Workbear재주넘는곰
대법원 92도1246

Violation of the Act on the Punishment of Violence, etc. (폭력행위등처벌에관한법률위반) and Violation of the Assembly and Demonstration Act (집회및시위에관한법률위반)폭력행위등처벌에관한법률위반,집회및시위에관한법률위반

Decided1992. 08. 14. Court대법원Employer/Authorities won (Defendant's appeal was dismissed; conviction upheld)
AI-generated English translation (summary, key points, decision summary and full text) for reference only — not an official translation and without legal effect. The Korean original below is authoritative.
AI Easy read — AI summary of this decision
AI-generated summary for reference only — the Korean original below is authoritative.

An executive member of the Korean Teachers and Education Workers' Union (전국교직원노동조합) organized an outdoor rally without submitting the required prior notification under the Assembly and Demonstration Act (집회및시위에관한법률). The defendant argued that the notification requirement should be waived because the authorities had unfairly banned the assembly, but the Supreme Court rejected this argument. The Court also confirmed that a suspended sentence (집행유예) may be granted again for a concurrent offense (경합범) even while another suspended sentence is still in effect, and ultimately upheld the conviction for failing to notify authorities of the assembly.

Key takeaways
  • CaseA labor union official held an outdoor rally without filing the legally required notification with authorities.
  • OutcomeThe Supreme Court ruled that an unfair ban by authorities does not excuse organizers from the duty to notify, and upheld the conviction.
  • LessonEven if you believe an assembly ban is unjust, you must still follow notification procedures or challenge the ban through official legal remedies rather than ignoring the requirement.
Issues
  • Whether a suspended sentence (집행유예) can be granted again for a concurrent offense while another suspended sentence from a prior conviction is still in effect
  • Whether the duty to notify authorities of an assembly is waived when the authorities' prohibition of the assembly is unfair
  • Criminal liability for violating the notification requirement under the Assembly and Demonstration Act (집회및시위에관한법률)
Key reasoning

Under the Assembly and Demonstration Act (집회및시위에관한법률), organizers of outdoor assemblies are required to submit advance notification to the authorities. The law already provides remedies—such as filing an objection or an administrative lawsuit (행정소송)—for cases where the authorities issue an unfair prohibition order against a planned assembly. Because these legal remedies exist, the mere fact that a prohibition might be unjust does not automatically exempt organizers from their duty to notify. Therefore, the defendant could not avoid criminal liability simply by claiming the ban itself was unlawful; he was still obligated to follow the notification procedure or seek redress through the proper legal channels rather than proceeding with an unnotified assembly.

Summary of Decision (English, AI translation)

a.

The meaning of "a person for whom five years have not elapsed since the completion of execution or since exemption from execution of a sentence of imprisonment without prison labor or a heavier punishment" as provided in the proviso to Article 62(1) of the Criminal Act (형법) does not refer only to cases where a person has been sentenced to actual imprisonment and five years have not elapsed since the completion of execution or exemption from execution thereof, but also includes cases where a person has been sentenced to a suspended sentence and the suspension period has not yet elapsed. However, where several offenses committed by a person, which are in a concurrent crime relationship under Article 37 of the Criminal Act, are separately prosecuted and tried in separate proceedings, and as a result a suspended sentence is first rendered and finalized for one of the offenses, if a suspended sentence could not be rendered again in the judgment on the remaining offense, this would result in a significantly unbalanced and unreasonable outcome compared to a case where the several offenses were tried simultaneously in the same proceeding and a suspended sentence could be rendered for all of them at once. Therefore, in such a case, the phrase "having been sentenced to a punishment" in the above proviso should be construed as referring only to cases where an actual sentence of imprisonment was rendered, and as not including cases where a suspended sentence was rendered. Meanwhile, the "remaining offense" for which a suspended sentence may be rendered again within the suspension period of the offense for which a suspended sentence was first finalized includes any offense that is in a concurrent crime relationship under the latter part of Article 37 of the Criminal Act with the offense for which the sentence was first finalized, so long as there was a legal possibility that it could have been tried simultaneously with that offense; it is not necessary to individually consider specific circumstances such as whether simultaneous trial was actually significantly difficult due to the particular litigation procedures or the timing of the offenses, or whether there were, in fact, mitigating circumstances that would have warranted a suspended sentence had simultaneous trial taken place.

