[Defendant] Defendant
[Appellant] Defendant
[Defense Counsel] Kim & Chang... Busan Law Firm, Attorney Yoon In-seop and 1 other
[Court Below] Ulsan District Court Decision 2005No1065, decided February 3, 2006
[Order]
The judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Panel Division of the Ulsan District Court.
[Reasoning]
We examine the grounds of appeal.
1. As to Grounds of Appeal Nos. 1 and 2
A. Article 69(1) of the Local Public Officials Act (지방공무원법, hereinafter referred to as the "Act") provides: "Where a public official falls under any of the following subparagraphs, a request for disciplinary resolution shall be made, and a disciplinary action shall be taken in accordance with the outcome of such disciplinary resolution: 1. Where the official has violated this Act or an order issued thereunder, or a municipal ordinance or rule of a local government; 2. Where the official has violated official duties or has been negligent in the performance thereof; 3. Where the official has committed an act that undermines the dignity of a public official." Article 72(1) of the Act provides: "Disciplinary action shall be taken by the appointing authority following resolution by the Personnel Committee." Furthermore, Article 2(1) of the Regulation on Disciplinary Action and Petitions for Local Public Officials (지방공무원 징계 및 소청규정) provides: "Where the appointing authority under Article 7(1) of the Act finds that a public official under its jurisdiction falls under any of the grounds set forth in each subparagraph of Article 69(1) of the Act, it shall, without delay, request disciplinary resolution to the committee having jurisdiction over the relevant disciplinary case." Article 8 thereof provides: "Standards for disciplinary measures shall be established by the rules of the relevant local government, following resolution by the committee, within the scope of standards set by the Minister of Home Affairs or the Minister of Education and Human Resources Development."
As set forth above, Article 69(1) of the Act provides that where a public official falls under grounds for disciplinary action, "...a request for disciplinary resolution shall be made...," and Article 2(1) of the Regulation on Disciplinary Action and Petitions for Local Public Officials likewise provides that the appointing authority, upon finding that a public official under its jurisdiction has grounds for disciplinary action, "shall, without delay, request disciplinary resolution to the committee having jurisdiction over the relevant disciplinary case." In light of the fact that the requirement that the appointing authority, in taking disciplinary action against a public official under its jurisdiction, must invariably request disciplinary resolution from the Personnel Committee and follow its deliberation and resolution is intended, in its legislative purpose, to check arbitrary disciplinary practices by the appointing authority, thereby protecting the rights and interests of local public officials while also promoting rational procedures and fair disciplinary administration so as to guarantee fairness in discipline; and in light of the fact that the Personnel Committee determines whether to impose discipline and the degree thereof only where the head of the local government requests disciplinary resolution; when the provisions relating to disciplinary action against local public officials are considered comprehensively, it must be held that while the head of a local government, who is both the disciplinary authority and the appointing authority, has discretion to determine whether a specific act of a public official under its jurisdiction indeed falls under the grounds for disciplinary action set forth in Article 69(1) of the Act, where it is clear that such grounds for disciplinary action exist, the head of the local government has a duty to request discipline from the competent Personnel Committee.
B. Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the record, the general strike (hereinafter the "instant general strike") conducted on November 15, 2004 by the so-called Korean Government Employees' Union (hereinafter "KGEU") was a collective refusal to perform duties carried out simultaneously across local governments nationwide pursuant to a meticulous plan, and the act of 213 public officials belonging to the Ulsan Metropolitan City ○○ Office (hereinafter the "○○ Office") participating in such strike violated the duty to prohibit collective action, the duty to prohibit unauthorized absence from the workplace, and other official duties prescribed under Articles 48 through 50 and Article 58, etc. of the Act, and thus constitutes grounds for disciplinary action to the extent that it gives rise to the appointing authority's duty to request disciplinary resolution (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 2005Chu62, decided March 22, 2007).
In the same vein, the court below's determination that the Defendant, as the head of the ○○ Office, had a specific duty to request disciplinary resolution from the competent Personnel Committee without delay with respect to the public officials belonging to the ○○ Office was justified, and there is no error of law, such as a misapprehension of the legal principles relating to the request for disciplinary resolution, as alleged.
