Workbear재주넘는곰
대법원 2007도235

Violation of the Act on the Punishment of Violence, etc. (Group/Deadly Weapon Injury) · Obstruction of Special Performance of Official Duties Resulting in Injury · Violation of the Act on the Punishment of Violence, etc. (Group/Deadly Weapon Confinement) · Violation of the Act on the Punishment of Violence, etc. (Group/Deadly Weapon Property Destruction) · Violation of the Act on the Punishment of Violence, etc. (Group/Deadly Weapon Trespassing) · Violation of the Act on the Punishment of Violence, etc. (Group/Deadly Weapon Assault) · Obstruction of Business폭력행위등처벌에관한법률위반(집단·흉기등상해)·특수공무집행방해치상·폭력행위등처벌에관한법률위반(집단·흉기등감금)·폭력행위등처벌에관한법률위반(집단·흉기등재물손괴등)·폭력행위등처벌에관한법률위반(집단·흉기등주거침입)·폭력행위등처벌에관한법률위반(집단·흉기등폭행)·업무방해

Decided2007. 04. 26. Court대법원Reversed and remanded in part: the defendant's co-principal liability for offenses committed after the building occupation was upheld, but the conviction for offenses committed before the occupation was overturned for insufficient proof of conspiracy, and the case was sent back to the lower court.
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AI-generated summary for reference only — the Korean original below is authoritative.

Members of a construction workers' union occupied the headquarters building of POSCO and committed assault, bodily injury, and obstruction of business, among other offenses. The case examined whether a senior official of the union's umbrella organization could be held liable as a co-principal through conspiracy (공모공동정범) for these acts. The Supreme Court recognized co-principal liability for offenses committed after the occupation began, but reversed and remanded the conviction for offenses committed before the occupation, citing insufficient proof of conspiracy at that stage.

Key takeaways
  • CaseConstruction union members, under the direction of a senior union federation official, occupied POSCO's headquarters building and committed assault, injury, confinement, and business obstruction.
  • OutcomeThe Supreme Court ruled that co-principal liability requires more than mere agreement—it demands functional control through essential contribution to the crime—and upheld liability for post-occupation acts while reversing the conviction for pre-occupation acts due to insufficient evidence.
  • LessonUnion officials and other collective actors should understand that leadership involvement alone does not automatically create criminal co-principal liability; prosecutors must prove specific, functional control over each phase of the unlawful conduct.
Issues
  • Requirements for establishing co-principal liability through conspiracy (공모공동정범)
  • The degree of specificity and proof required to establish a conspiracy or agreement among co-principals
  • The scope of criminal liability of a senior labor union official acting as a co-principal for acts committed by union members
Key reasoning

To establish co-principal liability through conspiracy (공모공동정범), it is not enough to show that the defendant merely agreed to the plan; there must be functional control over the crime (기능적 행위지배) achieved through an essential contribution to its commission. Because conspiracy is a fact requiring strict proof, courts cannot infer it loosely from a defendant's general leadership role. The Court found that after the building was occupied, the defendant acted alongside the union's executive leadership and directed and controlled the members, satisfying the requirements for co-principal liability. However, for offenses committed before the occupation, the evidence was insufficient to prove that the defendant had engaged in a specific conspiracy or exercised functional control over those particular acts.

Full text (English, AI translation) 10,468 chars

[Defendant]

[Appellant] Defendant
[Defense Counsel] Samil Law Firm and 1 other

[Judgment Below] Daegu High Court Decision 2006No462, decided December 21, 2006

[Order]

The judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Daegu High Court.

[Reasoning]

The grounds of appeal (including the supplementary grounds of appeal submitted after the expiration of the period for submitting the grounds of appeal, to the extent that they supplement the grounds of appeal) are examined as follows.

1.
Co-principal offense under Article 30 of the Criminal Act (형법) is established by satisfying the subjective and objective requirements of an intent to jointly commit the offense and the commission of the crime through functional control over the act based on that joint intent. Even a person among the co-conspirators who did not directly participate in carrying out part of the constituent elements of the offense may, depending on the circumstances, bear criminal liability as a so-called co-conspirator co-principal (공모공동정범). However, in order to do so, it must be recognized, considering comprehensively the person's status and role in the overall crime, and the degree of control or dominance over the course of the crime, that the person is not merely a co-conspirator but that functional control over the act exists through an essential contribution to the crime (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 98Do321, decided May 21, 1998; Supreme Court Decision 2002Do995, decided June 24, 2004; Supreme Court Decision 2002Do5112, decided March 11, 2005; Supreme Court Decision 2006Do1623, decided December 22, 2006, etc.).

