[Plaintiffs, Appellants] Plaintiff 1 and 6 others (Counsel for the plaintiffs: Attorney Lee Yong-hoon)
[Defendant, Appellee] Korea Agricultural and Rural Infrastructure Corporation (Counsel for the defendant: Lee International Law Offices, Attorney Cho Yoon and 10 others)
[Judgment Below] Gwangju High Court Decision 2001Na10846 decided September 6, 2002
[Order]
The part of the judgment below concerning Plaintiff 2's and Plaintiff 3's claims for confirmation of invalidity of dismissal is reversed, and that part of the lawsuit is dismissed. The part of the judgment below concerning Plaintiff 2's and Plaintiff 3's claims for payment of money and the part concerning the remaining plaintiffs are reversed, and that part of the case is remanded to the Gwangju High Court.
[Reasoning]
1. As to the part of Plaintiff 2's and Plaintiff 3's claims for confirmation of invalidity of dismissal, the Court examines this ex officio.
Where a worker seeks confirmation that a so-called honorary retirement (voluntary early retirement) disposition is in substance a dismissal and is therefore invalid, while simultaneously claiming wages for the period during which he could have provided labor, it is clear that the lawsuit for confirmation of invalidity of dismissal is aimed at the restoration of the worker's status under the employment contract with the defendant. Accordingly, if by the time of the conclusion of oral argument at the fact-finding trial the mandatory retirement age under the defendant's personnel regulations—which constitutes a cause for automatic separation from employment—has already passed, it becomes impossible to restore the worker's status as an employee, and thus the lawsuit for confirmation of invalidity of dismissal lacks the interest required for confirmation (see Supreme Court Decision 96Da10027 decided October 11, 1996). The same applies where the retirement age prescribed by the personnel regulations has already passed during the pendency of the appeal to the Supreme Court, since even if the honorary retirement disposition is confirmed to be invalid, it remains impossible to restore the worker's status as an employee (see Supreme Court Decision 91Nu5747 decided January 15, 1993).
According to the materials in the record, Article 64, Paragraph 2 of the defendant's pre-amendment personnel regulations provided that an employee whose retirement age under those regulations falls between January and June shall retire on June 30, and an employee whose retirement age falls between July and December shall retire on December 31. Even if the amended personnel regulations at issue in this case do not apply to the above plaintiffs and the original pre-amendment personnel regulations apply instead, it is clear that in the case of Plaintiff 2, the retirement age had already arrived before the conclusion of oral argument in the judgment below, and in the case of Plaintiff 3, the retirement age had already arrived during the pendency of this appeal to the Supreme Court. Accordingly, it has become impossible for these plaintiffs to restore their status as employees, and therefore the part of their lawsuits seeking confirmation of invalidity of dismissal lacks the interest required for confirmation.
Accordingly, the part of Plaintiff 2's lawsuit concerning this claim should have been dismissed on the ground that it lacks the interest required for confirmation; however, the judgment below, having instead proceeded to decide the merits, contains an error of misunderstanding the legal principles concerning the interest required for a confirmation action. As for Plaintiff 3, the part of his lawsuit concerning this claim is unlawful for lack of such interest. Therefore, the part of the judgment below concerning these plaintiffs cannot be upheld.
2. As to the first and second grounds of appeal
Pursuant to Articles 40 and 54 of the former Farmland Improvement Association Act (Nongji Gaeryang Johap Beop) (abolished by Act No. 5759 of February 5, 1999), the remuneration of the executives and employees of a farmland improvement association is determined by the association's chairman according to standards set by the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, and the farmland improvement association must prepare a business plan and budget of revenue and expenditure for each fiscal year, obtain approval through resolution of the general meeting, and secure the approval of the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry; the same procedure must be followed when the association intends to amend that budget. Accordingly, where a farmland improvement association enters into a collective agreement with a labor union providing for an increase in the remuneration of executives and employees beyond the previous level, without a resolution of the general meeting and approval of the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, such an agreement to increase remuneration has no effect (see Supreme Court Decision 2002Da24935 decided November 13, 2002).
The court below, in the same vein, determined that although the ○○ Farmland Improvement Association entered into the collective agreement at issue in this case with its labor union, providing for retirement allowance payment standards higher than those set forth in the Farmland Improvement Association Remuneration Regulations Guidelines established by the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, since the budget for payment of the increased retirement allowances was not subjected to a resolution of the general meeting and approval of the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, the collective agreement at issue is without effect; therefore, the defendant, which comprehensively succeeded to the obligations of the ○○ Farmland Improvement Association, has no obligation to pay the plaintiffs, who were its employees, the increased retirement allowances pursuant to the collective agreement at issue. This determination is correct, and there is no error of misunderstanding the legal principles concerning Articles 24 and 54 of the former Farmland Improvement Association Act or the legal principles concerning the right to collective action under the Labor Standards Act (Geunro Gijun Beop).
The arguments raised on this point in the appellate brief and the supplementary appellate brief are not accepted.
