[Plaintiff, Appellant] Plaintiff (Attorney Jang Sun-jae, Counsel for the Plaintiff)
[Defendant, Appellee] Defendant (Attorneys Park Kyung-hwan and 1 other, Counsel for the Defendant)
[Judgment Below] Daegu Family Court Decision 2012Reu754 dated January 11, 2013
[Order]
The appeal is dismissed. The costs of the appeal are to be borne by the Plaintiff.
[Reasoning]
The grounds of appeal (including the contents of the plaintiff's preparatory briefs submitted after the period for submitting the grounds of appeal had expired, to the extent they supplement the grounds of appeal) are examined as follows.
1. A. Marriage is a status-based contract that constitutes the substance of a married couple with the purpose of lifelong communal living, and its essence lies in a personal union based on affection and trust. Spouses have a duty to live together and to support and cooperate with each other (Article 826(1) of the Civil Act (민법)). This is what is required by the essence of marriage; in conducting married life, spouses must understand and protect each other with affection, good faith, and patience, and must make their best efforts to maintain the marriage. Even when they face various obstacles during married life, they must make every effort to overcome such obstacles, and must not engage in conduct that causes the breakdown of the marriage merely because of circumstances that temporarily impede harmony between the spouses (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 97Meu612 delivered on February 12, 1999).
B. Marriage is dissolved by divorce. Spouses may divorce by agreement (Article 834 of the Civil Act), and either spouse may petition the family court for divorce where grounds prescribed by law exist (Article 840 of the Civil Act). Article 840 of the Civil Act specifically and individually enumerates, in items 1 through 5, grounds constituting causes for judicial divorce, such as "where the spouse has committed an unchaste act," and additionally provides, in item 6, "where there exists any other serious cause making it difficult to continue the marriage" (hereinafter "Item 6 cause for divorce") as a ground for divorce. As to the meaning of the Item 6 cause for divorce, Supreme Court precedent has interpreted it to mean a case where the marital communal relationship corresponding to the essence of marriage has broken down to an irrecoverable degree, and forcing the continuation of the marriage would constitute unbearable suffering for one spouse (see Supreme Court Decision 90Meu1067 delivered on July 9, 1991; Supreme Court Decision 2007Meu1690 delivered on December 14, 2007; Supreme Court Decision 2009Meu2130 delivered on December 24, 2009, etc.).
C. Looking at the legislative examples of various countries regarding the divorce system, they can be broadly divided into the so-called "fault principle" (유책주의), which recognizes a right to petition for judicial divorce only in the other spouse where there is a clear cause for divorce, such as where one spouse has committed an act in violation of marital duties such as cohabitation, support, cooperation, or fidelity; and the so-called "breakdown principle" (파탄주의), which permits divorce on the ground of breakdown—an objective circumstance in which the purpose of the marriage can no longer be achieved—regardless of which spouse is at fault.
Since Article 36(1) of our Constitution (헌법) provides that "marriage and family life shall be established and maintained on the basis of individual dignity and equality of the sexes, and the State shall guarantee this," individual dignity and equality of the sexes serve as guiding principles not only for the effect of marriage but also for the evaluation and determination of grounds for judicial divorce. Accordingly, in operating the system of judicial divorce prescribed in Article 840 of the Civil Act, courts must, with individual dignity and equality of the sexes as guiding principles, closely examine Korea's socio-economic realities, the people's universal sense of morality, and legislative trends in various countries, and, while reconciling conflicting legal interests, maintain a consistent legal policy so as not to cause unnecessary confusion in the people's legal life.
2. A. The Supreme Court has long interpreted Article 840 of the Civil Act concerning grounds for judicial divorce as adopting, in principle, the fault principle. Accordingly, even where the causes for divorce under items 1 through 5 of Article 840 of the Civil Act are found to exist, if, viewed as a whole, the primary responsibility for the breakdown of the marriage lies with the other spouse rather than the spouse who caused the ground for divorce, that other spouse cannot claim divorce based on such ground for divorce (see Supreme Court Decision 92Meu1078 delivered on April 23, 1993, etc.). Also with respect to the Item 6 cause for divorce, it has been confirmed as a principle that the spouse who is primarily responsible for the breakdown of the marriage cannot claim divorce on the ground of that breakdown (see Supreme Court Decision 65Meu37 delivered on September 21, 1965; Supreme Court Decision 71Meu41 delivered on March 23, 1971; Supreme Court Decision 86Meu28 delivered on April 14, 1987; Supreme Court Decision 90Meu95 delivered on April 27, 1990; Supreme Court Decision 92Meu990 delivered on March 9, 1993, etc.).