b.
In light of the fact that the Act on Assembly and Demonstration (집회및시위에관한법률) requires that outdoor assemblies, except for assemblies under Article 13 thereof, be reported to the competent chief of police, and provides that where the competent chief of police issues an unjust prohibition notice, the right to assembly may be exercised through an objection or administrative litigation, etc., it cannot be said that there was no possibility of expecting a report on the assembly merely because the authorities were unjustly prohibiting all indoor and outdoor assemblies of the Korean Teachers and Education Workers' Union (전국교직원노동조합), of which the defendant was an executive, or of other organizations. Therefore, it cannot be held that hosting an outdoor assembly without reporting it to the competent chief of police does not constitute a crime merely for the above reason.

Full text (English, AI translation) 10,296 chars

[Defendant]

[Appellant] Defendant and Prosecutor
[Defense Counsel] Attorney
[Court Below] Seoul Criminal District Court Decision 92No632, decided April 22, 1992

[Order]

The appeals of both the Defendant and the Prosecutor are all dismissed.

[Reasoning]

1. As to the Prosecutor's grounds of appeal

The meaning of "a person for whom five years have not elapsed since the completion of execution or exemption from execution of a sentence of imprisonment or greater," as provided in the proviso of Article 62(1) of the Criminal Act (형법), does not refer only to cases where an actual sentence was pronounced and five years have not elapsed since the completion or exemption of its execution, but also includes cases where a suspended sentence was pronounced and the period of suspension has not yet elapsed. However, where a person commits several offenses that are in a concurrent-crime relationship under Article 37 of the Criminal Act, and these offenses are prosecuted separately at different times and tried in separate proceedings, resulting in a suspended sentence being pronounced and finalized for one offense first, if a suspended sentence could not then be pronounced again for the remaining offense(s) in a subsequent judgment, this would be markedly unbalanced and unreasonable compared to a case where all such offenses were tried simultaneously in the same proceeding and a suspended sentence was pronounced for all of them at once. Therefore, in such cases, it is the established precedent of this Court that the phrase "having been sentenced" in the above proviso refers only to cases where an actual sentence was pronounced, and does not include cases where a suspended sentence was pronounced (see this Court's en banc Decision 87Do2365, decided September 12, 1989, and Decision 88Do824, decided October 10, 1989).

Meanwhile, the "remaining offense" for which a suspended sentence may again be pronounced during the period of suspension of the offense for which a suspended sentence was first finalized, as contemplated in the above precedent, includes any offense that is in a concurrent-crime relationship under the latter part of Article 37 of the Criminal Act with the offense for which sentence was first finalized, so long as there was a legal possibility that it could have been tried simultaneously with that offense. It is not necessary to individually consider specific circumstances such as whether simultaneous trial was in fact significantly difficult due to the particular litigation procedures or the timing of the offenses, or whether there were in fact grounds for a suspended sentence had the offenses been tried simultaneously.

According to the record, the Defendant was sentenced by the Seoul Criminal District Court on November 11, 1989 to 10 months' imprisonment with a 2-year suspension of execution for violation of the Act on Assembly and Demonstration (집회및시위에관한법률), among other offenses; the Defendant appealed, and the appeal was dismissed on March 27, 1990; the Defendant then further appealed to this Court, but that appeal was dismissed on August 14 of the same year, whereupon the above judgment became final. Meanwhile, the offenses set forth in Items 1, 2, and 3 of the facts found by the court of first instance in this case were committed after the first-instance sentencing of the offense for which the above judgment became final, but before that judgment became final. Accordingly, Offenses 1, 2, and 3 found by the court of first instance in this case, having been committed before the above judgment became final, are in a concurrent-crime relationship under the latter part of Article 37 of the Criminal Act with the offense in the finalized judgment, and therefore a suspended sentence may also be pronounced again for them.

In conclusion, the court below's action of pronouncing a suspended sentence on the Defendant with respect to Offenses 1, 2, and 3 found by the court of first instance in this case, on the same reasoning, is proper, and the argument criticizing the court below's action on a different view is without merit.

