[Defendant]
[Appellant] Defendants and Prosecutor
[Defense Counsel] Jipyong LLC and 4 others
[Judgment Below] Seoul High Court Decision 2017No460 rendered on July 18, 2017
[Order]
All appeals are dismissed.
[Reasoning] The grounds of appeal (to the extent the supplementary brief on grounds of appeal submitted after the expiration of the period for submitting the grounds of appeal supplements the grounds of appeal) are examined as follows.
1. Regarding the violation of the Act on External Audit of Stock Companies, etc. (주식회사의 외부감사에 관한 법률, hereinafter the "External Audit Act") and violation of the Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act (자본시장과 금융투자업에 관한 법률, hereinafter the "Capital Markets Act") due to accounting fraud
A. Defendant 1's Ground of Appeal No. 1
1) The facts found by the court below and its judgment based thereon are as follows.
A) (1) Nonindicted Company 1 (hereinafter "Nonindicted Company 1") classified offshore project construction contracts, in its internal administrative processing, into "fixed-price contract construction" and "cost-settlement construction" according to the method of revenue settlement. However, with respect to fixed-price contract construction, given the nature of the contract, it is difficult to expect that the ordering party would approve a request for additional construction costs in the form of a Change Order even if construction costs increase after the fact. Based on past experience as well, in the case of fixed-price contract construction, unlike cost-settlement construction, when a Change Order relating to increased construction costs was requested from the ordering party, such approval was rarely obtained, or the process of actually securing it from the ordering party was not easy. For this reason, Nonindicted Accounting Firm 2, which was the external auditor, also took a passive stance on recognizing this as contract revenue before there was an agreement with the ordering party on approval of the Change Order in relation to fixed-price contract construction. (2) Meanwhile, under the Korean International Financial Reporting Standards on "Construction Contracts" (Accounting Standards Statement No. 1011, enacted November 23, 2007, before the amendment of December 24, 2015) applicable to Nonindicted Company 1's financial accounting at the time, contracts could be classified into two types, "fixed-price contracts" and "cost-plus contracts," depending on whether the contract amount was fixed or subject to settlement, and the accounting treatment, including the recognition of contract revenue, differs by contract type. Also, the components of contract revenue may include amounts added due to construction changes, etc., in addition to the originally agreed contract amount, but in order to recognize such amounts as contract revenue, it is required that there be a high probability that the ordering party will approve the fact of the construction change and the resulting amount, and that the amount can be reliably measured. (3) With respect to Change Orders relating to fixed-price contract construction, which belongs to the type of fixed-price contract with a fixed amount at the time of contract conclusion and a low possibility of subsequent settlement, unless such Change Orders were made pursuant to the ordering party's instructions and had already been approved with payment confirmed, then even if, from Nonindicted Company 1's perspective, this were a cause of unexpectedly added construction costs, a careful assessment of the possibility of the ordering party's approval and the measurability of the amount is separately required in order to reflect the amount under the Change Order in contract revenue as compensation corresponding to the nature of the contract. Therefore, the portion relating to a Change Order for fixed-price contract construction that was included in the business plan but remained unfixed and was not reflected in the closing accounts may be added to contract revenue and reflected in the calculation of the amount of accounting fraud only when it can be separately confirmed, by means of documents, e-mail, etc., by around mid-March of the following year, which is the date of issuance of the audit report for the relevant fiscal year, that there was an intention of approval from the ordering party.
B) In addition, considering all of the circumstances set forth in the judgment, including: the specific timing and detailed circumstances under which Nonindicted Company 1 could have specifically recognized that the recoverability of long-term trade receivables held against the four ordering companies—Nonindicted Company 3, Nonindicted Company 4, Nonindicted Company 5, and Nonindicted Company 6—which had raised the issue of the need for bad debt treatment due to the occurrence of asset impairment, had significantly decreased; the results of Nonindicted Accounting Firm 2's accounting audit of the fiscal year 2015 financial statements, in which prior period error corrections were made with respect to the manipulated accounting items after the fact of accounting fraud, including fraud relating to the bad debt allowance for the above long-term trade receivables, became known to the outside; and the results of Nonindicted Accounting Firm 7's 2015 financial due diligence of Nonindicted Company 1—it does not appear markedly unreasonable that, in calculating the amount of accounting fraud, the bad debt allowance related to the long-term trade receivables against the above four ordering companies, which Nonindicted Company 1 should have already recognized in past periods but had deliberately concealed, was retroactively set and divided between the two periods of fiscal year 2013 and fiscal year 2014, based on fiscal year 2015 when such material error was first recognized.
2) The court below then rejected Defendant 1's argument in the grounds of appeal, namely, that in calculating the amount of accounting fraud by fiscal year, unfixed Change Orders relating to fixed-price contract construction should have been additionally reflected in the total contract revenue under Nonindicted Company 1's order contracts as long as the possibility of approval from the ordering party is recognized, even if documentary evidence such as e-mail was not secured, and that the portion of impairment of long-term trade receivables arising during the term of the former representative director, which had not been recorded as a bad debt allowance in the financial statements, should be excluded from the amount of loss.
