[Plaintiffs, Appellants and Appellees] Hyundai Motor Company and 29 others (Litigation representative: Yulchon LLC, attorneys in charge Yoon Yong-seop and 2 others)
[Defendant, Appellee and Appellant] Korea Fair Trade Commission (Litigation representative: Samhan LLC, attorney in charge Yoo Geun-wan)
[Lower Court Judgment] Seoul High Court Judgment dated June 21, 2001, Case No. 98Nu13098
[Order]
1. The part of the lower court judgment concerning the order to publicize the fact of violation of law against the Plaintiffs is reversed in its entirety, and the lawsuit as to this part is dismissed.
2. Among the lower court judgment, the following parts are reversed and this part of the case is remanded to the Seoul High Court:
- the corrective order part and the surcharge payment order part concerning Plaintiff Hyundai Motor Company's act of underwriting commercial paper issued by Mando Machinery Co., Ltd. and Halla Construction Co., Ltd.;
- the corrective order part and the surcharge payment order part concerning Plaintiff Hyundai Heavy Industries Co., Ltd.'s act of underwriting commercial paper issued by Mando Machinery Co., Ltd., Halla Construction Co., Ltd., Halla Resources Co., Ltd., and Halla Shipping Co., Ltd.;
- the corrective order part and the surcharge payment order part concerning Plaintiff Hyundai Industrial Development Co., Ltd.'s act of underwriting commercial paper issued by Halla Cement Co., Ltd., Halla Construction Co., Ltd., and Mando Machinery Co., Ltd.;
- the corrective order part and the surcharge payment order part concerning Plaintiff Hynix Semiconductor Inc.'s act of underwriting commercial paper issued by Mando Machinery Co., Ltd. and Halla Construction Co., Ltd.;
and
- the corrective order part and the surcharge payment order part concerning Plaintiff Hyundai Motor Company's respective acts of failing to recover advance payments from Hyundai Heavy Industries Co., Ltd. and Hyundai Jonghap Metal Co., Ltd.
3. The remaining appeals by the Plaintiffs and by the Defendant are all dismissed.
4. As to Plaintiff and litigation successor to Hyundai Engineering Co., Ltd., namely Hyundai Construction Co., Ltd.; Plaintiff Hyundai Mobis Co., Ltd.; Plaintiff Hyundai Corporation; Litigation successor to Plaintiff Hyundai Motor Service Co., Ltd., namely Hyundai Motor Company; Plaintiff Hyundai Merchant Marine Co., Ltd.; Plaintiff Incheon Iron & Steel Co., Ltd.; Plaintiff and litigation successor to Hyundai Oil Sales Co., Ltd., namely Hyundai Oil Refinery Co., Ltd.; Plaintiff Hyundai Petrochemical Co., Ltd.; Plaintiff Hyundai Livart Co., Ltd.; Plaintiff, the receiver of Korea Industrial Development Co., Ltd. under reorganization, litigation successor to Korea Industrial Development Co., Ltd.; Plaintiff Korea Aluminum Industry Co., Ltd.; Plaintiff Hyundai Hysco Co., Ltd.; Plaintiff Hyundai Elevator Co., Ltd.; Plaintiff Hyundai Mipo Dockyard Co., Ltd.; Plaintiff Kefico Corporation; Plaintiff Hyundai Information Technology Co., Ltd.; Plaintiff Hyundai Heavy Equipment Industry Co., Ltd.; Plaintiff Kumkang Planning Co., Ltd.; Plaintiff Hyundai Broadcasting Co., Ltd.; Plaintiff Hyundai Securities Co., Ltd.; Litigation successor to Plaintiff Hyundai Merchant Banking Corporation, namely Cho Hung Bank Co., Ltd.; Plaintiff Hyundai Department Store Co., Ltd.; Plaintiff Hyundai Marine & Fire Insurance Co., Ltd.; Plaintiff Hyundai Research Institute Co., Ltd.; Plaintiff Hyundai Space and Aircraft Co., Ltd.; Plaintiff Hyundai Logistics Co., Ltd.; Plaintiff Hyundai Capital Co., Ltd.; and Plaintiff Hyundai Investment Trust Securities Co., Ltd. — the total litigation costs of the portion dismissing the lawsuit and the appeal costs of the portion dismissing the appeal, concerning the above Plaintiffs, shall be borne by the above Plaintiffs, and the appeal costs of the portion dismissing the appeal concerning the Defendant shall be borne by the Defendant.
[Reasoning]
1. As to the part ordering public announcement of the fact of violation of law
Upon *ex officio* review, the records show that the Defendant, on March 8, 2002, while this case was pending before this court, *ex officio* revoked the part of the disposition in this case ordering public announcement of the fact of violation of law. If that is so, there is no longer any interest in seeking revocation as to this part.
2. As to the Plaintiffs' appeal on the remaining parts
A. As to the act of underwriting unsecured convertible bonds
(1) As to Grounds 6 and 7
Considering together the provisions of Article 23(1) and (2) of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (독점규제및공정거래에관한법률) (before amendment by Act No. 5813 of February 5, 1999; hereinafter the "Act"), and Article 36(1) [Attached Table] Item 10(a) of the Enforcement Decree of the Act (before amendment by Presidential Decree No. 16221 of March 31, 1999), an "unfair provision of funds or assets" means "an act whereby a business entity, in an unfair manner, provides funds such as advance payments or loans to a person with a special relationship or another company, or engages in transactions therewith, at a price that is markedly lower or higher than normal, or at a markedly large scale, thereby providing excessive economic benefit and supporting the person with a special relationship or the other company, which act is likely to impede fair trade." In determining whether such an act constitutes "providing or transacting at a markedly low or high price, or providing or transacting at a markedly large scale so as to provide excessive economic benefit," it is necessary to comprehensively consider not only the difference between the performance and counter-performance but also the scale of the support-type transaction, the economic benefit resulting from the supporting act, the period of support, the number of instances of support, the timing of support, and the economic situation in which the supported entity found itself at the time of the supporting act, and to make the determination specifically and individually. The "normal interest rate," which is the standard for determining whether the performance and counter-performance are markedly favorable, means the interest rate that would apply if a fund transaction had taken place between the supported entity and an independent financial institution having no special relationship with it, under circumstances identical or similar in terms of timing, type, scale, period, and credit standing to the fund transaction between the supporting entity and the supported entity, or the interest rate that would apply if a fund transaction had taken place between independent persons having no special relationship, under circumstances identical or similar in terms of timing, type, scale, period, and credit standing to the fund transaction between the supporting entity and the supported entity (hereinafter the "individual normal interest rate").
