[Order]
The part of the judgment below, excluding the parts concerning each violation of the Attorney-at-Law Act (변호사법) for receiving money and valuables from Non-Indicted 1 and Non-Indicted 2, and the part concerning larceny, is reversed, and this part of the case is remanded to the Seoul High Court. The Prosecutor's appeal is dismissed.
[Reasoning]
1. We examine the grounds for appeal.
A. As to the Defendant's ground of appeal regarding the violation of the Attorney-at-Law Act (변호사법) related to Non-Indicted 3 and Non-Indicted 4
Article 111 of the Attorney-at-Law Act provides: "A person who receives or promises to receive money, valuables, entertainment, or other benefits, or who causes a third party to be given such benefits or promises to have a third party given such benefits, under the pretext of making a solicitation or acting as an intermediary in connection with a case or affairs handled by a public official (including a person who is deemed to be a public official under laws and regulations), shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than 5 years or a fine not exceeding 10 million won, or both."
In this way, the Attorney-at-Law Act provides for the punishment of acts such as receiving money or valuables under the pretext of making a solicitation or acting as an intermediary not only in connection with "a case or affairs handled by a public official" but also in connection with "a case or affairs handled by a person who is deemed to be a public official under laws and regulations." However, since the Act does not explicitly define who specifically qualifies as "a person deemed to be a public official under laws and regulations," the scope of that phrase must be determined through interpretation. Since Article 111 of the Attorney-at-Law Act was originally intended to criminally punish acts violating the prohibition against making "a case or affairs handled by a public official" the object of solicitation or intermediation and receiving money or valuables under that pretext, the phrase "a person deemed to be a public official under laws and regulations" must also be interpreted in this same context.
While there are numerous instances in which individual statutes deem persons who are not public officials to be public officials, the specific scope of persons, matters, and purposes for which such deeming provisions apply is determined by considering various factors, including the degree of public character of the duties handled by such persons. Therefore, even if an individual statute contains a deeming provision applicable to specific matters rather than a general deeming provision, this alone does not mean that the various types of affairs handled by a non-public-official who is subject to that statute should uniformly and categorically be regarded as "a case or affairs handled by a public official" to which Article 111 of the Attorney-at-Law Act applies.
Accordingly, the laws and regulations that deem a non-public-official to be a public official for purposes of Article 111 of the Attorney-at-Law Act should be limited to cases where: the content of the individual statute specifically deems the person to be a public official for purposes of applying Article 111 of the Attorney-at-Law Act; or generally deems the person to be a public official for purposes of applying all penal provisions in which "public official" is an element of the offense; or otherwise contains an intention to generally subject to criminal punishment, on the same basis as cases or affairs handled by public officials, solicitation or intermediation concerning cases or affairs handled by non-public-officials, thereby deeming such persons to be public officials.
However, Article 18 of the Framework Act on the Management of Government-Invested Institutions (정부투자기관 관리기본법), which is at issue in this case, provides: "Executives of an invested institution and employees prescribed by Presidential Decree shall be deemed public officials for purposes of the application of Articles 129 through 132 of the Criminal Act." The Supreme Court has previously interpreted the purport of this provision as meaning merely that "executives and employees of a government-invested institution are deemed public officials for purposes of applying the provisions of the Criminal Act concerning the crime of bribery, and it does not mean that executives and employees of a government-invested institution are naturally deemed public officials, or retain the status of public officials, in other circumstances" (see Supreme Court Decision 99Do3073, delivered on September 17, 1999). Following this precedent, it can be seen that the Supreme Court has already given a limited interpretation to the effect that the deeming-as-public-official provision under the above Framework Act on the Management of Government-Invested Institutions is strictly confined to the case where the crime of bribery under the Criminal Act applies, among the various circumstances in which the status of a public official might be at issue. Consistent with this line of interpretation, the meaning of the deeming-as-public-official provision under the above Act cannot be interpreted as intending to subject to criminal punishment all cases in which affairs or cases handled by executives or employees of a government-invested institution become the object of solicitation or intermediation, even in general matters not involving the application of the crime of bribery under the Criminal Act. Therefore, the deeming-as-public-official provision alone cannot be considered sufficient to render executives and employees of a government-invested institution "a person deemed to be a public official under laws and regulations" as provided in Article 111 of the Attorney-at-Law Act.
It is the Supreme Court's consistently established view, confirmed on numerous occasions, that the interpretation of penal statutes must be strict, and that excessively expansive interpretation or analogical interpretation of the meaning of an express provision in a direction unfavorable to the defendant is impermissible as contrary to the principle of nulla poena sine lege (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 92Do1428, delivered on October 13, 1992; Supreme Court Decision 2001Do5410, delivered on February 8, 2002; Supreme Court Decision 2003Do6535, delivered on February 27, 2004; Supreme Court en banc Decision 2004Do7773, delivered on October 19, 2006, etc.).
In light of these legal principles, if the scope of "a person deemed to be a public official under laws and regulations" set forth in parentheses in Article 111 of the Attorney-at-Law Act were interpreted as an all-encompassing, open-ended concept covering any case in which an individual statute contains any deeming-as-public-official provision, regardless of the matters to which it applies, it cannot be concluded that an ordinary person subject to the norm could clearly understand the meaning of the above penal provision in that manner. Moreover, as noted above, since it is entirely possible to reasonably limit the scope of "a person deemed to be a public official under laws and regulations" set forth in parentheses in Article 111 of the Attorney-at-Law Act, such an interpretation would excessively expand the scope of application of the above penal provision to the detriment of the person subject to the norm, and is therefore impermissible as contrary to the principle of nulla poena sine lege and the principle of clarity of penal statutes derived therefrom.
Accordingly, Supreme Court Decision 2005Do1903, delivered on May 13, 2005, which held to the effect that a person subject to Article 18 of the Framework Act on the Management of Government-Invested Institutions—a deeming-as-public-official provision for purposes of applying the crime of bribery under the Criminal Act—falls under "a person deemed to be a public official under laws and regulations," i.e., the counterpart of solicitation or intermediation under Article 111 of the Attorney-at-Law Act, is hereby modified to the extent inconsistent with the views expressed in this Decision.