3. As to the third ground of appeal
A. The determination of the court below
The court below, having considered the evidence it adopted and having found the facts as stated in its reasoning, determined as follows: at the time, the three institutions—the Agricultural Development Corporation, the various farmland improvement associations, and the Federation of Farmland Improvement Associations—required consolidation due to the inefficiency arising from overlapping duties and organizations and the extreme deterioration of their finances; to that end, prior workforce reduction through restructuring at each institution was unavoidable, and it was also necessary to unify the retirement ages across the three institutions; considering the harm employees would suffer from a single drastic reduction in retirement age, the reduction in retirement age was implemented in two stages, and the retirement age as finally reduced became identical to the retirement age of employees of the Agricultural Development Corporation and the Federation of Farmland Improvement Associations, which were to be consolidated in the future; at the time, the ○○ Farmland Improvement Association was experiencing extreme financial difficulties, including a failure to secure the funds needed to pay retirement allowances to its employees, yet through the restructuring accomplished by the aforementioned reduction of retirement age and honorary retirement for the purpose of consolidating the three institutions, the plaintiffs were able to receive retirement allowances corresponding to the reduced retirement age; the labor unions of other farmland improvement associations, recognizing that the reduction of retirement age was unavoidable, consented to the amended Personnel Regulations Guidelines, and ultimately the National Federation of Farmland Improvement Association Labor Unions also entered into a collective agreement providing for the reduced retirement age. In light of these circumstances, the court below determined that the amended personnel regulations of the ○○ Farmland Improvement Association, viewed both from the standpoint of necessity and content, possess reasonableness under generally accepted social norms to a degree sufficient to acknowledge the legal normative force of the provision, even taking into account the degree of disadvantage the workers would suffer as a result; therefore, even absent the consent of the labor union of the ○○ Farmland Improvement Association, the amended personnel regulations are effective as against the plaintiffs.
B. The determination of this Court
In principle, it is not permissible for an employer to unilaterally deprive workers of vested rights or interests through the unilateral drafting or amendment of new rules of employment, thereby imposing disadvantageous working conditions. However, where the drafting or amendment of the rules of employment at issue, viewed both from the standpoint of necessity and content, is found to possess reasonableness under generally accepted social norms to a degree sufficient to acknowledge the legal normative force of the provision, even taking into account the degree of disadvantage the workers would suffer as a result, the application of the amended rules cannot be denied solely on the ground that the workers who had been subject to the previous working conditions or rules of employment did not give consent through a collective decision-making method. Meanwhile, whether such reasonableness under generally accepted social norms exists must be determined by comprehensively considering the degree of disadvantage suffered by workers as a result of the amendment of the rules of employment, the content and degree of the necessity for amendment on the part of the employer, the appropriateness of the content of the amended rules of employment, the state of improvement of other working conditions including compensatory measures, the course of negotiations with the labor union and the response of the labor union or other workers, and the general domestic situation regarding similar matters (see Supreme Court Decision 99Da70846 decided January 5, 2001); and in determining whether there exists such reasonableness under generally accepted social norms as would substitute for the consent of the collective body of workers, the determination must be based on the circumstances existing at the time of the amendment (see Supreme Court Decision 92Da45490 decided September 14, 1993).
According to the facts as found by the court below, the plaintiffs retired between December 31, 1998 and September 30, 1999, and the defendant Corporation's labor union entered into a collective agreement on June 15, 2000, agreeing to the retirement age under the amended personnel regulations, thereby recognizing the effect of the amended personnel regulations. However, the fact that the labor union's recognition was obtained on June 15, 2000, after the plaintiffs had already retired, is not a circumstance that may be taken into account in determining the effect of the amendment of the retirement allowance regulations as against the plaintiffs.
Furthermore, according to the materials in the record, while it can be seen that, at the time, as consolidation of the three institutions was required, prior workforce reduction through restructuring at each institution was unavoidable, and it was also necessary to unify the retirement ages of the three institutions, such that amendment of the personnel regulations was called for, it can also be seen that, as a result of the amendment, no compensatory measures or transitional measures whatsoever were provided for plaintiffs who, having had their retirement age uniformly reduced by two years, would reach retirement age and retire not long thereafter, and that the disadvantage suffered by the plaintiffs as a result was substantial. Considering the motive for the amendment as revealed in this case, and the necessity and content of the drafting or amendment of the rules of employment, it is difficult to find that there exists reasonableness under generally accepted social norms sufficient to acknowledge the legal normative force of the provision at issue. Accordingly, the determination of the court below, that there exists reasonableness under generally accepted social norms sufficient to substitute for the consent of the collective body of workers with respect to the amendment of the personnel regulations at issue in this case, contains an error in that the court below either failed to conduct the necessary examination or misunderstood the legal principles concerning the amendment of rules of employment.
The argument in the grounds of appeal pointing out this error is well-founded, and this Court accepts that argument.
4. As to the fourth ground of appeal
Plaintiff 3 argues that although Personnel Regulations Guidelines under Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry Directive No. 983 of May 29, 1999 were never resolved by the board of directors of the association to be the personnel regulations of the ○○ Farmland Improvement Association, the court below erred in finding that the Guidelines became the rules of employment of the ○○ Farmland Improvement Association through resolution of the board of directors, and in recognizing that the retirement processing of Plaintiff 3 was carried out on the basis of those Guidelines; Plaintiff 3 contends that this was unlawful, in violation of the rules of evidence concerning the procedure for establishing rules of employment, or as a misunderstanding of the legal principles concerning the procedure for establishing personnel regulations.
However, this argument is raised for the first time at the appellate stage before the Supreme Court and thus cannot constitute a lawful ground of appeal; moreover, according to the record, it can be seen that the honorary retirement of that plaintiff was not carried out on the basis of Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry Directive No. 983. Therefore, the plaintiffs' argument on this ground of appeal cannot be accepted.
5. Conclusion
Therefore, the part of the judgment below concerning Plaintiff 2's and Plaintiff 3's claims for confirmation of invalidity of dismissal is reversed, and this Court, rendering judgment directly on that part, dismisses that part of the lawsuit; the part of the judgment below concerning Plaintiff 2's and Plaintiff 3's claims for payment of money and the part concerning the remaining plaintiffs are reversed, and that part of the case is remanded to the court below for further examination and determination, the Justices participating in this decision being unanimous in their opinion, in accordance with the Order set forth above.
Justices Lee Gyu-hong (Presiding Justice), Cho Mu-je (Justice in charge), Lee Yong-woo, Park Jae-yoon