[Plaintiff, Appellant] Plaintiff
[Defendant, Appellee] Kookmin Bank Co., Ltd., successor to the litigation of the merged Kookmin Bank Co., Ltd. (Attorneys of Law Firm Hwawoo, Yoo In-ui and 2 others, Defendant's Attorneys)
[Judgment Below] Seoul High Court Decision 2003Na86161, 86178 dated March 30, 2005
[Order]
The appeal is dismissed. The costs of the appeal are to be borne by the Plaintiff.
[Reasoning] The grounds for appeal are examined.
1. Regarding the portion of the action seeking confirmation of invalidity of the board resolution
Where a representative director appointed by a board resolution has retired from office, and a successor representative director has subsequently been appointed by a new, valid board resolution held thereafter, with the registration of such appointment having been completed, then, absent special circumstances, even if the original resolution appointing the representative director were invalid, seeking a declaration of non-existence or invalidity thereof amounts to seeking confirmation of a past legal relationship or right, and must be regarded as lacking the requirement of legal interest for protection as a declaratory action (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 80Da2425, delivered September 14, 1982; Supreme Court Decision 2001Da64479, delivered September 26, 2003, etc.).
Examining the record in light of the above legal principle, the court below was justified in holding, to the effect that since Nonparty 1, who had been the president of Defendant Bank, retired from office and Nonparty 2 was subsequently appointed as the successor president of Defendant Bank, with the registration of such appointment being completed on November 2, 2004, the Plaintiff's portion of the action seeking confirmation of invalidity of the board resolution appointing Nonparty 1 as president of Defendant Bank on November 1, 2001 is unlawful for lack of interest in seeking confirmation. There is no error of law, such as misapprehension of the legal principles concerning interest in seeking confirmation, as alleged in the grounds for appeal.
2. Regarding the assertion that Articles 4 and 5 of the Act on the Structural Improvement of the Financial Industry (금융산업의 구조개선에 관한 법률) are unconstitutional
Article 4 of the former Act on the Structural Improvement of the Financial Industry (before its amendment by Act No. 6807 of December 26, 2002; hereinafter the "former Financial Industry Structural Improvement Act") requires financial institutions to obtain authorization from the Financial Supervisory Commission when undertaking mergers, etc. under the former Financial Industry Structural Improvement Act (Paragraph 1 of the same Article), while providing for the criteria for authorization review (Paragraph 3 of the same Article) and conditional authorization (Paragraph 5 of the same Article). It is difficult to find grounds for concluding that these provisions essentially infringe upon the property rights of shareholders of financial institutions, or that shareholders of financial institutions are subjected to discriminatory treatment without reasonable grounds. Accordingly, these provisions cannot be deemed to violate the Constitution.
Furthermore, Article 5, Paragraphs 3 through 8, 10, and 11 of the former Financial Industry Structural Improvement Act are provisions simplifying the procedures relating to mergers, etc. of financial institutions. These provisions shorten the various periods under the Commercial Act (상법) relating to mergers as follows: the period for creditors to raise objections, set at one month or more under Article 232, Paragraph 1 of the Commercial Act, is shortened to ten days or more (Paragraph 3 of the same Article); the period for notice of convocation of a general shareholders' meeting, set at two weeks prior under Article 363, Paragraph 1 of the Commercial Act, is shortened to seven days prior (Paragraph 4 of the same Article); the period for disclosure of the balance sheet, set at two weeks prior to the date of the merger shareholders' meeting under Article 522-2, Paragraph 1 of the Commercial Act, is shortened to seven days prior (Paragraph 5 of the same Article); the period for closing the register of shareholders and public notice of the record date, set at two weeks prior under Article 354, Paragraph 4 of the Commercial Act, is shortened to seven days prior (Paragraph 6 of the same Article); the period for public notice for submission of old share certificates for share consolidation, set at one month or more under Article 530, Paragraph 3 and Article 440 of the Commercial Act, is shortened to five days or more (Paragraph 7 of the same Article); the period for exercising appraisal rights, set at within 20 days under Article 522-3, Paragraph 1 of the Commercial Act, is shortened to within 10 days (Paragraph 8 of the same Article); and the period for notice of convocation of the reporting meeting for an absorption-type merger or the inaugural meeting for a consolidation-type merger, set at two weeks prior under Articles 526 and 527 of the Commercial Act, is shortened to seven days prior (Paragraph 11 of the same Article). Additionally, as a special provision to Article 174-6, Paragraph 5, Item 3 of the Securities and Exchange Act (증권거래법), which restricts the voting rights of the Korea Securities Depository (hereinafter the "Depository") at such general shareholders' meetings, the provision recognizes the exercise of voting rights by the Depository even at such general shareholders' meetings (Paragraph 10 of the same Article). These provisions are designed to concretely and institutionally guarantee the legislative purpose (Article 1 of the former Financial Industry Structural Improvement Act) of supporting the structural improvement of the financial industry by enabling the swift pursuit of mergers of financial institutions, thereby promoting sound competition among financial institutions and enhancing the efficiency of financial business, and thereby contributing to the balanced development of the financial industry. While the shortening of the various periods under the Commercial Act relating to mergers, undertaken for the achievement of this legislative purpose, may to some extent restrict shareholders' exercise of rights, it cannot be said that the shortened periods are so unreasonably brief as to render the original purpose meaningless, or that they fundamentally deny or significantly impede shareholders' exercise of rights as a