2. As to the grounds of appeal of the Defendant and Defense Counsel

A. As to the arguments alleging violation of the rules of evidence and misapprehension of facts

The court below's selection and weighing of evidence and its factual findings on each of the points raised in the argument, and its determination that each of the assemblies pointed out in the argument constituted a prohibited assembly under Article 5(1)(2) of the Act on Assembly and Demonstration, are properly acknowledged in light of the record, and there is no illegality as alleged in the argument. This ground is without merit.

B. As to the argument that there was no possibility of expecting an assembly report to be filed

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below held, with respect to the argument concerning the points of hosting unreported assemblies described in Items 1 and 4-(a), (b), (c), and (f) of the criminal facts found by the court of first instance, as follows: in light of the fact that the Act on Assembly and Demonstration requires a report to the chief of the competent police station for outdoor assemblies other than those under Article 13 of that Act, and provides that, against an unjust prohibition notice by the chief of the competent police station, the right to assembly may be exercised through an objection or administrative litigation, etc., it cannot be said that there was no possibility of expecting a report simply because the authorities were unjustly prohibiting all indoor and outdoor assemblies of the Korean Teachers and Education Workers' Union, of which the Defendant was an officer, or of other organizations; therefore, it cannot be said that hosting an outdoor assembly without reporting to the chief of the competent police station on such grounds alone does not constitute a crime. This determination by the court below is proper and is hereby acknowledged, and there is no illegality as alleged in the argument. This ground is without merit.

C. As to the argument that the assembly was not one subject to the reporting requirement

The court below's determination that the assembly described in Item 1-(b) of the criminal facts found by the court of first instance was an assembly requiring a report under Article 6(1) of the Act on Assembly and Demonstration is properly acknowledged in light of the record, and there is no illegality as pointed out. This ground is without merit.

D. As to the argument that the Act on Assembly and Demonstration does not apply because it was an assembly for a funeral

According to the record, what was found problematic in Items 4-(d) and (e) of the criminal facts found by the court of first instance, which the court below found guilty, was not the funeral assembly itself for the deceased C, but the assembly accompanied by violence that occurred before and after the funeral, which constituted a prohibited assembly under Article 5(1)(2) of the Act on Assembly and Demonstration; this determination by the court below is proper.

This ground is without merit.

E. As to the argument of self-defense and the right of resistance

The court below's determination that the violent acts committed during each of the assemblies and demonstrations pointed out in the argument lacked legitimacy in their motive and purpose and reasonableness in their means and methods, and thus did not constitute acts of self-defense, is properly acknowledged in light of the record, and the court below's rejection of the Defendant's argument regarding the right of resistance is likewise proper. This ground is without merit.

F. As to the argument that there was no intent or conspiracy with respect to the violent acts during the assemblies

In light of the nature and circumstances of the convening of each assembly pointed out in the argument, the process of preparation and progress of the assemblies, and the degree of the Defendant's involvement as the host of the assemblies, all as found from the evidence cited in the judgment below and in the first-instance judgment adopted by the court below, it can be said that the Defendant had at least a conditional intent, in that he was fully aware that, if the assemblies were forcibly carried out, physical clashes with the police attempting to stop them, and the ensuing collective violence and damage, would follow, and yet was willing to accept the occurrence of such results; and it can also be said that there was sequential or tacit communication of intent between the Defendant and those who directly carried out such violent acts. Accordingly, the court below's determination finding the Defendant guilty of this portion of the charged facts, on the same reasoning, is proper, and there is no illegality as alleged in the argument.

Furthermore, the argument that the Act on the Punishment of Violent Acts, etc. (폭력행위등처벌에관한법률) is intended only for the punishment of vicious offenders or organized gangsters, and thus cannot be applied to politically motivated violent acts such as those in this case, is merely an idiosyncratic view and cannot be accepted. This ground is without merit.

G. As to the argument that the prosecution was unlawful for violating the principle of equity

The gist of the argument is that the facts of the crimes pointed out therein had already been treated as minor and not made an issue during the investigation of another case for which the Defendant had already been punished, and that it is unlawful, in violation of the principle of equity, to prosecute for them again in this case; however, upon examination of the record, there is no material whatsoever showing that the prosecutor, who has the authority to institute prosecution, made any disposition or expression of intent not to make an issue of the above facts of the crimes. Therefore, this argument is without merit, without need for further examination.