3) The finding of criminal facts must reach a degree of proof beyond a reasonable doubt (Article 307(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act (형사소송법)), but the selection and evaluation of evidence, which is the premise for fact-finding, and the probative value of evidence, are matters within the free evaluation of the court of fact-finding (Article 308 of the Criminal Procedure Act).
The grounds of appeal disputing the fact-finding of the court below are, in substance, nothing more than a complaint against the court below's selection of evidence and determination of probative value, which are matters within the free evaluation of the court of fact-finding. Furthermore, examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the lawfully adopted evidence and the various provisions of the accounting standards applicable to the recognition of contract revenue under the shipbuilding order contracts at issue in this case, the bad debt treatment due to impairment of long-term trade receivables, and prior period error corrections, the above judgment of the court below can be affirmed. There is no illegality therein, such as a misapprehension of the legal principles concerning the interpretation and application of accounting standards, a violation of the burden of proof, or exceeding the limits of the principle of free evaluation of evidence, as argued in the grounds of appeal.
B. Defendant 1's Grounds of Appeal Nos. 2 and 3, and Defendant 2's Ground of Appeal No. 3
Under Article 383(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act, an appeal may be filed on the ground that the judgment below contains a material mistake of fact that affected the judgment, only in cases where the death penalty, life imprisonment, or imprisonment or imprisonment without labor for ten years or more has been imposed. In the present case, where a lighter sentence was imposed on the defendants, the arguments in this part of the grounds of appeal, which dispute the court below's selection of evidence and fact-finding—matters exclusively within the authority of the court below as the court of fact-finding—or which point out a misapprehension of legal principles premised on facts different from those found by the court below, do not constitute lawful grounds of appeal (see Supreme Court Decision 2017Do3894, decided May 31, 2017, etc.).
Furthermore, in a relationship of joint offenders where two or more persons jointly engage in a crime, conspiracy does not require any particular legal form; it suffices that there is a combination of intentions of two or more persons to jointly engage in and realize a certain crime through conspiracy. Even if there was no comprehensive process of collusion, a conspiratorial relationship is established if there is a combination of intentions formed sequentially or implicitly among several persons. And once such a conspiracy is formed, even a person who did not directly participate in the execution of the crime bears criminal responsibility as a joint principal offender for the acts of the other co-conspirators (see Supreme Court Decision 2000Do3483, decided November 10, 2000, etc.). In the case of a co-principal by conspiracy, conspiracy or collusion constitutes part of the criminal facts, and strict proof is required to establish it; however, where a defendant admits to having directly participated in the act of execution but denies criminal intent along with the point of conspiracy, such subjective element, being a fact substantially related to criminal intent by the nature of the matter, can only be proven by proving indirect facts or circumstantial facts. What constitutes an indirect fact with such substantial relevance must be determined by rationally judging the connection of facts based on normal rules of experience through meticulous observation and analytical ability (see Supreme Court Decision 2002Do6103, decided January 24, 2003, etc.).
The court below found, for the reasons stated in its judgment, that Defendant 2, from fiscal year 2012 to fiscal year 2014, and Defendant 1, in fiscal years 2013 and 2014, respectively, conspired in and participated in the preparation and disclosure of false financial statements and business reports by understating the provision for construction losses, the bad debt allowance for long-term trade receivables, and the impairment of subsidiaries, in order to conceal deficits such as net loss for each period. It then determined that such acts of the defendants collectively constitute a violation of the External Audit Act and a violation of the Capital Markets Act arising from the preparation of false financial statements and business reports without complying with the accounting standards, and that the defendants cannot be exonerated from criminal liability solely on the ground that they did not actively instruct the responsible employees to commit accounting fraud, or that Defendant 2, in the early period after assuming the position of Executive Vice President in charge of Finance, recognized problems with the treatment of the bad debt allowance for long-term trade receivables and made efforts to resolve them.
Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the legal principles set forth above and the lawfully adopted evidence, there is no illegality in the above judgment of the court below, such as a misapprehension of legal principles concerning the establishment of co-principals by conspiracy or the degree of proof required for conviction, resulting in a failure to conduct the necessary examination, or exceeding the limits of the principle of free evaluation of evidence in violation of the rules of logic and experience, or a contradiction in reasoning, as argued in the grounds of appeal.
C. Defendant 1's Ground of Appeal No. 4
1) Since the appellate trial before the Supreme Court is a post-trial review of the judgment of the court of appeal, matters that were not subject to adjudication in the appellate trial do not fall within the scope of review of the Supreme Court, and matters other than those raised by the defendant as grounds of appeal in the appellate trial, or matters that the appellate court took up ex officio as subject to adjudication, may not be raised as grounds of appeal to the Supreme Court (see Supreme Court Decision 2015Do9010, decided October 29, 2015, etc.).