The court below, upon comprehensive consideration of the adopted evidence, found as follows: Plaintiff Hyundai Motor Company (hereinafter "Hyundai Motor") and 18 other companies, between November 19, 1997 and March 12, 1998, as set forth in the judgment below, underwrote, at the request of the supported entities, unsecured convertible bonds in the amount of KRW 210 billion and KRW 50 billion respectively issued by their affiliated companies Korea Aluminum Industry Co., Ltd. (hereinafter "Korea Aluminum Industry") and Hyundai Livart Co., Ltd. before its merger (hereinafter "Hyundai Livart"; when referring to both companies together in this section, the "supported entities"), with a redemption period ending on December 31, 1999 and a guaranteed maturity interest rate of 11% to 18% per annum; the underwritten amounts were excessive, exceeding Korea Aluminum Industry's net loss for 1997 of approximately KRW 108.7 billion and Hyundai Livart's net loss for the same year of approximately KRW 45.7 billion; the supported entities, as set forth in the judgment below, had suffered net losses for three consecutive years since 1995 and were in a state of complete capital erosion, and were restricted from borrowing funds from outside sources, making the issuance of long-term commercial paper practically difficult, so that they mostly issued ultra-short-term commercial paper with maturities of one to seven days merely to settle funds as needed, such that it appears objectively impossible for a third party other than an affiliated company to underwrite the unsecured convertible bonds at issue; in the case of convertible bonds, until the conversion right is exercised, they can only be regarded as bonds, and in the case of the unsecured convertible bonds at issue, the conversion price was 113% to 217% higher than the standard stock price under the Listed Company Financial Management Regulations, and considering the economic conditions at the time of issuance and the financial conditions of the issuing companies, the exercise of the conversion right appears practically impossible, so that the underwriting of the unsecured convertible bonds at issue cannot be regarded as a normal capital transaction, and accordingly the unsecured convertible bonds at issue must be regarded as equivalent to ordinary corporate bonds; compared to the yield of 14% to 22% per annum on ordinary corporate bonds (bank-guaranteed bonds with a three-year maturity) at the time of issuance, the unsecured convertible bonds at issue, with a maturity yield of 11% to 18% per annum, were markedly inferior in value even in terms of yield; and the overdraft interest rate of the supported entities in the month of issuance of the unsecured convertible bonds at issue was 18.1% to 30% per annum. Having found these facts, the court below determined, to the effect, that although an overdraft interest rate, being the interest rate for a temporary short-term loan based on an overdraft contract, is generally higher than ordinary loan interest rates such as normal commercial paper loan rates, and therefore the mere fact that it is difficult to calculate the individual normal interest rate does not by itself justify directly applying the relevant company's overdraft interest rate as the normal interest rate; however, in special cases where it is recognized that the individual normal interest rate would not fall below the general normal interest rate, the relevant company's overdraft interest rate may be applied as the normal interest rate even if the individual normal interest rate cannot be specifically determined; that, in light of the economic conditions at the time of issuance of the unsecured convertible bonds at issue and the financial conditions of the issuing companies, the supported entities were already on the verge of default, had a very high investment risk, and were practically unable to borrow funds from outside sources, so that the overdraft interest rate of the supported entities in the month of issuance of the unsecured convertible bonds at issue, namely 18.1% to 30% per annum, may be regarded as the individual normal interest rate; and that, comprehensively considering the scale of the support-type transaction, the economic benefit resulting from the supporting act, the period of support, the number of instances of support, the timing of support, and the economic situation in which the supported entities found themselves at the time of the supporting act, the act of underwriting the unsecured convertible bonds at issue constitutes a transaction on markedly favorable terms.
Examining the relevant statutory provisions and the legal principles set forth above in light of the record, the fact-finding and determination of the court below as described above are justified and acceptable, and there is no illegality therein, such as violation of the rules of evidence or failure to exhaust deliberation resulting in mistaken fact-finding, or misapprehension of the legal principles concerning the establishment of a supporting act, as alleged in the grounds of appeal.
(2) As to Grounds 6 and 8
(A) Considering together the fact that the legislative purpose of prohibiting unfair provision of support as a type of unfair trade practice under Article 23(1)(7) of the Act lies in establishing a fair trading order and preventing concentration of economic power, and the provisions of Article 23(1)(7) and (2) of the Act and Article 36(1) [Attached Table] Item 10 of the Enforcement Decree of the Act, in determining whether a supporting act is unfair, it is necessary to comprehensively consider the relationship between the supporting entity and the supported entity, the purpose and intent of the supporting act, the structure and characteristics of the market to which the supported entity belongs, the scale of the support-type transaction, the economic benefit resulting from the supporting act, the period of support, as well as the effect of the supporting act on restricting competition or causing concentration of economic power in the market to which the supported entity belongs, the degree of change in the competitive capacity and competitive conditions of small and medium enterprises and other competing business entities, the trend of the supported entity's market share before and after the supporting act, the degree of market opening, and other factors, and thereby examine whether there is a risk of impeding fair trade due to the relevant supporting act, such as by impeding competition or causing concentration of economic power in the relevant market to which the supported entity belongs (see Supreme Court Decision 2001Du7220, delivered on March 12, 2004).