2. As to Ground of Appeal No. 3
Article 73-2(1) of the Act provides: "A request for disciplinary resolution may not be made where two years (three years in the case of acceptance of money or valuables or entertainment, or embezzlement or unauthorized use of public funds) have elapsed from the date on which the grounds for disciplinary action arose." However, this provision is intended to guarantee the stability of public office by respecting, without inquiring into its legality or propriety, a factual state that has continued for a certain period where, even though a public official has committed misconduct constituting grounds for disciplinary action, the corresponding disciplinary procedure was not, or could not be, pursued; it is not to be construed as meaning that the appointing authority need only request disciplinary resolution within the disciplinary limitation period.
Rather, in light of the purport of Article 2(1) and (6) of the Regulation on Disciplinary Action and Petitions for Local Public Officials, which provide that the appointing authority, after conducting a sufficient investigation into the grounds for disciplinary action, shall, upon finding that a public official under its jurisdiction has grounds for disciplinary action, request disciplinary resolution "without delay" from the competent Personnel Committee, it must be held that the appointing authority has an official duty, absent special circumstances, to request disciplinary resolution without delay after conducting a sufficient investigation once grounds for disciplinary action have arisen.
According to the record, it may be found that a specific duty to request disciplinary resolution from the competent Personnel Committee had already arisen by around the date of the institution of the instant prosecution (February 22, 2005), by which time a considerable period had elapsed from the date of the general strike; therefore, the argument in the grounds of appeal cannot be accepted.
3. As to Ground of Appeal No. 4
A. Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the record, the court below's determination that the instant general strike constitutes "the same case involving officials belonging to different affiliated agencies," involving public officials nationwide belonging to different affiliated agencies, and that, accordingly, pursuant to Article 72(1) of the Act, jurisdiction over the disciplinary action against the 213 public officials belonging to the ○○ Office who participated therein rests with the Ulsan Metropolitan City Personnel Committee, is justified and acceptable, and there is no error of law, such as a misapprehension of the legal principles relating to disciplinary jurisdiction, as alleged.
B. As set forth above, since a specific duty to request disciplinary resolution from the Ulsan Metropolitan City Personnel Committee with respect to the 213 public officials belonging to the ○○ Office who participated in the KGEU general strike of November 15, 2004 had arisen for the Defendant, as head of the ○○ Office (Gu), by around the date of the institution of the instant prosecution at the latest, the court below's determination is acceptable to the effect that the Defendant, in approving the draft document dated December 1, 2004 proposing to request severe disciplinary resolution against all ○○ Office public officials who participated in the general strike before the Ulsan Metropolitan City Personnel Committee, wrote in the instruction column, "Request minor disciplinary action for the eight persons, Non-Indicted 1 through 8, and administer a reprimand to the remaining 205 persons, including Non-Indicted 9," and returned the document to the Planning and Audit Office; and that, notwithstanding having received official documents from Ulsan Metropolitan City on two occasions on the same day, stating, "Withdraw the policy of self-disciplinary action and take measures to ensure that discipline against strike participants proceeds promptly in accordance with government guidelines; since it is provided that discipline of persons involved in the same case belonging to different affiliated agencies shall be deliberated and resolved by the City Personnel Committee, deliberation and resolution of the disciplinary case by ○○ is void," the Defendant, upon approving the said official document around the 10th of the same month, wrote in the instruction column, "Proceed promptly in accordance with the self-handling policy. Reprimand for 205 persons, minor discipline for 8 persons," thereby instructing the Planning and Audit Office, and ultimately failed to perform the duty to request disciplinary resolution from the Ulsan Metropolitan City Personnel Committee with respect to the said 213 public officials.
However, the following circumstances are recognized from the record.