3. In conclusion, since the appeals of both the Defendant and the Prosecutor are without merit, the opinions of the Justices participating in this case are unanimous in dismissing them, as set forth in the Order.

Justice Park Man-ho (Presiding Justice), Justice Park Woo-dong, Justice Kim Sang-won, Justice Yoon Young-chul

【판결요지】

가. 형법 제62조 제1항 단서에서 규정한 “금고 이상의 형의 선고를 받아 집행을 종료한 후 또는 집행이 면제된 후로부터 5년이 경과하지 아니한 자”라는의미는 실형의 선고를 받고 집행종료나 집행이 면제된 후부터 5년을 경과하지 아니한 경우만을 가리키는 것이 아니라 형의 집행유예를 선고받고 그 유예기간이 경과하지 아니한 경우도 포함되나, 다만 어떤 사람이 저지른 형법 제37조의 경합범관계에 있는 수죄가 전후로 기소되어 각각 별개의 절차에서 재판을 받게 된 결과 어느 죄에 대하여 먼저 집행유예가 선고되어 그 형이 확정된 경우 그 나머지 죄에 대한 판결에서 다시 집행유예를 선고할 수 없다면 위 수죄가 같은 절차에서 동시에 심판을 받아 한꺼번에 집행유예를 선고받을 수 있었던 경우와 비교하여 현저히 균형을 잃게 되어 불합리하므로, 이러한 경우에 있어서는 위 단서 규정의 “형의 선고를 받아”라는 의미는 실형이 선고된 경우만을 가리키고 형의 집행유예를 선고받은 경우는 포함하지 않는다고 보아야하고, 한편 먼저 집행유예의 형이 확정된 죄의 집행유예기간 내에 다시 집행유예를 선고할 수 있는 나머지 죄란 그 먼저 형이 확정된 죄와 법률상 동시에 심판을 받을 가능성이 있었던 형법 제37조 후단의 경합범관계에 있는 죄이면 모두 이에 해당한다 할 것이지, 개개의 소송절차 또는 범행시기 등과의 관계에 의하여 현실적으로 동시심판이 현저히 곤란하였는지 여부 또는 동시심판을 하였을 경우 과연 집행유예를 선고받을 수 있는 정상이 있었는지 여부 등 구체적인 사정을 일일이 고려하여야 하는 것은 아니다.

나. 집회및시위에관한법률은 그 제13조의 집회를 제외한 옥외집회에 대하여 관할경찰서장에게 신고할 것을 요구하고 있고, 관할경찰서장의 부당한 금지통고에 대하여는 이의신청과 행정소송 등을 통하여 집회의 권리를 행사할 수 있도록 규정하고 있는 점에 비추어 보면, 단지 당국이 피고인이 간부로 있는 전국교직원노동조합이나 기타 단체에 대하여 모든 옥내외 집회를 부당하게 금지하고 있다고 하여 그 집회신고의 기대가능성이 없다 할 수 없으므로, 위와 같은 이유만으로 관할경찰서장에게 신고하지 않고 옥외집회를 주최한 것이 죄가되지 않는다고 할 수 없다.

【참조조문】

가. 형법 제62조 제1항 / 나. 집회및시위에관한법률 제19조 제2항, 제6조 제1항

【참조판례】

가. 대법원 1989.9.12. 선고 87도2365 전원합의체판결(공1989,1422), 1989.10.10. 선고 88도824 판결(공1989,1708), 1991.5.10. 선고 91도473 판결(공1991,1680)

【주문】·【이유】 전문 3,700자 · 펼쳐 보기

【피 고 인】

【상 고 인】 피고인 및 검사

【변 호 인】 변호사

【원심판결】 서울형사지방법원 1992.4.22. 선고 92노632 판결

【주 문】

피고인과 검사의 상고를 모두 기각한다.

【이 유】 1. 검사의 상고이유를 본다.