The court below, upon comprehensive consideration of the adopted evidence, found the facts set forth in the judgment below, and then determined that, considering the fact that Hyundai Motor and 18 other companies and the supported entities are in an affiliated company relationship within the large business group "Hyundai"; the general status of the supported entities as of the end of 1997, including their line of business, total assets, capital, sales, net income, and number of regular employees; the fact that at the time of issuance of the unsecured convertible bonds at issue, the financial market was practically paralyzed due to the IMF crisis, making fundraising extremely difficult, and in particular the supported entities, due to losses over several years, were in a state of complete capital erosion and were merely issuing ultra-short-term commercial paper with maturities of one to seven days in a desperate effort to avoid default; the fact that Hyundai Motor and 18 other companies underwrote the unsecured convertible bonds at issue in order to improve the financial difficulties of the supported entities, who were in financial distress, and thereby provided excessive economic benefits equivalent to KRW 3.314 billion and KRW 230 million, respectively, corresponding to the difference between the normal discount rate and the actual discount rate applied to the underwritten amounts; the fact that, particularly in the case of Hyundai Livart, Hyundai Heavy Industries Co., Ltd. (hereinafter "Hyundai Heavy Industries") underwrote KRW 20 billion in commercial paper issued by Hyundai Livart on January 12, 1998, just before the underwriting of the unsecured convertible bonds at issue, in order to resolve Hyundai Livart's financial difficulties, indicating that the affiliated companies of the large business group "Hyundai" systematically supported the supported entities; and the fact that even if there was practically no competing enterprise at the time of the underwriting of the convertible bonds at issue, the support to the supported entities could suppress the market entry of new enterprises, so that it cannot be said that this did not impede competition in the relevant market—considering these various circumstances, the act of Hyundai Motor and 18 other companies in underwriting the unsecured convertible bonds at issue is likely to impede fair and free competition in the relevant market by enabling the supported entities to continue to maintain their previous position in the relevant industry.
Examining the relevant statutory provisions and the legal principles set forth above in light of the record, the fact-finding and determination of the court below as described above are justified and acceptable, and there is no illegality therein, such as violation of the rules of evidence or failure to exhaust deliberation resulting in mistaken fact-finding, or misapprehension of the legal principles concerning unfairness or impediment to competition, etc., as alleged in the grounds of appeal.
(B) Whether a supporting act is unfair must be evaluated solely from the perspective of a fair trading order, and public interest purposes, consumer benefit, and the necessity or reasonableness in business management or transactions are, insofar as they are not unrelated to a fair trading order, one of the factors to be considered in determining whether unfairness exists; however, the mere fact that a supporting act has simple business management necessity or reasonableness or necessity in transactions cannot by itself negate the unfairness and the impediment to fair trade that constitute the elements of unfair provision of support.
Examining the relevant statutory provisions and the above legal principles in light of the record, although there are some inappropriate points in the reasoning of the court below, the court below, in the end, is deemed to have determined, considering the circumstances alleged by Hyundai Motor and 18 other companies as set forth in the judgment below together with the other factors underlying the determination of unfairness, that unfairness is recognized in the act of underwriting the unsecured convertible bonds at issue, and this is acceptable. There is no illegality therein, such as misapprehension of the legal principles concerning unfairness as an element of unfair provision of support, as alleged in the grounds of appeal.
B. As to the act of failing to recover advance payments
(1) The court below, upon comprehensive consideration of the adopted evidence, found as follows: Plaintiff Hyundai Motor, on December 5, 1995, in connection with the construction of automated logistics facilities as set forth in the judgment below, received a request from Hyundai Heavy Industries, an independently managed company owned by a relative (친족독립경영회사), the contractor, for payment of an advance of KRW 15 billion, and paid KRW 15 billion interest-free on condition that it be offset against the price of delivered goods after a one-year grace period; and on March 11, 1997, received a request from Hyundai Heavy Industries for payment of an advance of KRW 10 billion for the purchase of raw materials for the production of welding robots, and paid KRW 10 billion interest-free on the same condition of offset against the price of delivered goods after a one-year grace period. Also, the said Plaintiff, on December 4, 1995, received a request from Hyundai Metal Corporation (hereinafter "Hyundai Metal"), an independently managed company owned by a relative, unrelated to any specific transaction, for payment of KRW 10 billion in the name of an advance payment to cover funds needed for facility investment, and paid KRW 10 billion interest-free on December 6 of the same year. The said Plaintiff had no precedent of paying such large advance payments other than in this case, and even where it had paid small advance payments, it had offset them against the price of goods, whereas in this case it left the advance payments unoffset against the price of goods, recovering the full amount owed by Hyundai Heavy Industries on January 12, 1998, but not recovering the amount owed by Hyundai Metal until the time of the disposition at issue. Having found these facts, the court below determined that the act of providing support in the name of advance payments in this case, unlike in the case of a sale, is in substance a continuing lending act that does not terminate simultaneously with the provision of the funds but continues until the funds are recovered, and that if, as in this case, the funds were not recovered but left as they were even after Article 23(1)(7) of the Act came into force, this constitutes a continuing provision of economic benefit by the Plaintiff itself for the financial convenience of the supported entities, and thus constitutes unfair provision of support, and this cannot be characterized as retroactive application.