However, with respect to the Item 6 cause for divorce, the Supreme Court has also taken the view that recognizing the right to claim judicial divorce in a spouse who has brought about the breakdown of the marriage would be fundamentally contrary to the morality demanded by the marriage system and would lead to the unjust result of condoning divorce, or in effect, expulsion divorce, at the unilateral will of one spouse; this is only intended to prevent divorce against the will of the other spouse who, despite the breakdown of the marriage, does not wish to divorce, and is not intended to force the continuation of a broken marriage even in cases where it is objectively clear that the other spouse also has no intention of continuing the marriage. Thus, where the other spouse has also filed a counterclaim for divorce, or where, although outwardly refusing divorce solely out of spite or vindictive feelings, the other spouse in fact engages in conduct wholly incompatible with the continuation of the marriage such that the intention to divorce is objectively clear, it is proper to grant even the divorce claim of a spouse who bears entire responsibility for the breakdown of the marriage; and to refuse divorce and force the continuation of the marriage even in such cases would merely assist in the private retaliation against the at-fault spouse under the pretext that a marital relationship which neither party any longer intends to continue is formally still ongoing, and such a result cannot be condoned—this is the position the Supreme Court has taken (see the above-cited Supreme Court Decision 86Meu28, Supreme Court Decision 2009Meu2130, as well as Supreme Court Decision 91Meu177, 184 delivered on November 26, 1993; Supreme Court Decision 97Meu155 delivered on May 16, 1997, etc.).
B. Regarding this position taken in Supreme Court precedent, there has emerged an argument that the precedent should now be changed, in the direction of permitting even a divorce claim by the at-fault spouse in accordance with the original legislative intent, when interpreting the Item 6 cause for divorce as well, in consideration of: the fact that the legislation of various countries with legal systems similar to ours has already shifted from the fault principle to the breakdown principle; the fact that, where the marital communal relationship has broken down to a degree from which it cannot possibly recover, the marriage is nothing but a mere formality and divorce is inevitable, yet forcing the at-fault spouse to continue to maintain the marital relationship has an aspect of infringing upon individual dignity and the right to pursue happiness; the fact that, until the mid-1960s when precedent rejecting the at-fault spouse's divorce claim was formed, or until the late 1980s when that precedent became firmly established, there was no system of division of property or visitation rights under the Civil Act, but thereafter the Civil Act was amended to grant divorced parties the right to claim division of property and visitation rights, and custody and parental authority over children have also come to be guaranteed equally between men and women without discrimination; and the fact that, as our society has developed economically, it has changed into a society that values the individual over the family, women's participation in society has increased, and moreover, since the mid-1990s the divorce rate has surged sharply, greatly changing the public's perception of divorce. We examine this argument below.
C. It appears that the reasons the Supreme Court has traditionally not permitted the divorce claim of an at-fault spouse include, together with the general logic that it is contrary to good faith for a person who has caused the breakdown of a marriage to claim divorce on that ground, the fact that, as women's social and economic status is relatively inferior to that of men, if the divorce claims of at-fault spouses were to be broadly permitted, there is a great risk that a female spouse not responsible for the breakdown, in particular, would suffer unilateral disadvantage, such as great difficulty in supporting herself or raising children after divorce; thus there is an intention to protect the female spouse by disallowing the divorce claim of the at-fault male spouse. From this perspective, in order for the Supreme Court to change the interpretation of the law it has traditionally taken, there must be a deep examination of whether there has been a meaningful change in the overall legal system relating to divorce and in the socio-economic circumstances that formed the background of the traditional Supreme Court precedent, as of the present time.
First, the divorce systems of various countries that have adopted the breakdown principle regarding divorce, unlike our country, recognize only judicial divorce and do not recognize divorce by agreement. In our country, even an at-fault spouse has the avenue of divorcing through agreement with the other spouse, and in fact, as of 2014, approximately 77.7% of all divorces are divorces by agreement. This means that even an at-fault spouse has a means of obtaining a divorce by persuading the other party through sincere feelings and sufficient compensation, and therefore there is no inevitable reason to introduce the breakdown principle even with respect to grounds for judicial divorce for the sake of the at-fault spouse's right to pursue happiness.
Second, it is true that with the amendment of the Civil Act on January 13, 1990, granting parties the right to claim division of property and visitation rights upon divorce, there was an improvement in the legal status of divorced women. However, in countries that have adopted breakdown-principle legislation, they have specifically and in detail regulated the limits of the breakdown principle by establishing so-called "hardship clauses," under which divorce is not permitted where there exist special circumstances making it necessary to maintain the marital relationship for the benefit of minor children even where the marriage has broken down, or where divorce would result in extremely harsh consequences for the party who does not consent to the divorce; and moreover, even where divorce is permitted, it is generally the case that systems such as post-divorce support or compensatory payment systems are established, imposing on the at-fault spouse a support-related responsibility toward the other party after divorce. This is intended, on the one hand, to adopt the principle of the breakdown principle, while on the other hand, by establishing institutional safeguards to protect the at-fault spouse's counterpart or children, to prevent the unilateral sacrifice of the other party resulting from the implementation of the breakdown principle. In contrast, our country has no statutory provisions whatsoever concerning the limits or standards of the breakdown principle, or the support-related responsibility toward the other party after divorce. Of course, the courts could, through precedent, present some standard for the application of the breakdown principle, and could also develop practice in the direction of giving greater consideration to the other party in the operation of the systems of solatium or division of property; however, such judicial functions alone are far too insufficient and limited to protect the other party. Accordingly, at the present stage, where no legislative measures to protect the at-fault spouse's counterpart have been established, if the breakdown principle were adopted and the divorce claims of at-fault spouses broadly permitted, there is a great risk that the result would be that the other party is unilaterally sacrificed for the happiness of the at-fault spouse.
