[Order]
All appeals are dismissed.
[Reasoning]
The grounds of appeal are examined.
1. As to the Defendant's grounds of appeal
A. As to the point concerning occupational breach of trust due to the lease of the parking lot
In the crime of occupational breach of trust, "causing damage to the principal" means causing damage to the principal's property as a whole, and this includes causing a risk of actual damage to property; thus, even if the amount of damage has not been specifically and clearly calculated, this does not affect the establishment of the crime of occupational breach of trust (see Supreme Court Decision 2000Do2914, decided January 19, 2001; Supreme Court Decision 2007Do6772, decided October 29, 2009, etc.).
The court below, citing the circumstances stated in its holding, found that the Defendant, as the representative director of the victim Nonindicted Company 1 (hereinafter "victim Company 1"), concluded lease agreements with respect to the ○○ Parking Lot and △△ Parking Lot managed by victim Company 1, setting the rent at KRW 2,000,000, an amount less than the total monthly revenue each parking lot was earning at the time, and setting the lease term at five years, longer than usual, thereby acquiring a pecuniary benefit of an unspecified amount and causing damage of the same amount to victim Company 1; based on this, the court below upheld the judgment of the court of first instance which found the Defendant guilty of this part of the charges.
Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the legal principles set forth above and the evidence lawfully adopted, the above judgment of the court below is justified and may be affirmed. There is no illegality therein, as alleged in the grounds of appeal, such as a violation of the rules of logic and experience in fact-finding regarding the appropriate rent, thereby exceeding the limits of the principle of free evaluation of evidence, or a misapprehension of the legal principles regarding pecuniary damage in the crime of occupational breach of trust and the corroboration rule for confessions, or an omission of judgment.
Meanwhile, the argument in the grounds of appeal that, since the owner of the ○○ Parking Lot is Nonindicted 2, the victim, even if the Defendant leased the ○○ Parking Lot at a low price, cannot be said to be Nonindicted 2 [sic] Company 1, is not a proper ground of appeal, since the Defendant did not raise it as a ground of appeal in the appellate court, nor was it a matter that the appellate court took up ex officio for adjudication. Moreover, according to the evidence lawfully adopted, it can be seen that at the time of the above lease by the Defendant, the registration of initial ownership and the registration of transfer of ownership with respect to the building and land where the ○○ Parking Lot is located had been completed in the name of Company 1, not Nonindicted 2; therefore, the argument in this part of the grounds of appeal, which presupposes that the owner of the ○○ Parking Lot is Nonindicted 2, cannot be accepted in any respect.
Furthermore, where a company carries on as its business the handling of another person's affairs, if the representative director of that company, in handling the affairs of that other person, commits an act in violation of his occupational duty and thereby acquires a pecuniary benefit or causes a third party to acquire it, and thereby causes the company to bear a liability, such as liability for damages, to that other person, this may be deemed to have caused damage to the company or to have caused a risk of actual damage to its property (see Supreme Court Decision 83Do1568, decided April 28, 1987; Supreme Court Decision 2012Do10822, decided December 27, 2012, etc.); such an act constitutes the crime of occupational breach of trust in relation to that company. In light of this, even if the above argument in the grounds of appeal is construed as meaning that Nonindicted 2 held substantial control over the ○○ Parking Lot, the judgment of the court below that the Defendant's above act of leasing the parking lot constitutes the crime of occupational breach of trust in relation to Company 1 is justified, and therefore the above argument in the grounds of appeal is without merit. Supreme Court Decision 82Do2595, decided October 10, 1984, cited in the grounds of appeal, merely held that where the subject bearing the duty to handle another person's affairs is a juridical person, the representative organ of the juridical person may be the subject of the crime of breach of trust in relation to that other person; it does not hold that such a representative cannot be the subject of the crime of breach of trust in relation to the juridical person that bears the duty. Therefore, this decision does not conflict with the above judgment of the court below.
B. As to the point concerning occupational embezzlement of KRW 704,510,000
In the crime of occupational embezzlement, the intent of unlawful acquisition means the intent to dispose of another person's property held in the course of business, in violation of one's occupational duty, as if it were one's own property, for the purpose of benefiting oneself or a third party; even if there is an intent to return, compensate for, or make up for it afterward, this does not preclude the recognition of such intent (see Supreme Court Decision 95Do59, decided March 14, 1995; Supreme Court Decision 2010Do9871, decided June 14, 2012, etc.).
The court below, comprehensively considering the following circumstances as stated in its holding: the rejection, at the general shareholders' meeting held at the time the Defendant withdrew KRW 704,510,000 of the funds of victim Company 1, of the agenda item approving the Defendant's reappointment; the deteriorated relationship with her husband Nonindicted 2, then the largest shareholder; the absence of any credit-debt relationship between the Defendant's father Nonindicted 3 and victim Company 1; the lack of consistency in and insufficiency of evidence for the Defendant's assertion that Nonindicted 2 borrowed KRW 705,736,605, the purchase funds for the real estate in this case, from Nonindicted 3; the fact that no accounting treatment was made for a long period regarding the Defendant's withdrawal of the above funds; the Defendant's subsequent consent to the withdrawn money being treated as a loan to the Defendant; and the registration status of each real estate in this case, etc. — found that the Defendant's act of withdrawing KRW 704,510,000 of the funds of victim Company 1 under the pretext of repaying, on behalf of Nonindicted 2, the loan owed to Nonindicted 3, and arbitrarily consuming it, constitutes the crime of occupational embezzlement; on this basis, the court below upheld the judgment of the court of first instance which found the Defendant guilty of this part of the charges.
Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the legal principles set forth above and the evidence lawfully adopted, the above judgment of the court below is justified, and there is no illegality therein, as alleged in the grounds of appeal, such as a misapprehension of the legal principles regarding intent, the intent of unlawful acquisition, and the burden of proof in the crime of occupational embezzlement, or exceeding the limits of the principle of free evaluation of evidence in violation of the rules of logic and experience, or an omission of judgment.
C. As to the point concerning occupational breach of trust due to use of the corporate card
A stock company and its shareholder are separate legal entities and cannot be regarded as identical, and damage to a stock company does not always coincide with damage to its shareholder; therefore, even where an officer who is the substantive sole shareholder commits an act in violation of his duty, thereby acquiring a pecuniary benefit or causing a third party to acquire it, and causes damage to the company, he is criminally liable for occupational breach of trust. Accordingly, where an officer of a stock company, by an act in violation of his duty, acquires a pecuniary benefit or causes a third party to acquire it, thereby causing damage to the stock company, even if such duty-violating act was undertaken with the consent of the substantive sole shareholder, this does not preclude the establishment of the crime of occupational breach of trust (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 83Do2330, decided December 13, 1983; Supreme Court Decision 2008Do6335, decided March 10, 2011, etc.).
Meanwhile, where an officer of a stock company continuously and repeatedly uses, for personal purposes, a corporate card that may be used only for the performance of official business, it may be considered, absent special circumstances, that the officer had awareness of the violation of duty and awareness that he thereby acquired a benefit and caused damage to the stock company; such an act therefore constitutes the crime of occupational breach of trust. The mere fact that consent of the substantive sole shareholder was obtained for such use of the corporate card, or that the officer unilaterally expected that the substantive sole shareholder would compensate for or make up for the corporate card charges in the future, cannot be deemed to negate the intent of occupational breach of trust or the intent of unlawful gain.
Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the above legal principles and the evidence lawfully adopted, it is justified that the court below, citing the circumstances stated in its holding, found that the Defendant's act of using four corporate cards of victim Company 1 for personal purposes constitutes the crime of occupational breach of trust, and upheld the judgment of the court of first instance which found the Defendant guilty of this part of the charges. There is no illegality therein, as alleged in the grounds of appeal, such as a misapprehension of the legal principles regarding intent or the intent of unlawful gain in the crime of occupational breach of trust, or exceeding the limits of the principle of free evaluation of evidence in violation of the rules of logic and experience.
D. As to whether the provisions on special exemption for relatives (친족상도례) apply
Since the victim of the crimes of occupational breach of trust and of violation of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment of Specific Economic Crimes (embezzlement) (특정경제범죄가중처벌등에관한법률위반(횡령)), which the court below found to be guilty as stated in its holding, is not Nonindicted 2, the Defendant's spouse, but Company 1, there is no room for the provisions on special exemption for relatives under Article 328 of the Criminal Code (형법), applied mutatis mutandis under Article 361 of the Criminal Code, to apply to each of the above crimes. This part of the argument in the grounds of appeal likewise cannot be accepted.
2. As to the Prosecutor's grounds of appeal
With respect to the examination of evidence, the court has discretion to determine whether it is necessary for the trial of the case (see Supreme Court Decision 83Do1419, decided July 12, 1983, etc.), and the finding of facts and the selection and evaluation of evidence forming the premise thereof fall within the exclusive authority of the fact-finding court, so long as it does not exceed the limits of the principle of free evaluation of evidence in violation of the rules of logic and experience (see Supreme Court Decision 2013Do10011, decided November 28, 2013, etc.).
According to the record, the court below, having accepted the prosecutor's request to examine witness Nonindicted 4 at the second date for pleading in the court below, revoked that acceptance after the prosecutor withdrew the witness request at the fifth date for pleading in the court below, and, after closing the pleadings, upheld the judgment of the court of first instance which found this part of the charges not guilty on the ground that the evidence submitted by the prosecutor alone was insufficient to establish that the Defendant embezzled the funds of Company 1 under the pretext of his own salary, bonus, or retirement allowance, and there was no other evidence to establish this.
Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the relevant evidence, it is difficult to find that the court below's action in revoking its decision to adopt Nonindicted 4 as a witness, following the prosecutor's withdrawal of the witness request, was unlawful, or that such action caused the court below to find this part of the charges not guilty; nor can it be said that the court below's finding of not guilty on this part involved exceeding the limits of the principle of free evaluation of evidence in violation of the rules of logic and experience, or a failure to conduct the necessary examination. The argument in the grounds of appeal cannot be accepted.
3. Conclusion
Therefore, all appeals are dismissed, and this Judgment is rendered as stated in the Order by the unanimous opinion of the Justices participating.
Justice Kim Chang-seok (Presiding Justice), Yang Chang-soo, Park Byong-dae (Justice in charge), Ko Young-han