[Plaintiff, Appellant] Plaintiff (Attorney Jeong Deok-jang, Counsel for the Plaintiff)
[Defendant, Appellee] Chairman of the National Labor Relations Commission
[Intervenor for the Defendant] MBC (Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation) Art Troupe Co., Ltd. (Attorney Seo Ye-gyo, Counsel for the Intervenor)
[Judgment Below] Seoul High Court Decision 96Gu35325 dated July 18, 1997
[Order]
The appeal is dismissed.
The costs of the appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiff.
[Reasoning]
The grounds of appeal are examined.
1. Regarding whether a renewed contract was concluded
The court below found that the Plaintiff entered into an exclusive contract with the Intervenor for the Defendant (hereinafter "the Intervenor") for a one-year term on March 1, 1994, and worked for one year as a timpani player in the orchestra operated by the Intervenor, and then, on March 1, 1995, entered into another contract of the same content for a one-year term and continued working; that around the time the contract term was about to expire, on February 26, 1996, the Intervenor posted a notice designating the Plaintiff as a candidate for contract renewal, but around April 26 of the same year, notified the Plaintiff that renewal was not possible and did not conclude a renewed contract, and accordingly, the Plaintiff resigned on April 30 of the same year. Based on these findings, the court below determined that, since the Intervenor had posted the list of candidates for contract renewal but then immediately removed the notice due to problems in the selection, and since the Intervenor was entitled to withdraw the selection of candidates for renewal at any time before the renewed contract was actually concluded, the mere fact that the Plaintiff was posted as a candidate for renewal could not be deemed to mean that a renewed contract had been concluded between the Plaintiff and the Intervenor.
A manifestation of intent to offer must be specific and definite enough that a contract could be formed merely upon acceptance thereof (see Supreme Court Decision 92Da29696 delivered on October 13, 1992; Supreme Court Decision 93Da32507 delivered on October 22, 1993, etc.). According to the record, the content of the notice posted by the Intervenor was merely that the orchestra members, etc., whose names were listed therein had been selected as candidates for contract renewal for 1996, and did not include specific matters that would constitute the content of the contract. In fact, it can be seen that, after posting the list of candidates for renewal, the Intervenor specifically determined matters such as the contract term, basic salary, and bonus with the candidates who had been posted for renewal, prepared a written contract, and thereby concluded the renewed contract. Therefore, the posting of the list of candidates for renewal, including the Plaintiff, cannot be regarded as an offer of renewal to the Plaintiff, and accordingly, it cannot be said that the Plaintiff accepted the Intervenor's offer by continuing to work. The determination of the court below that a renewed contract was not concluded with the Plaintiff is therefore justified, and the argument in the grounds of appeal alleging errors such as misapprehension of facts or misunderstanding of the law cannot be accepted.
2. Regarding whether the contract was renewed
The court below determined that the fact that the Plaintiff continued to work while the conclusion of the renewed contract was held in abeyance for two months was due to the fact that, because of the labor union's strike and the movement demanding the resignation of the president, which had continued since early February 1996 at the non-party Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation, the parent company of the Intervenor, the Intervenor was unable to determine the wage level, such as the exclusive contract fee, of the orchestra members who were contract employees, and, further compounded by a movement by some orchestra members demanding the resignation of the orchestra director, the Intervenor failed to conclude the renewed contract by the expiration date of the contract term; and that this circumstance was known to all the orchestra members, including the Plaintiff. On these grounds, the court below determined that the mere fact that the Plaintiff worked for two months after the expiration of the contract term could not be deemed to mean that the contract between the Plaintiff and the Intervenor had been impliedly renewed, and that the employment relationship between the Plaintiff and the Intervenor had terminated upon the expiration of the contract term.
However, the strike situation, etc., cited by the court below is merely an internal matter of the Intervenor, and in light of the fact that the Intervenor posted the Plaintiff as a candidate for contract renewal three days before the expiration of the contract term while such a situation was ongoing, this cannot be regarded as a reason that made it impossible to conclude a renewed contract with the Plaintiff by the time the contract term expired. Moreover, there is no evidence in the record showing that the Intervenor reserved any objection to the Plaintiff's continued work, such as by notifying the Plaintiff of a postponement of the conclusion of the renewed contract. Therefore, insofar as the Plaintiff continued to provide labor even after the expiration of the contract term and the Intervenor raised no objection to the provision of such labor for what can be regarded as a considerable period of about two months, the exclusive contract between the Plaintiff and the Intervenor must be deemed to have been impliedly renewed pursuant to Article 662(1) of the Civil Act (민법).
