[Plaintiff, Appellee] Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd. (Attorneys Yoo Kyung-hee and 1 other of Hanmi Joint Law Office, Attorneys-in-fact)
[Defendants, Appellants] Defendant 1 and 2 others (Attorney Lee Jung-ho, Counsel)
[Judgment Below] Seoul High Court Decision 90Na38636 rendered on June 21, 1991
[Order]
All appeals are dismissed.
The costs of the appeal shall be borne by the Defendants.
[Reasoning]
The Court judges together on Grounds of Appeal 1 through 4 of the Defendants' litigation counsel (including, to the extent it supplements the grounds of appeal, the supplementary grounds of appeal stated in the supplementary brief on grounds of appeal submitted after the period for submitting the grounds of appeal had expired).
The court below found the following facts: The Plaintiff company is a company established for the purpose of the domestic and international passenger and cargo air transport business, and while it owns numerous aircraft of various models for its business activities, it conducts various types and contents of education and training in order to have its employees acquire the knowledge and skills necessary for the operation and maintenance of aircraft, for the smooth performance of its business. According to the Plaintiff company's employment rules, education and training regulations, and detailed rules on management of entrusted education, which provide for matters concerning the above education and training, for employees who complete entrusted education and training conducted by the Plaintiff company (or, in the case of flight crew members, all education and training), the education and training expenses are first borne by the Plaintiff company by way of a loan to the employee, to be repaid later; employees who have completed entrusted education and training (including in-house education excluding on-the-job training) are obligated to remain employed at the Plaintiff company for a certain period from the date of completion of the relevant education, and if they resign without unavoidable cause before that period has elapsed, they are required to refund the education and training expenses calculated in proportion to the ratio of the remaining mandatory service period to the total mandatory service period. As for the persons subject to education and training: in the case of flight crew members such as captains and co-pilots, the Plaintiff company's Flight Crew Qualification Review Committee selects personnel for promotion/transition training—such as promotion from co-pilot to captain, or transition from a lower aircraft type to a higher aircraft type—using career, qualifications, training performance, whether they have received safety commendations, work performance, etc. as selection criteria; and in the case of maintenance technicians, those with excellent work performance, etc. are selected as candidates for entrusted education. Once persons subject to education and training are selected, the fact of selection is individually notified to the selected candidates, and unless there is a particular expression of objection, a personnel order is issued for them to receive the education and training (in the case of flight crew members, a separate training personnel order is issued prior to the education and training order). Once a person selected as a trainee in the above manner completes the education and training, this results in promotion or transition to a higher aircraft type, which is connected not only to promotion and salary increase but also serves as a mark of recognition of the person's ability, and for this reason, the Plaintiff company's employees aspire to be selected as trainees. The Defendants, while employed at the Plaintiff company, were selected as trainees in the above manner and received entrusted education and in-house education on the condition of complying with the provisions of the education and training regulations and the detailed rules on management of entrusted education. The contents of the education and training were: (i) maintenance education necessary for the operation of flight simulators newly introduced by the Plaintiff company from abroad; (ii) training necessary to be promoted from co-pilot to captain of the F27 aircraft type; (iii) aircraft type transition training to become captain of a higher aircraft type; (iv) training necessary to become a co-pilot from a trainee pilot; and (v) aircraft type transition training to become a co-pilot of a higher aircraft type introduced by the Plaintiff company from abroad. Prior to receiving each of the above entrusted education programs, the Defendants each submitted an application for loan of education and training expenses, a promissory note, and a written pledge, as prescribed by the detailed rules on management of entrusted education. The Defendants resigned before the mandatory service period had elapsed after completing each of the above education programs. Having found the above facts, and after judging the Defendants' arguments as set forth below, the court below held that since the Defendants, having each completed the above education and training pursuant to the Plaintiff company's employment rules, education and training regulations, and detailed rules on management of entrusted education, were required to work at the Plaintiff company during the mandatory service period, but resigned before that period had elapsed, absent other special circumstances, they are liable to repay a portion of the education and training expenses to the Plaintiff in accordance with the Plaintiff company's employment rules, education and training regulations, and detailed rules on management of entrusted education.
