[Defendant]
[Appellant] Defendant and Prosecutor
[Defense Counsel] Attorney
[Court Below] Seoul Criminal District Court Decision 92No632, decided April 22, 1992
[Order]
The appeals of both the Defendant and the Prosecutor are all dismissed.
[Reasoning]
1. As to the Prosecutor's grounds of appeal
The meaning of "a person for whom five years have not elapsed since the completion of execution or exemption from execution of a sentence of imprisonment or greater," as provided in the proviso of Article 62(1) of the Criminal Act (형법), does not refer only to cases where an actual sentence was pronounced and five years have not elapsed since the completion or exemption of its execution, but also includes cases where a suspended sentence was pronounced and the period of suspension has not yet elapsed. However, where a person commits several offenses that are in a concurrent-crime relationship under Article 37 of the Criminal Act, and these offenses are prosecuted separately at different times and tried in separate proceedings, resulting in a suspended sentence being pronounced and finalized for one offense first, if a suspended sentence could not then be pronounced again for the remaining offense(s) in a subsequent judgment, this would be markedly unbalanced and unreasonable compared to a case where all such offenses were tried simultaneously in the same proceeding and a suspended sentence was pronounced for all of them at once. Therefore, in such cases, it is the established precedent of this Court that the phrase "having been sentenced" in the above proviso refers only to cases where an actual sentence was pronounced, and does not include cases where a suspended sentence was pronounced (see this Court's en banc Decision 87Do2365, decided September 12, 1989, and Decision 88Do824, decided October 10, 1989).
Meanwhile, the "remaining offense" for which a suspended sentence may again be pronounced during the period of suspension of the offense for which a suspended sentence was first finalized, as contemplated in the above precedent, includes any offense that is in a concurrent-crime relationship under the latter part of Article 37 of the Criminal Act with the offense for which sentence was first finalized, so long as there was a legal possibility that it could have been tried simultaneously with that offense. It is not necessary to individually consider specific circumstances such as whether simultaneous trial was in fact significantly difficult due to the particular litigation procedures or the timing of the offenses, or whether there were in fact grounds for a suspended sentence had the offenses been tried simultaneously.
According to the record, the Defendant was sentenced by the Seoul Criminal District Court on November 11, 1989 to 10 months' imprisonment with a 2-year suspension of execution for violation of the Act on Assembly and Demonstration (집회및시위에관한법률), among other offenses; the Defendant appealed, and the appeal was dismissed on March 27, 1990; the Defendant then further appealed to this Court, but that appeal was dismissed on August 14 of the same year, whereupon the above judgment became final. Meanwhile, the offenses set forth in Items 1, 2, and 3 of the facts found by the court of first instance in this case were committed after the first-instance sentencing of the offense for which the above judgment became final, but before that judgment became final. Accordingly, Offenses 1, 2, and 3 found by the court of first instance in this case, having been committed before the above judgment became final, are in a concurrent-crime relationship under the latter part of Article 37 of the Criminal Act with the offense in the finalized judgment, and therefore a suspended sentence may also be pronounced again for them.
In conclusion, the court below's action of pronouncing a suspended sentence on the Defendant with respect to Offenses 1, 2, and 3 found by the court of first instance in this case, on the same reasoning, is proper, and the argument criticizing the court below's action on a different view is without merit.
2. As to the grounds of appeal of the Defendant and Defense Counsel
A. As to the arguments alleging violation of the rules of evidence and misapprehension of facts
The court below's selection and weighing of evidence and its factual findings on each of the points raised in the argument, and its determination that each of the assemblies pointed out in the argument constituted a prohibited assembly under Article 5(1)(2) of the Act on Assembly and Demonstration, are properly acknowledged in light of the record, and there is no illegality as alleged in the argument. This ground is without merit.