Third, while there can be various causes attributable to an at-fault spouse, the one that is realistically most problematic is forming a de facto marital-like adulterous relationship with a person other than one's spouse. Our country prohibits bigamy (Article 810 of the Civil Act), and a violation thereof may be grounds for a petition to rescind the marriage (Article 816(1) of the Civil Act), but there is no penal provision punishing this. Since the crime of adultery, which in effect functioned as a penal provision against bigamy, was abolished by the Constitutional Court's (헌법재판소) decision of unconstitutionality on February 26, 2015, it is indeed the case that there is no criminal sanction against bigamy. One of the intentions behind the Supreme Court precedent's disallowance of divorce claims by at-fault spouses was to prevent the expulsion divorce of the legal spouse placed in a bigamous relationship; and in light of the fact that many countries, while abolishing the crime of adultery, have instead enacted provisions punishing bigamy, there is a risk that, if the breakdown principle were introduced without any countermeasure in this regard, bigamy, which is prohibited by law, would in effect be recognized.
Fourth, even though the values of our society concerning family and married life have greatly changed and women's participation in society has significantly increased, it remains the reality that our society has not yet sufficiently achieved gender equality in all areas of the socio-economy, such as employment, wages, and child-rearing. Furthermore, even if it is true that the divorce rate has surged in our country and the public's perception of divorce has greatly changed, this can, paradoxically, be taken as evidence that the need for protection of marriage and family life has correspondingly grown greater; and the reality that there indisputably exist cases where a party suffers extreme mental distress or has difficulty maintaining a livelihood as a result of an at-fault spouse's divorce claim should not be disregarded.
D. Taking the above discussion together, it is difficult to accept, even considering the various grounds advanced, the argument that it would be correct to change the existing Supreme Court precedent, which in principle does not permit the divorce claim of an at-fault spouse with respect to the Item 6 cause for divorce.
However, as noted above, the reason the Supreme Court precedent does not permit the divorce claim of an at-fault spouse is to prevent results contrary to the morality demanded by the marriage system and contrary to the principle of good faith; therefore, even in light of the ideals pursued by the marriage system and the principle of good faith, in cases where the responsibility does not remain to a degree requiring the divorce claim to be rejected, such a spouse's divorce claim should be held permissible, since it poses no risk of hollowing out the marriage and family system and is not contrary to society's sense of morality and ethics.
Accordingly, just as the Supreme Court precedent has already permitted, in cases where the other spouse likewise has no intention of continuing the marriage, such that there is no concern of divorce, or in effect expulsion divorce, at the unilateral will of one party, and further, in cases where there exist special circumstances such that the fault of the at-fault spouse does not remain to a degree requiring the divorce claim to be rejected—such as where protection and consideration for the other spouse and the children have been provided to a degree offsetting the fault of the spouse claiming divorce, or where, with the passage of time, the fault of the at-fault spouse and the mental suffering of the other spouse, which were pronounced at the time of the marital breakdown, have gradually weakened to the point where it is no longer meaningful to strictly weigh the relative gravity of each party's responsibility—the divorce claim of the at-fault spouse may exceptionally be permitted. In determining whether the divorce claim of an at-fault spouse may exceptionally be permitted in this manner, the following should all be comprehensively considered: the nature and degree of the at-fault spouse's responsibility; the other spouse's intention to continue the marriage and feelings toward the at-fault spouse; the ages of the parties; the duration of the marriage and the specific circumstances of life after marriage; the period of separation; the living relationships formed after the spouses' separation; whether various circumstances have changed since the breakdown of the marriage; the mental, social, and economic condition of the other spouse and the degree of livelihood security if divorce is granted; the circumstances of the rearing, education, and welfare of minor children; and other various circumstances of the marital relationship.
3. According to the reasoning of the judgment below and of the first-instance judgment cited by the court below, as well as the record, the following facts may be recognized: ① the plaintiff and the defendant are a legally married couple who completed the marriage registration on March 9, 1976, and have three adult children between them; ② since around January 2000, the plaintiff has left home and has been cohabiting with a third party who gave birth to the plaintiff's daughter; ③ since the plaintiff left home, the defendant has raised the three children alone; ④ the defendant has no occupation and has maintained her livelihood on approximately KRW 1,000,000 per month received from the plaintiff as living expenses, but has not even received living expenses from the plaintiff since around January 2012; and ⑤ as of the closing of argument in the court below, the defendant, at an advanced age of over 63, is in poor health, having undergone gastric cancer surgery and being on thyroid medication, and has expressed attachment to her marital relationship with the plaintiff and an intention to continue the marriage.
Examining these facts in light of the legal principles set out above, the plaintiff is the at-fault spouse who bears the primary responsibility for the breakdown of the marriage, and even considering the various circumstances of the marital relationship comprehensively, it cannot be said that this is a case where it is objectively clear that the defendant has no intention of continuing the marriage and is merely refusing to consent to divorce out of spite or vindictive feelings, or a case in which there exist special circumstances such that the plaintiff's fault does not remain to a degree requiring the divorce claim to be rejected. Therefore, the plaintiff cannot claim divorce on the ground of that breakdown.