result. Moreover, although the provision recognizes proxy voting by the Depository at general shareholders' meetings resolving on mergers, unlike the Securities and Exchange Act, it recognizes only exceptional and supplementary proxy voting for shareholders who did not attend the general shareholders' meeting, and provides for a so-called "shadow voting" method, thereby preventing distortion of shareholders' decision-making through proxy voting. Accordingly, even if shareholders of financial institutions suffer some disadvantage from restriction of their rights due to these provisions, this cannot be deemed to outweigh the aforementioned legislative purpose of responding to the demands of the times for improvement of the industrial structure to enhance the competitiveness of the financial industry, and there is reasonable ground to conclude that the public interest purpose of these provisions is superior when compared to the private interests lost thereby. Therefore, it cannot be said that these provisions exceed legislative discretion and excessively restrict shareholders' property rights. Furthermore, considering comprehensively the public interest purpose of realizing the enlargement and specialization of financial institutions through acquisitions, mergers, etc. of financial institutions in order to enhance the competitiveness of the financial industry, as well as the necessity of swift response in restructuring to achieve enhancement of the competitiveness of the financial industry and rationalization of the industrial structure, it can be said that there is reasonable ground for the differential treatment between shareholders of merging companies subject to the former Financial Industry Structural Improvement Act and shareholders of merging companies not subject thereto, and thus it cannot be said that the right to equality is infringed thereby. It is also difficult to find any possibility that these provisions would excessively suppress the market economic order pursued by the Constitution, or any concern that the economic freedom and initiative of individuals and enterprises would fail to be respected as a result. Accordingly, it cannot be said that these provisions violate Article 119, Paragraph 1 of the Constitution (see Constitutional Court Decision 2005Hun-Ba34, delivered December 26, 2008).
Therefore, Articles 4 and 5 of the former Financial Industry Structural Improvement Act cannot be deemed to be provisions in violation of the Constitution, and thus the court below was justified in applying the former Financial Industry Structural Improvement Act to the instant merger between Kookmin Bank Co., Ltd. before the merger (hereinafter "pre-merger Kookmin Bank") and Korea Housing Bank Co., Ltd. before the merger (hereinafter "pre-merger Korea Housing Bank"). There is no error of law, such as application of an unconstitutional statute, as alleged in the grounds for appeal.
3. Regarding the scope of application of Article 5 of the former Financial Industry Structural Improvement Act
Article 2, Items 1 and 3 of the former Financial Industry Structural Improvement Act separately define "financial institution" and "insolvent financial institution," respectively, and Articles 3 through 5 of the former Financial Industry Structural Improvement Act provide for mergers between "financial institutions" without limiting the scope of application to mergers between "insolvent financial institutions." Accordingly, Article 5 of the former Financial Industry Structural Improvement Act is to be interpreted as applicable so long as both merging companies are financial institutions, regardless of whether either or both are insolvent financial institutions.
In the same vein, the court below was justified in holding, to the effect that even though pre-merger Kookmin Bank and pre-merger Korea Housing Bank were not each insolvent financial institutions, Article 5 of the former Financial Industry Structural Improvement Act could be applied to the merger procedure between the two banks, which are financial institutions. There is no error of law, such as misapprehension of the legal principles concerning the scope of application of Article 5 of the former Financial Industry Structural Improvement Act, as alleged in the grounds for appeal.
4. Regarding the legality of the procedures for the convocation and holding of the general shareholders' meeting, etc.
A. According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below found that there was no evidence to acknowledge that pre-merger Kookmin Bank had intentionally set September 29, 2001 as the date of the general shareholders' meeting in order to impede the exercise of rights by minority shareholders, and thereby rejected the Plaintiff's assertion of invalidity of the merger on the ground of defects in the procedure for selecting the date of the general shareholders' meeting. Examining the record, it cannot be said that the court below violated the rules of logic and experience in selecting and evaluating the relevant evidence and comparing and assessing its probative value. Accordingly, the argument in the grounds for appeal disputing violation of the rules of evidence cannot be accepted. The court below's rejection of the Plaintiff's assertion of invalidity of the merger as above is justified, and there is no error of law, such as misapprehension of the legal principles concerning infringement of shareholders' rights and commercial customs or customary law, as alleged in the grounds for appeal.
B. Examining the record, the court below was justified in rejecting, based on the relevant provisions of the former Financial Industry Structural Improvement Act and for the reasons stated in its judgment, all of the Plaintiff's assertions that the instant merger between pre-merger Kookmin Bank and pre-merger Korea Housing Bank should be deemed invalid on the grounds of defects in the procedure for determining the record date of the register of shareholders of pre-merger Kookmin Bank, the period of notice for convocation of the general shareholders' meeting, and the delay in dispatch of the notice of convocation of the general shareholders' meeting of pre-merger Kookmin Bank. There is no error of law, such as misapprehension of the legal principles concerning shareholders' rights, infringement of shareholders' voting rights, and public notice of the record date of the register of shareholders, or inconsistency of reasoning, as alleged in the grounds for appeal.
