[Plaintiffs, Appellants] Plaintiff 1 and 2 others (Attorneys of Law Firm Sejoong, Attorney Park Young-il and 3 others, representing)
[Defendant, Appellee] Gangwon-do School Safety Mutual Aid Association (Attorney Lee Jae-seong, representing)
[Judgment Below] Seoul High Court Decision (Chuncheon Branch) 2020Na426 dated January 13, 2021
[Order]
The part of the judgment below concerning lost income among the portion in which Plaintiff 1 lost is reversed, and this part of the case is remanded to the Seoul High Court. The remainder of Plaintiff 1's appeal and the appeals of Plaintiff 2 and Plaintiff 3 are all dismissed. Of the costs of appeal, the portion resulting from the appeals of Plaintiff 2 and Plaintiff 3 shall be borne by Plaintiff 2 and Plaintiff 3.
[Reasoning]
The grounds of appeal are examined.
1. Determination on the portion concerning Plaintiff 1's lost income
A. The portion concerning the average wage used as the basis for calculating lost income
1) In principle, the lost income suffered by a victim who has lost labor capacity due to a physical disability must be calculated based on the income at the time the damage occurred; however, if the income forming the basis of the lost income calculation has increased between that time and the closing of the fact-finding hearing, the lost income for the period thereafter must be calculated based on the income closest to the time of the closing of the fact-finding hearing. Where lost income is assessed based on statistical facts, the income must be determined through reasonable fact-finding by taking into account various circumstances appearing in various statistical data, including facts notorious to the court, and by supplementing this with other appropriate materials (see Supreme Court Decision 2002Da30275 delivered on September 24, 2002; Supreme Court Decision 2020Da270282 delivered on February 25, 2021, etc.).
2) According to the record, on August 20, 2020, Plaintiff 1 filed an application to amend the purport and grounds of claim, claiming lost income for the employable period from January 4, 2015 to April 4, 2059, applying the statistical income for urban ordinary laborers under the "Survey Report on Wage Conditions in the Construction Industry" by period, and amended the purport and grounds of claim accordingly. It is notorious to this Court that the statistical income for urban ordinary laborers increased each year, based on January 1 and September 1, from January 1, 2015 to January 1, 2020, which is close to the date of filing the above application to amend the purport and grounds of claim. Therefore, the court below should have used the statistical income increased by period as the basis for calculating Plaintiff 1's lost income damages.
3) Nevertheless, the court below, in calculating Plaintiff 1's lost income, failed to reflect Plaintiff 1's amendment to the purport of claim, and instead calculated the lost income on the assumption that Plaintiff 1 was claiming lost income based on the statistical income for urban ordinary laborers as of January 1, 2015. Such determination by the court below contains an error that misapprehends the legal principles concerning the calculation of lost income and thereby affected the judgment. Plaintiff 1's ground of appeal pointing this out is well-founded.
B. The portion concerning comparative negligence offset
1) The mutual aid system under the Act on the Prevention of and Compensation for School Safety Accidents (이하 "학교안전법," hereinafter referred to as the "School Safety Act"), which aims to prescribe matters necessary for implementing the school safety accident compensation mutual aid project for the purpose of preventing school safety accidents and promptly and appropriately compensating for damage suffered by students, faculty and staff, and education activity participants due to school safety accidents, was established as a special law to directly compensate for damage suffered by the insured due to school safety accidents from the perspective of mutual assistance and social security, and must be regarded as having a different purpose and objective from the general tort damages compensation system. Therefore, unless there is a special provision in the law, the principle of fault liability or the theory of comparative negligence offset cannot necessarily be applied to the obligation to pay mutual aid benefits under the School Safety Act. Furthermore, the legal principle applied in civil damages cases, whereby, in fairness, the theory of comparative negligence offset is applied by analogy to limit the scope of liability for damages where a pre-existing condition has contributed to the expansion of damage, does not apply to mutual aid benefits under the School Safety Act absent a special provision in the law (see Supreme Court Decision 2011Da111961 delivered on December 13, 2012, etc.).
2) The School Safety Act divides the mutual aid benefits paid by the School Safety Mutual Aid Association into medical care benefits, disability benefits, nursing care benefits, survivor benefits, and funeral expenses (Article 34), and provides that the amount of each type of mutual aid benefit shall be determined pursuant to Articles 36 through 40 (Article 35), while prescribing the payment standards for each mutual aid benefit amount (Articles 36 through 40). Regarding medical care benefits, nursing care benefits, survivor benefits, and funeral expenses, it provides that "matters necessary for the payment standards, etc. shall be prescribed by Presidential Decree" (Article 36(5), Article 38(2), Article 39(2), Article 40(2)), and regarding disability benefits, it provides that "matters necessary for the criteria for determining the degree of disability, the calculation of the amount of disability benefits, and the method of payment, etc. shall be prescribed by Presidential Decree" (Article 37(2)), thereby delegating such matters to Presidential Decree. In accordance with such delegation, the Enforcement Decree of the School Safety Act (hereinafter referred to as the "Enforcement Decree") prescribes detailed matters concerning the payment standards for each benefit item and the factors for calculating the payment amount (Articles 14 through 19).