(2) Considering together the legislative purpose of the system prohibiting unfair provision of support and the provisions of Article 23(1)(7) and (2) of the Act and Article 36(1) [Attached Table] Item 10(a) of the Enforcement Decree of the Act, it is reasonable to interpret that the act of providing funds includes an omission such as failing to recover, with the intent to provide support, funds that are the consideration for a transaction involving assets or services, even after the due date, thereby allowing the supported entity to use those funds and thus obtain profit equivalent to interest thereon (see Supreme Court Decision 2001Du7411, delivered on September 5, 2003). However, since the subject of regulation of unfair provision of funds is the act itself of providing or transacting funds with the intent to provide support, or the act itself of failing to recover funds, the act of unfair provision of funds is established the moment there occurs the provision or transaction of funds, or the failure to recover funds, with the intent to provide support; the benefit thereby obtained by the supported entity is merely the economic effect resulting from such act. Therefore, where the supporting entity's provision or transaction of funds, or its omission in failing to recover funds, with the intent to provide support to the supported entity, already occurred before Article 23(1)(7) of the Act came into force, and after the said provision came into force such omission merely continued, this cannot, absent other special circumstances, be regarded as constituting an act of providing funds.
(3) Nevertheless, the court below, contrary to the foregoing, determined, for the reasons set forth in the judgment below, that the said Plaintiff's act of merely failing to recover, even after Article 23(1)(7) of the Act came into force, funds paid in the name of advance payments with the intent, already existing before the said provision came into force, to support Hyundai Heavy Industries and Hyundai Metal, constitutes an act of providing funds. In so determining, the court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles concerning the elements for the establishment of unfair provision of support, and such error affected the outcome of the judgment.
C. As to the act of underwriting commercial paper
(1) As to Ground 12
The average overdraft interest rate of commercial banks at the end of each month, as published by the Bank of Korea (calculated by weighted-averaging the entire outstanding balance of loans executed under overdraft contracts by commercial banks as of the end of the relevant month; hereinafter the "general normal interest rate"), being the interest rate for a temporary short-term loan based on an overdraft contract, is generally higher than ordinary loan interest rates such as normal commercial paper loan rates, and therefore the mere fact that it is difficult to calculate the individual normal interest rate does not by itself justify directly applying the general normal interest rate as the normal interest rate; however, where there are special circumstances recognizing that the individual normal interest rate would not fall below the general normal interest rate, the general normal interest rate may be applied as the normal interest rate even if the individual normal interest rate cannot be specifically determined.
The court below, upon comprehensive consideration of the adopted evidence, found as follows: Plaintiff Hyundai Motor, Plaintiff Hyundai Heavy Industries, Plaintiff Hyundai Industrial Development Co., Ltd. (hereinafter "Hyundai Industrial Development"), Hyundai Merchant Banking Corporation before its merger (hereinafter "Hyundai Merchant Banking"), and Plaintiff Hynix Semiconductor Inc. (hereinafter "Hynix Semiconductor"), between December 2 and December 9, 1997, as set forth in the judgment below, underwrote commercial paper in this case in the aggregate amount of KRW 470.4 billion issued by Mando Machinery Co., Ltd., Halla Heavy Industries Co., Ltd., Halla Cement Co., Ltd., Halla Resources Co., Ltd., and Halla Shipping Co., Ltd. (hereinafter the "Halla affiliated companies"), which are independently managed companies owned by relatives; meanwhile, Hyundai Heavy Industries, Hyundai Oil Refinery Co., Ltd. (hereinafter "Hyundai Oil Refinery"), Hyundai Petrochemical Co., Ltd. (hereinafter "Hyundai Petrochemical"), Hyundai Securities Co., Ltd. (hereinafter "Hyundai Securities"), and Hyundai Corporation (hereinafter "Hyundai Corporation") also, between December 1 and December 5, 1997, as set forth in the judgment below, underwrote commercial paper in the aggregate amount of KRW 83.443 billion issued by Halla Heavy Industries Co., Ltd., Halla Cement Co., Ltd., Mando Machinery Co., Ltd., and Halla Construction Co., Ltd., which are independently managed companies owned by relatives. However, the Halla affiliated companies, including their affiliate Halla Heavy Industries Co., Ltd., as set forth in the judgment below, were all in a state of loss-making management with eroded capital, and, despite already having received direct and indirect support amounting to as much as KRW 300 billion from Hyundai affiliated companies including Plaintiff Hyundai Motor prior to the issuance of the commercial paper at issue, were facing severe financial difficulties; on December 2, 1997, they were unable to settle bills totaling KRW 542.1 billion presented by Shinsegae Merchant Banking and other financial companies and faced a crisis of default, but, in consideration of the fact that negotiations with the IMF were then in progress, the said financial companies extended the maturity of the bills on a temporary basis by receiving new bills from the Halla affiliated companies, thereby narrowly avoiding default; on December 3 of the same year, they were again unable to settle bills totaling KRW 153 billion presented by the said financial companies and again faced a crisis of default, and the said financial companies again extended the maturity in the same manner, thereby temporarily avoiding default; however, on December 4, 1997, they were unable to settle, by the settlement deadline of 10:00 a.m. on December 6 of the same year, bills totaling KRW 170 billion again presented to them, and thus finally all defaulted simultaneously. The Halla affiliated companies were insolvent enterprises, and, as set forth above, having faced a crisis of default due to financial difficulties, had a high investment risk, such that, between December 1 and December 9 of the same year, when the Plaintiffs underwrote the commercial paper, it was practically impossible for them to raise funds from outside sources. Having found these facts, the court below determined, to the effect, as follows: before December 22, 1997, the discount rate on commercial paper could not exceed 25% per annum pursuant to Article 1(1) of the Interest Limitation Act (이자제한법) and the Regulation on the Maximum Interest Rate under Article 1(1) of the Interest Limitation Act (이자제한법제1조제1항의최고이자율에관한규정); the yield on commercial paper published by the Bank of Korea at the time was also 26.67% per annum, which, converted back to a discount rate, amounts to about 25% per annum; however, at the time of the underwriting of the commercial paper at issue, the commercial paper market was in a state of paralysis, and the actual interest rates prevailing in the financial market at the time already exceeded the maximum rate of 25% per annum under Article 1(1) of the Interest Limitation Act and the Regulation on the Maximum Interest Rate under Article 1(1) of the Interest Limitation Act; in order to resolve this discrepancy between law and economic reality, the Regulation on the Maximum Interest Rate under Article 1(1) of the Interest Limitation Act was amended on December 22, 1997, raising the maximum interest rate under the Interest Limitation Act to 40% per annum; the supported entities, the Halla affiliated companies, at the time of issuance of the commercial paper at issue, were already on the verge of