형법 제62조 제1항 단서에서 규정한 “금고이상의 형의 선고를 받아집행을 종료한 후 또는 집행이 면제된 후로부터 5년이 경과하지 아니한 자”라는 의미는 실형의 선고를 받고 집행종료나 집행이 면제된 후부터 5년을 경과하지 아니한 경우만을 가리키는 것이 아니라 형의 집행유예를 선고받고 그 유예기간이 경과하지 아니한 경우도 포함되나, 다만 어떤 사람이 저지른 형법제37조의 경합범관계에 있는 수죄가 전후로 기소되어 각각 별개의 절차에서 재판을 받게 된 결과 어느 죄에 대하여 먼저 집행유예가 선고되어 그 형이 확정된 경우 그 나머지 죄에 대한 판결에서 다시 집행유예를 선고할 수 없다면 위수죄가 같은 절차에서 동시에 심판을 받아 한꺼번에 집행유예를 선고받을 수있었던 경우와 비교하여 현저히 균형을 잃게 되어 불합리하므로, 이러한 경우에 있어서는 위 단서규정의 “형의 선고를 받아”라는 의미는 실형이 선고된 경우만을 가리키고 형의 집행유예를 선고받은 경우는 포함하지 않는다고 보는것이 당원의 판례이고 ( 당원 1989.9.12.선고 87도 2365 전원합의체판결, 1989.10.10.선고 88도 824 판결 각 참조), 한편 위 판례에서 의도하는 먼저 집행유예의 형이 확정된 죄의 집행유예기간내에 다시 집행유예를 선고할 수있는 나머지 죄란 그 먼저 형이 확정된 죄와 법률상 동시에 심판을 받을 가능성이 있었던 형법제37조 후단의 경합범관계에 있는 죄이면 모두 이에 해당한다 할 것이지, 개개의 소송절차 또는 범행시기 등과의 관계에 의하여 현실적으로 동시심판이 현저히 곤란하였는지 여부 또는 동시심판을 하였을 경우 과연 집행유예를 선고받을 수 있는 정상이 있었는지 여부등 구체적인 사정을 일일이 고려하여야 하는 것은 아니다.

기록에 의하면, 피고인은 1989.11.11. 서울형사지방법원에서 집회및시위에관한법률위반등의 죄로 징역 10월에 집행유예 2년의 형을 선고받고 항소하여 1990.3.27. 항소기각되고 다시 상고하였으나 같은해 8.14. 상고기각되어 위 판결이 확정되었고, 한편 피고인에 대한 이사건 제1심판시 제1, 2, 3항의 각 범행은 위 판결이 확정된 죄의 제1심 선고후로부터 그 판결이 확정되기 전 사이에저질러진 것이므로, 위 판결 확정 이전에 범한 이사건 제1심판시 제1, 2, 3죄는 위 확정판결의 죄와 형법제37조 후단의 경합범관계에 있고 따라서 이에 대하여 다시 집행유예를 선고할 수도 있는 것이다.

결국 같은 취지에서 이사건 제1심 판시 제1, 2, 3죄에 관하여 피고인에게 집행유예의 선고를 한 원심의 조치는 정당하고 이와 다른 견해로써 원심의 조치를 비난하는 논지는 이유없다.

2. 피고인과 변호인의 상고이유를 본다.

가. 각 채증법칙위반 및 사실오인등 주장에 대하여

소론 지적의 각 점에 관한 원심의 증거취사와 사실인정 및 소론 지적의 각집회가 집회및시위에관한법률 제5조 제1항 제2호 소정의 금지된 집회에 해당한다고 본 원심판단은 기록에 비추어 옳게 수긍되고 거기에 소론과 같은 위법이 있다할 수 없다. 논지는 이유없다.

나. 집회신고의 기대가능성이 없었다는 주장에 대하여 원심판결이유에 의하면, 원심은 제1심 판시 범죄사실 제1 및 제4의 가, 나, 다, 바 각 항 기재 각 미신고 집회주최의 점에 관한 소론 주장에 대하여, 집회및시위에관한법률은 그 제13조의 집회를 제외한 옥외집회에 대하여 관할경찰서장에게 신고할 것을 요구하고 있고, 관할경찰서장의 부당한 금지통고에대하여는 이의신청과 행정소송등을 통하여 집회의 권리를 행사할 수 있도록 규정하고 있는 점에 비추어 보면, 단지 당국이 피고인이 간부로 있는 전국교직원노동조합이나 기타 단체에 대하여 모든 옥내외 집회를 부당하게 금지하고 있다고 하여 그 집회신고의 기대가능성이 없다 할 수 없고, 따라서 위와 같은 이유만으로 관할경찰서장에게 신고하지 않고 옥외집회를 주최한 것이 죄가 되지 않는다고 할 수 없다 고 판시하였는 바, 이러한 원심판단은 정당한 것으로 수긍되고 거기에 소론과 같은 위법이 없다. 논지는 이유없다.