The argument that the judgment below, which found guilty the portion of the charges against Defendant 1 concerning the preparation and disclosure of false financial statements for fiscal years 2013 and 2014 in conspiracy with Defendant 2 and others, contains an error of misapprehending the legal principles concerning the method of "disclosure" as a requirement for establishing the crime of violation of the External Audit Act, resulting in a failure to conduct the necessary examination, is being raised for the first time at the Supreme Court level, without having been raised as a ground of appeal by the said defendant or taken up ex officio by the court below as subject to adjudication, and therefore cannot constitute a lawful ground of appeal.
2) Nevertheless, upon further examination, the argument in the grounds of appeal cannot be accepted, for the following reasons.
Under Article 14(1) of the External Audit Act and Article 7(4) of its Enforcement Decree, the method of disclosure of financial statements under the External Audit Act is to be governed by Article 448(1) of the Commercial Act (상법), and under Article 448(1) of the Commercial Act, directors are required to disclose the financial statements by keeping the financial statements at the head office for five years and copies thereof at branch offices for three years, from one week before the date of the ordinary general meeting. Therefore, the crime of preparing and disclosing false financial statements as defined in Article 20(1) of the External Audit Act must be deemed to be established at the time the financial statements are kept at the head office from one week before the date of the ordinary general meeting (see Supreme Court Decision 2004Do520, decided June 24, 2004).
Accordingly, the court below's determination, which concluded that the crime of preparing and disclosing false financial statements was established solely on the ground that Defendant 1, in conspiracy with Defendant 2 and others, prepared false financial statements for fiscal year 2013 between around January and March 2014, and false financial statements for fiscal year 2014 between around January and March 2015, and registered them with the Financial Supervisory Service's Data Analysis, Retrieval and Transfer System (DART), contains an error of misapprehending the legal principles concerning the timing of establishment of the crime of preparing and disclosing false financial statements under the External Audit Act, and the argument in the grounds of appeal pointing this out is well-founded.
However, according to the lawfully adopted evidence, it can be seen that: (1) Nonindicted Company 1 designated three to four employees belonging to Accounting Team 1 within the management support department, which oversees the annual closing work, as persons in charge of disclosure, and had them exclusively handle disclosure-related work for the prepared closing financial statements, etc.; (2) Nonindicted Company 1 internally resolved and finalized, at an extraordinary board meeting on March 6, 2014, an agenda to approve the items to be submitted at the 14th ordinary general meeting of shareholders, including the resolution to approve the fiscal year 2013 financial statements, and on March 12 of the same month, registered with DART a notice convening the 14th ordinary general meeting of shareholders scheduled to be held on March 28, 2014, stating in that notice that materials relating to the current period's financial statements were being kept as "management reference matters" at Nonindicted Company 1's head office, etc.; and (3) Nonindicted Company 1 resolved and finalized, at an extraordinary board meeting on March 9, 2014, an agenda to approve the items to be submitted at the 15th ordinary general meeting of shareholders, including the resolution to approve the fiscal year 2014 financial statements, and when registering with DART a notice convening the 15th ordinary general meeting of shareholders to be held on March 31, 2014, on March 16 of the same month, made a statement of the same purport in that notice as well.
Examining these facts in light of the legal principles set forth above, it must be said that Nonindicted Company 1, around the time it registered each notice convening the ordinary general meeting with DART, which was one week before each date of the ordinary general meeting for fiscal years 2013 and 2014, had also completed the act of disclosure by keeping the relevant financial statements at the head office, etc. as stated in the notice, in preparation for requests to inspect and copy documents from shareholders and other interested parties. Given these circumstances, the conclusion of the court below, which found that the crime of preparing and disclosing false financial statements was established on each date of the offenses set forth in the judgment, is, as a result, justified.
D. The Prosecutor's Grounds of Appeal
1) Argument concerning the propriety of revenue recognition for unfixed Change Orders relating to cost-settlement construction
In a criminal trial, the burden of proving the prosecuted criminal facts lies with the prosecutor, and a conviction must be based on evidence with such probative value as to convince the judge that the charged facts are true to a degree leaving no room for reasonable doubt. Therefore, if there is no such evidence, even if there is suspicion of guilt against the defendant, the matter must be resolved in the defendant's favor (see Supreme Court Decision 2006Do735, decided April 27, 2006).
The court below, citing the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance, found the facts as stated in its judgment, and then premised that, unlike fixed-price contract construction, cost-settlement construction is a contract premised on subsequent settlement according to predetermined criteria, such that there is a considerable possibility that the contract amount will increase according to changes in circumstances. It then determined that, since the prosecutor's proof was insufficient to establish that there was no possibility of recovery of the Change Order relating to cost-settlement construction, it was not particularly unreasonable, in the manner most favorable to the defendants, to also recognize as contract revenue the Change Order in the nature of a sales target included in the business plan at the beginning of the year, and reflect it in the calculation of the amount of accounting fraud. Accordingly, it rejected the prosecutor's argument in the grounds of appeal disputing this, and upheld the judgment of the court of first instance, which had found a portion of the charges relating to violations of the External Audit Act and the Capital Markets Act concerning accounting fraud from 2012 to 2014 not guilty.