5. Regarding whether pre-merger Kookmin Bank obstructed shareholders' exercise of rights
Even where it is required that the free exercise of shareholders' voting rights be guaranteed by ensuring that a shareholder be permitted to delegate the exercise of voting rights to an agent, the appointment of an agent for the exercise of a shareholder's voting rights is not unrestrictedly permitted, and where there are special circumstances such that the holding of the general shareholders' meeting would be unduly obstructed, or the interests of the company would be unduly infringed, as a result of proxy voting, the company may refuse such proxy voting (see Supreme Court Decision 2001Do2917, delivered September 7, 2001, etc.).
According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below, comprehensively considering the evidence adopted, found the facts as stated in its judgment, and then determined, to the effect that: although the labor union of pre-merger Kookmin Bank could have sufficiently exercised split voting with respect to its 13,214 shares by having its representative attend the general shareholders' meeting and exercise split voting, the fact that it instead distributed 9,000 attendance cards for one share each to union members and had them exercise voting rights individually can be seen as indicating an intent to obstruct the general shareholders' meeting by force; that the act of pre-merger Kookmin Bank in obtaining an injunction prohibiting obstruction of the holding of the general shareholders' meeting, etc., and, on the day of the instant general shareholders' meeting, blocking the entrance to the meeting venue and preventing entry by union members other than the single labor union representative, constitutes a lawful measure for the holding and conduct of the general shareholders' meeting; and that, in a situation where normal entry into the general shareholders' meeting venue by shareholders appeared impossible at the time, the act of some shareholders, agents, and persons concerned with the general shareholders' meeting entering the instant meeting venue through a separate passage under the guidance of pre-merger Kookmin Bank can be regarded as an unavoidable measure taken by pre-merger Kookmin Bank to admit persons confirmed to be shareholders or agents, and persons concerned with the general shareholders' meeting, into the meeting venue in order to conduct a normal general shareholders' meeting; and therefore, such circumstances alone cannot be deemed to constitute a defect sufficient to invalidate the instant merger.
Examining the record, it cannot be said that the court below violated the rules of logic and experience, or exceeded the limits of free evaluation of evidence, in selecting and evaluating the relevant evidence and comparing and assessing its probative value in finding the above facts. Accordingly, the argument in the grounds for appeal disputing violation of the rules of evidence cannot be accepted. In light of the legal principles set forth above, the court below's determination as above is justified and may be affirmed, and there is no error of law, such as inconsistency of reasoning, or misapprehension of the legal principles concerning shareholders' rights, the exercise of shareholders' voting rights, and the obligations of a stock company toward its shareholders, as alleged in the grounds for appeal.
6. Regarding the method of voting at the general shareholders' meeting
According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below determined, to the effect that: since, at the instant general shareholders' meeting, no attending shareholder other than those whose opposing votes pre-merger Kookmin Bank had already been notified of and was aware of raised any objection to the agenda item of approval of the merger agreement, pre-merger Kookmin Bank was not obliged to go through the procedure of voting and vote-counting, and could pass the agenda item by determining the ratio of opposing to approving votes; and accordingly, on the day of the instant general shareholders' meeting, when the chairperson placed the agenda item of approval of the merger agreement on the floor, explained the main contents of the merger agreement, and sought the consent of the attending shareholders, and none of the attending shareholders raised any objection but gave their consent, the act of passing the agenda item of approval of the merger agreement by applause cannot be deemed unlawful.
Examining the record, the above determination of the court below is justified and may be affirmed, and there is no error of law, such as inconsistency of reasoning, or misapprehension of the legal principles concerning the method of voting at a general shareholders' meeting, as alleged in the grounds for appeal.
7. Regarding the documents proving the shareholder's identity and the agent's authority
Article 368, Paragraph 3 of the Commercial Act provides: "A shareholder may have an agent exercise his or her voting right. In such a case, the agent shall submit to the general meeting a document proving the authority of agency." Here, the "document proving the authority of agency" refers to a power of attorney, and the requirement that a company request submission of a certificate of seal impression, an attendance card, etc. together with the power of attorney is merely to more reliably confirm the agent's qualification; even where such documents are not brought, if the shareholder or the agent can prove the authenticity of the power of attorney or the fact of delegation by other means, the company may not deny such authority of agency. Meanwhile, the requirement that a company impose on a shareholder in person to bring the attendance card to the general shareholders' meeting is likewise merely a means to more reliably confirm the shareholder's identity in person; where the shareholder's identity in person can be confirmed by other means, the company may not refuse the exercise of voting rights by the shareholder in person.
Examining the record in light of the above legal principle, the court below was justified in holding, to the effect that: in the case of a shareholder in person, even without possessing an attendance card, it suffices to go through a procedure of confirming the shareholder's identity in person by means of an identification card and by checking whether the seal possessed is identical to the seal impression submitted to pre-merger Kookmin Bank; and in the case of an agent of a shareholder, it suffices to go through a procedure of confirming the identity of the person by receiving the power of attorney and checking whether the personal particulars of the shareholder in person stated in the power of attorney are correct, whether the seal impression of the shareholder in person affixed on the power of attorney is identical to that submitted to pre-merger Kookmin Bank, and comparing the identification card of the person who brought the power of attorney against the personal particulars of the agent stated in the power of attorney; and accordingly, the mere fact that some shareholders in person did not possess an attendance card, or that some agents of shareholders did not submit a copy of the shareholder's identification card, a certificate of seal impression, etc. in addition to the power of attorney, cannot render the exercise of voting rights by these persons invalid. There is no error of law, such as misapprehension of the legal principles concerning the documents proving the identity of the shareholder in person and the authority of agency of the agent, as alleged in the grounds for appeal.