다. 집회신고의 대상이 되지 않는 집회라는 주장에 대하여 제1심 판시 범죄사실 제1의 나항 기재 집회가 집회및시위에관한법률 제6조제1항 소정의 신고를 요하는 집회라고 본 원심의 판단은 기록에 비추어 정당한 것으로 수긍되고 거기에 지적하는 바와같은 위법이 없다. 논지는 이유없다.

라. 장례식을 위한 집회로서 집회및시위에관한법률이 적용되지 않는다는 주장에 대하여 기록에 의하면 원심이 유죄로 인정한 제1심 판시 범죄사실 제4의 라,마항에서 문제된 것은 고 C군 장례식을 위한 집회 자체가 아니라 그 장례식 전후에 벌어진 폭력을 수반한 집회가 집회및시위에관한법률 제5조 제1항 제2호소정의 금지된 집회에 해당한다는 것이고, 이러한 원심의 판단은 정당하다.

논지는 이유없다.

마. 정당방위 및 저항권 주장에 대하여

소론 지적의 각 집회 및 시위 과정에서 행사된 폭력행위가 그 동기와 목적에 있어서의 정당성 및 수단과 방법에 있어서의 상당성을 결여한 것이어서 정당방위행위에 해당하지 않는다고 본 원심판단은 기록상 정당한 것으로 수긍되고, 저항권에 관한 피고인의 주장을 배척한 조치 또한 정당하 논지는 이유없다.

바. 집회중의 폭력행위에 대한 범의 및 공모행위가 없었다는 주장에 대하여 원심판결 및 원심이 인용한 제1심 판결이 거시한 증거들에 의하여 인정되는 소론 지적의 각 집회의 성격과 개최경위, 집회의 준비 및 진행과정, 집회주최자로서의 피고인의 관여정도 등에 비추어 볼 때, 피고인에게는 위 각 집회를 강행할 경우 이를 저지하는 경찰과의 물리적 충돌과 그에 따른 집단적 폭행및 손괴행위가 뒤따를 것을 충분히 인식하고서도 그러한 결과의 발생을 용인하고자 하는 미필적 고의가 있었고, 그러한 폭력행위를 직접 실행한 자들과의사이에 순차적 또는 암묵적인 의사의 연락도 있었다고 볼 수 있으므로, 같은 취지에서 이 부분 공소사실을 유죄로 인정한 원심의 판단은 정당하고 거기에소론과 같은 위법이 있다 할 수 없다.

또한 폭력행위등처벌관한법률이 흉악범이나 조직폭력배들만의 처벌을 위한것이어서 이사건과 같이 정치적 성격을 띤 폭력행위에 대하여는 적용할 수 없다는 소론주장은 독자적 견해에 불과하여 받아들일 수 없다. 논지는 이유없다.

사. 공소제기가 형평의 원칙에 위배되어 부적법하다는 주장에 대하여 소론주장의 요지는 그 지적하고 있는 각 범죄사실이 피고인이 이미 처벌받은 다른 사건의 조사과정에서 사안이 경미하다 하여 문제삼지 않았던 것인데도 이 사건에서 이를 다시 문제삼아 공소를 제기한 것이 형평의 원칙에 반하여 위법하다는 것인바, 기록을 살펴보아도 공소제기권자인 검사가 위 각 범죄사실을 문제삼지 않기로 하는 어떠한 처분이나 의사표시를 하였다고 볼 아무런자료가 없으므로 위 주장은 더 나아가 판단할 것 없이 이유없다.

3. 결국 피고인과 검사의 상고는 모두 이유없으므로 이를 기각하기로 관여 법관의 의견이 일치되어 주문과 같이 판결한다.

대법관 박만호(재판장) 박우동 김상원 윤영철

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