The grounds of appeal disputing the fact-finding of the court below are, in substance, nothing more than a complaint against the court below's selection of evidence and determination of probative value, which are matters within the free evaluation of the court of fact-finding. Furthermore, examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the legal principles set forth above and the record, there is no illegality in the above judgment of the court below, such as a misapprehension of legal principles concerning the recognition of contract revenue under accounting standards, a violation of the burden of proof, or exceeding the limits of the principle of free evaluation of evidence, as argued in the grounds of appeal.
2) Argument concerning Defendant 1's involvement in the 2012 accounting fraud
The court below, considering the circumstances set forth in its judgment as a whole, determined that Defendant 1 did not know that the preparation of the fiscal year 2012 financial statements had been falsified, and did not participate in the accounting fraud. Accordingly, it rejected the prosecutor's argument in the grounds of appeal disputing this, and upheld the judgment of the first instance, which had found the portion of the charges relating to violations of the External Audit Act and the Capital Markets Act concerning the 2012 accounting fraud not guilty.
This part of the grounds of appeal also disputes the fact-finding concerning the presence of criminal intent, a matter exclusively within the authority of the court below as the court of fact-finding, and is nothing more than a complaint against the court below's determination concerning the selection of evidence and the credibility of witness statements and other matters of probative value.
Furthermore, examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the record, there is no illegality in the above judgment of the court below, such as a misapprehension of legal principles concerning criminal intent and the relationship of conspiracy in accounting fraud, or exceeding the limits of the principle of free evaluation of evidence in violation of logic and rules of experience, as argued in the grounds of appeal.
2. Regarding the portion concerning violation of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Economic Crimes (특정경제범죄 가중처벌 등에 관한 법률, hereinafter the "Specific Economic Crimes Act") (fraud) due to fraud related to accounting fraud, and violation of the Capital Markets Act due to fraudulent unfair trading
A. Argument concerning criminal intent in the fraud and fraudulent unfair trading portions of Defendant 1's Ground of Appeal No. 5
The arguments in this part of the grounds of appeal all concern matters that Defendant 1 did not raise as grounds of appeal in the appellate trial and that therefore did not become subject to adjudication in the appellate trial, and thus do not constitute lawful grounds of appeal.
Furthermore, examining, in light of the legal principles concerning co-principals by conspiracy set forth above, the various circumstances discernible from the lawfully adopted evidence, such as the course of Defendant 1's performance of duties as representative director, the content of Nonindicted Company 1's board of directors operating regulations concerning various fund borrowings or guarantee-providing transactions and the deliberation and resolution thereunder, and the manner in which Nonindicted Company 1's finance team leader handled its duties, it appears that even if Defendant 1 did not know the detailed particulars of the process by which Nonindicted Company 1, at the company level, received individual loans, opened letter of credit limits, issued or traded corporate bonds or commercial paper for fund-raising purposes, or obtained credit ratings, he, as representative director, was fully aware of the management situation of Nonindicted Company 1, and, well aware of the fact of the accounting fraud, comprehensively or individually approved or instructed, orally or in writing, financial transactions related to fund-raising in the course of board resolutions or reports from the finance team leader. The judgment of the court below, which found that the crime of violation of the Specific Economic Crimes Act (fraud) and the crime of violation of the Capital Markets Act due to fraudulent unfair trading were established with respect to the act of engaging in financial transactions using each falsely prepared financial statement, or obtaining a credit rating for that purpose, is justified. There is no illegality therein, such as a misapprehension of legal principles concerning the criminal intent for fraud and fraudulent unfair trading, or a misapprehension of facts by exceeding the limits of the principle of free evaluation of evidence in violation of the rules of logic and experience, as argued in the grounds of appeal.
B. Defendant 1's Ground of Appeal No. 6, Defendant 2's Ground of Appeal No. 1
1) Argument concerning the existence of deceptive conduct, disposal act, and causation with respect to the loans related to the Korea Finance Corporation
The court below found that the victim of the R&D loans dated July 11, 2014 and December 10, 2014, set forth in the judgment, which were made as a result of being deceived by the defendants' deceptive conduct concerning accounting fraud, was the Korea Development Bank, and found this part of the charges guilty.
The argument in this part of the grounds of appeal, to the effect that, since the financial institution that actually entered into each of the above loan agreements with Nonindicted Company 1 was the Korea Finance Corporation, and the creditor was merely changed to the Korea Development Bank around January 2015, the determination as to the existence of the deceptive conduct, disposal act, and causation required to establish the crime of fraud should have been examined and confirmed in relation to the Korea Finance Corporation, is a matter that Defendant 1 did not raise as a ground of appeal in the appellate trial, and which the appellate court also did not take up ex officio as subject to adjudication, and therefore does not constitute a lawful ground of appeal.