8. Regarding the validity of the articles of incorporation restricting the qualification of an agent to a shareholder
The provision of Article 368, Paragraph 3 of the Commercial Act is to be interpreted as not intending to prohibit, where there is reasonable ground to restrict the qualification of an agent of a shareholder, the imposition of a restriction to a reasonably recognized degree by provision of the articles of incorporation. A provision of the articles of incorporation of a stock company limiting the qualification of an agent to a shareholder is established for the purpose of protecting the company's interests by preventing the general shareholders' meeting from being disrupted by a third party other than a shareholder, and can be seen as a restriction to a reasonable degree based on reasonable grounds; accordingly, it cannot be deemed invalid. However, even where such a provision of the articles of incorporation exists, where a shareholder that is the State, a local government, or a stock company, etc. has its affiliated public official, employee, or servant, etc. exercise voting rights by proxy, absent special circumstances, the exercise of voting rights by such person can be said to reflect, as is, the intent of the representative in accordance with the internal decision-making of the shareholder, and accordingly there is no risk of the general shareholders' meeting being disrupted and the company's interests being infringed thereby; on the other hand, if the exercise of the authority of agency by such persons is refused, this could lead to the unjust result of effectively depriving the State, local government, or stock company, etc. of the opportunity to exercise voting rights. Accordingly, it should be permitted for a public official, employee, or servant, etc. affiliated with a shareholder that is the State, a local government, or a stock company to exercise voting rights by proxy as an agent for that shareholder, and this cannot be said to constitute invalid proxy exercise of voting rights in violation of the provision of the articles of incorporation.
According to the record, it can be seen that Nonparty 3, who exercised by proxy the voting rights attached to 19,407,241 shares held by the Republic of Korea as a shareholder, was a Grade 5-equivalent public official affiliated with the National Property Division of the Ministry of Finance and Economy. In light of the legal principles set forth above, even though Nonparty 3 was not a shareholder of pre-merger Kookmin Bank, the exercise by proxy of the voting rights attached to the shares held by the Republic of Korea is valid.
Although there is some insufficiency in the reasoning of the court below, the court below's determination, which reaches the same conclusion, is justified, and there is no error of law affecting the judgment due to misapprehension of the legal principles concerning the validity of the articles of incorporation of a stock company, as alleged in the grounds for appeal.
9. Regarding the proxy exercise of voting rights by the Depository on behalf of domestic beneficial shareholders
Examining the reasoning of the judgment below and the record, the court below determined, having first held that the Depository's exercise by proxy of voting rights, pursuant to Article 5, Paragraph 10 of the former Financial Industry Structural Improvement Act, which provides that the Depository may exercise by proxy the voting rights attached to the shares of beneficial shareholders with respect to a resolution of merger of a financial institution, in connection with the instant merger resolution, is lawful, to the effect that: the mere fact that the period of notice for convocation of the general shareholders' meeting was somewhat pressed in light of the time required for domestic beneficial shareholders to communicate their intent as to the exercise of voting rights to the Depository does not lead to the conclusion that the opportunity of beneficial shareholders to express their intent was blocked, and thus the exercise of voting rights by the Depository cannot be deemed unlawful as infringing upon the rights of beneficial shareholders; even if there was some error in the number of shares of beneficial shareholders on whose behalf the Depository exercised voting rights at the time of the instant merger resolution, or in the aggregated figures thereof, inasmuch as it is computationally clear that the quorum required for the resolution approving the instant merger agreement is satisfied even after correcting and re-aggregating such figures, such error does not affect the validity of the resolution of the instant general shareholders' meeting; and even if there were circumstances in which the number of shares of some minority shareholders who were unavoidably unable to attend the general shareholders' meeting on the day of the instant general shareholders' meeting were not reflected in and aggregated into the number of shares voting for or against the agenda item, such circumstances alone cannot render the entirety of the portion in which the Depository exercised voting rights invalid.
Examining the relevant statutes and the record, the above determination of the court below is justified and may be affirmed, and there is no error of law, such as inconsistency of reasoning, or misapprehension of the legal principles concerning the proxy exercise of voting rights by the Depository on behalf of beneficial shareholders, notice of convocation of the general shareholders' meeting, and vote-counting, as alleged in the grounds for appeal.
10. Regarding whether the standing proxy of a foreigner may re-delegate the proxy exercise of voting rights
Article 7-16, Paragraph 1 of the former Regulation on Supervision of Securities Business (증권업감독규정) (before its amendment by Financial Supervisory Commission Public Notice No. 2001-72 of October 4, 2001; the same hereinafter) provides that a foreigner may appoint a standing proxy from among custodian institutions, and may not have a person other than the appointed standing proxy act as agent or perform, on the foreigner's behalf, matters relating to the exercise of rights attached to acquired securities and other related matters. This is to be interpreted as a provision established to avoid confusion that may arise where a foreigner, having appointed a standing proxy, nevertheless from time to time has a person other than the standing proxy exercise the rights attached to acquired securities. Accordingly, it cannot be said that the above provision prohibits a standing proxy, who has been delegated the exercise of voting rights by a foreign shareholder, from re-delegating the exercise of such voting rights to a third party, as distinguished from a foreign shareholder delegating the exercise of voting rights to a person other than the standing proxy. Furthermore, where, due to the nature of the juristic act which is the object of the agency, handling by the agent personally is not required, it is proper to hold that, unless the principal expressly manifests an intent prohibiting the appointment of a sub-agent, there is deemed to be implied consent to the appointment of a sub-agent (see Supreme Court Decision 94Da30690, delivered January 26, 1996). Accordingly, absent special circumstances, a standing proxy who has been delegated the exercise of voting rights by a foreign shareholder may re-delegate the proxy exercise of such voting rights to a third party in accordance with the purport of such exercise of voting rights.