Meanwhile, if it is an unavoidable exceptional case in light of the nature of the crime, it cannot necessarily be held unlawful merely because part of the facts charged is described somewhat comprehensively, so long as this does not contravene the purpose of the Criminal Procedure Act (형사소송법) requiring the facts charged to be specified (see Supreme Court Decision 2002Do6103, decided January 24, 2003, etc.). However, in the case of a co-conspirator co-principal, since the conspiracy or plotting constitutes a major part of the "facts constituting the crime," it must be specified as concretely and in as much detail as possible, and moreover, it is subject to strict proof (see Supreme Court Decision 88Do1114, decided September 13, 1988; Supreme Court Decision 88Do2381, decided June 27, 1989, etc.).

2. The court below, for the reasons stated in its judgment, recognized the Defendant's criminal liability as a co-conspirator co-principal for all of the offenses set forth in the judgment, which were committed in the course of the occupation of the head office building of POSCO Co., Ltd. by approximately 2,500 members of the (name omitted) Union in the Pohang area, led by Union President Non-Indicted 1, from around 14:15 on July 13, 2006 to around 04:00 on July 21, 2006.

A. First, according to the evidence lawfully adopted by the court below, the following facts can be recognized: the executive body of the (name omitted) Union finally decided, around the afternoon of July 14, 2006, to occupy the POSCO head office building for a considerable period; accordingly, around 02:00 on July 15, approximately 2,000 union members entered the head office building; approximately 7 to 8 members of the executive body of the (name omitted) Union, including Union President Non-Indicted 1, who directly directed this occupation, stayed on the 9th floor of the building during the period of occupation and directed and controlled the union members' occupation activities by controlling their conduct and preventing their departure through the union's chain of command; and the Defendant, as the Head of the Gyeongbuk Regional Headquarters of the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (전국민주노동조합총연맹), which is the higher-level organization of the (name omitted) Union, entered the head office building together with the aforementioned union members around 02:00 on July 15, and stayed on the 9th floor with the executive body of the (name omitted) Union, discussing the manner of struggle through meetings, touring each floor together to encourage the union members, and otherwise acting in concert with the executive body, mainly playing the role of informing Union President Non-Indicted 1 of external circumstances such as those of the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions, and promoting negotiations through the negotiation channel. In light of the legal principles set forth above, examining the above recognized facts, it can be recognized that, with respect to each offense set forth in the judgment below—such as trespass on a building, obstruction of business, destruction of property, assault, and bodily injury—that occurred around the time the Defendant entered the POSCO building together with the (name omitted) Union members around 02:00 on July 15 and thereafter, even though the Defendant did not personally participate in carrying out some of these acts, considering comprehensively the Defendant's status and role as shown in the above recognized facts, as well as the Defendant's control or dominance over the course of the crime through the chain of command of the organized group that is a labor union engaged in industrial action, the Defendant is not merely a simple co-conspirator with respect to each of the above offenses, but is a person in whom functional control over the act exists through an essential contribution to the crime. Therefore, the Defendant cannot avoid criminal liability as a co-conspirator co-principal for each of the offenses committed by the members of the (name omitted) Union in this portion. The fact that part of the description of the criminal facts, including the conspiracy, is somewhat comprehensively stated appears to be unavoidable in light of the characteristics of this case, namely, a collective crime committed over a period of approximately 6 days; therefore, even if the description is somewhat insufficient, it cannot be said to be unlawful.

With respect to this portion, the court below's conclusion recognizing the Defendant's criminal liability as a co-conspirator co-principal for each of the offenses set forth in the judgment is justified, and there is no illegality affecting the judgment, such as a misapprehension of the legal principles concerning the requirements for establishing co-principal offense under Article 30 of the Criminal Act or the specification of the facts charged, or a violation of the rules of evidence, as pointed out in the grounds of appeal.

B. However, the part of the judgment below that recognized the Defendant's criminal liability as a co-conspirator co-principal even with respect to the offenses committed by the members of the (name omitted) Union prior to around 02:00 on July 15 is difficult to accept for the following reasons.