Furthermore, examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the lawfully adopted evidence and the record, it can be seen that: (1) although the above loan claims are based on loan agreements entered into between the Korea Finance Corporation and Nonindicted Company 1, the Korea Finance Corporation is a financial institution established by separating the relevant business organization within the Korea Development Bank pursuant to the Korea Finance Corporation Act (Act No. 9618, enacted April 1, 2009), for the purpose of succeeding to the Korea Development Bank's small and medium enterprise support business, etc., in the course of the Korea Development Bank's pursuit of privatization; and (2) however, as the above Act was abolished, the Korea Finance Corporation was again absorbed and merged into the Korea Development Bank around December 31, 2014, and in that process, the Korea Development Bank succeeded to all assets, including the above loan claims. Therefore, even if the court below found the victim of the above loans to be the Korea Development Bank, there is no illegality therein, such as a misapprehension of legal principles concerning the victim of the crime of fraud, resulting in a failure to conduct the necessary examination, or a misapprehension of facts by exceeding the limits of the principle of free evaluation of evidence in violation of the rules of logic and experience, as argued in the grounds of appeal.
2) Argument concerning the existence of causation between the deceptive conduct and the disposal act with respect to the collateralized loans from policy financial institutions such as the Korea Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank of Korea
In the crime of fraud involving the taking of money by deceit, the fraud is established as soon as money is delivered as a result of the deception, in and of itself constituting an infringement of the victim's property, and even if considerable consideration was paid or there was no loss to the victim's overall property, this has no effect on the establishment of the crime of fraud. Therefore, even where part of the consideration was paid or collateral was provided in a case of fraud, the amount obtained by deception must be regarded as the entire amount of money received from the victim, not the difference obtained by deducting the amount equivalent to the consideration or collateral from the money delivered by the victim (see Supreme Court Decision 2006Do7470, decided January 25, 2007, etc.).
Meanwhile, a company's financial statements and the audit report describing the results of the external auditor's accounting audit thereof are the most objective materials revealing the accurate financial condition of the target company, which are disclosed to the public through the stock exchange, etc., and serve as basic data on the company's creditworthiness and repayment ability, constituting important grounds for judgment in the credit rating evaluation of corporate bonds and commercial paper issued by the company and in the decision of whether financial institutions will extend credit. As a result, a case in which large-scale credit is extended despite knowing that there is fraud in violation of accounting standards regarding material matters in the relevant company's financial statements cannot but be regarded as exceptional, and matters such as whether net income is positive or negative are generally one of the important matters in judging the creditworthiness of the relevant company (see Supreme Court Decision 2004Do5163, decided April 27, 2007). Furthermore, even if, under a financial institution's ordinary credit handling standards, credit extension might have been possible for a company in a deficit state, this does not mean that the causation between the deceptive conduct arising from the submission of fraudulent financial statements and the credit extension decision is uniformly severed; rather, whether causation is severed must be examined by appropriately considering and evaluating even the negative impact on the credibility assessment that could result if it were discovered that the company submitted financial statements prepared to appear to be in a surplus state in order to conceal its deficit state (see Supreme Court Decision 2006Do1813, decided June 1, 2007; Supreme Court Decision 2012Do1283, decided June 14, 2012, etc.).
The court below, considering the circumstances set forth in its judgment, determined that causation is recognized between the defendants' act of preparing and submitting false financial statements and the respective loans made by the victims, the Export-Import Bank of Korea and the Korea Development Bank, and that the amount of profit obtained by deception is the entire amount of the loans.
Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the lawfully adopted evidence and the above legal principles, the above judgment of the court below can be affirmed, and the argument in the grounds of appeal, premised on a different view, that the portion recoverable through the enforcement of the security rights on the claims or vessels, etc. that Nonindicted Company 1 provided to the Export-Import Bank of Korea in order to receive the "manufacturing finance" loan set forth in the judgment below should be deducted from the amount obtained by deception, or that this case falls under a case where the amount of profit resulting from the deceptive act cannot be calculated, cannot be accepted. Moreover, Supreme Court en banc Decision 2005Do7288, decided April 19, 2007, cited in the grounds of appeal, involves a different case from the present case and is not appropriate to be relied upon in this case.
C. Defendant 1's Ground of Appeal No. 7, Defendant 2's Ground of Appeal No. 2
1) Argument concerning whether the act constitutes the use of unfair means in fraudulent unfair trading
Article 178(1)(1) of the Capital Markets Act prohibits "the act of using unfair means, plans, or schemes" in connection with trading or other transactions of financial investment instruments, where "unfair means, plans, or schemes" refer to any means, plans, or schemes recognized as unfair according to social norms (see Supreme Court Decision 2011Do8109, decided October 27, 2011, etc.).
This part of Defendant 1's grounds of appeal concerns a matter that was not raised as a ground of appeal in the appellate trial and therefore did not become subject to adjudication in the appellate trial, and thus does not constitute a lawful ground of appeal.