default, had a very high investment risk, and were practically unable to borrow funds from outside sources, so that, even if the discount rate was high, there was no possibility that a third party unrelated to the issuing companies would underwrite commercial paper issued by the Halla affiliated companies; indeed, in the case of newly issued commercial paper by the Halla affiliated companies, there was in fact no instance in which a third party, a non-affiliated company, underwrote such newly issued commercial paper, other than instances where merchant banking companies underwrote it as a means of extending maturing commercial paper; nevertheless, only the Hyundai affiliated companies, including Plaintiff Hyundai Heavy Industries, which are in an independently managed company relationship owned by relatives with the Halla affiliated companies, participated collectively, at the level of the business group, in underwriting the commercial paper just before the default of the Halla affiliated companies, underwriting as much as KRW 553.5 billion in newly issued commercial paper from the Halla affiliated companies and others; and the average overdraft interest rate of commercial banks published by the Bank of Korea as of December 31, 1997 was 37.48% per annum. In light of the above, it is recognized that the interest rate at which the Halla affiliated companies could realistically raise funds at the time of issuance of the commercial paper at issue would not fall below 37.48% per annum, the average overdraft interest rate of commercial banks as of December 31, 1997 published by the Bank of Korea, notwithstanding the restrictions under Article 1(1) of the Interest Limitation Act and the Regulation on the Maximum Interest Rate under Article 1(1) of the Interest Limitation Act, and since it is difficult to reasonably calculate a specific individual normal interest rate, the general normal interest rate of 37.48% per annum may be applied as the normal interest rate.
Examining the relevant statutory provisions and the legal principles set forth above in light of the record, the fact-finding and determination of the court below as described above are justified and acceptable, and there is no illegality therein, such as violation of the rules of evidence or failure to exhaust deliberation resulting in mistaken fact-finding, or misapprehension of the legal principles concerning the maximum interest rate under the Interest Limitation Act and the calculation of the normal price, etc., as alleged in the grounds of appeal.
(2) As to Ground 13
The court below, upon comprehensive consideration of the adopted evidence, found the facts set forth in the judgment below, and then determined, to the effect, that it was lawful to regard the actual discount rate, as the standard for calculating the amount of support, as the purchase discount rate of Plaintiff Hyundai Motor, Plaintiff Hyundai Heavy Industries, Plaintiff Hyundai Industrial Development, and Plaintiff Hynix Semiconductor in underwriting the commercial paper at issue respectively issued by the Halla affiliated companies through the intermediation of the financial institutions set forth in the judgment below, calculated by adding to each issuance amount the fees and other expenses paid to the intermediary institutions, and to calculate the amount of support by comparing this with the normal discount rate on that basis.
The comparison of the normal discount rate and the actual discount rate in a particular fund or asset transaction is for the purpose of determining whether the transaction in question is on "markedly favorable terms" to the supported entity and whether there is a risk of impeding fair trade due to this, such as by impeding competition or causing concentration of economic power in the relevant market to which the supported entity belongs. Therefore, in the case of underwriting commercial paper through an intermediary institution, the actual discount rate to be compared with the normal discount rate should be based on the issuance discount rate of the commercial paper, which is the actual discount rate of the funds provided to the supported entity, and not on the purchase discount rate of the supporting entity, which includes the fees and other expenses paid to the intermediary institution added to the issuance amount; and the amount of support should also be understood to mean only the economic benefit that the supported entity received or that can be deemed identical to what it received, not the amount expended by the supporting entity.
Nevertheless, the court below, contrary to the foregoing, determined that it was proper to calculate the amount of support by regarding the purchase discount rate applied by the said Plaintiffs in purchasing the commercial paper at issue through the intermediary institutions as the actual discount rate. In so determining, the court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles concerning the calculation of the actual discount rate and the amount of support, and such error affected the outcome of the judgment.
(3) As to Ground 14 (concerning Plaintiff Cho Hung Bank Co., Ltd., successor to the litigation of Plaintiff Hyundai Merchant Banking)
The court below, upon comprehensive consideration of the adopted evidence, found the facts set forth in the judgment below, and then determined, considering the following: that the Halla affiliated companies, at the time of issuance of the commercial paper at issue, were already on the verge of default, had a very high investment risk, and were practically unable to borrow funds from outside sources, so that, even if the discount rate was high, there was no possibility that a third party unrelated to the issuing companies would underwrite the commercial paper at issue issued by the Halla affiliated companies; indeed, in the case of newly issued commercial paper by the Halla affiliated companies, there was in fact no instance in which a third party, a non-affiliated company, underwrote such newly issued commercial paper, other than instances where merchant banking companies underwrote it as a means of extending maturing commercial paper; nevertheless, only the Hyundai affiliated companies, including Plaintiff Hyundai Securities, which are in an independently managed company relationship owned by relatives with the Halla affiliated companies, participated collectively, at the level of the business group, in underwriting the commercial paper just before the default of the Halla affiliated companies, underwriting as much as KRW 553.5 billion in newly issued commercial paper from the Halla affiliated companies at a discount rate markedly lower than the then-prevailing overdraft interest rate of 37.48%; the act of Plaintiff Hyundai Securities and others in underwriting the commercial paper at issue provided excessive economic benefit totaling approximately KRW 23 billion; the Halla affiliated companies had already, in substance, fallen into a state of default on December 2, 1997, but had merely obtained a temporary deferral of default through a temporary maturity extension from the financial companies, their creditors, until they finally all defaulted simultaneously, and it appears that the relevant financial institutions and Plaintiff Hyundai Motor and the four other companies were all aware of this impending crisis of default; and although shares of Mando Machinery were provided as collateral for some of the commercial paper at issue, since Mando Machinery too was already on the verge of default at the time of underwriting the commercial paper, the fact that such shares were provided as collateral cannot be regarded as showing the absence of intent to provide unfair support—considering these circumstances comprehensively, the act of Plaintiff Hyundai Securities and others in underwriting the commercial paper at issue is likely to impede fair and free competition in the relevant industry by enabling the Halla affiliated companies to continue to maintain their previous position in their respective industries.