According to the evidence lawfully adopted by the court below, the Defendant arrived at the head office building around 22:00 on July 13, after approximately 500 union members, led by Union President Non-Indicted 1 of the (name omitted) Union, had trespassed into the POSCO head office building around 14:15 on July 13; the Defendant returned home around 02:00 on July 14, but came out again to the front of the head office building around 09:00, and stayed together with the executive body of the (name omitted) Union until around 02:00 on July 15, when, as noted above, he entered the head office building together with approximately 2,000 union members. During this period, it is recognized that, as an officer of the higher-level organization, the Defendant listened to explanations from Non-Indicted 1 and other members of the executive body of the (name omitted) Union regarding the circumstances of the occupation of the head office building, listened to and discussed future negotiation or struggle plans, and otherwise took a stance of supporting the struggle of the (name omitted) Union members. However, it is difficult to find any evidence sufficient to recognize that the Defendant had, in advance, conspired with Union President Non-Indicted 1 and other members of the executive body of the (name omitted) Union to trespass into the POSCO head office building, or that the Defendant concurred in the final decision of the executive body of the (name omitted) Union to occupy the head office building for a considerable period, or further, that the Defendant exerted influence, such as by controlling or dominating the course of the crime through the executive body of the (name omitted) Union, even with respect to the acts of the (name omitted) Union members that occurred before the joint entry into the head office building around 02:00 on July 15.

Given this, with respect to the offenses committed by the members of the (name omitted) Union prior to around 02:00 on July 15—namely, the confinement of Woori Bank and POSCO employees committed from around 14:15 to around 23:30 on July 13, and the trespass into the POSCO head office building by approximately 500 members of the (name omitted) Union prior to around 02:00 on July 15, and the obstruction of business and destruction of property resulting therefrom—it is difficult to find that functional control over the act through an essential contribution to each offense exists on the part of the Defendant, and therefore, criminal liability as a co-conspirator co-principal cannot be recognized with respect to this portion.

The court below, which nevertheless recognized the Defendant's criminal liability as a co-conspirator co-principal even with respect to this portion of the facts charged, committed an error of misapprehending the legal principles concerning the requirements for establishing co-principal offense under Article 30 of the Criminal Act, and therefore, the judgment below cannot be sustained as it is.

3. Therefore, without the need to examine the remaining grounds of appeal, the judgment below cannot avoid being reversed. Since the court below rendered a single sentence for all of the criminal facts set forth in its judgment, the judgment below is reversed in its entirety, and the case is remanded to the court below for further examination and adjudication. This judgment is rendered by the unanimous opinion of the participating Justices, as set forth in the Order.

Justice Yang Sung-tae (Presiding Justice), Justice Ko Hyun-cheol, Justice Kim Ji-hyung, Justice Jeon Su-an (Reporting Justice)

【참조조문】

[1] 형법 제30조

[2] 형법 제30조, 형사소송법 제254조 제4항, 제307조

[3] 형법 제30조

【참조판례】

[1] 대법원 1998. 5. 21. 선고 98도321 전원합의체 판결(공1998하, 1829), 대법원 2004. 6. 24. 선고 2002도995 판결(공2004하, 1255), 대법원 2005. 3. 11. 선고 2002도5112 판결(공2005상, 618), 대법원 2006. 12. 22. 선고 2006도1623 판결(공2007상, 255) / [2] 대법원 1988. 9. 13. 선고 88도1114 판결(공1988, 1294), 대법원 1989. 6. 27. 선고 88도2381 판결(공1989하, 1192), 대법원 1992. 10. 23. 선고 92도1983 판결(공1992, 3334), 대법원 2002. 10. 11. 선고 2002도2939 판결(공2002하, 2778), 대법원 2003. 1. 24. 선고 2002도6103 판결(공2003상, 758)

【주문】·【이유】 전문 4,171자 · 펼쳐 보기

【피 고 인】

【상 고 인】 피고인

【변 호 인】 법무법인 삼일외 1인

【원심판결】 대구고법 2006. 12. 21. 선고 2006노462 판결

【주 문】

원심판결을 파기하고, 사건을 대구고등법원에 환송한다.

【이 유】상고이유(상고이유서 제출기간 경과 후에 제출된 상고보충이유서의 기재는 상고이유를 보충하는 범위 내에서)를 판단한다.