The measure of the court below, which, on the same reasoning, upheld the first-instance judgment dismissing the plaintiff's divorce claim, is justified, and there is no error therein, as alleged in the grounds of appeal, of exceeding the limits of the principle of free evaluation of evidence in violation of the rules of logic and experience, or of misapprehending the legal principles concerning the Item 6 cause for divorce or the judicial divorce claim of an at-fault spouse.
The Supreme Court decisions cited as grounds of appeal involve facts different from those of this case, and are therefore not appropriate to invoke in this case.
4. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of the appeal are to be borne by the losing party, and it is so decided as set forth in the Order. This Judgment has the dissenting opinion of Justices Min Il-young, Kim Yong-deok, Ko Young-han, Kim Chang-seok, Kim Shin, and Kim So-young; the opinions of the other Justices participating are unanimous.
5. The dissenting opinion of Justices Min Il-young, Kim Yong-deok, Ko Young-han, Kim Chang-seok, Kim Shin, and Kim So-young is as follows.
A. If the marital communal relationship has broken down to an irrecoverable degree, this means that married life can no longer be expected, and ultimately signifies a state in which the substance of the marriage has vanished and does not exist, leaving only the outward form of marriage. Where the recovery of married life is impossible and the substance of the marriage as a marital communal body contemplated by law has completely vanished, this constitutes, in substance, a state of divorce, and it is reasonable to confirm and settle the legal relationship accordingly. In recognizing divorce with respect to a marital communal relationship in such a state, one should be mindful that this merely confirms the nonexistence of the marital substance that has already vanished, and is not a matter of newly destroying and dissolving a marriage whose substance still remains and which has a possibility of being restored.
Therefore, although there may be various causes in the process leading to a state of breakdown of married life to an irrecoverable degree, and accordingly one or both parties may bear primary fault, once married life has reached a state of breakdown to an irrecoverable degree such that the substance of the marriage has vanished, such fault no longer has any bearing on the maintenance or restoration of the substance of the marriage, and therefore such fault cannot serve as the standard for determining the dissolution of the marriage. However, with respect to such fault, it is possible to hold the at-fault party accountable in a manner commensurate with the fault, and thereby also protect the other spouse, by fully reflecting the damages suffered by the other party and matters necessary for the protection of the other party in the liability for compensation arising from the divorce and in the division of property, etc.
Therefore, we cannot agree with the majority opinion that, while stating that the Item 6 cause for divorce refers to a case where the marital communal relationship has broken down to an irrecoverable degree and forcing the continuation of married life would constitute unbearable suffering for one spouse, nevertheless holds that the judicial divorce claim under the Item 6 cause for divorce should not be permitted merely because the claiming spouse bears primary responsibility for having caused such an irrecoverable state of breakdown; and the prior Supreme Court precedent to the same effect as the majority opinion should be changed.
Below, we present in detail the grounds supporting the propriety of this dissenting opinion.
B. When a person who has reached the age of marriageable capacity reaches an agreement to marry and completes marriage registration, the marriage is established (Article 807, Article 812(1), and Article 815(1) of the Civil Act). Marriage is a community united spiritually, physically, and economically, based on affection, with the purpose of lifelong communal living, and spouses have a duty to live together and to support and cooperate with each other (Article 826(1) of the Civil Act). Article 36(1) of the Constitution also protects the marriage system by providing that "marriage and family life shall be established and maintained on the basis of individual dignity and equality of the sexes, and the State shall guarantee this." Once a marriage is established, the spouses must comprehensively cooperate with each other with affection, good faith, and patience to understand and protect each other so that the marriage, as a marital communal life, is maintained, and even when they face various obstacles during married life, they must make their best efforts to overcome them. However, since there arise cases where spouses who have formed a communal life through marriage can no longer maintain the marriage due to various circumstances, the Civil Act provides, as methods for dissolving such a marriage, the systems of divorce by agreement (Article 834 of the Civil Act) and judicial divorce (Article 840 of the Civil Act).
Divorce by agreement takes effect upon registration after confirmation of the intent to divorce by the family court, and since there is no restriction on the grounds for such divorce, divorce is permitted so long as a genuine agreement on divorce is reached between the spouses.
On the other hand, judicial divorce is permitted where there exists a cause for judicial divorce prescribed in Article 840 of the Civil Act, and either spouse may petition the family court for judicial divorce without the other spouse's consent. The purpose of establishing a separate system of judicial divorce, in addition to the system of divorce by agreement, is to take into account the fact that there are cases in which dissolution of the marriage is unavoidable even though the spouses have not reached an agreement on divorce, and, within the scope not departing from the purpose of the constitutional institutional guarantee of marriage, to prescribe by law objective grounds for judicial divorce, while permitting divorce only when the family court determines through adjudication that such grounds exist.
Accordingly, Article 840 of the Civil Act individually enumerates, as causes for which judicial divorce may be claimed, the grounds from items 1 through 6; among these, the grounds in items 1 through 5—unchastity, malicious desertion, extremely unfair treatment, or the other party's unknown whereabouts for three years or more—all specifically prescribe grounds attributable to the party against whom divorce is claimed, whereas the Item 6 cause for divorce is prescribed abstractly and comprehensively as "where there exists any other serious cause making it difficult to continue the marriage."