Examining the record in light of the above legal principle, the court below was justified in holding, to the effect that since Nonparty 4 exercised voting rights by proxy at the instant general shareholders' meeting having been re-delegated the exercise of Goldman Sachs's voting rights by the ○○ Branch of Goldman Sachs Securities Co., which was the standing proxy of Goldman Sachs, Nonparty 4's proxy exercise of voting rights cannot be deemed to violate Article 7-16, Paragraph 1 of the former Regulation on Supervision of Securities Business. There is no error of law, such as misapprehension of the legal principles concerning the proxy exercise of voting rights by a standing proxy of a foreign shareholder and sub-agency, as alleged in the grounds for appeal.
11. Regarding split exercise of voting rights
Article 368-2, Paragraph 1 of the Commercial Act provides: "Where a shareholder holds two or more voting rights, he or she may exercise them without unifying them. In such a case, he or she shall notify the company in writing of that intent and the reasons therefor three days prior to the date of the meeting." Here, the three-day period is a period granted to allow the company sufficient time to determine whether to refuse the split exercise of voting rights where such split exercise is to take place, and to avoid disruption to the company's administration of the general shareholders' meeting; the notice of split exercise is required to reach the company three days prior to the date of the general shareholders' meeting. However, in light of the purpose for which the aforementioned three-day period is granted, even if the notice of split exercise arrives later than the deadline of three days prior to the date of the general shareholders' meeting, if the company itself determines that there would be no disruption to the administration of the meeting and decides to accept it, and the split exercise of voting rights is carried out accordingly, such split exercise of voting rights cannot be deemed unlawful, absent special circumstances such as that it was carried out arbitrarily in violation of the principle of equality of shareholders or for the purpose of manipulating the outcome of the exercise of voting rights.
According to the reasoning of the judgment below, it can be seen that the Depository's notice of split exercise of voting rights with respect to the shares of foreign beneficial shareholders reached pre-merger Kookmin Bank on September 26, exceeding the deadline of three days prior to September 29, 2001, the date of the instant general shareholders' meeting, but that pre-merger Kookmin Bank did not refuse but permitted such split exercise of voting rights. In light of the legal principles set forth above, in the instant case where no circumstance can be found in the record indicating that the above measure by pre-merger Kookmin Bank was carried out arbitrarily in violation of the principle of equality of shareholders or for the purpose of manipulating the outcome of the exercise of voting rights, it cannot be said that the Depository's split exercise of voting rights with respect to the shares of foreign beneficial shareholders was unlawful.
Although there is some insufficiency or impropriety in the reasoning of the court below, the court below's determination that the Depository's split exercise of voting rights on behalf of foreign beneficial shareholders cannot be deemed unlawful is justified in its conclusion, and there is no error of law affecting the judgment, such as misapprehension of the legal principles concerning split exercise of shareholders' voting rights and calculation of the number of days, as alleged in the grounds for appeal.
12. Regarding the period for application for exercise of voting rights by foreign shareholders to the Depository, etc.
Article 174-6(1) of the former Securities and Exchange Act (증권거래법) (before amendment by Act No. 6623 on January 26, 2002; hereinafter the same) provides that "the Korea Securities Depository (예탁원, hereinafter "the Depository") may exercise rights concerning deposited securities upon application by a depositor or a customer. In this case, an application by a customer shall be made through a depositor," and the main text of paragraph (5) of the same Article provides that "where a shareholder who owns shares registered in the name of the Depository fails to indicate to the Depository, by five days before the date of the general shareholders' meeting, an intention to exercise voting rights directly, to exercise them by proxy, or not to exercise them, the Depository may exercise the voting rights." Considering that: the five-day period is to be interpreted as a period granted for the convenience of the Depository's administrative processing; even if the Depository does not accept an application for the exercise of voting rights that arrives after the deadline of five days before the date of the general shareholders' meeting, the beneficial shareholder concerned still retains the opportunity to attend the general shareholders' meeting and directly exercise voting rights, so there is no particular reason to prohibit the Depository, upon determining on its own that there would be no impediment to its administrative processing, from exercising the voting rights by proxy in accordance with the purport of the application for proxy exercise of voting rights; and the matter of the delegation of proxy exercise of voting rights between the Depository and the beneficial shareholder is, in principle, merely an internal matter between the principal and the agent, making it difficult to conclude that this alone constitutes a defect in the resolution of the general shareholders' meeting — taking these matters together, even if an application for proxy exercise of voting rights submitted to the Depository arrived after the deadline of five days before the date of the general shareholders' meeting, if the Depository consented to exercise the voting rights by proxy in accordance with the purport of the application and the proxy exercise of voting rights was actually carried out at the general shareholders' meeting in accordance with that purport, such proxy exercise of voting rights by the Depository cannot be said to be invalid, absent special circumstances.