1. 형법 제30조의 공동정범은 공동가공의 의사와 그 공동의사에 기한 기능적 행위지배를 통한 범죄 실행이라는 주관적·객관적 요건을 충족함으로써 성립하는바, 공모자 중 구성요건 행위 일부를 직접 분담하여 실행하지 않은 자라도 경우에 따라 이른바 공모공동정범으로서의 죄책을 질 수도 있는 것이기는 하나, 이를 위해서는 전체 범죄에 있어서 그가 차지하는 지위, 역할이나 범죄 경과에 대한 지배 내지 장악력 등을 종합해 볼 때, 단순한 공모자에 그치는 것이 아니라 범죄에 대한 본질적 기여를 통한 기능적 행위지배가 존재하는 것으로 인정되는 경우여야 한다 ( 대법원 1998. 5. 21. 선고 98도321 전원합의체 판결, 2004. 6. 24. 선고 2002도995 판결, 2005. 3. 11. 선고 2002도5112 판결, 2006. 12. 22. 선고 2006도1623 판결 등 참조).

한편, 범죄의 특성에 비추어 부득이한 예외적인 경우라면 형사소송법이 공소사실을 특정하도록 한 취지에 반하지 않는 범위 내에서 공소사실 중 일부가 다소 개괄적으로 기재되었다고 하여 반드시 위법하다고 할 수 없으나( 대법원 2003. 1. 24. 선고 2002도6103 판결 등 참조), 공모공동정범에 있어서 공모 또는 모의는 ‘범죄될 사실’의 주요부분에 해당하는 이상 가능한 한 이를 구체적이고 상세하게 특정하여야 할 뿐 아니라 엄격한 증명의 대상에 해당한다( 대법원 1988. 9. 13. 선고 88도1114 판결, 1989. 6. 27. 선고 88도2381 판결 등 참조).

2. 원심은 판시와 같은 이유를 들어, 포항지역 (이름 생략)노조 조합원 중 약 2,500명이 조합장 공소외 1의 주도 아래 2006. 7. 13. 14:15경부터 7. 21. 04:00경까지 주식회사 포스코 본사 건물을 점거하는 과정에서 이루어진 판시 각 범행에 대하여 피고인에게 공모공동정범으로서의 죄책을 모두 인정하였다.

가. 먼저, 원심이 적법하게 채택한 증거들에 의하면, (이름 생략)노조 집행부는 2006. 7. 14. 오후쯤 주식회사 포스코 본사 건물을 상당기간 점거하기로 최종 결정하였고 이에 따라 7. 15. 02:00경 조합원 약 2,000명이 본사 건물에 진입하였으며, 이 사건 점거를 직접 지휘한 조합장 공소외 1을 비롯한 (이름 생략)노조 집행부 약 7~8명은 점거기간 동안 건물 9층에 머물면서 노동조합의 지휘 계통을 통하여 조합원들의 행동을 통제하고 이탈을 방지하는 등 조합원들의 점거행위를 지휘·통제해 왔는데, 피고인은 (이름 생략)노조의 상급단체인 민주노동조합총연맹 경북지역 본부장으로서 7. 15. 02:00경 위 조합원들과 함께 본사 건물로 들어가 (이름 생략)노조 집행부와 함께 9층에서 생활하면서 회의를 통해 투쟁 방식을 상의하고 함께 각 층을 순회하며 조합원들을 격려하는 등 집행부와 행동을 같이 하면서 주로 민주노동조합총연맹 등 외부상황을 조합장 공소외 1에게 알려주고 교섭 창구를 통해 교섭을 추진하는 역할을 담당해 온 사실을 인정할 수 있는바, 앞서 본 법리에 비추어 위 인정사실을 살펴보면, 7. 15. 02:00경 피고인이 (이름 생략)노조 조합원들과 함께 주식회사 포스코 건물에 들어감으로써 건조물에 침입할 즈음과 그 이후에 이루어진 원심 판시 각 건조물 침입, 업무방해, 손괴, 폭행, 상해 등 범죄행위에 대하여는 그 중 일부를 피고인이 직접 분담하여 실행하지는 않았다고 하더라도, 위 인정사실에서 나타나는 피고인의 지위, 역할이나 쟁의행위 중인 노동조합이라는 조직화된 단체의 지휘계통을 통한 범죄 경과에 대한 지배 내지 장악력 등을 종합해 볼 때, 피고인은 위 각 범행의 단순한 공모자에 그치는 것이 아니라 범죄에 대한 본질적 기여를 통한 기능적 행위지배가 존재하는 자로 인정된다 할 것이므로, (이름 생략)노조 조합원들이 행한 이 부분 각 범행에 대한 공모공동정범으로서의 죄책을 면할 수 없다고 할 것이다. 그 범죄사실 중 공모를 포함한 일부 기재가 다소 개괄적으로 이루어져 있는 것은 약 6일 동안 이루어진 집단적인 범행이라는 이 사건 범행의 특성에 비추어 부득이한 것으로 보이므로 그 기재가 다소 미흡하다고 하더라도 위법하다고까지 할 것은 아니다.