C. The Supreme Court has heretofore interpreted the Item 6 cause for divorce, "where there exists any other serious cause making it difficult to continue the marriage," to mean a case where the marital communal relationship corresponding to the essence of marriage has broken down to an irrecoverable degree, and forcing the continuation of married life would constitute unbearable suffering for one spouse (see the above-cited Supreme Court Decision 90Meu1067, etc.).
Marriage not only serves as the basis for realizing human dignity and worth and pursuing happiness, but is also a major foundation for forming the family, the most fundamental social organization in social life, and therefore it is desirable that a marital relationship once formed be maintained. Nevertheless, where, due to causes such as a prolonged separation between spouses, the marital communal life has in substance broken down and no longer exists, and has objectively reached an irrecoverable degree, the substance of the marriage—whose essence is a marital communal life united spiritually, physically, and economically—must be regarded as having vanished. This is because, although the marriage has not been legally dissolved, so long as it is not possible to restore the marital relationship to the state before the breakdown and it is not possible to expect the restoration of affection and trust between the spouses or the performance of the duty of cohabitation, etc., the family formed on the basis of that marriage cannot perform its function as an organization realizing the dignity and worth of its members, the spouses and children.
Moreover, as spouses whose marriage is maintained only in outward form continue in a relationship of mutual conflict and antagonism over a prolonged period, this has a negative effect on the character formation and emotional development of the children, and there is also a risk that the ill feelings between the spouses toward each other will be passed on to the children as they are, leading even to the breakdown of the parent-child relationship.
Nevertheless, maintaining a marital relationship that exists only in outward form would be unreasonable, in that it would require both spouses to perform a marital communal life or duty of cohabitation, etc. that is actually impossible to perform, and forcing the continuation of such married life may constitute unbearable suffering for one spouse; therefore, such a case should be regarded as falling under the Item 6 cause for divorce, namely, a case where there exists a serious cause making it difficult to continue the marriage.
Since whether the marital communal relationship has broken down to an irrecoverable degree and forcing the continuation of married life would constitute unbearable suffering for one spouse is the standard for determining whether the Item 6 cause for divorce is met, it is necessary to carefully consider, together with the degree of the breakdown, the existence of an intention to continue the marriage, the existence of the parties' responsibility for the cause of the breakdown, the duration of the marriage, the existence and rearing of children, the ages of the parties, the security of livelihood after divorce, and other various circumstances relating to the marital relationship (see Supreme Court Decision 87Meu24 delivered on July 21, 1987, etc.), and to make a careful determination in light of the purpose of the Civil Act to protect marriage and family life and the constitutional spirit of guaranteeing the marriage system.
D. (1) Meanwhile, the Supreme Court has interpreted that, even where the marital relationship between spouses is found to have broken down irrecoverably as above, if the breakdown is due to a cause for which the spouse claiming divorce must bear entire or primary responsibility, or if the responsibility of the spouse claiming divorce is found to be heavier than that of the other spouse, the divorce claim of such at-fault spouse should not be granted; however, where there exist special circumstances such that it is objectively clear that the other party to the divorce claim has no intention of continuing the marriage since the breakdown but is merely outwardly refusing to consent to divorce out of spite or vindictive feelings, the right of the at-fault spouse to claim divorce may be recognized (see the above-cited Supreme Court Decisions 65Meu37, 86Meu28, 90Meu1067, etc.).
(2) The reason the Supreme Court has thus restricted the right of an at-fault spouse who bears primary responsibility for the breakdown of the marital relationship to claim divorce is that recognizing the right to claim judicial divorce in a person who has brought about the breakdown of the marriage would amount to recognizing a right to claim divorce in a person who has committed the wrong of intentionally destroying the marital relationship, which would be contrary to the morality demanded by the marriage system, and could lead to the unjust result of condoning divorce, or in effect, expulsion divorce, at the unilateral will of one spouse (see the above-cited Supreme Court Decisions 71Meu41, 86Meu28, etc.).
Moreover, considering the social atmosphere that views divorce as a pathological phenomenon, together with the circumstance that, women's social and economic status being relatively inferior, it is realistically difficult for a female spouse who has divorced without fault to achieve economic independence or engage in social activities after divorce, as well as the circumstance that there were insufficient systems or procedures to ensure that women would not suffer disadvantages regarding division of property, support, custody, etc. in the process of divorce, the purpose of protecting the female spouse, who is socially and economically the weaker party, formed the background of this restriction.
(3) However, as a result of not permitting judicial divorce on the ground that the divorce claim is that of the primarily at-fault spouse, spouses have had no choice but to highlight the other party's fault in order to win, and consequently, in divorce litigation proceedings, both spouses have exposed conflicts and antagonisms arising during married life and engaged in disputes over responsibility for them, and have poured out criticism and ill feelings toward each other, making the marital relationship even more hostile; and there has been the evil of the hearing in divorce litigation focusing solely on exposing past wrongs, resulting in relative neglect of seeking rational solutions regarding the resolution of conflicts arising in the course of divorce, or life after divorce, or the rearing and welfare of children, etc.