Accordingly, the President of the Korea Water Resources Corporation, an executive of a government-invested institution, cannot be considered to fall under "a person deemed to be a public official under laws and regulations" as provided in Article 111 of the Attorney-at-Law Act, for the reasons set forth above. Nevertheless, the court below erred in finding, as stated in its reasoning, that the President of the Korea Water Resources Corporation falls under "a person deemed to be a public official under laws and regulations" as provided in Article 111 of the Attorney-at-Law Act, and accordingly found the Defendant guilty on this part of the charges. This constitutes an error in the legal principles concerning "a person deemed to be a public official under laws and regulations" as provided in Article 111 of the Attorney-at-Law Act, and this error clearly affected the judgment. Since the Defendant's ground of appeal pointing out this error is well-founded, and there is no need to further examine the remaining grounds of appeal, this part of the judgment below cannot be sustained as it stands.
B. As to the Prosecutor's ground of appeal regarding the violation of the Attorney-at-Law Act and larceny related to Non-Indicted 2 and Non-Indicted 1
The gist of the Prosecutor's ground of appeal on this point amounts to nothing more than an assertion challenging the selection and weighing of evidence and the fact-finding, which fall within the exclusive authority of the court below. Furthermore, upon examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the record, the court below's determination that the evidence submitted by the prosecutor lacked credibility or admissibility, or was insufficient to establish this part of the charges, in light of the circumstances found by the court below, and its consequent finding of not guilty on this part of the charges, is justified. Therefore, the argument regarding this ground of appeal is without merit.
Furthermore, as set forth above in Section A, since the President of the Korea Water Resources Corporation cannot be considered to fall under "a person deemed to be a public official under laws and regulations" as provided in Article 111 of the Attorney-at-Law Act, the act of receiving money or valuables under the pretext of making a solicitation or acting as an intermediary in connection with affairs handled by the President of the Korea Water Resources Corporation cannot be said to constitute a violation of Article 111 of the Attorney-at-Law Act. For this reason as well, the Prosecutor's argument regarding this ground of appeal cannot be accepted.
C. As to the respective grounds of appeal of the Defendant and the Prosecutor regarding the violation of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Economic Crimes (특정경제범죄 가중처벌 등에 관한 법률) (Embezzlement) related to approximately 3 billion won of company funds
Upon examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the record, the court below's determination finding the Defendant guilty with respect to the portion of the charges alleging embezzlement of approximately 1.1 billion won of company funds, and not guilty with respect to the portion alleging embezzlement of approximately 1.8 billion won of company funds, is justified.
The judgment below contains no error such as a misapprehension of the legal principles concerning provisional payments and embezzlement, and the remaining arguments of the Defendant and the Prosecutor on this ground of appeal amount to challenges to the selection and weighing of evidence and fact-finding, which fall within the exclusive authority of the court below as the fact-finding court, and none of these arguments can be accepted.
D. As to the respective grounds of appeal of the Defendant and the Prosecutor regarding the violation of the former Punishment of Tax Evaders Act (조세범처벌법) (as amended before Act No. 7321 of December 31, 2004, the same hereinafter) relating to the receipt of false tax invoices, the guilty portion of the violation of the Punishment of Tax Evaders Act relating to evasion of value-added tax for the first and second periods of 2003 and the first period of 2004, and the violation of the Punishment of Tax Evaders Act relating to evasion of corporate tax for the year 2003
(1) The gist of the Defendant's ground of appeal on this point amounts to nothing more than an assertion challenging the selection and weighing of evidence and fact-finding, which fall within the exclusive authority of the court below, or an assertion of an error in the court below's legal determination based on facts different from those found by the court below. Moreover, upon examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the record, the court below's finding of guilt on this part of the charges (excluding the not-guilty portion relating to corporate tax evasion), premised on the fact that the 115 tax invoices at issue were prepared and issued without any supply of goods or services as provided under the Value-Added Tax Act, is justified, and there is no error such as a violation of the rules of evidence or empirical rules, or a misapprehension of legal principles. All of the Defendant's arguments regarding this ground of appeal are rejected.
(2) Meanwhile, under the principle of substance-over-form taxation as provided in Article 14(1) of the Framework Act on National Taxes (국세기본법) and Article 4(1) of the Corporate Tax Act (법인세법), where a person to whom income or profit subject to taxation actually accrues is different from the person to whom it is legally attributed, the tax laws must be applied by treating the person to whom it actually accrues as the taxpayer. Accordingly, the court below's determination, made on the same premise, that in calculating the corporate tax of Non-Indicted Company 5, operated by the Defendant, the 4.7 billion won received from Non-Indicted 3 as consideration for solicitation should be excluded from gross income, is justified, and there is no error such as a misapprehension of the legal principles concerning gross income under the Corporate Tax Act as alleged. The Prosecutor's argument regarding this ground of appeal is without merit.
2. As to the violation of the Act on Regulation and Punishment of Criminal Proceeds Concealment (범죄수익은닉의 규제 및 처벌 등에 관한 법률), although no specific ground of appeal has been stated, upon examination ex officio, since the President of the Korea Water Resources Corporation, as set forth above, cannot be considered to fall under "a person deemed to be a public official under laws and regulations" as provided in Article 111 of the Attorney-at-Law Act, the court below's finding of guilt on this part of the charges relating to the violation of the Act on Regulation and Punishment of Criminal Proceeds Concealment, premised on the view that the President of the Korea Water Resources Corporation falls under "a person deemed to be a public official under laws and regulations" as provided in Article 111 of the Attorney-at-Law Act, and that the act of receiving money or valuables under the pretext of making a solicitation or acting as an intermediary in connection with affairs handled by the President of the Korea Water Resources Corporation violates Article 111 of the Attorney-at-Law Act, constitutes an error in the legal principles concerning criminal proceeds, and this error affected the judgment; accordingly, this part cannot be sustained as it stands.
