[Defendant] Defendant 1 and 1 other
[Appellant] The Defendants and the Military Prosecutor (as to Defendant 1)
[Defense Counsel] Attorney Park Jong-min and 2 others
[Judgment Below] High Military Court Decision 2018No64 decided February 1, 2019
[Order]
The guilty part of the judgment below as to Defendant 1 and the part as to Defendant 2 are reversed, and this part of the case is remanded to the High Military Court. The Military Prosecutor's appeal is dismissed.
[Reasoning]
The grounds of appeal are examined.
1. Determination on the military prosecutor's grounds of appeal
The court below upheld the judgment of the first instance court, which acquitted Defendant 1 of the portions of the charges concerning the acts of molestation on or about September 18, 2016 and on or about December 2016, on the ground that there was no proof of the crime. Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the relevant legal principles and the record, there is no error in the lower court's determination in misapprehending the legal principles concerning illegally obtained evidence.
2. Determination on the Defendants' grounds of appeal
A. Summary of the facts charged
Defendant 1, in the early to mid part of September 2016, in the evening, at his single-person quarters located in ○○-gun, Gangwon-do, committed an act of molestation with Non-indicted Person (rank 1 omitted) by kissing each other and engaging in oral sex or anal sex, and thereafter, from around that time until around February 2017, committed molestation against Non-indicted Person (rank 1 omitted) in the same or similar manner on six occasions.
Defendant 2, from around 15:36 on September 18, 2016, at his single-person quarters located in ○○-gun, Gangwon-do, committed an act of molestation with Defendant 1 (rank 1 omitted) by kissing each other and engaging in oral sex or anal sex, and until around December 2016, committed molestation against Defendant 1 (rank 1 omitted) in the same manner on two occasions.
B. The lower court's determination and the issue
The court below upheld the judgment of the first instance court, which found the above charges guilty, on the ground that Article 92-6 of the Military Criminal Act (군형법) applies even to acts done through voluntary consent, and that oral sex, mutual ejaculation, and the like between the male Defendants of the same sex objectively cause disgust to the general public and are contrary to sound sexual morality, thereby constituting "other molestation" under Article 92-6 of the Military Criminal Act.
The issue in this case is whether, when soldiers of the same sex engage by mutual consent in sexual acts including anal sex in a private space outside a military installation, they can be found to have violated and be punished under Article 92-6 (Molestation) of the Military Criminal Act.
C. Determination of the Supreme Court
Law is, in principle, a universally valid norm of society that has the same binding force on an unspecified number of people; therefore, in interpreting it, the standard meaning of the law should be clarified so as to have objective validity, and consistency that can be accepted by everyone as far as possible should be maintained so that legal stability is not impaired. Furthermore, since positive law is enacted with universal and typical cases in mind, when applying that law to the various cases that arise in social reality, it is also required to be interpreted so as to achieve the most reasonable resolution suited to the specific case, that is, so as to have concrete validity. In short, the goal of legal interpretation should be to seek concrete validity within a range that does not undermine legal stability. In that process, the principle should be to interpret the text of the statute faithfully to its ordinary meaning as far as possible, and further, by additionally employing systematic and logical interpretation methods that consider the legislative purpose and intent, the history of enactment and amendment, harmony with the legal order as a whole, and relationships with other statutes, a reasonable interpretation should be made that meets the above-mentioned demands of legal interpretation (see Supreme Court Decision 2006Da81035 delivered April 23, 2009, among others).
Comprehensively considering the text of Article 92-6 of the Military Criminal Act, its amendment history, the legal interest protected, and the changes in the overall legal order including constitutional provisions, it is reasonable to hold that the above provision does not apply where anal sex or other similar acts between soldiers of the same sex are carried out in a private space based on voluntary mutual consent, in circumstances that cannot be seen as directly and specifically infringing upon the sound life and discipline of the military community.
The specific reasons are as follows.
(1) Changes in the statutory provisions and the textual meaning of the current provision
Article 92 of the Military Criminal Act as originally enacted (before the amendment by Act No. 9820 of November 2, 2009; hereinafter "the originally enacted Military Criminal Act") provided: "A person who commits sodomy (계간) or other acts of molestation shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than one year." Article 92-5 of the former Military Criminal Act (before the amendment by Act No. 11734 of April 5, 2013; hereinafter "the former Military Criminal Act") provided: "A person who commits sodomy (鷄姦) or other acts of molestation shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than two years."
The Supreme Court held that "molestation" under Article 92 of the originally enacted Military Criminal Act refers to same-sex sexual acts not amounting to sodomy, that is, an act of sexual gratification that objectively causes disgust to the general public and is contrary to sound sexual morality, thereby infringing on the sound life and discipline of the military community (see Supreme Court Decision 2008Do2222 delivered May 29, 2008), and made the same determination regarding "molestation" under Article 92-5 of the former Military Criminal Act (see Supreme Court Decision 2012Do3980 delivered June 14, 2012). The Constitutional Court, in three separate decisions, held Article 92 of the originally enacted Military Criminal Act and Article 92-5 of the former Military Criminal Act to be constitutional (Constitutional Court en banc Decision 2001Hun-Ba70 delivered June 27, 2002; Constitutional Court en banc Decision 2008Hun-Ga21 delivered March 31, 2011; Constitutional Court en banc Decision 2012Hun-Ba258 delivered July 28, 2016), holding that this provision applies only to acts between same-sex soldiers, does not require the exercise of force, and imposes no separate restriction as to whether the act was consensual or as to the time or place of the act.