That is: (1) First, the Defendants argue that the education and training in this case all constitute vocational training under the Basic Act on Vocational Training (직업훈련기본법), and that under Article 13 of the same Act, expenses necessary for vocational training are to be borne by the person conducting the vocational training; further, that the education and training in this case were implemented by the Plaintiff company unilaterally issuing education orders regardless of the Defendants' wishes, due to the Plaintiff's business needs, and that the expenses incurred thereby should be considered necessary expenses to be borne by the Plaintiff company; and that, under the Aviation Act (항공법) and the Plaintiff company's flight operation regulations, maintenance regulations, and training review rules enacted thereunder, the Plaintiff company bears a public duty to provide the Defendants with certain education and training such as that at issue in this case, and thus the expenses thereof should be considered expenses for performing a public duty; and that, in light of the foregoing, since the education and training expenses in this case are, in any view, of a nature that should be borne by the Plaintiff, the act of shifting this burden onto the Defendants by invoking the above education and training regulations, etc., is void as an act contrary to public order. However, in light of the purport of Articles 1, 2, 5, 8, and 9 of the Basic Act on Vocational Training, "vocational training" as referred to in the said Act refers to training conducted for the purpose of improving the status of workers and contributing to the development of the national economy, whereby the Minister of Labor establishes a basic plan to train skilled workers, supervisors, managers, office/service workers, and vocational training instructors, and sets standards concerning the content of training courses, the qualifications of trainees by course, curricula, facilities, etc., in order to enable workers to acquire and improve the job performance ability necessary for their occupation; this does not include training such as that at issue in this case, which requires a high degree of specialized expertise and involves entrustment to specialized educational institutions located abroad at a cost of a large amount of training expenses. Furthermore, according to Articles 22, 24, 25, and 26 of the Aviation Act, the Minister of Transportation issues skill certifications to aviation personnel, and in issuing skill certifications for the qualifications of aviation personnel such as the Defendants, who are transport pilots or aircraft maintenance technicians, the certification may be limited to a particular type, class, or model of aircraft; a person without such a skill certification may not, or is restricted from, engaging in aviation duties; and in order to obtain a skill certification, one must pass the prescribed written and practical examinations. Furthermore, according to Article 5, Paragraph 3 of the Plaintiff company's training review rules and Article 12-5-5 of the maintenance regulations, when a flight crew member wishes to fly after transitioning to a different aircraft type, training necessary for such transition flight shall be provided, and when a new aircraft type is introduced, education necessary for operating the relevant aircraft type shall be provided to aircraft maintenance technicians. Although each education and training program in this case was implemented in order to have the Defendants acquire the appropriate skill certification as the Plaintiff company introduced a new aircraft type or transitioned the aircraft type flown by the Defendants, on the other hand, each of the above education and training programs is different in nature from the periodic training and periodic review that aviation personnel such as the Defendants must receive in order to continue maintaining their existing qualifications (the expenses for such periodic training, etc. are borne by the Plaintiff company); the Defendants not only obtained benefits such as promotion and salary increase by receiving promotion and aircraft type transition training such as that at issue in this case, but also, through this, gained the advantage of increasing the value of their own labor by acquiring multiple skill certifications, and for this reason, the Defendants raised no objection whatsoever to the education orders in this case and, moreover, preferred to receive such education; and while, if the Defendants did not receive each of the above training programs and thus did not acquire the necessary skill certification, the Plaintiff would not be able to promote them or transition their aircraft type, the Plaintiff could address this by hiring persons who have undergone such training and possess the necessary skill certification. In light of the foregoing, it cannot be said that the expenses incurred for each of the above training programs are necessary expenses to be entirely borne by the Plaintiff company, nor can it be said that, beyond the Plaintiff company's duty not to employ unqualified persons, the Plaintiff company bears a duty to provide the prescribed education in order to employ such persons. Therefore, the Defendants' above argument, premised on the assumption that the education and training in this case constitutes vocational training under the Basic Act on Vocational Training, that its implementation is a public duty of the Plaintiff, and that the expenses thereof are necessary expenses of the Plaintiff company, is without merit; and
