[Plaintiff, Appellee]
[Defendant, Appellant] Chief of Uijeongbu Regional Labor Office, Attorney Cho Kyung-geun, Litigation Representative
[Judgment Below] Seoul High Court Judgment 92Gu9748, decided March 19, 1993
[Order]
The appeal is dismissed.
The costs of the appeal shall be borne by the Defendant.
[Reasoning]
The Defendant's litigation representative's grounds of appeal are examined.
"Occupational accident" under Article 3(1) of the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act (산업재해보상보험법) refers to an accident that occurs to a worker in the course of performing duties and is attributable to such duties. Therefore, where the accident is a disease or death resulting from a disease, there must be a substantial causal relationship between the disease and the worker's duties. Meanwhile, where a worker's death results from suicide while receiving medical treatment for an occupational disease, if the suicide was committed while the worker was in a state of loss of mental capacity or mental derangement caused by the occupational disease constituting the original occupational accident, there is deemed to be a substantial causal relationship between the death and the worker's duties (see this Court's Decision 93Nu13797, decided October 22, 1993). In such a case, the party asserting the causal relationship between the worker's duties and the disease, or the death resulting from the disease, bears the burden of proof. However, such causal relationship need not be clearly proven in a medical or scientific manner; it suffices if, considering all the circumstances, a substantial causal relationship between the duties and the disease or death can be inferred, in which case proof shall be deemed to have been established (see this Court's Decision 91Nu10022, decided May 12, 1992). Accordingly, where a worker commits suicide while receiving medical treatment for an occupational disease, the causal relationship must be recognized if a substantial causal relationship can be inferred by comprehensively considering the degree of the deceased's disease or aftereffects, the general symptoms of the disease, the period of treatment, the possibility of recovery, age, physical and psychological condition, the circumstances surrounding the deceased, and the process leading to the suicide.
According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below, based on the evidence cited therein, found as follows:
The deceased Nonparty 1 joined Nonparty Wonjin Rayon Co., Ltd. on March 24, 1975, and worked in the spinning department, a department exposed to carbon disulfide, until his resignation on August 7, 1981. At the time of joining the company, he was physically healthy and had never suffered from mental illness such as schizophrenia. However, beginning around 1984, after his resignation, symptoms of muscle paralysis, renal disorder, and respiratory disorder appeared, along with symptoms of mental illness; he stopped sleeping at night, went up into the mountains to hunt animals, and became violent in temperament, frequently assaulting his wife and children, leading to his divorce by mutual consent from his wife around October 1987. Thereafter, the deceased's illness worsened further, with severe delirious speech, and he received 14 months of psychiatric treatment at Yongin Mental Hospital and other institutions. Around September 1988, during the period for collective reporting of occupational diseases at the aforementioned company, he applied to the Defendant for an occupational disease examination, and as a result of the examination, he was diagnosed with carbon disulfide poisoning and schizophrenia, and received the Defendant's approval for medical care. He then received treatment at Hyehwa Hospital, affiliated with Korea University College of Medicine, and subsequently at Seoul Christian Hospital. While the deceased's schizophrenia had improved to the point where outpatient treatment was possible, on April 12, 1991, at Room 202, Building A, Jeonggwang Villa, 405-5 Todang-ri, Jido-eup, Goyang-gun, Gyeonggi Province, he locked the door of his room, lit two briquettes of coal in a brazier in his room, and died of carbon monoxide poisoning while sleeping. The deceased had previously, on two occasions, told his father that he intended to commit suicide, and on the day before his death, he made statements suggesting that he was planning suicide. At the time of his death, he left a will containing content that would have been difficult to compose without lucid judgment, such as matters concerning the distribution of his estate and his relationship with the Plaintiffs' biological mother, but which also contained the irrational statement: "Report my death only when Dad would have turned 90; that way you can receive the disability benefits. There will be no problem receiving the disability benefits until age 90." Medically, although the biochemical mechanism by which carbon disulfide produces toxic effects on the human body has not yet been clarified, it is widely known in the medical field that while acute poisoning resulting from short-term exposure to high concentrations of carbon disulfide can cause immediate coma and death, chronic exposure to carbon disulfide above a certain concentration can cause various systemic symptoms and neurological symptoms of peripheral neuritis, as well as psychiatric symptoms such as severe excitability, anger, severe emotional changes, euphoria, hallucinations, paranoid tendencies, suicidal tendencies, mania, and delirium. It has also been reported in the medical community that once biochemical changes begin due to carbon disulfide poisoning, secondary vascular lesions continue to progress even after exposure to carbon disulfide has ceased, and accordingly, there is a possibility that health impairment may continue to progress even after retirement in workers who have been exposed to carbon disulfide. In particular, numerous studies on carbon disulfide poisoning report tendencies toward suicidal and homicidal impulses among workers exposed to carbon disulfide, such that suicide attempts may be regarded as a characteristic symptom of schizophrenia caused by carbon disulfide poisoning. In the field of psychiatry, while some suicides result from impulsive acts caused by delusions and auditory hallucinations, most suicides by schizophrenia patients occur not as impulsive acts but rather as acts committed upon clearly recognizing the limitations placed on one's own life as the illness improves; in terms of timing, suicides tend to occur more frequently not during the acute phase but during the period medically referred to as the post-psychotic depressive state, i.e., the period when symptoms are improving, and in most cases, patients continue to openly express their intent to commit suicide to caregivers or family members, then carry out the suicide when the family or medical staff become less vigilant regarding the risk of suicide. Accordingly, the court below found that suicidal warnings, suicidal ideation, suicide attempts, and completed suicide by schizophrenia patients are all symptoms of schizophrenia.
Based on a comprehensive consideration of the foregoing findings, the court below determined that the deceased, while receiving treatment for schizophrenia caused by carbon disulfide poisoning resulting from his work at the aforementioned company, committed suicide out of despair over his illness due to suicidal tendencies, which is itself one of the symptoms of schizophrenia; therefore, there is a substantial causal relationship between the schizophrenia and the suicide, and consequently, the deceased's death constitutes an occupational accident having a substantial causal relationship with the performance of his duties.
In light of the record, the relevant statutes, and the legal principles set forth above, the fact-finding and determination of the court below as set forth above are deemed justified and acceptable, and there is no illegality therein, as argued in the grounds of appeal, resulting from a misapprehension of facts due to a violation of the rules of evidence or a misunderstanding of the legal principles concerning the causal relationship required for "occupational accident" under Article 3(1) of the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act. The argument is without merit.
Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of the appeal are to be borne by the losing party. This judgment is rendered as set forth in the Order by the unanimous opinion of the participating Justices.
Justice Ahn U-man (Presiding Justice), Kim Yong-jun, Cheon Kyung-song (Justice in Charge), Ahn Yong-deuk