Meanwhile, the School Safety Act comprehensively provides for grounds for restricting the payment of mutual aid benefits in Article 43, enumerating: cases where the insured self-harms or commits suicide for reasons other than a school safety accident; cases where it is clear that the insured's condition, such as injury, worsened due to failure to follow the instructions of a medical care institution without justifiable reason, or that the insured obstructed treatment by the medical care institution; cases where the person entitled to receive benefits has received compensation for damages under the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act (자동차손해배상 보장법); and cases of delinquency in mutual aid premiums attributable to the insured. There is no other provision prescribing grounds for restricting payment.
Considering the above form and content and system of the School Safety Act and its Enforcement Decree, as well as the legislative purpose and basic ideology of the School Safety Act and the nature of the mutual aid benefits arising therefrom, it must be understood that the delegation under Articles 36 through 40 of the School Safety Act, whereby matters necessary for the payment standards, etc. of mutual aid benefits by benefit type are delegated to Presidential Decree, was made in consideration of the legislative-technical difficulty of prescribing in detail the method of calculating and paying the amount of mutual aid benefits in the statute itself, and in order to enable flexible operation of the mutual aid benefit system by allowing appropriate responses to changes in the socio-economic environment, etc. Such delegation should be understood as merely allowing the Enforcement Decree to prescribe detailed standards for paying mutual aid benefits and the method of calculating the benefit amount, and not as delegating authority to restrict mutual aid benefits on grounds other than those prescribed in Article 43 of the School Safety Act.
However, Article 19-2(2) of the Enforcement Decree provides that "the Association may offset against the insured's negligence when calculating disability benefits, nursing care benefits, and survivor benefits under Articles 37 through 39 of the School Safety Act if the insured is negligent," and Article 19-2(3) provides that "matters necessary for the subject and standards of comparative negligence offset under paragraph (2) shall be prescribed by Ordinance of the Ministry of Education" (hereinafter, Article 19-2(2) and (3) of the Enforcement Decree are collectively referred to as "the instant Enforcement Decree provision"). Accordingly, the insured's negligence contributing to a school safety accident may limit the payment amount by comparative negligence offset when calculating disability benefits, nursing care benefits, and survivor benefits, i.e., the remaining benefits excluding medical care benefits and funeral expenses among the five types of mutual aid benefits.
However, in light of the legislative purpose of the School Safety Act, the nature of mutual aid benefits, the purpose of delegation under Articles 36 through 40 of the School Safety Act, and the fact that the parent statute, the School Safety Act, exhaustively enumerates the grounds for restricting the payment of mutual aid benefits in Article 43, if the instant Enforcement Decree provision, which prescribes grounds for restricting payment through comparative negligence offset, is deemed to prescribe matters delegated under Articles 36 through 40 of the School Safety Act, then it exceeds the scope of such delegation. Moreover, no other provision in the parent statute delegating authority to add such grounds for restricting payment in the Enforcement Decree can be found. Therefore, the instant Enforcement Decree provision must be regarded as invalid, as it restricts the rights of the insured without statutory delegation (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 2016Da208389 delivered on October 19, 2016).
3) Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the above legal principles, even if Plaintiff 1, the insured, contributed to the occurrence of the instant accident or to the expansion of the damage, the defendant's liability for mutual aid benefits cannot be limited by applying or applying by analogy the legal principle of comparative negligence offset pursuant to the instant Enforcement Decree provision. Nevertheless, the court below, based on the instant Enforcement Decree provision, considered various circumstances and limited the defendant's liability to pay mutual aid benefits to 85%, thereby calculating Plaintiff 1's lost income. Such determination by the court below contains an error that misapprehends the legal principles concerning the validity of the instant Enforcement Decree provision and the application of the comparative negligence offset principle to mutual aid benefits under the School Safety Act, thereby affecting the judgment. Plaintiff 1's ground of appeal pointing this out is well-founded.
2. Determination on the portion concerning the Plaintiffs' delay damages
The court below determined, for the reasons stated in its judgment, that it was insufficient to find that the Plaintiffs had requested payment of mutual aid benefits prior to filing the instant lawsuit, and accordingly held that the defendant is obligated to pay delay damages to the Plaintiffs on the mutual aid benefits to be paid, from the day 14 days after the delivery of a copy of the complaint in this case, pursuant to Article 41(2) and (4) of the School Safety Act. Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the record, there is no error in the court below's determination in violation of the rules of logic and experience that exceeds the limits of the principle of free evaluation of evidence.
3. Determination on the portion concerning the Plaintiffs' claim for consolation money
The Plaintiffs also filed an appeal regarding the portion of the judgment below concerning the claim for consolation money, but there is no statement of grounds of objection thereto in the petition of appeal or the appellate brief.
4. Conclusion
Therefore, the portion of the judgment below concerning lost income among the portion in which Plaintiff 1 lost is reversed, and this part of the case is remanded to the Seoul High Court for retrial and determination. The remainder of Plaintiff 1's appeal and the appeals of Plaintiff 2 and Plaintiff 3 are all dismissed, and of the costs of appeal, the portion resulting from the appeals of Plaintiff 2 and Plaintiff 3 shall be borne by the losing parties. It is so decided by the unanimous opinion of the Justices participating in the judgment, as set forth in the Order.
Justice Roh Tae-ak (Presiding Justice), Lee Ki-taek, Park Jung-hwa (Justice in Charge), Kim Sun-soo