Examining the evidence adopted by the court below in light of the record, the fact-finding of the court below as described above is justified and acceptable, and there is no illegality therein, such as violation of the rules of evidence resulting in mistaken fact-finding, or misapprehension of the legal principles concerning the establishment of a supporting act, as alleged in the grounds of appeal.
D. As to the common grounds of appeal
(1) As to Ground 1
(A) The court below, upon comprehensive consideration of the adopted evidence, found the facts set forth in the judgment below, and then determined, to the effect, that the imposition of the surcharge in this case was lawful, since the Defendant, with respect to multiple violations by the supporting entity, determined the amount of support serving as the basis for calculating the surcharge separately by supported entity and by type of violation, and accordingly determined the surcharge amount separately by supported entity and by type of violation, comprehensively considering the various factors set forth in Article 55-3 of the Act, and then simply added these amounts together, imposing the surcharge within the limit of 2/100 of the sales of the supporting entity.
Examining the relevant statutory provisions in light of the record, the fact-finding and determination of the court below as described above are justified and acceptable, and there is no illegality therein, such as violation of the rules of evidence resulting in mistaken fact-finding, or contradiction in reasoning, or misapprehension of the legal principles concerning the specification of the surcharge imposition disposition and the statement of the basis of calculation, as alleged in the grounds of appeal.
(B) The purpose of Article 45 of the Act, which requires the reasons for the disposition to be stated in the written resolution, is, like the purpose of the system of presenting the grounds and reasons for a disposition under the Administrative Procedure Act (행정절차법), to ensure the prudence, appropriateness, fairness, reasonableness, and rationality of the disposing authority's judgment and thereby restrain arbitrariness, to notify the other party of the reasons for the disposition and thereby persuade the other party, and to provide convenience for filing a petition for relief of rights. Insofar as this purpose can be achieved by clearly stating, in the reasons for the disposition in the written resolution, the basis for calculating the surcharge for each violation, it cannot be said to be unlawful merely because the surcharge amount for each violation is not separately specified in the order of the written resolution.
The determination of the court below to the same effect is justified and acceptable, and there is no illegality therein, such as misapprehension of the legal principles concerning Article 45 of the Act, as alleged in the grounds of appeal.
(2) As to Ground 2
(A) The "Surcharge Imposition Standards" among the "Surcharge Calculation Method and Imposition Guidelines" (enacted April 29, 1997) established by the Defendant has no basis of delegation in a higher statute, and, examining its content, cannot be regarded as content that would particularly supplement a higher statute; accordingly, the "Surcharge Imposition Standards" must ultimately be regarded as merely internal rules of business handling within the Fair Trade Commission for calculating the specific amount of surcharge to be imposed for unfair provision of support (see Supreme Court Decision 2000Du1713, delivered on September 24, 2002); however, insofar as the result of applying the "Surcharge Imposition Standards" in a specific case does not contravene the principle of proportionality or the principle of equity, the mere fact that the "Surcharge Imposition Standards" prescribes a heavier surcharge imposition standard than for other unfair trade practices cannot render the surcharge imposition standards invalid.
Examining the relevant statutory provisions and the above legal principles in light of the record, although there are some inappropriate points in the reasoning of the court below, the conclusion that the "Surcharge Imposition Standards" cannot be regarded as automatically invalid is justified, and there is no illegality therein, such as misapprehension of the legal principles concerning the calculation of surcharges, as alleged in the grounds of appeal.
(B) In light of the legal nature of the surcharge imposed for unfair provision of support, within the range not exceeding the amount calculated by multiplying 2/100 by the sales as determined by Presidential Decree, which is the upper limit of the surcharge prescribed in Article 24-2 of the Act, the Defendant may determine the surcharge in the exercise of its discretion, taking into account the purpose sought to be achieved by the imposition of the surcharge and the factors set forth in Article 55-3(1) of the Act.
Examining the relevant statutory provisions and these legal principles in light of the record, although there are some inappropriate points in the reasoning of the court below concerning the legal nature of the surcharge, in light of the fact that setting the surcharge at 70% of the amount of support, taking into account that 30% of the amount of support resulting from the underwriting of the unsecured convertible bonds is subject to corporate tax under the tax law, already reflects consideration of the factors set forth in Article 55-3(1) of the Act, and that the unfair provision of support itself is carried out in a coordinated manner among affiliated companies of a large business group that is economically a single entity, and in light of the type of violation at issue in this case, there is no particularly high need to set different surcharge imposition ratios, it cannot be said that merely because different surcharge imposition ratios were not set by supporting entity or by type of violation, this constitutes an abuse of discretion in the surcharge imposition disposition. Accordingly, the conclusion of the court below that there is no illegality of abuse of discretion in the surcharge imposition disposition in this case is justified, and there is no illegality therein, such as misapprehension of the legal principles concerning Article 55-3(1) of the Act, as alleged in the grounds of appeal.