3. The Defendant filed a notice of appeal purporting to object also to the guilty portion of the violation of the former Punishment of Tax Evaders Act relating to the issuance of false tax invoices and the guilty portion of the violation of the Punishment of Tax Evaders Act relating to evasion of value-added tax for the first and second periods of 2000 and the first and second periods of 2001, and the Prosecutor filed a notice of appeal purporting to object also to the violation of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Economic Crimes (Embezzlement) relating to approximately 2.6 billion won of aggregate proceeds sale of the aggregate, and to the not-guilty portions of the violation of the Punishment of Tax Evaders Act relating to evasion of value-added tax. However, since neither notice of appeal states any grounds regarding these portions, and no statement of grounds for appeal contains any grounds of objection regarding these portions, this Court does not render a determination on these portions.
4. Accordingly, the portions of the judgment below relating to the violation of the Attorney-at-Law Act connected with Non-Indicted 3 and Non-Indicted 4, and the violation of the Act on Regulation and Punishment of Criminal Proceeds Concealment, can no longer be sustained. These offenses are in a relationship of concurrent crimes under the first part of Article 37 of the Criminal Act with the remaining guilty portions; the guilty portions and the not-guilty portions of the violation of the Punishment of Tax Evaders Act relating to tax evasion for each corresponding taxable period (the violations of the Punishment of Tax Evaders Act relating to evasion of corporate tax for 2000 and 2001 have already become final, as the Prosecutor did not appeal the first instance judgment of acquittal on those points), and the portion for which the prosecution is dismissed, as well as the guilty and not-guilty portions of the violation of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Economic Crimes (Embezzlement), are each in a relationship of a single crime (일죄). Therefore, the portions of the judgment below other than the portions relating to the violations of the Attorney-at-Law Act concerning the receipt of money or valuables from Non-Indicted 1 and Non-Indicted 2, and the portion relating to larceny, are reversed, and this part of the case is remanded to the court below for further hearing and determination. The Prosecutor's appeal is dismissed, and it is so ordered as set forth in the Order (주문). This Decision is unanimous among the participating Justices, except for the dissenting opinion of Justices Kim Yong-dam, Yang Sung-tae, Kim Hwang-sik, Park Il-hwan, Kim Neung-hwan, and Ahn Dae-hee on the legal principles concerning the interpretation of "a person deemed to be a public official under laws and regulations" as provided in Article 111 of the Attorney-at-Law Act, and there is a concurring supplementary opinion of Justice Kim Ji-hyung to the majority opinion.
5. The dissenting opinion of Justices Kim Yong-dam, Yang Sung-tae, Kim Hwang-sik, Park Il-hwan, Kim Neung-hwan, and Ahn Dae-hee is as follows.
It goes without saying, as the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized, that penal statutes must be strictly interpreted and applied, and must not be excessively expanded or interpreted by analogy in a direction unfavorable to the defendant. However, the interpretation of penal statutes is also a task of clarifying the normative meaning of the statute so that it may be applied to specific facts; while, as required by the principle of nulla poena sine lege, such limitations exist, penal statutes must, like other statutes, first be interpreted by clarifying the possible linguistic meaning of the language and text used (literal interpretation), and at the same time interpreted so as to achieve logical consistency in light of their relationship with other statutes (logical interpretation); and where the meaning of the provision as a legal norm cannot be sufficiently grasped through its text and logic alone, its meaning may be given concrete substance—within the bounds of the ordinary meaning of the penal statute—by comprehensively considering various factors including the ideology of the legal order as a whole, the function of the penal statute, its legislative history, legislative intent and purpose, the legal interest it protects and the purpose of that protection, and the form of the conduct at issue (teleological interpretation). This method of interpretation, too, is a firmly established view that the Supreme Court has repeatedly confirmed (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 2001Do2819, delivered on February 21, 2002; Supreme Court Decision 2002Do2363, delivered on January 10, 2003; Supreme Court Decision 2005Do6525, delivered on May 12, 2006, etc.).
First, as to the possible meaning of the language at issue in this case, namely, "public official (including a person who is deemed to be a public official under laws and regulations)" in Article 111 of the Attorney-at-Law Act: the portion in parentheses (hereinafter the "parenthetical portion") merely states, in its text, "a person deemed to be a public official under laws and regulations," without placing any limitation on the scope or the manner of provision by which a person is deemed to be a public official. Accordingly, it should be read as encompassing any person deemed to be a public official, regardless of the specific form or the scope of the deeming under the individual statute concerned. Since Article 18 of the Framework Act on the Management of Government-Invested Institutions provides that executives of government-invested institutions as defined in Article 2 of that Act and employees prescribed by Presidential Decree (hereinafter "executives and employees") shall be deemed public officials for purposes of the application of Articles 129 through 132 of the Criminal Act, it may be said that, within the bounds of the possible meaning of the language of the parenthetical portion, executives and employees of the Korea Water Resources Corporation fall under the meaning of "public official" as used in Article 111 of the Attorney-at-Law Act. This interpretation, made within the bounds of the possible meaning of the language of the parenthetical portion, does not constitute the kind of excessive expansive interpretation or analogical interpretation, unfavorable to the defendant, against which the principle of nulla poena sine lege guards.
However, if such an interpretation based on the possible meaning of the language were to produce unreasonable results, or run contrary to the requirements of the principle of nulla poena sine lege, in light of the reasons why other statutes deem certain persons to be public officials and the legislative purpose of Article 111 of the Attorney-at-Law Act, then the meaning of the parenthetical portion should be interpreted more narrowly than its ordinary meaning, taking into account all relevant factors including the ideology of the legal order as a whole, the function and purpose of the penal statute, and the legal interest and purpose of protection (teleological reduction). We therefore examine whether the interpretation based on the possible meaning of the language in this case is unreasonable or contrary to the principle of nulla poena sine lege such that a teleological reduction is required.