Furthermore, examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the lawfully adopted evidence and the record, it is clear that Defendant 1, in conspiracy with Defendant 2 and others, disclosed the falsely prepared financial statements by registering business reports to which they were attached with DART, and, knowing that such business reports, etc. would be collected by credit rating agencies and used as data for credit rating evaluation, proceeded with financial investment instrument transactions such as the issuance and trading of unsecured corporate bonds and commercial paper, utilizing Nonindicted Company 1's unfairly evaluated credit rating. This being so, even if there is some inappropriate point in the reasoning of the court below, the conclusion of the court below finding this part of the charges guilty is justified, and the above error of the court below has no effect on the outcome of the judgment.
2) Argument concerning the subject to which the profits from the violation are attributed in fraudulent unfair trading
Defendant 1's argument in this part of the grounds of appeal, that the entire profit from the fraudulent unfair trading was attributed to Nonindicted Company 1, and that the representative director gained no personal profit whatsoever, is also a matter that was not raised as a ground of appeal in the appellate trial and therefore did not become subject to adjudication in the appellate trial, and thus does not constitute a lawful ground of appeal.
Furthermore, "profit obtained from the violation" as defined in the proviso of Article 443(1) and Article 443(2) of the Capital Markets Act refers, in principle, to the profit obtained by the actor as a result of the relevant violation, and does not include profit attributed to a third party who did not participate in the crime (see Supreme Court Decision 2011Do3180, decided July 14, 2011). However, where a representative, etc. of a corporation, as an organ of the corporation, commits a violation as defined in Article 443 of the Capital Markets Act in relation to the business of the corporation, the profit obtained by the corporation as a result of the violation is also included in the profit obtained by the violation of the representative, etc. of the corporation (see Supreme Court Decision 2011Do12041, decided December 22, 2011). Therefore, this part of Defendant 1's grounds of appeal cannot be accepted on any ground.
3) Argument concerning the method of calculating the profit from fraudulent unfair trading
The defendants' argument in the grounds of appeal, to the effect that the profit from fraudulent unfair trading using accounting fraud as a means should be calculated as the difference in interest expense arising from the interest rate gap resulting from the difference in credit rating evaluation depending on the presence or absence of accounting fraud, is also a matter that was not raised as a ground of appeal in the appellate trial and therefore did not become subject to adjudication in the appellate trial, and thus does not constitute a lawful ground of appeal.
Furthermore, "profit obtained from the violation" as provided for in the proviso of Article 443(1) and Article 443(2) of the Capital Markets Act is a concept opposite to "amount of loss" set forth together therein, and, in principle, refers to the profit, i.e., the difference obtained by deducting the total expenses for the transaction from the total revenue from the transaction, obtained by the actor as a result of the relevant violation (see Supreme Court Decision 2011Do3180, decided July 14, 2011, etc.). Therefore, this part of the grounds of appeal cannot be accepted.
4) Argument concerning the deduction of transaction costs in calculating the profit from the violation in fraudulent unfair trading
The defendants' argument in the grounds of appeal, to the effect that transaction costs, such as issuance fees borne by Nonindicted Company 1, should have been deducted from the total sale proceeds in calculating the profit obtained from the fraudulent unfair trading but were not so deducted, or that, considering this, this case falls under a case where the amount of profit from the violation cannot be calculated, is, as to Defendant 1, a matter that was not raised as a ground of appeal in the appellate trial and therefore did not become subject to adjudication in the appellate trial, and thus does not constitute a lawful ground of appeal.
Furthermore, even if there is some error in the court below's calculation of profit with respect to the transaction costs, the above act of fraudulent unfair trading equally falls under the provisions of Article 443(2)(2), etc. of the Capital Markets Act applied by the court below, and thus has no effect on the outcome of the judgment (see, in the same vein, Supreme Court Decision 2014Do8111, decided October 15, 2014).
D. The Prosecutor's Grounds of Appeal
1) Argument concerning the existence of criminal intent with respect to the portion of the violation of the Specific Economic Crimes Act (fraud) and violation of the Capital Markets Act due to fraudulent unfair trading, for which the defendants were found not guilty
Since Article 308 of the Criminal Procedure Act provides for the principle of free evaluation of evidence, under which the probative value of evidence is to be determined by the free judgment of the judge, even if there is considerable room to view the court below's determination of the probative value of evidence and its selection of evidence differently, this alone does not immediately amount to a violation of statute as defined in Article 383(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act as a ground of appeal, so long as the court below's determination does not exceed the limits of the principle of free evaluation of evidence based on the rules of logic and experience (see Supreme Court Decision 2007Do1755, decided May 29, 2008).