First, the Defendant was elected as head of the Gu, having received the nomination of his affiliated political party, which advocated as its platform the guarantee of the three labor rights of public officials, including the right to collective action, in the local government head election of 2002, and while he considered it appropriate, in light of his affiliated party's platform and his personal convictions, to recognize the three labor rights of public officials, he did not consent to or endorse the instant general strike, believing that a strike ought to be undertaken with caution since it would ultimately cause harm to the citizens; he stated that he had told [staff] to act with careful consideration of the responsibility that would flow from their conduct, and had instructed senior officials to faithfully carry out their role of, inter alia, persuading employees to refrain from collective action, and that when the Deputy Head of the Gu and other senior officials formulated a response plan for collective action, he had them implement it as planned (see Investigation Record, pp. 941, 950; meanwhile, it appears that among the four Gu/Gun of Ulsan Metropolitan City, the ○○ Office had the lowest strike participation rate and number of participants, see Investigation Record, p. 185); Non-Indicted 10, the Head of the Audit Office, whose views on the disciplinary procedure were opposed to those of the Defendant, likewise testified to the same effect at the first instance (see Trial Record, p. 88); and according to the first-instance testimony of Non-Indicted 11, the Vice Mayor of Ulsan Metropolitan City for Administrative Affairs who filed the complaint against the Defendant, in the case of the ○○ Office, the public officials who participated in the strike had, in their own way, made arrangements for the handling of their duties so as not to cause any disruption before participating in the strike, such that there was in fact no disruption to work, and all of the strike participants returned to work on the morning of November 16, 2004, the day after the general strike, and many of them had participated only passively (see Trial Record, p. 76).
Second, although the Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs and Ulsan Metropolitan City had, through the "Guidelines Relating to the Collection of Funds for Illegal Strikes by Illegal Public Officials' Organizations" of September 13 and September 15, 2004, the "Guidelines for Handling Disciplinary Matters Relating to the KGEU General Strike" of November 6 and November 9, 2004, and the "Supplementary Guidelines for Handling Disciplinary Matters Relating to the KGEU General Strike" of November 10 and November 12, 2004, transmitted to front-line local governments the content that "the fund-raising activities of the KGEU constitute unlawful collective action by public officials, and the general strike is a grave situation that disrupts the functions of the State and endangers national security, such that, should it proceed, all persons involved should be subject to severe disciplinary action," this cannot be regarded as constituting compulsory or mandatory measures legally binding upon each local government, but rather as advice or recommendations given in the spirit of mutual cooperation, or as mere "administrative liaison" (see Constitutional Court Decision 2005Hunra1, decided March 30, 2006).
Third, according to the Defendant's press statement of December 1, 2004, the Defendant stated with respect to his own measures as follows: "Even granting the justification of the demand for the three labor rights, as public officials, responsibility cannot but be sought for the portion where they caused inconvenience and anxiety to the residents of the Gu by absenting themselves from their post without authorization for one day. The majority of the employees acted in accordance with the union's directives, and taking into account extenuating circumstances such as their generally amicable interpersonal relations and their ordinarily faithful performance of duties, I decided upon a reprimand at the level of a stern warning. However, since the union officers who actively organized the collective action bear heavier responsibility than the general employees, I decided to refer them to the Disciplinary Committee. The concerns of each local government head are the same. It is difficult to defy the Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs' guidelines, yet it is also painful to cast out one's own employees in accordance with the guidelines, and so [others] are watching and waiting. In such a situation, I resolved that now was the time to present a standard by making a determination based on my convictions without delaying the disciplinary decision. As for the issue of equity in discipline for the same matter, I believe that the equity of discipline ought to be aligned not with the exclusionary disciplinary guidelines demanded by the Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs, but with the level of common sense generally accepted in society." Further, in the course of being investigated by the prosecution, the Defendant stated that, as to the 205 persons, since he considered the matter minor and the persons mere simple participants such that it was unnecessary to go so far as discipline, he merely administered a reprimand; and as to the reasons why, with respect to the eight persons, he sought to request self-disciplinary resolution rather than requesting disciplinary resolution from the Ulsan Metropolitan City Personnel Committee, he stated to the effect that he had instructed the Legal Affairs Office to conduct a legal review, and, as a result thereof, having determined that there was room to interpret the instant KGEU strike as constituting merely "the same type of case" rather than "the same case," he instructed that the request for disciplinary resolution be made to the Personnel Committee of the ○○ Office, rather than that of Ulsan Metropolitan City (see Investigation Record, pp. 958, 959); and he stated to the effect that he did not follow the Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs' guideline calling for severe discipline against all persons involved, because he considered it excessive and believed that following it would bring about greater confusion (see Investigation Record, p. 980).