Furthermore, the circumstances leading to the breakdown of married life are generally complex and subtle, and there are many cases in which it cannot be determined that responsibility lies solely with one party; and even where the primary responsibility for the breakdown lies with the spouse claiming judicial divorce, as noted above, if the marital communal relationship has already broken down to an irrecoverable degree, it is difficult to deny that the substance of the marriage, whose essence is marital communal life, has objectively vanished. Moreover, as the majority opinion itself recognizes, as the state of irrecoverable breakdown of the marital communal relationship becomes prolonged, the primary fault of the responsible spouse may also weaken, and as the cause of the prolonged state of breakdown or other various circumstances change, the legal and social significance of strictly weighing the relative gravity of responsibility may be significantly diminished, and it may become difficult or inappropriate to render a definitive determination on the relative gravity of each party's responsibility (see the above-cited Supreme Court Decision 2009Meu2130).
(4) In addition, with rapid economic growth and individual-centered social change, the social perception of divorce has changed and divorce, including divorce by agreement, has increased; along with this, there has arisen a change in values such that, where there exists an important cause making it impossible to continue married life, divorce is also acceptable for the pursuit of a better quality of life; and as women's participation in society has become more active, there has been an increase in cases in which women have economic capacity not inferior to that of men, resulting in substantial improvement in the socio-economic conditions for women's self-support after divorce. Moreover, the Civil Act, as amended by Act No. 4199 on January 13, 1990 and effective from January 1, 1991, reflecting the constitutional spirit emphasizing the principle of gender equality in family life, newly established systems recognizing the right of divorced parties to claim division of property and visitation rights with children, and guaranteed custody and parental authority over children equally between men and women without discrimination. Furthermore, in actual property division cases, the proportion of property division recognized for female spouses has gradually increased, with a considerable number of cases reaching an approximately equal proportion, and protection for female spouses has continuously expanded in divorce litigation practice. Although the Civil Act does not recognize a duty of support between spouses after divorce, it instead recognizes a right to claim damages arising from judicial divorce (Article 843 and Article 806 of the Civil Act), which is generally not recognized under legal systems that have introduced a post-divorce support system; and pursuant to Supreme Court precedent holding that, in property division cases, not only the liquidation of property relations formed during the marriage but also support-related factors, such as consideration for the parties' living security after divorce, are also to be taken into account (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 2010Meu4071, 4088 delivered on June 20, 2013, etc.), the scope of property division is determined in practice reflecting the need for support after divorce. Moreover, in Supreme Court en banc Decision 2012Meu2888 delivered on July 16, 2014, it was held that already-accrued retirement pension rights are included as subject matter of property division, and it was permitted for property division to be effected in the manner of periodically paying to the other spouse an amount corresponding to a certain proportion of the monthly retirement pension received by the spouse entitled to the pension; accordingly, ensuring life security or support after divorce through the periodic payment of property division amounts has also become practically possible.
Taking together such changes in the general social perception of divorce, the socio-economic environment, as well as changes in divorce legislation and practice, the need to restrict a judicial divorce claim under the Item 6 cause for divorce merely on the ground that it is the divorce claim of an at-fault spouse, as in the prior Supreme Court precedent, has considerably diminished; rather, the time has come to reflect these circumstances and establish new, rational standards for determining whether divorce should be granted under the Item 6 cause for divorce.
(5) The other spouse's intention to continue the marriage is an important factor to be taken into account in determining whether the marital communal relationship has broken down and has objectively reached an irrecoverable degree. However, even after taking such intention into account, where it is recognized that the marital communal relationship has objectively broken down to an irrecoverable degree, it is unreasonable to conclude, based solely on the subjective intention of the other spouse once more, that a divorce claim seeking to dissolve a marital relationship that is nothing but a formality must be disallowed, and this also does not conform to the purpose of the judicial divorce system, which prescribes the procedure for dissolving a marriage where agreement cannot be reached. In light of this, it can be seen that the majority opinion's position—that although the breakdown principle is permitted in the case of divorce by agreement, there is no need to permit the breakdown principle in judicial divorce, which performs a function in lieu thereof—is not persuasive.
(6) Meanwhile, as the Constitutional Court rendered a decision of unconstitutionality with respect to the provision punishing adultery, adulterous acts are no longer subject to punishment. However, since the crime of adultery is a criminal sanction against the act of adultery itself in the past, whereas divorce due to marital breakdown is the dissolution of the future marital legal relationship resulting from the vanishing of the substance of the marriage, the purpose and legal effect of these systems differ; therefore, even though criminal sanctions against an at-fault spouse who has committed adultery have been eliminated, apart from the question of strengthening liability for damages arising from the tort of adultery under civil law, there is no need to treat differently a legal relationship in which the substance of the marriage has vanished. Moreover, the question of whether to recognize the right to claim divorce should be determined for the future in a direction that harmonizes the interests of the parties, the spouses and children, comprehensively considering the statutory provisions and the purpose, intent, and function of the systems of marriage and divorce; it should not become a means of achieving retribution or private retaliation against the at-fault spouse by forcing the continuation of a marital relationship that exists only in outward form and thereby inflicting unbearable suffering upon that spouse.