The purpose of Article 18 of the Framework Act on the Management of Government-Invested Institutions, which deems executives and employees of government-invested institutions to be public officials for purposes of the application of Articles 129 through 132 of the Criminal Act, is to protect public trust in the fair and honest performance of duties by such executives and employees, and to secure the fairness of the functions and roles undertaken by government-invested institutions, given that a government-invested institution is an enterprise in which the Government has invested 50% or more of the paid-in capital, and the duties performed by its executives and employees have a high degree of public character, comparable to the duties performed by public officials. Meanwhile, while the basic legislative purpose of Article 111 of the Attorney-at-Law Act is to prevent intervention, for the purpose of obtaining money or other benefits, in another person's case or affairs that are subject to the execution of laws and regulations by a public official, this provision additionally functions to prevent the indirect infringement of public trust in the fair and honest performance of duties by public officials, and to preemptively block the receipt of money or valuables for purposes of solicitation or intermediation in connection with a case or affairs handled by a public official, given that such conduct, by its nature, has a very high likelihood of escalating into the bribery of a public official. The latter function, too, is an important function of Article 111 of the Attorney-at-Law Act that cannot be disregarded. From this, it can be seen that Article 111 of the Attorney-at-Law Act is very closely related to Articles 129 through 132 of the Criminal Act, and in light of this relationship, as well as the fact, discussed below, that executives and employees of a government-invested institution are deemed public officials even where they are the counterpart of intermediation for purposes of the application of Article 132 of the Criminal Act, no unreasonable result can be said to arise from treating executives and employees of a government-invested institution as public officials in accordance with the language of the parenthetical portion.
Moreover, from the standpoint of an ordinary person subject to the norm, there are, apart from cases where an individual statute deems a person to be a public official "for purposes of the application of Articles 129 through 132 of the Criminal Act" and cases where a person is deemed to be a public official "for purposes of the application of penal provisions under the Criminal Act or other statutes," essentially no significantly different types of deeming provisions in individual statutes. Since this manner of regulation is relatively simple and clear, it cannot be said that a person subject to the norm is unable to clearly understand the meaning of the penal provision, nor can it be said that the scope of application of the parenthetical portion of Article 111 of the Attorney-at-Law Act is thereby expanded without limit to the detriment of the person subject to the norm. Furthermore, with respect to executives and employees of government-invested institutions at issue in this case, in light of the purpose of deeming them to be public officials for purposes of the application of Articles 129 through 132 of the Criminal Act, and the legislative purpose and function of Article 111 of the Attorney-at-Law Act discussed above, a person subject to the norm could easily recognize that cases or affairs handled by executives and employees of a government-invested institution are included among the cases or affairs subject to solicitation that are punishable under Article 111 of the Attorney-at-Law Act. Accordingly, our interpretation cannot be said to be contrary to the principle of clarity of penal statutes derived from the principle of nulla poena sine lege.
In sum, treating cases or affairs handled by executives and employees of a government-invested institution as falling under cases or affairs handled by a public official as provided in Article 111 of the Attorney-at-Law Act is an interpretation faithful to the text of the statute, and does not constitute an excessive expansive interpretation of Article 111 of the Attorney-at-Law Act unfavorable to the defendant, nor can it be said that any unreasonable result arises from such interpretation.
If the interpretation of the majority opinion were followed, the purpose of the amendment to the Attorney-at-Law Act newly establishing the parenthetical portion would be rendered entirely meaningless, and for this reason as well, we cannot agree with the majority opinion. That is, among the cases that the majority opinion enumerates as potentially falling under the parenthetical portion: (i) where a person is specifically deemed to be a public official for purposes of the application of Article 111 of the Attorney-at-Law Act, or (ii) where a provision generally deems a person to be a public official for purposes of the application of all penal provisions in which "public official" is an element of the offense—in either of these cases, even without the parenthetical portion, the case or affairs handled by the person so deemed could be interpreted as a case or affairs handled by a public official under Article 111 of the Attorney-at-Law Act. It is only in case (iii)—where a provision generally subjects to criminal punishment, on the same basis as cases or affairs handled by public officials, solicitation or intermediation concerning cases or affairs handled by non-public-officials, thereby containing an intention to deem such persons to be public officials—that the parenthetical portion would carry independent meaning. However, at present, there exists no such case falling under (iii) above, and moreover, in light of the legislative purpose and function of Article 111 of the Attorney-at-Law Act discussed above, it is doubtful how many provisions could be found that fall under case (iii) to a greater degree than a provision deeming a person to be a public official for purposes of the application of Articles 129 through 132 of the Criminal Act. Ultimately, under the majority opinion, the conclusion would be reached that the newly established parenthetical portion carries no meaning whatsoever. It appears that the majority opinion has arrived at this difficult-to-accept conclusion because, in this case where the issue is whether Article 111 of the Attorney-at-Law Act has been violated, notwithstanding that the parenthetical portion was newly established when the former Attorney-at-Law Act was wholly amended by Act No. 6207 on January 28, 2000, whereby the former Article 90 was revised into the current Article 111 of the Attorney-at-Law Act, the majority opinion has placed the starting point, or focus, of its discussion not on the interpretation of the newly established parenthetical portion, but—just as before the amendment—on the interpretation of the individual deeming-as-public-official provision at issue in this case, namely, Article 18 of the Framework Act on the Management of Government-Invested Institutions. However, since the parenthetical portion was newly established by the amendment to Article 111 of the Attorney-at-Law Act, the meaning of the language "public official (including a person who is deemed to be a public official under laws and regulations)" in Article 111 of the Attorney-at-Law Act must be newly interpreted accordingly.
