at the same time, in violation of the principle of equality.
D. Nevertheless, the court below, on a different premise, determined that the main text of the provision at issue was invalid as violating the principle of equality, and accordingly determined that the instant refusal notice made pursuant thereto was also unlawful. Therefore, the judgment below erred in its determination as to whether the main text of the provision at issue violates the principle of equality by misapprehending the legal principles concerning the honorary retirement system and the principle of equality, which affected the judgment.
3. Therefore, the judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court below for further examination and adjudication. This judgment is rendered with the unanimous consent of the participating Justices, as set forth in the Order.
Justices Lee Ki-taek (Presiding Justice), Lee In-bok, Kim Yong-deok (Justice in charge), Kim So-young