The court below, considering the circumstances set forth in its judgment as a whole, upheld the judgment of the court of first instance, which found not guilty, on the ground that there was no proof of the charges, the portions concerning violation of the Specific Economic Crimes Act (fraud) as to Defendant 1 relating to Serial Nos. 1 through 30 in the crime list (2) of the judgment of the court of first instance, Serial Nos. 1 through 14 in crime list (3), and crime list (4), and the portions concerning violation of the Capital Markets Act due to fraudulent unfair trading as to Serial Nos. 1 and 2 in crime list (5) and Serial Nos. 1 through 4 in crime list (6-1), and the portions concerning violation of the Capital Markets Act due to fraudulent unfair trading as to the defendants relating to crime list (6-2). Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the record, although there are some inadequate points in the reasoning of the court below, the conclusion that the evidence of guilt is insufficient is justified, and there is no illegality therein, such as a misapprehension of facts by exceeding the limits of the principle of free evaluation of evidence in violation of logic and rules of experience, as argued in the grounds of appeal.
2) Argument concerning refinancing and extension of maturity in the loan-related fraud portion
Since obtaining a deferral of debt performance also constitutes a pecuniary advantage (see Supreme Court Decision 97Do1095, decided July 25, 1997), the crime of fraud may be established in respect of obtaining a deferral of debt performance; however, since the amount of pecuniary advantage from obtaining such a deferral cannot be calculated, it should not be aggregated when calculating the amount of profit under Article 3(1)(2) of the Specific Economic Crimes Act (see Supreme Court Decision 98Do3282, decided December 9, 1998, etc.).
The court below, for the reasons stated in its judgment, determined that the criminal facts set forth in Serial Nos. 7, 14, 20, and 24 of crime list (2), Serial Nos. 3 and 6 of crime list (3), and crime list (4) of the judgment of the court of first instance all constitute mere refinancing or extension of maturity, in which the loan agreements, letter of credit guarantee agreements, or advance payment refund guarantee agreements with the victims had been entered into before Defendant 2's respective accounting fraud offenses set forth in the judgment, and only the maturity had been extended, such that although the crime of fraud in obtaining a deferral of debt performance may be established, the resulting amount of pecuniary advantage cannot be calculated, and therefore should not be aggregated into the amount of profit under Article 3(1) of the Specific Economic Crimes Act. It then determined that this part of the charges of violation of the Specific Economic Crimes Act (fraud) constitutes a case where there is no proof of the crime and found it not guilty, applying instead simple fraud only with respect to victim ○○ Bank and victim Korea Finance Corporation.
Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the record, the above judgment of the court below is in accordance with the legal principles set forth above, and there is no illegality therein, such as a misapprehension of legal principles concerning the establishment of the crime of fraud and the calculation of the amount of profit under Article 3(1) of the Specific Economic Crimes Act, as argued in the grounds of appeal.
3. Regarding the portion concerning violation of the Specific Economic Crimes Act (breach of trust) due to the improper payment of performance bonuses, etc. related to accounting fraud
A. The portion of Defendant 1's Ground of Appeal No. 5 concerning criminal intent for occupational breach of trust, and Ground of Appeal No. 8
The criminal intent for occupational breach of trust is established when a person who, in the course of business, handles the affairs of another combines the intention of causing pecuniary damage to the principal and thereby obtaining pecuniary gain for oneself or a third party, with the recognition that the causing of such gain and loss is contrary to one's duty. Even in determining whether an executive had the criminal intent and the intention of illegal gain in relation to a business judgment, the criminal intent for breach of trust should be recognized only where it is found, considering various circumstances such as the background and motive leading to the business judgment in question, the content of the business subject to the judgment, the economic situation faced by the enterprise, and the probability of loss occurring and the probability of gain being obtained, that the act was an intentional act done with the recognition that oneself or a third party would obtain pecuniary gain and that damage would be caused to the principal; and liability should not be imposed merely on the ground that damage resulted to the principal without such recognition, or on the ground that there was merely negligence in the form of a failure to exercise due care (see Supreme Court Decision 2007Do6075, decided November 15, 2007, etc.). On the other hand, an act in breach of duty as referred to in the crime of breach of trust means any act that betrays the relationship of trust with the principal by failing to perform an act that is naturally expected to be performed, or by performing an act that is naturally expected not to be performed, under the statutory provisions, the terms of the contract, or the principle of good faith, in light of the specific circumstances such as the content and nature of the affairs being handled. Therefore, even taking into full account all of the above circumstances concerning an executive's business judgment, if the executive obtained pecuniary gain, or caused a third party to obtain such gain, and caused damage to the principal, by failing to perform an act that is naturally expected to be performed, or by performing an act that is naturally expected not to be performed, under the statutory provisions, the terms of the contract, or the principle of good faith, given the specific circumstances and the executive's own role and position, then criminal intent or the intention of illegal gain in that regard is recognized (see Supreme Court Decision 2009Do14464, decided October 27, 2011; Supreme Court Decision 2012Do10629, decided January 24, 2013, etc.).