[Reasoning] (continued)
Article 78, Item 1 of the former Attorney-at-Law Act (변호사법) (before amendment by Act No. 4544 of March 10, 1993) and Article 90, Item 1 of the former Attorney-at-Law Act (before amendment by Act No. 6207 of January 28, 2000), which punish the act of brokering bribery (알선수재행위) (hereinafter, since the content of the two provisions is substantially the same, both are referred to as the "former Attorney-at-Law Act"), did not contain the parenthetical portion. Under the former Attorney-at-Law Act, the Supreme Court, in interpreting the above provision punishing brokering bribery, held that the provision deeming officers and employees of the National Park Service to be public officials for purposes of applying penal provisions under the Criminal Act (형법) or other statutes means only that such officers and employees are deemed public officials solely for the purpose of applying penal provisions under the Criminal Act or the Natural Parks Act, and does not mean that they are necessarily deemed public officials or hold the status of public officials in other respects; therefore, cases and affairs handled by officers and employees of the National Park Service do not constitute cases and affairs handled by public officials as defined in the former Attorney-at-Law Act (Supreme Court Decision 94Do474, decided May 10, 1994). Subsequently, the Supreme Court held that the provision deeming officers of the Korea Expressway Corporation and employees at or above the rank of section chief or assistant manager to be public officials for purposes of applying Articles 129 through 132 of the Criminal Act means only that such officers and employees are deemed public officials for the purpose of applying the bribery provisions set forth in the Criminal Act, and does not mean that they are necessarily deemed public officials or hold the status of public officials in other respects; therefore, the affairs of officers and employees of the Korea Expressway Corporation do not fall under cases and affairs handled by public officials as defined in the former Attorney-at-Law Act (Supreme Court Decision 99Do3073, decided September 17, 1999). Following these Supreme Court interpretations of the provision punishing brokering bribery under the former Attorney-at-Law Act, the legislature appears to have newly inserted the parenthetical portion when comprehensively amending the Attorney-at-Law Act on January 28, 2000, in deference to the purport of the above decisions, and it is the interpretation of this newly inserted parenthetical portion that is now at issue in this case. This entire process may be regarded as a process of communication between the legislative branch and the bodies that interpret and apply the law, and therefore it is desirable to understand the intent expressed by the legislature in that process within the context of that communicative process. Viewed in that context, the purport or purpose behind the legislature's insertion of the parenthetical portion is to punish, as brokering bribery under Article 111 of the Attorney-at-Law Act, the act of receiving money, goods, or other benefits in the name of solicitation or brokerage in connection with cases or affairs handled by persons deemed public officials under individual statutes, in consideration of the public nature of the work performed by such persons. There may be differing views as to whether the legislature's choice to express this intent by inserting a parenthetical portion was truly desirable, or whether it was appropriate in light of the principle of clarity (명확성의 원칙), a derivative principle of the principle of legality (죄형법정주의) proclaimed by the Constitution of the Republic of Korea. However, even if the legislative method has some shortcomings and there are ambiguous aspects, this should not be used as a basis for an interpretation that disregards the legislative purpose of the provision as a whole; rather, one should adopt an interpretation and application that is consistent with the Constitution, at least with respect to the parts that appear clear. We believe that doing so, on the one hand, shows respect for the legislature, and on the other hand, properly fulfills our duty to establish justice in criminal matters through the realization of the State's penal power within the scope delegated and permitted by the Constitution. For this reason as well, we find it difficult to agree with the majority opinion.
The majority opinion is premised on a strict, limited interpretation of the meaning of the public official deeming provision in Article 18 of the Government-Invested Institutions Management Basic Act (정부투자기관 관리기본법), to the effect that persons are deemed public officials only when the bribery provisions of the Criminal Act are applied. Such an interpretation may be valid when considered solely in terms of Article 18 of the Government-Invested Institutions Management Basic Act itself. However, according to the public official deeming provision in Article 18 of the Government-Invested Institutions Management Basic Act, in applying Article 132 of the Criminal Act (brokering bribery, where both the subject of the crime and the counterpart of the brokerage are public officials), officers and employees of government-invested institutions should be understood to be deemed public officials not only when they are the subject of the crime of receiving a bribe in exchange for brokerage, but also when they are the counterpart of the brokerage. That is, there are cases in which officers and employees of government-invested institutions are deemed public officials when they are the counterpart of the brokerage act. Meanwhile, "receiving money, goods, entertainment, or other benefits in the name of solicitation or brokerage in connection with a case or affair handled by a public official," as defined in Article 111 of the Attorney-at-Law Act, refers to receiving money or goods in the name of mediating between a public official and the person requesting the brokerage in connection with a case or affair handled by the public official (see Supreme Court Decision 97Do547, decided December 23, 1997; Supreme Court Decision 2003Do3145, decided September 24, 2004, etc.), and in this case as well, the counterpart of the brokerage act is likewise a public official. As such, the crime of brokering bribery under Article 111 of the Attorney-at-Law Act and the crime of brokering bribery under Article 132 of the Criminal Act differ only in the subject of the crime and whether the position of a public official is used, while the remaining conduct and the counterpart of the brokerage are the same. Given that officers and employees of government-invested institutions are deemed public officials when they are the counterpart of the brokerage act in the crime of brokering bribery under Article 132, it would be appropriate to likewise regard them as public officials when they are the counterpart of the brokerage act in the crime of brokering bribery under Article 111 of the Attorney-at-Law Act, and the parenthetical portion of Article 111 of the Attorney-at-Law Act may be understood as an explicit expression of this point. For this reason as well, we find it difficult to agree with the majority opinion.
For the foregoing reasons, we dissent from the majority opinion, which construes "cases and affairs handled by officers and employees of the Korea Water Resources Corporation" as not falling under "cases and affairs handled by a public official (including a person deemed a public official under statutes or regulations)" as referred to in Article 111 of the Attorney-at-Law Act. Accordingly, taking the same view as ours, Supreme Court Decision 2005Do1903, decided May 13, 2005, which held that officers and employees of the Korea Expressway Corporation, a government-invested institution, fall within the parenthetical portion in interpreting and applying Article 111 of the Attorney-at-Law Act, should be maintained, and, in accordance with the purport of this Supreme Court decision, the lower court's determination finding the defendant guilty with respect to the portions concerning violation of the Attorney-at-Law Act and violation of the Act on Regulation and Punishment of Criminal Proceeds Concealment (범죄수익은닉의 규제 및 처벌 등에 관한 법률) relating to Non-Indicted 3 and Non-Indicted 4 should likewise be maintained.
6. Supplementary opinion of Justice Kim Ji-hyung to the majority opinion is as follows.
The difference in views between the majority opinion and the dissenting opinion as to how to interpret the meaning of "a person deemed a public official under statutes or regulations," as provided in the parenthetical portion of Article 111 of the Attorney-at-Law Act, ultimately appears to come down to the question of how the limits of the principle of legality should be set.
