[Plaintiff, Appellant]
[Defendant, Appellee] Mayor of Chungju City
[Lower Court Judgment]
Seoul High Court, Judgment rendered June 10, 1987, Case No. 86Gu548, 589
[Order]
The appeal is dismissed.
The costs of the appeal are borne by the Plaintiff.
[Reasoning]
The grounds of appeal are examined.
1.
Article 55 of the Local Public Officials Act (지방공무원법) provides that a public official shall not engage in conduct that damages his or her dignity. Here, "dignity" refers to a character befitting a person who has undertaken and is carrying out the duties entrusted by the sovereign people. Therefore, even where a public official has exercised a fundamental right guaranteed to all citizens, if the degree of exercise of that right exceeds the social significance for which the right was recognized, to the extent that it is judged, from the standpoint of the sovereign people, to be undesirable conduct, such conduct by the public official constitutes conduct that damages his or her dignity.
According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below found the following facts: the Plaintiff, while serving at the Nam-gu Office of Busan Directly Governed City, was dismissed from office effective April 15, 1975; the Plaintiff filed an administrative litigation seeking revocation of the dismissal disposition, and the judgment against the Plaintiff became final; nevertheless, without accepting that outcome, the Plaintiff did not cease litigating the same matter; even after being reappointed as a local public official of Chungju City on July 5, 1981, the Plaintiff continued to repeat futile litigation until around the end of 1985, and in a total of seven lawsuits, judgments against the Plaintiff were rendered in every instance. Having found these facts, the court below determined that the Plaintiff's aforesaid conduct was sufficient to be regarded as damaging his dignity as a public official. In light of the legal principles set forth above, the determination of the court below is justified, and there is no illegality therein such as violation of the Constitution or statutes, or contradictory reasoning, as pointed out in the grounds of appeal.
2.
Even where a public official has applied for annual leave within the statutory number of annual leave days and, with respect to such application, the head of the administrative agency is required to grant the leave unless there is a particular impediment to the performance of official duties, conduct in which the official leaves the workplace before such leave application has been approved constitutes conduct in violation of Article 50, Paragraph 1 of the Local Public Officials Act and constitutes grounds for disciplinary action. Moreover, the fact that leaving the workplace during night duty was for the purpose of having dinner cannot constitute a justifiable reason for leaving the workplace. The determination of the court below to the same effect is justified, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles therein.
3. According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below, based on the evidence cited, found that the Defendant City's Personnel Committee notified the Plaintiff on January 25, 1986 to appear before the Personnel Committee meeting to be held at 14:00 on January 29, 1986 to discuss the disciplinary matter concerning the Plaintiff, that the Plaintiff received the notice of attendance, and moreover that the Defendant had, around 13:20 on January 29, 1986, sent an employee to visit the Plaintiff and urge his attendance. Based on these findings, the court below rejected the Plaintiff's argument that the Defendant, in taking the disciplinary action at issue in this case, failed to give the Plaintiff an opportunity to appear before the Personnel Committee and make statements. Upon examination of the record, the fact-finding and determination of the court below are justified, and there is no illegality therein such as misapprehension of facts or omission of judgment as asserted in the grounds of appeal.
4. The court below, on the premise that whether the degree of disciplinary action exceeds the bounds of discretion must be determined by comprehensively considering the facts constituting grounds for discipline together with the administrative purpose sought to be achieved by the discipline and all attendant circumstances, determined, taking into account the Plaintiff's ordinary attitude toward his duties, that dismissing the Plaintiff from office on the basis of the aforesaid grounds for discipline appears to be appropriate, and thus rejected the Plaintiff's argument that the disciplinary action at issue in this case departed from the bounds of discretion. Upon examination of the record, the above determination of the court below is deemed justified, and there is no illegality therein such as misapprehension of legal principles or omission of judgment as asserted in the grounds of appeal.
5.
The grievance review system provided for in Article 67-2 of the Local Public Officials Act is a system designed to guarantee the rights and interests of public officials and to create appropriate working environments, whereby a public official may request the appointing authority to devise measures for correction and improvement, through de facto procedures rather than through legal litigation procedures, with respect to working conditions, personnel management, or other matters concerning the official's status. Upon receiving such a request, the appointing authority refers the matter to the Personnel Committee for review, or has an official of the relevant agency consult with the requesting official, and is to endeavor to resolve the grievance and otherwise handle it fairly based on the outcome. However, since the grievance review decision itself does not directly bring about any change in legal relations or any infringement of interests, a grievance review decision cannot be regarded as an administrative disposition subject to administrative litigation. The determination of the court below to the same effect is justified, and the argument attacking the judgment below from the opposite viewpoint is without merit.
Accordingly, since all the grounds of appeal are without merit, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of the appeal are to be borne by the Plaintiff, who has lost the case. This judgment is rendered as stated in the Order, upon the unanimous opinion of the Justices participating.
Justice Lee Jun-seung (Presiding Justice), Kim Hyeong-gi, Park Woo-dong