The court below, for the following reasons, determined that Defendant 1's act of paying performance bonuses constitutes an act in breach of duty, and rejected the said defendant's argument in the grounds of appeal disputing this. (1) The provisions concerning the limits on and amounts of performance bonuses to be paid by position to executives, included in the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) entered into between Nonindicted Company 1 and the Korea Development Bank, have the nature of internal regulations relating to the payment of remuneration to Nonindicted Company 1's executives. However, despite the fact that the above regulations expressly provide that no performance bonus is to be paid if a deficit occurs, Defendant 1, in a situation where a deficit had occurred, committed accounting fraud to make it appear as if there were a surplus, and, using the falsely prepared and disclosed financial statements, obtained from the Korea Development Bank an evaluation result sufficient to permit the receipt of performance bonuses, and then paid performance bonuses to executives, including himself. Despite the fact that the collective agreement entered into between Nonindicted Company 1 and its labor union provides that employee performance bonuses are to be paid only where the management goals reported to the board of directors at the beginning of each year are achieved, Defendant 1, in a situation where a deficit had occurred, committed accounting fraud to make it appear as if there were a surplus, and, using the falsely prepared and disclosed financial statements, pretended that the management goals under the collective agreement had been achieved, as if the condition for employees to receive performance bonuses had been met, and paid performance bonuses to the employees. (2) Defendant 1's above act of paying performance bonuses is an act in breach of duty, improperly carried out in violation of the conditions for paying performance bonuses based on accounting fraud, and the criminal intent for occupational breach of trust and the intention of illegal acquisition are recognized, and it is difficult to view such payment of performance bonuses, regardless of the occurrence of a deficit or whether management goals were achieved, as having been made pursuant to a business judgment.
The grounds of appeal disputing the fact-finding of the court below are, in substance, nothing more than a complaint against the court below's selection of evidence and determination of probative value, which are matters within the free evaluation of the court of fact-finding, or are merely premised on facts different from those found by the court below. Furthermore, examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the lawfully adopted evidence, the above judgment of the court below appears to be based on the legal principles set forth above, and there is no illegality therein, such as a misapprehension of legal principles concerning criminal intent for occupational breach of trust, acts in breach of duty, or business judgment, or a misapprehension of facts by exceeding the limits of the principle of free evaluation of evidence in violation of logic and rules of experience, as argued in the grounds of appeal.
B. The Prosecutor's Grounds of Appeal
The court below, considering the circumstances set forth in its judgment as a whole, determined that there was insufficient proof of this part of the charges—that Defendant 1, using the falsely prepared and disclosed financial statements, obtained from the Korea Development Bank an evaluation result permitting the receipt of executive performance bonuses, or pretended that the management goals under the collective agreement had been achieved so that the condition for employees to receive performance bonuses had been met, and thereby caused executives and employees to obtain pecuniary gain and caused damage to victim Nonindicted Company 1, by paying performance bonuses to executives around May 7, 2013 and to employees on seven occasions from July 31, 2012 to December 31, 2014—and upheld the judgment of the court of first instance, which had found this not guilty.
Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the record, although there are some inadequate points in the reasoning of the court below, the conclusion that the evidence of guilt is insufficient can be affirmed, and there is no illegality therein, such as a misapprehension of legal principles concerning the requirements for establishing the crime of occupational breach of trust, or a misapprehension of facts by exceeding the limits of the principle of free evaluation of evidence in violation of logic and rules of experience, as argued in the grounds of appeal.
4. Regarding the Prosecutor's Argument of Omission of Judgment
Under the principle of no adjudication without accusation, a court may not adjudicate a matter without the prosecutor's filing of an accusation, and the court must adjudicate only within the case prosecuted by the prosecutor (see Supreme Court Decision 2001Do5304, decided December 27, 2001).
The court below, considering the circumstances set forth in its judgment as a whole, determined that, as to this part of the charges—that "the defendants, in conspiracy, obtained unjust profit on April 1 and April 2, 2013, by using unfair means such as accounting fraud and manipulation of credit ratings in connection with the trading or other transactions of financial investment instruments"—since the prosecutor prosecuted this solely as an act of violation of the Capital Markets Act due to fraudulent unfair trading, the court could not adjudicate on the crime of violation of the Specific Economic Crimes Act (fraud). Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the record, there is no illegality of omission of judgment in the court below as argued in the grounds of appeal.
5. Regarding the Remainder of the Defendants' Appeals
The Defendants stated in their petition for appeal that they were dissatisfied with the entirety of the lower court's judgment; however, since the Defendants have no right of appeal with respect to the not-guilty portion of the lower court's judgment, the appeal as to this portion is unlawful (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 93Do1091, decided July 29, 1994).
6. As to the Prosecutor's Remaining Appeal
The Prosecutor stated in the petition for appeal that he was dissatisfied with the entirety of the lower court's judgment; however, the Prosecutor did not state, either in the petition for appeal or in the appellate brief, any grounds of appeal concerning the guilty portion of the lower court's judgment.
7. Conclusion
Therefore, all of the appeals are dismissed, and it is so ordered by the unanimous opinion of the participating Justices as set forth in the Order.
Justices Kim Yong-deok (Presiding Justice), Kim Shin, Park Sang-ok (Justice in Charge), Park Jeong-hwa