Nevertheless, the determination of the court below that the contract between the Plaintiff and the Intervenor could not be deemed to have been impliedly renewed is the result of a misapprehension of facts or a misunderstanding of the legal principles concerning the implied renewal of an employment contract. However, the court below also added, as an alternative determination, that even if the Intervenor's refusal to conclude a renewed contract with the Plaintiff were regarded as a dismissal, such dismissal was justified, and thus the employment relationship between the Plaintiff and the Intervenor had lawfully terminated. Moreover, as will be seen below, this employment contract must be regarded as having been terminated by that dismissal, and thus the conclusion of the court below is justified. Therefore, the above error of the court below cannot be said to have affected the judgment, and consequently, this part of the grounds of appeal cannot be accepted either.
3. Regarding whether there was a dismissal
In this case, the fact that the Intervenor, after the exclusive contract had been renewed, notified the Plaintiff on April 26, 1996, that a renewed contract could not be concluded and thereby terminated the employment relationship with the Plaintiff, constitutes a unilateral termination of the exclusive contract by the Intervenor, and thus constitutes a dismissal.
As to the grounds for such dismissal, the court below found that, from February 1996 until the aforementioned point in time when the employment relationship terminated, the Plaintiff, together with some other members, participated in the movement demanding the resignation of the orchestra director, refused to perform in defiance of the direction of the conductor who was the orchestra director, and participated in performances while intoxicated on several occasions in violation of the instructions of the orchestra director, etc. The court below determined that such conduct of the Plaintiff, in light of the characteristics of an orchestra which must achieve artistic excellence through harmony between the conductor and the performers, constituted a violation of the duty of good faith under the exclusive contract between the Plaintiff and the Intervenor, breaking the harmony of the orchestra as a whole, and thus constituted a case in which the cause attributable to the Plaintiff was such that, in light of social norms, the employment relationship could not be maintained, and accordingly, the dismissal of the Plaintiff was justified.
In light of the record, the above fact-finding and determination of the court below are correct.
Furthermore, the term "rules of employment" under Article 94 of the former Labor Standards Act (근로기준법) (abolished by Act No. 5309 on March 13, 1997) refers to any rules containing standards concerning matters of service discipline and working conditions such as wages, regardless of their title, and thus, if an individual employment contract contains the content of such standards concerning working conditions, it likewise constitutes rules of employment (see Supreme Court Decision 91Da30828 delivered on February 28, 1992; Supreme Court Decision 97Da24511 delivered on November 28, 1997, etc.). According to the record, in concluding the exclusive contract with the Plaintiff and other orchestra members, the Intervenor used a printed contract form providing, among other things, that a member must exclusively perform in all projects required by the Intervenor and must not cause any hindrance to the Intervenor's business (Articles 1 and 3); that a member may not perform in any capacity other than the duties assigned by the Intervenor without the Intervenor's approval (Article 8); and that the Intervenor may unilaterally terminate the contract if a member fails to faithfully perform this contract (Article 10), with blank spaces left for the contract term, basic salary, bonus, welfare benefits, and practice fees, and that the exclusive contracts had been concluded by merely filling in the blank spaces of such a form. Accordingly, the said contract form constitutes rules of employment applicable to the orchestra members. Furthermore, since the contract form does not contain any procedural provisions requiring the convening of a personnel committee or the granting of an opportunity to present an explanation at the time of dismissal, there is no procedural defect in the fact that the Intervenor orally notified the Plaintiff of the dismissal unilaterally without going through such procedures.
Meanwhile, it is the established precedent of this Court that even where advance notice of dismissal was not given, the validity of the dismissal is not affected as long as there existed justifiable grounds for the dismissal (see Supreme Court Decision 93Nu20115 delivered on June 14, 1994).
Therefore, the determination of the court below set forth above, that the employment relationship with the Plaintiff terminated either because the contract was not renewed, or, even if it was renewed, because it was terminated by dismissal, is ultimately justified, and there is no illegality therein, such as misapprehension of facts or misunderstanding of the law, that affected the judgment. Accordingly, this part of the grounds of appeal is not accepted either.
4. Conclusion
Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of the appeal are to be borne by the losing party. This judgment is rendered in accordance with the unanimous opinion of the participating Justices, as stated in the Order.
Justice Kim Hyung-seon (Presiding Justice), Jeong Gwi-ho, Lee Yong-hun, Cho Mu-je (Justice in Charge)