(3) As to Ground 3
Where the content of a corrective order under Article 24 of the Act, issued on the ground of unfair provision of support under Article 23(1)(7) of the Act, is excessively specific, it would lack consistency with respect to the numerous transactions that occur daily with various minor modifications, ultimately rendering the corrective order meaningless; therefore, by its inherent nature, a corrective order must necessarily bear a certain degree of comprehensiveness and abstraction. Meanwhile, in light of the purpose of the corrective order system, it is reasonable to interpret that the content of a corrective order may include not only the cessation of past violations but also an order prohibiting the repetition of the same type of act that is likely to recur in the near future (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 2001Du5347, delivered on February 20, 2003).
The court below determined that the content of each corrective order among the dispositions at issue in this case confirmed the unfair provision of support engaged in by the Plaintiffs and ordered the prohibition of the repetition in the future of the same type of act, and that each corrective order specified the supporting entity and the supported entity and specifically indicated the party subject to the disposition, namely the supporting entity and the supported entity, and the type and kind of the supporting act, by prohibiting the provision of support through excessive economic benefit by stating that in the future the Plaintiffs shall not "underwrite unsecured private convertible bonds on markedly favorable terms for the issuing companies," "provide funds free of charge in the name of advance payments," or "underwrite commercial paper on markedly favorable terms for the issuing companies"; moreover, the content of the supporting act whose repetition was prohibited is also specific and clear in light of the provisions of law cited as the basis for each corrective order and the reasons stated therein, and cannot be interpreted as generally prohibiting the underwriting of unsecured private convertible bonds, the failure to recover advance payments, or the underwriting of commercial paper as such; accordingly, each corrective order is sufficiently specific and clear, in terms of the supporting entity and supported entity, the kind and type of the supporting act whose repetition is prohibited, and its content, to be recognizable by the parties concerned, and thus rejected the Plaintiffs' argument that each corrective order is unlawful for being unspecified and unclear.
Examining the relevant statutory provisions and the above legal principles in light of the record, this measure of the court below is justified, and there is no illegality therein, such as misapprehension of the legal principles concerning the clarity and specificity of a corrective order, as alleged in the grounds of appeal.
(4) As to Ground 4
Considering together the purpose and function of the surcharge imposed on a supporting entity that has engaged in unfair provision of support under Article 23(1)(7) and Article 24-2 of the Act, as well as the entity and procedure for imposition, the surcharge, based on the legislator's policy judgment for realizing the administrative purpose of deterring unfair provision of support, has, in its basic character, the nature of an administrative sanction imposed on the violation, to which an element of disgorgement of unjust enrichment is added; it cannot therefore be regarded as constituting punishment as an exercise of the State's penal power prohibited under Article 13(1) of the Constitution. Accordingly, even though the Act provides for the imposition of a surcharge in addition to criminal punishment, this cannot be regarded as violating the principle against double jeopardy or the presumption of innocence, or as infringing upon judicial power or the right to a trial; furthermore, in light of the fact that the surcharge may be imposed only within a reasonable amount proportionate to the degree of illegality of the unfair provision of support, taking into account the various factors set forth in Article 55-3(1) of the Act, it cannot be said to violate the principle of proportionality (see Constitutional Court Decision 2001Hun-Ga25, delivered on July 24, 2003).
The determination of the court below to the same effect is justified, and there is no illegality therein, such as misapprehension of the legal principles concerning the unconstitutionality of the surcharge system, as alleged in the grounds of appeal.
3. As to the Defendant's appeal
A. As to Ground 1
The court below, upon comprehensive consideration of the adopted evidence, found as follows: Plaintiff Hynix Semiconductor had, from around 1995, promoted the establishment of a research institute in order to secure competitiveness in the semiconductor industry; upon receiving a recommendation from the Ministry of Science and Technology on September 19, 1995, it entered into a construction contract with Hyundai Construction Co., Ltd. (hereinafter "Hyundai Construction") on October 1, 1996, and obtained, on December 6, 1996, a building permit from the mayor of Yongin City for the construction of a research institute with a total floor area of 35,008㎡ on the site of Mabuk-ri Mountain 1-1 and two other lots, Guseong-myeon, Yongin City; however, due to the downturn in the semiconductor business and consequent financial difficulties, and upon requests from affiliated companies to use the newly constructed building as a training center, the said Plaintiff, on December 10, 1996, changed the original plan to build a research institute and decided instead to build a training center; as the newly constructed building's purpose was changed to a training center for employees of affiliated companies, at a meeting of executives of Hyundai affiliated companies on May 19, 1997, it was decided that each affiliated company requiring the training center would pay a lease deposit to the said Plaintiff, with the amount to be determined based on the intended area of use for each affiliated company calculated according to the number of employees of grade 4 or higher subject to training in each affiliated company; pursuant to this decision, Hyundai Motor and 31 other companies entered into a lease agreement with Hynix Semiconductor on May 31, 1997 (lease term: June 1, 1998 to May 31, 2001) and, as set forth in the judgment below, paid the lease deposit between May 31 and September 30, 1997; the said training center opened on August 24, 1998 as the Hyundai Human Resources Development Institute, and has since been used as a training venue for employees of Hyundai affiliated companies, its structure consisting of a dormitory, main building, lodging, exhibition hall, and other facilities for training purposes. Having found these facts, the court below determined that although the training center originally obtained a building permit as a research institute, it has actually been used as a training center for employees of affiliated companies, and even if the change of use to a training center was not lawfully made, insofar as it has been used in fact as a training center, the payment of the lease deposit by Hyundai Motor and 31 other companies cannot be regarded as support for the construction fund of a research institute; furthermore, considering the fact that as many as 32 companies paid the lease deposit and that, for some companies, the amount paid was markedly small; that Hyundai Motor and 31 other companies had a need to use the training center for the training of their employees, and accordingly entered into the lease agreement with Hynix Semiconductor for the training center building; that employees of Hyundai Motor and 31 other companies have received training at the training center, and that if the lease deposit had not been paid, there would rather be room to find that Hynix Semiconductor had unfairly supported Hyundai Motor and 31 other companies—considering these circumstances, the court below determined that the payment of the lease deposit in this case cannot be regarded as an act of unfair provision of support, and that the fact that the payment was made before the completion of the building does not warrant a different conclusion; accordingly, the part of the disposition premised on the payment of the lease deposit in this case being support for Hynix Semiconductor's research institute construction fund is unlawful.