(2) Next, the Defendants argue that the Plaintiff company's provision, in connection with the implementation of the education in this case pursuant to the education and training regulations and the detailed rules on management of entrusted education, that the education and training expenses would be lent to the Defendants, while setting a mandatory service period and requiring repayment of the loaned expenses if the Defendants resign within that period, violates the mandatory provisions of Articles 6, 21, 24, and 25 of the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법) and is void, and also violates Article 17 of the Basic Act on Vocational Training, which provides that even a person who has completed training for the development of skills is only required to work for a period equivalent to twice the training period, and is thus void; and that even if it does not directly violate the above provisions, it was devised as a means to evade them and is thus void as an act in circumvention of the law. However, the purport of Articles 21 and 24 of the Labor Standards Act is to prevent the restriction of a worker's freedom to resign so as to compel continued labor; and considering that the purpose of an enterprise such as the Plaintiff company bearing and disbursing expenses to dispatch employees abroad for various types of education and training is to make use of the knowledge and skills acquired by the employee who has completed the education and training for the benefit of the enterprise upon return, and that there is a need, for this purpose, to have the employee work for a certain period, the provisions of the Plaintiff company's education and training regulations and detailed rules on management of entrusted education—whereby, if an employee who has completed entrusted education and training does not work at the Plaintiff company for at least a certain mandatory service period from the date of completion of the education, the employee must repay all or part of the relevant education expenses first borne by the Plaintiff company, but such repayment is waived if the employee works during the said mandatory service period—cannot be considered an agreement for a penalty or predetermined damages prohibited under Article 24 of the Labor Standards Act. Furthermore, it is reasonable to view the above mandatory service period not as a labor contract period referred to in Article 21 of the Labor Standards Act, but as a period fixing the waiver of the obligation to repay education expenses; therefore, such regulations or detailed rules cannot be said to violate Articles 21 and 24 of the Labor Standards Act. It is also clear that the content of the above provisions does not constitute forcing labor against the worker's free will by means of unjustly restraining the worker's mental or physical freedom, as prohibited under Article 6 of the Labor Standards Act, nor does it constitute an agreement to offset wages against an advance loan claim conditioned on future labor, such as an advance payment or other advance, as prohibited under Article 25 of the same Act. Moreover, as discussed above, since the education and training in this case does not constitute vocational training under the Basic Act on Vocational Training, it cannot be said that the above mandatory service period violates Article 17 of the same Act merely because it exceeds the period set forth in that Article; and there is no evidence whatsoever suggesting that the above regulations, etc. were devised as a means to evade the Labor Standards Act or the Basic Act on Vocational Training. Therefore, the Defendants' above argument is likewise without merit; and
(3) Furthermore, the Defendants argue that the above written pledge, application for loan, and promissory note were prepared under the Plaintiff's coercion, at a time when the Defendants were extremely busy, pressed for time before departure, mistakenly believing that the Plaintiff was actually disbursing the education and training expenses, without knowing that the foreign educational institution was providing the education and training free of charge and that the implementation of such education and training was in fact the Plaintiff's own public duty owed to the State; and that these documents are therefore void as an unfair juristic act, or alternatively, are declarations of intent made by mistake, or induced by fraud or duress, which the Defendants rescind. However, there is no evidence to substantiate this; furthermore, at least in this case, the training and education expenses, business travel expenses, lodging expenses, airfare, etc., for which the Defendants are found liable for repayment, were actually disbursed or borne by the Plaintiff company, and, as discussed above, the implementation of such education and training was not a duty of the Plaintiff. Therefore, the above argument, which is premised on facts contrary thereto, is also without merit.
In light of the relevant evidence, the record, and the content of the relevant statutory provisions, the above factual findings and judgment of the court below are found to be justified and are accepted, and it cannot be said that the judgment below, as argued in the grounds of appeal, contains an illegality of erroneously finding facts in violation of the rules of evidence due to inadequate examination, or an illegality of misunderstanding the legal principles concerning the Aviation Act, Articles 103 and 104 of the Civil Act, Article 24 of the Labor Standards Act, Article 17 of the Vocational Training Act, or the rescission of a declaration of intent due to fraud or mistake.
The arguments all amount to no more than criticizing the court below's selection and weighing of evidence and its fact-finding, which fall within the exclusive authority of the court below, or disparaging the court below's justified judgment on the premise of facts contrary to those found by the court below, and thus cannot be accepted.
Therefore, all of the Defendants' appeals are dismissed, and the costs of the appeal are to be borne by the Defendants, the losing parties. This judgment is rendered as set forth in the Order, with the unanimous concurrence of the participating Justices.
Presiding Justice Yoon Kwan, Justice Choi Jae-ho, Justice Kim Ju-han, Justice Kim Yong-jun