In the same vein, the lower court's determination — to the effect that it is difficult to find any defect in the resolution of the general shareholders' meeting at issue merely because the Depository exercised voting rights by proxy with respect to the shares of a foreign beneficial shareholder for which an application for the exercise of voting rights was submitted to the Depository after the deadline of five days before the date of the general shareholders' meeting — is justified, and there is no error of law, such as a misapprehension of the legal principles concerning an application by a foreign shareholder for proxy exercise of voting rights before the Depository, as alleged in the grounds of appeal.
13. Regarding discriminatory prior notice to foreign beneficial shareholders, reduction of the number of voting shares attended by foreign shareholders, errors in the tabulation of the numbers of votes for, against, and abstaining, and other tabulation errors regarding attendees at the general shareholders' meeting
The argument in the grounds of appeal that Kookmin Bank prior to the merger discriminatorily gave notice of convocation of the general shareholders' meeting at issue only to foreign beneficial shareholders seven days before the date of the meeting is a new argument raised for the first time at the appellate stage and thus cannot constitute a legitimate ground for appeal; moreover, even if such fact existed, this circumstance alone cannot constitute grounds for invalidating the merger at issue, and therefore this portion of the argument in the grounds of appeal is not accepted.
Furthermore, the remainder of the argument in the grounds of appeal merely disputes, in a vague manner, the lower court's selection of evidence and fact-finding, and ultimately amounts to nothing more than a mere allegation of mistaken fact-finding, which cannot be regarded as an allegation concerning a violation of statute, order, or rule affecting the judgment, and therefore cannot constitute a legitimate ground for appeal. This portion of the Plaintiff's argument in the grounds of appeal is not accepted.
14. Regarding the exercise of voting rights concerning the Bank of New York's Depositary Receipts, etc.
A. Since Article 174-8(2) of the former Securities and Exchange Act provides that "an entry in the register of beneficial shareholders concerning shares of stock certificates deposited with the Depository has the same effect as an entry in the register of shareholders," a company is discharged from liability by giving notice of convocation of a general shareholders' meeting, etc. to the Depository rather than to the beneficial shareholder, by virtue of the exculpatory effect of the register of beneficial shareholders. In the case of Depositary Receipts (DR) issued abroad by a foreign depositary institution, using as underlying shares newly issued shares of a domestic corporation or treasury shares held by the issuer of such shares, which are kept domestically while the DRs are issued abroad in lieu of the underlying shares, the foreign depositary institution is recorded as the beneficial shareholder in the issuing company's register of beneficial shareholders. Accordingly, the issuing company is discharged from liability by giving notice of convocation of the general shareholders' meeting, etc. to the foreign depositary institution recorded as the beneficial shareholder in the register of beneficial shareholders, and furthermore, has no obligation to ascertain the personal details and address of the actual owner of the Depositary Receipts and give notice to such actual owner as well.
Although the lower court did not expressly rule on the Plaintiff's argument that notice of convocation of the general shareholders' meeting at issue should have been given even to the actual owner of the Depositary Receipts at issue, it can be seen that the lower court's fact-finding that the Bank of New York, the foreign depositary institution for the Depositary Receipts at issue, knew of the fact that the general shareholders' meeting at issue was being held, includes the purport of rejecting the Plaintiff's above argument, and in light of the legal principles set forth above, this determination by the lower court cannot be said to contain any error of law, and thus there is no error of law of omission of judgment affecting the judgment, as alleged in the grounds of appeal.
B. According to the reasoning of the lower court's judgment, the lower court, comprehensively considering the evidence it adopted, found the following facts: with respect to the Depositary Receipts at issue, from the time of their issuance, a so-called shadow voting agreement was concluded among Kookmin Bank prior to the merger as the issuing company, the Bank of New York as the foreign depositary institution, and the actual owners of the Depositary Receipts at issue, under which the Bank of New York would exercise the voting rights of the Depositary Receipts in accordance with the ratio of votes for and against among the number of shares for which voting rights were exercised, among the shares held by other shareholders excluding the Depositary Receipts at issue; on September 21, 2001, prior to the general shareholders' meeting at issue, the Bank of New York instructed the Depository, its standing agent, to exercise voting rights in accordance with the ratio of votes for and against among the number of shares of Kookmin Bank prior to the merger, excluding the Depositary Receipts at issue, for which voting rights were exercised by attendance at the general shareholders' meeting; and the Depository exercised the voting rights in accordance with that instruction. Based on these findings, the lower court determined that the fact that the Bank of New York, the foreign depositary institution, instructed the Depository to exercise the voting rights in accordance with the agreement concluded among the actual owners of the Depositary Receipts at issue, and that the Depository exercised the voting rights in accordance with that instruction as described above, cannot be regarded as invalid.
Upon examination of the record, the above determination by the lower court can be affirmed as justified, and there is no error of law, such as a misapprehension of the legal principles concerning the legal status of Depositary Receipts and the procedure for exercising voting rights with respect to Depositary Receipts, as alleged in the grounds of appeal.