Examining the relevant evidence in light of the record, the fact-finding and determination of the court below as described above are justified and acceptable, and there is no illegality therein, such as violation of the rules of evidence resulting in mistaken fact-finding, or failure to state adequate reasons, as alleged in the grounds of appeal.
B. As to Ground 2
Whether the newly constructed building at issue was actually used as a research institute or as a training center, if the lease deposit had not been received from the Plaintiffs, the building at issue could not have been constructed and owned, and this ultimately has the same economic effect as receiving an interest-free loan, and therefore constitutes unfair provision of support; and even if, in providing the lease deposit at issue, in addition to Hynix Semiconductor's financial difficulties, one of the causes was the Plaintiffs' business necessity or benefit in actually using the newly constructed building as a training center, this fact alone cannot exclude or justify the character of support or the restriction of competition—this argument in the grounds of appeal is based on facts different from those lawfully found by the court below, namely that the payment of the lease deposit in this case was made pursuant to a lawful lease agreement, and therefore cannot be accepted.
There is no illegality in the judgment of the court below, such as misapprehension of the legal principles concerning the requirements for a supporting act and grounds for exclusion of illegality.
4. Conclusion
Therefore, the part of the lower court's judgment ordering the plaintiffs to publish the fact of violation of the law is entirely reversed; however, since this Court finds it sufficient to render judgment directly, the Court renders judgment on this part directly and dismisses the action as to this part. Without rendering judgment on the remaining grounds of appeal, the following parts of the lower court's judgment are each reversed: the corrective order part and the penalty surcharge payment order part concerning Plaintiff Hyundai Motor Company's acceptance of commercial papers issued by Mando Machinery Co., Ltd. and Halla Construction Co., Ltd.; the corrective order part and the penalty surcharge payment order part concerning Plaintiff Hyundai Heavy Industries Co., Ltd.'s acceptance of commercial papers issued by Mando Machinery Co., Ltd., Halla Construction Co., Ltd., Halla Resources Co., Ltd., and Halla Shipping Co., Ltd.; the corrective order part and the penalty surcharge payment order part concerning Plaintiff Hyundai Industrial Development Co., Ltd.'s acceptance of commercial papers issued by Halla Cement Co., Ltd., Halla Construction Co., Ltd., and Mando Machinery Co., Ltd.; the corrective order part and the penalty surcharge payment order part concerning Plaintiff Hynix Semiconductor Inc.'s acceptance of commercial papers issued by Mando Machinery Co., Ltd. and Halla Construction Co., Ltd.; and the corrective order part and the penalty surcharge payment order part concerning Plaintiff Hyundai Motor Company's failure to recover advance payments from Hyundai Heavy Industries Co., Ltd. and Hyundai Comprehensive Metal Co., Ltd. These parts of the case are remanded to the lower court for further hearing and determination.
The remaining appeals of the plaintiffs and the defendant are all dismissed.
As for Plaintiff and litigation successor of Hyundai Engineering Co., Ltd., Hyundai Engineering & Construction Co., Ltd.; Plaintiff Hyundai Mobis Co., Ltd.; Plaintiff Hyundai Corporation; the litigation successor of Plaintiff Hyundai Motor Service Co., Ltd., Hyundai Motor Company; Plaintiff Hyundai Merchant Marine Co., Ltd.; Plaintiff Incheon Iron & Steel Co., Ltd.; Plaintiff and litigation successor of Hyundai Oil Sales Co., Ltd., Hyundai Oil Refinery Co., Ltd.; Plaintiff Hyundai Petrochemical Co., Ltd.; Plaintiff Hyundai Livart Co., Ltd.; the plaintiff, being the administrator of Koryo Industrial Development Co., Ltd. (a company under reorganization) as litigation successor of Koryo Industrial Development Co., Ltd.; Plaintiff Daehan Aluminum Industry Co., Ltd.; Plaintiff Hyundai HYSCO Co., Ltd.; Plaintiff Hyundai Elevator Co., Ltd.; Plaintiff Hyundai Mipo Dockyard Co., Ltd.; Plaintiff Kefico Corporation; Plaintiff Hyundai Information Technology Co., Ltd.; Plaintiff Hyundai Jungki Industry Co., Ltd.; Plaintiff Keumkang Planning Co., Ltd.; Plaintiff Hyundai Broadcasting Co., Ltd.; Plaintiff Hyundai Securities Co., Ltd.; the litigation successor of Plaintiff Hyundai Comprehensive Finance Co., Ltd., Chohung Bank Co., Ltd.; Plaintiff Hyundai Department Store Co., Ltd.; Plaintiff Hyundai Marine & Fire Insurance Co., Ltd.; Plaintiff Hyundai Research Institute Co., Ltd.; Plaintiff Hyundai Space and Aircraft Company; Plaintiff Hyundai Logistics Co., Ltd.; Plaintiff Hyundai Capital Co., Ltd.; and Plaintiff Prudential Investment & Securities Co., Ltd., the above plaintiffs shall bear the total litigation costs of the dismissed part of the action and the appeal costs of the dismissed part of the appeal as to them, and the defendant shall bear the appeal costs of the dismissed part of the appeal as to the defendant. It is so ordered as stated in the Order, by the unanimous opinion of the participating Justices.
Justice Lee Kang-kook (Presiding Judge), Bae Ki-won (Justice in Charge), Kim Yong-dam