(7) Taking the above various circumstances together, it is difficult to view uniformly rejecting a divorce claim, merely on the ground that the marital relationship has broken down yet the at-fault spouse claims divorce and the other party refuses it, as an appropriate and rational solution for resolving conflicts surrounding divorce.
E. Accordingly, as the public's consciousness regarding divorce has greatly changed and social conditions have matured, and legal and institutional supplementation has also been considerably achieved, it is now the case that, where a divorce is claimed under the Item 6 cause for divorce on the ground that the marital relationship has broken down and its substance has vanished, whether to grant the divorce cannot be left solely to the intention of the parties merely because it is the divorce claim of an at-fault spouse; rather, a way must be sought to harmonize the potentially conflicting purposes and intents of the two systems of marriage and divorce, through a rational determination based on objective circumstances as to whether the marital relationship has completely broken down and its substance has vanished, and whether there remains a need for such a marital relationship to continue to be protected and maintained.
As noted above, Article 36(1) of the Constitution not only provides that marriage and family life shall be established and maintained on the basis of individual dignity and equality of the sexes, but also institutionally guarantees marriage; therefore, the grounds for judicial divorce prescribed by the Civil Act must also be interpreted and applied within the scope not departing from the purpose of the constitutionally recognized individual dignity, equality of the sexes, and institutional guarantee of marriage.
Even where the marital communal relationship has broken down to an irrecoverable degree, there is no difference before and after such breakdown in the need to realize individual dignity and equality of the sexes between the spouses and to protect the spouses' and children's right to pursue happiness and right to a life worthy of human dignity. Although the duty of cohabitation as a marital communal body is a fundamental element of marriage, support for the spouse and rearing of the children are equally important, and there is a need to protect the spouse who bears no responsibility for the breakdown of the marital relationship from suffering serious disadvantage due to the divorce.
In light of these circumstances, where the marital communal relationship has broken down to an irrecoverable degree, this should in principle be regarded as falling under the Item 6 cause for divorce; however, where there exist objective circumstances such that granting the at-fault spouse's divorce claim would seriously harm the interests of the other spouse or the children, resulting in a manifest violation of the concept of justice and fairness—such as where, due to the divorce, the other spouse who bears no responsibility for the breakdown would be placed in an extremely harsh mental, social, or economic state; where the parents' divorce would seriously harm the rearing, education, or welfare of the children; where, during the marriage, one party has intentionally and for a prolonged period abandoned the duty of support and the duty to rear children; or where one party, in anticipation of divorce, has intentionally evaded the performance of division of property or solatium, such as by concealing property subject to liability, thereby placing the other spouse in dire straits—there is a risk of hollowing out the constitutionally guaranteed system of marriage and family; therefore, it accords with the constitutional spirit of institutionally guaranteeing marriage to interpret the Item 6 cause for divorce as existing only where such objective circumstances do not exist.
Moreover, even where judicial divorce is permitted with respect to a spouse who bears no responsibility for the marital breakdown, when determining the amount of solatium for the mental suffering caused by the breakdown of the marital relationship, the fault of the primarily responsible spouse should be fully reflected so as to hold that spouse accountable for the dissolution of the marriage and to ensure that substantial compensation for damages is made to the other spouse; and when determining the ratio and amount of property division as well, not only the liquidation of property relations formed during the marriage but also support-related factors should be fully reflected, so as to ensure that the other spouse can be guaranteed a standard of living after divorce not inferior to that during the marriage, thereby seeking to achieve balance and harmony between the responsibility of the spouse claiming divorce and the protection and consideration afforded to the other spouse.
Meanwhile, the majority opinion holds that, in order to recognize the divorce claim of an at-fault spouse, institutional supplementary safeguards such as the so-called "hardship clauses" found in other countries are necessary. However, the above interpretation of the Item 6 cause for divorce already incorporates the circumstances that other countries consider as so-called "hardship clauses," and, based on the constitutional spirit guaranteeing the marriage system and the systems already established under the Civil Act, such interpretation and the operation of judicial practice can sufficiently protect the other spouse, etc.; therefore, statutory or institutional supplementation in this regard need not necessarily precede such recognition.
F. In conclusion, we cannot agree with the majority opinion that, where the marital relationship between spouses has broken down to an irrecoverable degree and forcing the continuation of married life would constitute unbearable suffering for one spouse, a divorce claim under the Item 6 cause for divorce may be rejected solely on the ground that the claiming spouse bears the primary responsibility for the breakdown; and the prior Supreme Court precedent cited by the majority opinion should be changed to the extent it conflicts with this view.
Where the substance of the marriage has vanished and become irrecoverable, such that the marriage remains only in outward form, even if it is necessary to require the at-fault spouse to provide performance or consideration, etc. in order to protect the other spouse, appropriate measures should be devised to ensure that such performance or consideration, etc. continue to be provided even after the dissolution of the marriage; the dissolution itself of a marriage that exists only in outward form should not be refused merely on the ground that it is the divorce claim of the at-fault spouse.