이 부분에 대하여 피고인에게 판시 각 범행에 대한 공모공동정범의 죄책을 인정한 원심은 그 결론에 있어 정당하고, 거기에 상고이유에서 지적하는 바와 같은 형법 제30조 공동정범의 성립요건 내지 공소사실 특정에 관한 법리오해나 채증법칙 위반 등으로 인하여 판결에 영향을 미친 위법은 없다.

나. 그러나 원심판결 중 7. 15. 02:00경 이전에 이루어진 (이름 생략)노조 조합원들의 범행에 대하여도 피고인에게 공모공동정범의 죄책을 인정한 부분은 아래와 같은 이유로 이를 그대로 수긍하기가 어렵다.

원심이 적법하게 채택한 증거들에 의하면, 피고인은 (이름 생략)노조 조합장 공소외 1의 주도 아래 조합원 약 500명이 7. 13. 14:15경 주식회사 포스코 본사 건물에 침입한 후인 7. 13. 22:00경 본사 건물에 도착하였으나 7. 14. 02:00경 귀가하였다가 09:00경 다시 본사 건물 앞으로 나와 앞서 본 바와 같이 7. 15. 02:00경 조합원 약 2,000명과 함께 본사 건물에 침입할 때까지 (이름 생략)노조 집행부와 함께 머무르면서 상급단체 간부로서 공소외 1 등 (이름 생략)노조 집행부로부터 본사 건물 점거 경위 등에 대하여 설명을 듣고 앞으로의 협상 내지 투쟁 계획 등에 대하여 설명을 듣고 상의하는 등 (이름 생략)노조 조합원들의 투쟁을 지지하는 태도를 취한 사실이 인정될 뿐, 피고인이 조합장 공소외 1 등 (이름 생략)노조 집행부와 주식회사 포스코 본사 건물 침입을 사전에 미리 공모하였다거나 본사 건물을 상당기간 점거하기로 한 (이름 생략)노조 집행부의 최종 결정에 동조하였다거나 나아가 7. 15. 02:00경 본사 건물에 함께 침입하기 이전에 이루어진 (이름 생략)노조 조합원들의 행위에 대하여도 (이름 생략)노조 집행부를 통하여 범죄 경과를 지배 내지 장악하는 등 영향력을 미쳤다고 인정할 만한 증거는 찾아보기 어렵다.

그렇다면 7. 15. 02:00경 이전에 이루어진 (이름 생략)노조 조합원들의 범행 즉, 7. 13. 14:15경부터 23:30경까지 이루어진 우리은행 및 포스코 직원들에 대한 감금행위, 7. 15. 02:00경 이전에 이루어진 (이름 생략)노조 조합원 약 500명의 주식회사 포스코 본사 건물 침입과 이로 인한 업무방해 및 손괴행위에 대하여는 피고인에게 각 범행에 대한 본질적 기여를 통한 기능적 행위지배가 존재한다고 보기 어려우므로 이 부분에 대하여는 공모공동정범의 죄책을 인정할 수 없다고 할 것이다.

이와 달리 이 부분 공소사실에 대하여까지 모두 공모공동정범의 죄책을 인정한 원심은 형법 제30조 공동정범의 성립요건에 대한 법리를 오해하는 등의 위법을 범한 잘못이 있어 그대로 유지될 수 없다.

3. 그러므로 나머지 상고이유에 대하여 살펴 볼 필요 없이 원심은 파기를 면할 수 없는바, 원심은 판시 범죄사실 전부에 대하여 하나의 형을 선고하였으므로 원심판결을 전부 파기하고 사건을 다시 심리·판단하게 하기 위하여 원심법원에 환송하기로 하여 관여 대법관의 일치된 의견으로 주문과 같이 판결한다.

대법관 양승태(재판장) 고현철 김지형 전수안(주심)

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