It is a basic requirement of the principle of clarity, derived from the principle of legality, that penal statutes must be clearly defined so that anyone can know what conduct the law seeks to punish and can accordingly determine their own conduct. The question, then, is whether Article 111 of the Attorney-at-Law Act, as a penal statute, is defined in such a way that ordinary persons subject to it can sufficiently know what specific conduct is prohibited. I wish to supplement the majority opinion by expressing several doubts that arise in this connection.
A. First of all, doubt arises as to whether the legislative form itself of the parenthetical portion of Article 111 of the Attorney-at-Law Act is proper.
By providing "a person deemed a public official under statutes or regulations," the parenthetical portion of Article 111 of the Attorney-at-Law Act takes the form of a blanket delegation of a certain part of the elements of the offense constituting a violation of Article 111 of the Attorney-at-Law Act to the provisions of other statutes or regulations.
While it would be most desirable for a penal statute to fully define the elements of the offense by itself, it need not necessarily be self-sufficient in every case, and delegation to subordinate statutes or regulations, or to other statutes, may of course be permitted depending on the circumstances.
However, while the parenthetical portion of Article 111 of the Attorney-at-Law Act delegates a certain part of the elements of the offense to the provisions of other statutes or regulations, it merely provides vaguely "under statutes or regulations" without any other provision that would allow the specific statute or regulation to be identified. This is a highly unusual case, different even from cases in which a penal provision is delegated to subordinate statutes or regulations.
Moreover, even where other statutes or regulations contain a provision deeming a person to be a public official, an ordinary person who is not deemed a public official and thus does not fall within the scope of regulation of that provision would have no way of knowing whether his or her conduct constitutes a criminal act in violation of Article 111 of the Attorney-at-Law Act unless he or she individually examines all of the countless statutes and regulations to determine whether any person who is not a public official is nonetheless deemed a public official under some specific, individual statute or regulation.
If one were to compile the individual statutes and regulations currently containing public official deeming provisions, they would include: the Act on the Protection of Personal Information Maintained by Public Institutions (공공기관의 개인정보 보호에 관한 법률), the Construction Technology Management Act (건설기술관리법), the Framework Act on the Construction Industry (건설산업기본법), the Building Act (건축법), the Public Officials Pension Act (공무원연금법), the Special Act on the Management of Public Funds (공적자금관리 특별법), the Registration of Bonds and Debentures Act (공사채등록법), the Tourism Promotion and Development Fund Act (관광진흥개발기금법), the National Technical Qualifications Act (국가기술자격법), the Act on the Establishment, etc. of Financial Supervisory Organizations (금융감독기구의 설치 등에 관한 법률), the Korea Technology Credit Guarantee Fund Act (기술신용보증기금법), the Special Measures for the Deregulation of Corporate Activities Act (기업활동 규제완화에 관한 특별조치법), the Act on the Appointment, etc. of a Special Prosecutor for Investigation into Allegations of Secret Remittances to North Korea in Connection with the Inter-Korean Summit (남북정상회담 관련 대북비밀송금 의혹사건 등의 진상규명을 위한 특별검사 임명 등에 관한 법률), the Labor Relations Commission Act (노동위원회법), the Farmland Act (농지법), the Korea National Housing Corporation Act (대한주택공사법), the Urban Development Act (도시개발법), the Act on the Maintenance and Improvement of Urban Areas and Dwelling Conditions for Residents (도시 및 주거환경정비법), the Civil Petitions Treatment Act (민원사무처리에 관한 법률), the Invention Promotion Act (발명진흥법), the Act on Support for Areas Surrounding Power Plants (발전소주변지역 지원에 관한 법률), the Act on the Utilization and Promotion of Radiation and Radioisotopes (방사선 및 방사성동위원소 이용진흥법), the Act on the Public Notice of Real Estate Values and the Appraisal Thereof (부동산가격공시 및 감정평가에 관한 법률), the Busan Transportation Corporation Act (부산교통공단법), the Feed Control Act (사료관리법), the Act on Compensation for Shareholders of Private Railway Companies (사설철도주식회사 주식소유자에 대한 보상에 관한 법률), the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act (산업재해보상보험법), the Act on the Restoration of Honor and Compensation for Victims of the Samchung Reeducation Camps (삼청교육피해자의 명예회복 및 보상에 관한 법률), the Act on the Establishment and Operation, etc. of the Sudokwon Landfill Site Management Corporation (수도권매립지관리공사의 설립 및 운영 등에 관한 법률), the Fishery Products Quality Control Act (수산물품질관리법), the Water-Related Leisure Activities Safety Act (수상레저안전법), the Export Insurance Act (수출보험법), the Elevator Manufacture and Management Act (승강기제조 및 관리에 관한 법률), the Korea Credit Guarantee Fund Act (신용보증기금법), the Natural Parks Act (자연공원법), the Act on the Promotion of Information and Communications Network Utilization and Information Protection, etc. (정보통신망 이용촉진 및 정보보호 등에 관한 법률), the Industrial Bank of Korea Act (중소기업은행법), the Local Public Enterprises Act (지방공기업법), the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes (특정범죄 가중처벌 등에 관한 법률), the Korea Expressway Corporation Act (한국도로공사법), the Korea Development Bank Act (한국산업은행법), the Export-Import Bank of Korea Act (한국수출입은행법), the Bank of Korea Act (한국은행법), and the Criminal Procedure Act (형사소송법), among others. I have listed these several dozen statute names one by one in order to reconsider whether it would truly be easy for an ordinary person—who, in general, would not appear to be a specific person subject to any of these individual statutes—to properly grasp the content of the public official deeming provisions contained in all of these various individual statutes. This is all the more so when one considers that new deeming provisions may appear at any time in the future, without limit.
B. Next, setting aside the question of whether the parenthetical portion of Article 111 of the Attorney-at-Law Act exceeds the limits of legislative delegation required by the principle of legality, let us consider only the question of how to interpret the meaning of "a person deemed a public official under statutes or regulations" in the parenthetical portion.