사. According to the reasoning of the judgment below and the reasoning of the first instance judgment cited by the court below, the court below, after finding the facts as stated in its judgment, determined that the Plaintiff's claim for divorce could not be accepted, on the premise that a spouse who bears primary responsibility for the breakdown of the marital relationship may not seek divorce on the grounds of that breakdown, given that the Plaintiff is the spouse at fault.
However, according to the legal principles set forth above, a claim for divorce should not be rejected solely on the ground that it is brought by the spouse at fault. Rather, it must first be determined whether the marital community life between the Plaintiff and Defendant has broken down to an irrecoverable degree and whether compelling the continuation of the marriage would constitute unbearable suffering for the Plaintiff, and if the marriage has broken down in such a manner, it must then be examined whether it can be objectively recognized that granting the divorce in this case would not seriously harm the interests of the Defendant or the children, who bear no primary responsibility for the breakdown, and would not be significantly contrary to the concept of justice and fairness, in order to determine whether the grounds for divorce under item 6 are satisfied.
According to the reasoning of the judgment below and the first instance judgment cited by the court below, as well as the record, it can be seen that: (1) although the Plaintiff and Defendant are legally married, they began living separately around January 2000, and a considerable period of time has passed since then; (2) the Plaintiff provided the primary cause of the breakdown of the marriage, such as by leaving the household after a daughter was born out of wedlock between the Plaintiff and the non-party, but the Defendant likewise made no particular effort to restore the marital relationship even after a considerable period had passed following the commencement of separation, and the record contains no indication that the Defendant participated in the Plaintiff's family events such as holidays or ancestral rites, or maintained contact with the Plaintiff's relatives; (3) even during the separation, the Plaintiff not only bore the educational expenses of the children born between the Plaintiff and Defendant, but also paid the Defendant approximately KRW 1,000,000 per month in living expenses up until the time this lawsuit was filed; (4) the Plaintiff's health is poor, as the Plaintiff suffers from diabetes and hypertension and has been registered as a Grade 2 disabled person due to renal impairment arising from complications; around the end of 2011, the Plaintiff raised the subject of a kidney transplant with the Defendant and the children but was refused, and the Plaintiff is currently undergoing peritoneal dialysis at home with the assistance of the non-party, such that the Plaintiff is in a situation where it is difficult to live without the non-party's care and cooperation; and (5) the independent living arrangements of the Plaintiff and Defendant that formed after the separation have become entrenched, as the Plaintiff is cohabiting with the non-party and raising their minor daughter born of that relationship.
In light of the course of the marital life and the circumstances of its breakdown as described above, it must be said that the marital relationship between the Plaintiff and Defendant has broken down to a point beyond recovery, and that compelling the continuation of the marriage would constitute unbearable suffering for the Plaintiff; moreover, there are substantial circumstances from which it can be objectively found that granting the divorce in this case would not be significantly contrary to the concept of justice and fairness.
Furthermore, even under the majority opinion, given the passage of time, strictly weighing the relative degree of fault between the Plaintiff and Defendant may no longer be meaningful, such that there is room to find that the Plaintiff's fault is no longer of such a degree as to require rejection of the divorce claim; this circumstance also needs to be clarified through examination by the fact-finding court.
In particular, in this case, consideration must be given to the fact that there is a minor daughter, albeit born of a bigamous de facto marital relationship, who requires parental care. A family is not merely a community consisting of the spouses alone, but also functions to protect the communal life of children; therefore, when determining whether to maintain or dissolve a marriage, the welfare of the child must be given priority consideration, and the welfare of the child can be realized on the basis of the living relationship that has actually and substantially formed at present. Although, as a general principle, a bigamous de facto marital relationship cannot be protected in preference to a legal marriage, where the substance of the legal marriage has already been extinguished and only its outward form remains, while the de facto marital relationship has come to possess the substance of a marriage, consideration must be given, for the sake of the welfare of the children born of that de facto marital relationship, to enabling the formation of legal relationships appropriate to that substance. It is appropriate to consider a future-oriented approach whereby, where the substance of a marriage has been extinguished and recovery is impossible, the legal relationship of the preceding generation, which retains only an empty outward form, is reasonably reorganized to reflect the actual substance, so as to prevent a situation in which maintaining only the outward form due to conflict or emotional discord between the spouses adversely affects the normal development of the minor children of the succeeding generation or harms their welfare.
Nevertheless, the court below dismissed the Plaintiff's claim solely for the reasons stated in its judgment, without properly examining the circumstances described above; the judgment below thus contains an error of law that affected the conclusion of the judgment, in misapprehending the legal principles concerning the grounds for divorce under item 6 and the claim for judicial divorce by a spouse at fault, and in failing to conduct the necessary examination. Therefore, the judgment below must be reversed.
For the foregoing reasons, we state that we cannot concur with the majority opinion.
Chief Justice Yang Sung-tae (Presiding Judge), Justice Min Il-young, Justice Lee In-bok, Justice Lee Sang-hoon, Justice Kim Yong-deok (Justice in charge), Justice Park Bo-young, Justice Ko Young-han, Justice Kim Chang-seok, Justice Kim Shin, Justice Kim So-young, Justice Cho Hee-dae, Justice Kwon Soon-il, Justice Park Sang-ok