B. As to the argument that there was no possibility of expecting an assembly report to be filed
According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below held, with respect to the argument concerning the points of hosting unreported assemblies described in Items 1 and 4-(a), (b), (c), and (f) of the criminal facts found by the court of first instance, as follows: in light of the fact that the Act on Assembly and Demonstration requires a report to the chief of the competent police station for outdoor assemblies other than those under Article 13 of that Act, and provides that, against an unjust prohibition notice by the chief of the competent police station, the right to assembly may be exercised through an objection or administrative litigation, etc., it cannot be said that there was no possibility of expecting a report simply because the authorities were unjustly prohibiting all indoor and outdoor assemblies of the Korean Teachers and Education Workers' Union, of which the Defendant was an officer, or of other organizations; therefore, it cannot be said that hosting an outdoor assembly without reporting to the chief of the competent police station on such grounds alone does not constitute a crime. This determination by the court below is proper and is hereby acknowledged, and there is no illegality as alleged in the argument. This ground is without merit.
C. As to the argument that the assembly was not one subject to the reporting requirement
The court below's determination that the assembly described in Item 1-(b) of the criminal facts found by the court of first instance was an assembly requiring a report under Article 6(1) of the Act on Assembly and Demonstration is properly acknowledged in light of the record, and there is no illegality as pointed out. This ground is without merit.
D. As to the argument that the Act on Assembly and Demonstration does not apply because it was an assembly for a funeral
According to the record, what was found problematic in Items 4-(d) and (e) of the criminal facts found by the court of first instance, which the court below found guilty, was not the funeral assembly itself for the deceased C, but the assembly accompanied by violence that occurred before and after the funeral, which constituted a prohibited assembly under Article 5(1)(2) of the Act on Assembly and Demonstration; this determination by the court below is proper.
This ground is without merit.
E. As to the argument of self-defense and the right of resistance
The court below's determination that the violent acts committed during each of the assemblies and demonstrations pointed out in the argument lacked legitimacy in their motive and purpose and reasonableness in their means and methods, and thus did not constitute acts of self-defense, is properly acknowledged in light of the record, and the court below's rejection of the Defendant's argument regarding the right of resistance is likewise proper. This ground is without merit.
F. As to the argument that there was no intent or conspiracy with respect to the violent acts during the assemblies
In light of the nature and circumstances of the convening of each assembly pointed out in the argument, the process of preparation and progress of the assemblies, and the degree of the Defendant's involvement as the host of the assemblies, all as found from the evidence cited in the judgment below and in the first-instance judgment adopted by the court below, it can be said that the Defendant had at least a conditional intent, in that he was fully aware that, if the assemblies were forcibly carried out, physical clashes with the police attempting to stop them, and the ensuing collective violence and damage, would follow, and yet was willing to accept the occurrence of such results; and it can also be said that there was sequential or tacit communication of intent between the Defendant and those who directly carried out such violent acts. Accordingly, the court below's determination finding the Defendant guilty of this portion of the charged facts, on the same reasoning, is proper, and there is no illegality as alleged in the argument.
Furthermore, the argument that the Act on the Punishment of Violent Acts, etc. (폭력행위등처벌에관한법률) is intended only for the punishment of vicious offenders or organized gangsters, and thus cannot be applied to politically motivated violent acts such as those in this case, is merely an idiosyncratic view and cannot be accepted. This ground is without merit.
G. As to the argument that the prosecution was unlawful for violating the principle of equity
The gist of the argument is that the facts of the crimes pointed out therein had already been treated as minor and not made an issue during the investigation of another case for which the Defendant had already been punished, and that it is unlawful, in violation of the principle of equity, to prosecute for them again in this case; however, upon examination of the record, there is no material whatsoever showing that the prosecutor, who has the authority to institute prosecution, made any disposition or expression of intent not to make an issue of the above facts of the crimes. Therefore, this argument is without merit, without need for further examination.
3. In conclusion, since the appeals of both the Defendant and the Prosecutor are without merit, the opinions of the Justices participating in this case are unanimous in dismissing them, as set forth in the Order.
Justice Park Man-ho (Presiding Justice), Justice Park Woo-dong, Justice Kim Sang-won, Justice Yoon Young-chul