15. Regarding the illegality and unfairness of the merger ratio and violation of the merger agreement, etc.
A. A merger agreement that sets a manifestly unfair merger ratio is invalid in light of the principle of good faith and fair dealing or the principle of equity governing private law relations, and therefore, where the merger ratio is manifestly unfair, the shareholders, etc. of each company to be merged may seek the invalidation of the merger by an action pursuant to Article 529 of the Commercial Act (상법). However, since the merger ratio must be determined by considering various factors in addition to asset value, such as market value, earnings value, and relative value, it cannot be fixed as a single figure based on strict objective accuracy, and if the consideration of these various factors was carried out within a reasonable range, the determined merger ratio cannot be said to be manifestly unfair. Accordingly, where all or part of the companies party to a merger are listed corporations, and the merger price was calculated and the merger ratio determined accordingly, based on the requirements, methods, and procedures prescribed by the Securities and Exchange Act and its Enforcement Decree, etc., absent special circumstances such as the calculation of the merger price being based on false data or being based on baseless projected figures, the merger ratio cannot be considered so manifestly unfair as to render the merger agreement invalid (see Supreme Court Decision 2007Da64136, decided January 10, 2008).
In light of the above legal principles and the record, the lower court's determination — that since the merger at issue, which was carried out with the approval of the Financial Supervisory Commission pursuant to the former Act on the Structural Improvement of the Financial Industry (금융산업의 구조개선에 관한 법률, "former Financial Industry Structural Improvement Act"), is a merger made pursuant to a governmental approval by document, Article 84-7(1) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Securities and Exchange Act (before amendment by Presidential Decree No. 17518 on February 9, 2002), which requires the merger ratio to be calculated based on the day before the date of submission of the merger report, does not apply to the merger at issue, and that there is no other evidence to recognize that the merger ratio at issue is so manifestly unfair as to invalidate the merger, and on that basis rejecting the Plaintiff's argument that the merger at issue is invalid on the ground of illegality and unfairness of the merger ratio at issue — is justified, and there is no error of law, such as a misapprehension of the legal principles concerning invalidation of a merger on the ground of unfairness of the merger ratio and concerning the principle of good faith and fair dealing, as alleged in the grounds of appeal.
B. In the reasoning of a judgment, it suffices to indicate the determination on the parties' arguments and other means of attack and defense to the extent sufficient to recognize that the order of the judgment is justified, and it is not necessary to rule on all of the parties' arguments or means of attack and defense (Article 208 of the Civil Procedure Act (민사소송법)). Therefore, even if the judgment does not specifically and directly indicate a determination on a party's argument, etc., if it can be understood from the overall purport of the reasoning of the judgment that the argument was accepted or rejected, this cannot be regarded as an omission of judgment, and even if a determination was in fact omitted, where it is clear that the argument would have been rejected, this has no effect on the outcome of the judgment and cannot constitute grounds for reversal (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 68Da1859, decided June 10, 1969).
Upon examination of the reasoning of the lower court's judgment in light of the record, even though the lower court did not expressly rule on the Plaintiff's argument for invalidation of the merger based on issues such as accounting treatment and tax evasion concerning the trust account of the Korea Housing Bank prior to the merger, inaccuracies in the balance sheet of the Korea Housing Bank prior to the merger, problems in the operation of the National Housing Fund, the issue of ING Bearing's failure to perform its capital contribution obligation, and violation of the merger agreement, the lower court's determination rejecting the Plaintiff's argument for invalidation of the merger on the ground that there is no evidence to recognize that the merger ratio at issue is so manifestly unfair as to invalidate the merger can be seen to include the purport of rejecting the above arguments of the Plaintiff as well; furthermore, no material can be found in the record to recognize that the circumstances alleged by the Plaintiff as above actually existed, or that such circumstances had a significant effect on the unfairness of the merger ratio at issue so as to constitute grounds for invalidating the merger at issue. Therefore, even if the lower court omitted a determination thereon, this cannot be said to constitute an error of law affecting the judgment, as alleged in the grounds of appeal.
16. Regarding the substitution of the inaugural general meeting of the newly incorporated merged company by a board of directors' public notice and the method of such notice
A. Article 527(4) of the Commercial Act provides that, in the case of a merger by incorporation of a new company, the report to the inaugural general meeting for the newly incorporated merged company may be substituted by a public notice of the board of directors, and Article 528(1) of the Commercial Act provides that the merger registration shall be made within a certain period from the date the inaugural general meeting for the newly incorporated merged company concludes or the date of the public notice substituting for the report. Accordingly, Article 527(4) of the Commercial Act is to be interpreted as a provision allowing the inaugural general meeting itself for the newly incorporated merged company to be substituted by a public notice of the board of directors. Meanwhile, Article 527(2) of the Commercial Act provides that a resolution to amend the articles of incorporation may be adopted at the inaugural general meeting for the newly incorporated merged company, provided that such resolution does not contravene the purport of the merger agreement; however, this merely means that an amendment to the articles of incorporation may be made at the inaugural general meeting, not that it must necessarily be made. Even though Article 312 of the Commercial Act, which provides that directors and auditors must be elected at the inaugural general meeting for the incorporation of a stock company, is applied mutatis mutandis to the inaugural general meeting for a newly incorporated merged company pursuant to Article 527(3) of the Commercial Act, under Article 524(6) of the Commercial Act, where the directors, auditors, or members of the audit committee of the company to be incorporated as a result of the merger are determined, their names and resident registration numbers are to be stated in the merger agreement for the merger by incorporation of a new company, and since the election of the directors and auditors, etc. of the company to be incorporated as a result of the merger is accomplished by the approval of that merger agreement at the general shareholders' meeting of each merging company, in such a case, there is no need to newly go through the procedure of convening an inaugural general meeting for the newly incorporated merged company to elect the directors and auditors, etc. of the company to be incorporated as a result of the merger, and this may be substituted by a public notice of the board of directors.
