[Plaintiff, Appellee]
[Defendant] Chairperson of the National Labor Relations Commission
[Intervenor for the Defendant, Appellant] Korea Racing Authority (Legal representative: Bae, Kim & Lee LLC (Yulchon), Attorney Lee Jeong-han)
[Judgment Below] Seoul High Court Decision 2011Nu34391, decided April 5, 2012
[Order]
All appeals are dismissed. The costs of the appeal shall be borne by the Intervenor for the Defendant.
[Reasoning]
The grounds for appeal are examined.
1. As to the First Ground for Appeal
The former Act on the Protection, etc. of Dispatched Workers (「구 파견근로자보호 등에 관한 법률」) (before its amendment by Act No. 8076 on December 21, 2006; hereinafter the "former Dispatch Act," and the amended Act on the Protection, etc. of Dispatched Workers referred to as the "amended Dispatch Act") provides, in the main text of Article 6(3), that "where a using employer continuously uses a dispatched worker for a period exceeding two years, the using employer shall be deemed to have employed the dispatched worker as of the day following the date on which the two-year period expires" (hereinafter the "deemed direct employment provision"). This means that where a worker dispatch exists and continues for a period exceeding two years, a direct employment relationship is deemed to have been formed immediately between the using employer and the dispatched worker, and, absent special circumstances, such employment relationship must be regarded as one without a fixed term (see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Decision 2007Du22320, decided September 18, 2008).
Furthermore, in light of the following points, taken together: (i) since Article 1 of the former Dispatch Act states that its legislative purpose is to contribute to the employment stability and welfare improvement of dispatched workers by establishing standards regarding the working conditions, etc. of dispatched workers, the working conditions of dispatched workers may be considered no less important than their employment stability; (ii) Article 21 of the former Dispatch Act not only provides that a dispatched worker shall not be subjected to discriminatory treatment as compared with a worker of the same kind performing the same duties within the using employer's business, but treating a dispatched worker who has come to form a direct employment relationship with the using employer equally with workers of the using employer performing the same or similar duties also accords with the concept of fairness; and (iii) Article 6-2(3)(1) of the amended Dispatch Act likewise provides that, with respect to the working conditions applicable where a using employer must directly employ a dispatched worker as a result of having continuously used said dispatched worker for a period exceeding two years, such conditions shall be governed by "the working conditions prescribed in the rules of employment, etc. applicable to a worker of the using employer who performs the same or similar duties as the relevant dispatched worker, where such a worker exists" — it is reasonable to conclude that the working conditions of a dispatched worker who is deemed to have been directly employed by the using employer pursuant to the deemed direct employment provision are identical to the working conditions prescribed in the rules of employment, etc. applicable to a worker of the using employer who performs the same or similar duties as the relevant dispatched worker, where such a worker exists.
In light of these legal principles and the record, the court below's determination — to the same effect, that where employment is deemed to exist pursuant to the deemed direct employment provision, and there exists among the using employer's workers a worker performing the same or similar duties as the relevant dispatched worker, the working conditions prescribed in the rules of employment, etc. applicable to that worker shall also apply to the dispatched worker — is justifiable and may be upheld, and there is no error therein, as alleged in the grounds for appeal, in misunderstanding the legal principles concerning the working conditions arising from the application of the deemed direct employment provision.
2. As to the Second through Fourth Grounds for Appeal
According to the reasoning of the judgment below and the reasoning of the first instance judgment partially cited by the court below, the court below, having found the facts as stated in its reasoning, determined that although it cannot be said that the Plaintiffs performed duties identical to those of the Intervenor for the Defendant's technical staff employees, in light of the fact that most of the duties they actually performed substantially overlapped with the duties of the technical staff employees, it may be said that they performed at least duties similar to those of the technical staff employees, and therefore the working conditions applicable to the Intervenor for the Defendant's technical staff employees also apply to the Plaintiffs. Furthermore, with respect to the legitimacy of the personnel order dated February 24, 2010 issued by the Intervenor for the Defendant with respect to the Plaintiffs (hereinafter "the instant personnel order"), the court below, citing the circumstances stated in its reasoning, determined that the instant personnel order was unlawful in that it either failed to grant working conditions appropriate to the Plaintiffs or altered the content of the employment relationship formed between the Plaintiffs and the Intervenor for the Defendant.
Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the record, the above determination of the court below may be upheld, and there is no error therein such as exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence in violation of the rules of logic and experience, or misunderstanding the legal principles concerning the reasonableness of working conditions or personnel orders.
3. Conclusion
Therefore, all appeals are dismissed, and the costs of the appeal are to be borne by the losing party. This judgment is rendered as set forth in the Order with the unanimous consent of the participating Justices.
Justice Lee In-bok (Presiding Justice), Kim So-young, Lee Ki-taek (Justice in Charge)