The dissenting opinion's view on this point is, in essence, that "regardless of the specific form of the individual statute or regulation, the scope of persons deemed public officials, or other such content, any person deemed a public official should be regarded as falling within this category, and this is the interpretation according to the possible meaning of the language of the provision," and that "however, exceptionally, in light of the reason for deeming a person a public official under the individual statute or regulation and the legislative purpose of Article 111 of the Attorney-at-Law Act, etc., where it would be unreasonable or contrary to the principle of legality to interpret a person deemed a public official under a specific statute or regulation as being included among persons deemed public officials under Article 111 of the Attorney-at-Law Act, such person may be excluded from those deemed public officials under Article 111 of the Attorney-at-Law Act."
While it is highly commendable that the dissenting opinion, in interpreting the meaning of the parenthetical portion of Article 111 of the Attorney-at-Law Act, thus acknowledges room for a teleological restrictive interpretation that limits the meaning of the language, it is nonetheless understood to be taking the position that such a restrictive interpretation is to be recognized only in exceptional cases, thereby broadly permitting the application of the parenthetical portion of Article 111 of the Attorney-at-Law Act in general. On this point as well, the following doubts remain from the standpoint of the principle of legality.
The number of ways in which a person who is not a public official may nonetheless be deemed a public official can truly vary widely. Nevertheless, when the provision simply states "a person deemed a public official under statutes or regulations," can it truly be asserted with confidence that an ordinary person subject to this penal provision can clearly foresee, from his or her own vantage point, whether this refers to all cases of being deemed a public official, or whether cases are to be divided into those meaningful for purposes of applying Article 111 of the Attorney-at-Law Act and those that are not, and if the latter, how specifically the line between meaningful and non-meaningful cases for purposes of applying Article 111 of the Attorney-at-Law Act is to be drawn and where its limits are to be set?
To elaborate further: the legal status of a public official, as distinguished from that of a private individual who is not a public official, cannot be reduced to one or two matters. A public official is the subject who performs administrative actions in the course of his or her duties. Public officials are sometimes granted special rights concerning the security of their status, and are sometimes recognized as having property rights, such as with respect to remuneration, that differ from those of ordinary workers. On the other hand, they sometimes bear special duties or responsibilities. Such responsibility may include administrative responsibility, such as disciplinary action or indemnification, special treatment in civil liability, and, further, in criminal liability, they may become subjects of criminal punishment different from ordinary private individuals. Accordingly, recognizing a status equivalent to that of a public official for a person who is not a public official may, depending on the legislative necessity required under the individual statute or regulation among the various matters described above, sometimes deem the person a public official within the scope of granting a certain right given to public officials, and sometimes deem the person a public official within the scope of imposing the same duties or responsibilities as a public official. Among such responsibilities, a person may be deemed a public official within the scope of bearing administrative responsibility, such as disciplinary action or indemnification, or may be given the same treatment for purposes of the same regulatory objective as a public official with respect to civil liability, or may be deemed a public official for purposes of imposing criminal liability.
With this in mind, let me offer a few examples. Suppose, in connection with State compensation, that while an individual public official bears liability for compensation only in cases of intent or gross negligence, there is a deeming provision recognizing a status equivalent to that of a public official, within that scope, for a specific person who is not a public official, because there is a need to limit that individual's liability for compensation. Could a person deemed a public official under such a deeming provision be said to be "a person deemed a public official under statutes or regulations" as provided in Article 111 of the Attorney-at-Law Act? Article 136, Paragraph 1 of the Criminal Act punishes the act of assaulting or intimidating a public official who is executing official duties as the crime of obstruction of the performance of official duties. Suppose there is a provision deeming a person who is not a public official to be a public official, solely for purposes of applying Article 136, Paragraph 1 of the Criminal Act, in order to subject to punishment the act of assaulting or intimidating that person in connection with the performance of duties carried out by that person. Could such a person likewise be affirmatively said to be "a person deemed a public official under statutes or regulations" as provided in Article 111 of the Attorney-at-Law Act?
The dissenting opinion takes the position that, in the case of officers and employees of government-invested institutions who are deemed public officials under Article 18 of the Government-Invested Institutions Management Basic Act, at issue in this case, for purposes of applying Articles 129 through 132 of the Criminal Act, this does not fall within the cases to be excluded from "a person deemed a public official under statutes or regulations" as provided in Article 111 of the Attorney-at-Law Act, and cites as its main ground that "in light of the purport of the provision deeming officers and employees of government-invested institutions to be public officials for purposes of applying Articles 129 through 132 of the Criminal Act, and the legislative purpose and function of Article 111 of the Attorney-at-Law Act, a person subject to this provision could readily know that cases and affairs handled by officers and employees of government-invested institutions are included among the cases and affairs concerning which solicitation is punished under Article 111 of the Attorney-at-Law Act."
On this point, the dissenting opinion appears to be premised on the assumption that it can be clearly interpreted, from the standpoint of the person subject to the provision, that "the public official deeming provision under Article 18 of the Government-Invested Institutions Management Basic Act also carries the intent of prohibiting solicitation or brokerage with respect to cases and affairs handled by officers and employees of government-invested institutions, thereby making them subject to criminal punishment under Article 111 of the Attorney-at-Law Act." However, recalling once again that Supreme Court Decision 99Do3073, decided September 17, 1999, cited earlier by the majority opinion, took the position, in a case concerning whether the act of receiving money in the name of solicitation in connection with affairs handled by officers and employees of a government-invested institution constitutes a violation of the Attorney-at-Law Act—where the issue was whether affairs handled by officers and employees of a government-invested institution could be equated with affairs handled by public officials—that the meaning of the public official deeming provision in Article 18 of the Government-Invested Institutions Management Basic Act should be strictly interpreted and should not be expanded even slightly beyond the scope of that deeming provision, I cannot dispel my doubt as to whether an interpretation such as that of the dissenting opinion is truly possible.
Moreover, as mentioned in Section A above, I cannot help but doubt whether it would truly accord with the principle of legality to require a person subject to the provision, in order to know what conduct is prohibited by the parenthetical portion of Article 111 of the Attorney-at-Law Act, not only to find the public official deeming provision set forth in an individual statute or regulation, but further, having found such a deeming provision, to again determine specifically whether it renders the person subject to punishment under Article 111 of the Attorney-at-Law Act.