According to the reasoning of the lower court's judgment, it can be seen that Kookmin Bank prior to the merger and the Korea Housing Bank prior to the merger had already agreed, at the time of the merger agreement at issue, to the effect that "if the newly incorporated bank does not hold an inaugural general meeting, the directors of the newly incorporated bank shall be elected in accordance with the resolutions of the general shareholders' meetings of both banks approving the merger," and thereafter attached the list and career details of the candidates for director of the newly incorporated bank to the merger agreement, while also giving prior notice to the shareholders of both banks of the list and career details of the candidates for director and audit committee member of the newly incorporated bank, and subsequently adopted a resolution at the general shareholders' meeting at issue for approval of the merger to elect these persons as directors and audit committee members of the newly incorporated bank. In light of the legal principles set forth above, the lower court's determination — rejecting, on the grounds stated in its judgment, the Plaintiff's argument to the effect that the merger procedure at issue was defective, and thus the merger at issue is invalid, in that the inaugural general meeting necessary for the election of the directors and auditors of the newly incorporated bank and the resolution to amend the articles of incorporation was omitted — is justified, and there is no error of law, such as a misapprehension of the legal principles concerning the inaugural general meeting for a merger by incorporation of a new company, as alleged in the grounds of appeal.
B. Since the Commercial Act does not contain any special provision concerning the method of public notice by the board of directors that substitutes for the inaugural general meeting for a merger by incorporation of a new company, in this case, the board of directors' public notice may be made by the general method of public notice prescribed in the articles of incorporation of the merging companies pursuant to Article 289(1)(7) of the Commercial Act.
In the same vein, the lower court's rejection of the Plaintiff's argument that grounds for invalidating the merger exist in the merger at issue on the ground that the board of directors' public notice substituting for the inaugural general meeting for the merger by incorporation of a new company was not made in the same manner as the notice of convocation of a general shareholders' meeting is justified, and there is no error of law, such as a misapprehension of the legal principles concerning the method of the board of directors' public notice substituting for the inaugural general meeting for a merger by incorporation of a new company, as alleged in the grounds of appeal.
17. Regarding the argument for invalidation of the merger based on the illegality of the Merger Promotion Committee's involvement in the merger and the conclusion of the memorandum of understanding, etc.
According to the reasoning of the lower court's judgment, the lower court determined that the Merger Promotion Committee at issue was a voluntary body created by agreement between the presidents of Kookmin Bank prior to the merger and the Korea Housing Bank prior to the merger in order to more smoothly promote the merger at issue, and that since the draft merger agreement created by the Merger Promotion Committee at issue through deliberation and coordination on the major matters concerning the merger of the two banks underwent resolution by the boards of directors of both banks and was approved at the general shareholders' meetings, it cannot be said that the Merger Promotion Committee at issue decided upon the merger at issue; and further, that since the memorandum of understanding at issue was not a formal contract having legal binding force with respect to the merger, and the formal merger agreement was concluded on April 23, 2001 after undergoing resolution by the boards of directors of both banks, whether the conclusion of the memorandum of understanding was unlawful has no effect on the validity of the merger at issue. On these grounds, the lower court rejected all of the Plaintiff's arguments to the effect that the merger at issue should be deemed invalid due to the unlawful involvement of the Merger Promotion Committee at issue in the merger, the illegality in the process of concluding the memorandum of understanding, etc.
Upon examination of the record, the above determination by the lower court can be affirmed as justified, and it cannot be said that there is an error of law, such as a misapprehension of the legal principles concerning grounds for invalidation of a merger, as alleged in the grounds of appeal.
18. Regarding the argument for invalidation of the merger based on a forced merger through the government's abuse of authority and violation of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (독점규제 및 공정거래에 관한 법률), etc.
According to the reasoning of the lower court's judgment, the lower court determined that there is no evidence to recognize that the government disregarded the requirements and procedures prescribed by statute and forced the merger at issue against the will of the shareholders, or that the merger at issue violated the restriction on business combinations prescribed in Article 7 of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act, and on these grounds rejected the Plaintiff's argument for invalidation of the merger based thereon.
Upon examination of the record, it cannot be said that the lower court, in selecting the relevant evidence and comparing and evaluating the probative value of the evidence, violated the rules of logic and experience, and therefore the argument in the grounds of appeal disputing a violation of the rules of evidence cannot be accepted. The lower court's rejection of the Plaintiff's above argument for invalidation of the merger is justified, and there is no error of law, such as a misapprehension of the legal principles concerning grounds for invalidation of a merger, as alleged in the grounds of appeal.
19. Regarding other grounds for invalidation of the merger
Upon examination of the record, it cannot be found that the merger at issue must be invalidated due to the other grounds for invalidation of the merger asserted by the Plaintiff in the grounds of appeal, and therefore these arguments in the grounds of appeal are likewise not accepted.
20. Conclusion
Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of the appeal are to be borne by the losing party. This judgment is rendered as set forth in the order, by the unanimous opinion of the participating Justices.
Justice Ahn Dae-hee (Presiding Justice), Park Si-hwan (Justice in charge), Park Il-hwan, Shin Young-cheol