Fourth, the "Regulation on Warnings and Other Measures against Public Officials" (공무원 경고 등 처분에 관한 규정), a directive of the Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs, provides that a public official who has received a reprimand (including an unrecorded warning) may suffer disadvantages with respect to reassignment, payment of performance-based bonuses, commendations, etc. (Article 4), and requires the Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs and each local government to maintain a ledger of warnings and other dispositions and to record and maintain the status of such dispositions (Article 8(1)); accordingly, even though the reprimand which the Defendant, at the time, instructed with respect to the 205 persons whom he judged to have participated to a minor degree does not constitute discipline, it is an act recommending or guiding [those persons] to be more diligent in the performance of their duties so as not to repeat similar wrongdoing in the future, and the underlying misconduct may in fact affect or be taken into account in personnel evaluations such as promotion or step increases in pay grade; accordingly, it cannot be said that the Defendant took no measure whatsoever with respect to the said 205 persons, or that this is equivalent to taking no measure.
The crime of dereliction of duty (직무유기죄) is not established in every case where a public official is negligent in the abstract duty of fidelity imposed by statute, internal regulations, etc.; rather, it is established only in cases involving an infringement of legal interest of a high degree of unlawfulness and culpability, such as unauthorized absence from the workplace or the conscious abandonment of one's duties, which pose a concrete danger of impeding the functions of the State and causing harm to the citizenry (see Supreme Court Decision 2003Do4331, decided May 12, 2005, etc.); accordingly, where a person has performed his or her duties, in whatever form, with the intent to execute such duties, the crime of dereliction of duty is not to be found established merely because the content of such execution of duties is evaluated as unlawful (see Supreme Court Decisions 2003Do3718, decided October 24, 2003, and 2004Do5259, decided October 28, 2004, etc.).
Given that the Defendant, as head of the local government, viewed the Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs' guideline on discipline at the time as being somewhat excessive, and, as head of the local government, was concerned about the confusion and attendant adverse consequences that would arise were he to request disciplinary resolution against all of the striking public officials, who constituted more than half of the employees under his jurisdiction; and further, having judged that there was room to evaluate the said act of participation in the strike as not constituting the same case, and having, in his own judgment, distinguished the gravity of the matter, instructed that a request for disciplinary resolution be made to the ○○ Personnel Committee with respect to some subjects who had participated to a serious degree, while instructing that a reprimand be administered to the remaining subjects who had participated to a minor degree, then, setting aside the question of whether the Defendant's aforesaid execution of duties is to be evaluated as unlawful, it cannot be evaluated as equivalent to unauthorized absence from the workplace or the conscious abandonment of duties; moreover, it may be found that the Defendant, at the very least, believed that the series of measures he took constituted a legitimate manner of performing the duties incumbent upon his position.
Contrary to this, the court below, having understood the Defendant's aforesaid measures solely as being intended to protect the interests of the public officials who participated in the strike, concluded that they amounted, in and of themselves, to nothing more than a conscious abandonment or neglect, without justifiable reason, of the affirmative duty imposed upon him by statute; such determination by the court below contains an error of law in misapprehending the legal principles concerning the crime of dereliction of duty, and the argument in the grounds of appeal pointing this out is well-founded.
4. Conclusion
Accordingly, the judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court below for further hearing and determination, in accordance with the unanimous opinion of the Justices participating in the decision, as set forth in the Order.
Justice Yang Sung-tae (Presiding Justice), Ko Hyun-chul, Kim Ji-hyung, Jeon Soo-an (Justice in Charge)