It is precisely for this reason that the majority opinion holds that the parenthetical portion of Article 111 of the Attorney-at-Law Act must be interpreted all the more strictly, and takes the position that, in applying Article 111 of the Attorney-at-Law Act, cases in which a person is deemed a public official should be limited to those in which the scope of persons subject to punishment under Article 111 of the Attorney-at-Law Act can be clearly identified—specifically, cases in which a person is deemed a public official for purposes of applying a criminal punishment provision in which "public official" is generally an element of the offense, or cases carrying the intent that, where solicitation or brokerage occurs with respect to a case or affair handled by a person who is not a public official, such case or affair is generally equated with a case or affair handled by a public official and made subject to criminal punishment, thereby deeming such person a public official. I believe that such an interpretation is closer to being consistent with the Constitution.
C. I must also say a word about the legislative purpose of the parenthetical portion of Article 111 of the Attorney-at-Law Act as put forward by the dissenting opinion.
It goes without saying that the majority opinion does not depart from the view of prior Supreme Court precedent that, even in interpreting penal statutes, a teleological interpretation that takes into account the legislative purpose and objective of the statute, its legislative history, and so forth is not excluded. Legislative purpose must be respected. However, as the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated, this must be done "within the scope that does not depart from the ordinary meaning of the statutory language." One cannot emphasize legislative purpose alone to the point of substituting an interpretation that departs from the ordinary meaning of the statutory language. Legislative purpose is merely one consideration for arriving at a more specific and reasonable interpretation, premised on the ordinary meaning of the language having first been ascertained to some degree.
First, I doubt whether the purpose of amending the Attorney-at-Law Act to newly insert the parenthetical portion of Article 111 in its current form was truly, as the dissenting opinion infers, to make all cases and affairs handled by persons deemed public officials under individual statutes or regulations subject to Article 111 of the Attorney-at-Law Act, regardless of the purport of such provisions.
The dissenting opinion cites, as a ground for its position, that if the parenthetical portion is interpreted restrictively as in the majority opinion, then the insertion of the parenthetical portion at the time of the amendment of the Attorney-at-Law Act would have no meaning whatsoever. However, just as principles such as the priority of special law over general law, and of new law over old law, are discussed, questions of interpretation may arise as to whether content generally provided in one statute can indeed apply to another statute; moreover, even where a provision states that "a person shall be deemed a public official for purposes of applying penal provisions under the Criminal Act or other statutes," doubt may arise as to whether such a provision is intended to deem a person a public official only with respect to penal provisions in which a public official is the subject of punishment, or whether it is intended to deem a person a public official in all cases in which the term "public official" is used in a penal provision. Accordingly, expressly providing for this in the statutory text so as not to give rise to such disputes over interpretation is faithful to the principle of legality and cannot be said to be meaningless, and an interpretation such as that of the majority opinion cannot be said to be contrary to the legislative purpose of the parenthetical portion.
Furthermore, even if the purpose of amending the Attorney-at-Law Act to newly insert the parenthetical portion of Article 111 in its current form was, as the dissenting opinion infers, "to punish, under Article 111 of the Attorney-at-Law Act, the act of receiving money or other benefits in the name of solicitation or brokerage in connection with cases and affairs handled by persons deemed public officials under individual statutes or regulations, in consideration of the public nature of their work," the language of the parenthetical portion—"including a person deemed a public official under statutes or regulations"—must be said to be sorely insufficient to clearly and properly reveal such legislative intent, as I have repeatedly emphasized from various angles above.
If the legislative intent, at the time the Attorney-at-Law Act was amended to insert the parenthetical portion of Article 111, had truly been to encompass all persons who were, at that time, deemed public officials under public official deeming provisions, then, since the content of the public official deeming provisions at that time fell into types such as "shall be deemed a public official for purposes of applying Articles 129 through 132 of the Criminal Act" and "shall be deemed a public official for purposes of applying penal provisions under the Criminal Act or other statutes," the legislature should at the very least have used language different from that of the parenthetical portion as enacted—for example, a clear provision such as "cases and affairs handled by a person who is deemed, under statutes or regulations, a public official for purposes of applying penal provisions under the Criminal Act or other statutes, shall be regarded as cases and affairs handled by a public official for purposes of applying Article 111 of the Attorney-at-Law Act," or a provision to a similar effect.
The dissenting opinion also takes a reserved position on this point, stating that "there may be differing views as to whether the legislative method of the parenthetical portion was appropriate in light of the principle of clarity, a derivative principle of the principle of legality," while nonetheless expressing the view that "even if the legislative method has some shortcomings and there are ambiguous aspects, this should not be used as a basis for an interpretation that disregards the legislative purpose." However, given that the legislature has, in this way, given rise to interpretive problems by adopting an inappropriate and unclear legislative method, it cannot be said that the true legislative intent was to attach special significance to the insertion of the parenthetical portion even at the cost of sacrificing the principle of clarity under the principle of legality. I believe there is no reason to insist on an unreasonable interpretation, in order to attach special significance to the insertion of the parenthetical portion, by emphasizing solely a legislative intent that an ordinary person subject to the provision could not readily ascertain.
[Reasoning]
라. Lastly, what I wish to emphasize once again is that whether the principle of clarity, which derives from the principle of statutory definiteness in criminal law (죄형법정주의), has been violated must be judged not from the perspective of a legal expert who has undergone analysis and examination, but from the standpoint of an ordinary person, who is the addressee of the relevant penal provision, looking at that provision.
It may seem paradoxical, but I believe the very fact that the majority opinion and the dissenting opinion are so sharply divided over the meaning of the parenthetical portion of Article 111 of the Attorney-at-Law Act (변호사법) is itself eloquent testimony to the unclarity of that parenthetical portion. I hereby set forth the foregoing as a supplementary opinion to the majority opinion.
Chief Justice Lee Yong-hoon (Presiding Judge), Ko Hyun-cheol, Kim Yong-dam, Kim Young-ran, Yang Seung-tae, Kim Hwang-sik, Park Si-hwan, Kim Ji-hyung (Justice in Charge), Lee Hong-hoon, Park Il-hwan, Kim Neung-hwan, Jeon Su-an, An Dae-hee