The current Article 92-6 of the Military Criminal Act, applicable to this case, was amended by Act No. 11734 of April 5, 2013, and provides: "A person who commits anal sex or other acts of molestation against a person prescribed in paragraphs (1) through (3) of Article 1 (hereinafter referred to as a 'soldier, etc.') shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than two years" (hereinafter "the current provision"). Unlike Article 92-5 of the former Military Criminal Act, the current provision uses the term "anal sex" instead of "sodomy (鷄姦)," and limits the object of the act to a "soldier, etc." to whom the Military Criminal Act applies.
"Sodomy (鷄姦)," the representative constituent element of Article 92 of the originally enacted Military Criminal Act and Article 92-5 of the former Military Criminal Act, dictionary-wise means "an act performed as if men were engaging in sexual intercourse," and inherently includes the conceptual element of sexual acts between males. In contrast, "anal sex," the representative constituent element of the current provision, refers to a form of sexual intercourse, namely "a sexual act in which an erect penis is inserted into the anus," which is possible between persons of the opposite sex as well, and is not limited in usage to acts between males. Therefore, the mere text of the current provision does not necessarily lead to the interpretation that it punishes same-sex sexual acts between soldiers per se; such an interpretation is possible only by adding a separate normative consideration or legal evaluation.
It may be argued that, at the time of the amendment of the Military Criminal Act on April 5, 2013, only the terminology was refined and there was no change in the legislative intent to punish consensual sexual acts between males. However, the reason for the amendment, namely "to change the term that denigrates same-sex sexual acts," can be seen as including an intent not to denigrate or taboo same-sex sexual acts per se and thereby subject them unconditionally to punishment; thus, it is not appropriate to maintain the previous interpretation while disregarding this purport.
The dictionary meaning of "molestation (추행)" is "① a dirty and unseemly act, ② rape or a similar act." Some provisions punishing sexual violence crimes, such as those in the Criminal Act (형법), define "molestation" as a constituent element, and the Supreme Court has held that molestation refers to "an act that objectively causes sexual shame or disgust to the general public and is contrary to sound sexual morality, thereby infringing upon the victim's sexual freedom," and has considered the victim's intent as one of the factors in making that determination (see Supreme Court Decision 2015Do6980 delivered September 10, 2015, among others).
The general perception of what constitutes molestation, and the normative evaluation of same-sex sexual acts, have changed with the times and with social change, and it has become difficult to accept, as a universally valid norm of this era, the view that same-sex sexual acts objectively cause sexual shame or disgust to the general public and are contrary to sound sexual morality. Supreme Court Decision 2011Du11266 delivered November 14, 2013 upheld the lower court's determination revoking a disposition that classified a film containing a scene of same-sex sexual acts as "restricted to adults," on the ground, among others, that "there is an argument that homosexuality should be regarded as a normal sexual orientation on par with heterosexuality, and social attitudes have also come to show increasing understanding of and interest in sexual minorities, including homosexuals." In Supreme Court Decision 2012Meu806 delivered July 24, 2014, it was held that "an adoption legally reported in accordance with the Civil Act (민법) cannot be deemed void as contrary to good morals merely because the adopter is a homosexual who cohabits with a person of the same sex and performs a gender role different from his or her own sex."
Considering the change in the wording of the current provision together with the change in the normative legal evaluation of same-sex sexual acts as described above, it has become difficult to maintain the previous interpretation that same-sex sexual acts per se constitute "molestation." Below, we examine the change in the protected legal interest resulting from the amendment of the current provision, and, considering the overall legal order including the Constitution, reexamine the scope of application of the current provision.
(2) The protected legal interest and the special nature of the military
Article 92 of the originally enacted Military Criminal Act was one of the provisions under "Chapter 15, Other Crimes," and at that time there was no other provision in the Military Criminal Act punishing sexual violence crimes. The Supreme Court held that the primary legal interest protected by Article 92 of the originally enacted Military Criminal Act was not "an individual's sexual freedom" but rather the social legal interest of "the sound life and discipline of the military community," and held that sexual acts between male soldiers constituted an act infringing on this protected legal interest and thus subject to punishment (see the above Supreme Court Decision 2008Do2222). The Constitutional Court likewise took the same position, holding that there was a reasonable basis for treating sexual acts between male same-sex persons differently from sexual acts between persons of the opposite sex, considering the special circumstances of the military, whose essence lies in strict discipline based on chain of command and collective communal life. That is, because vigorous young male conscripts live in closed communal settings, there is a high likelihood of abnormal sexual intercourse occurring between males, and a high likelihood of superiors engaging in nonconsensual sexual acts against subordinates.
However, as the number of women in the military increased, the problem of sexual violence against female soldiers became serious, and in the strictly hierarchical society governed by the chain of command, sexual violence crimes against male soldiers who were subordinates also occurred frequently, drawing social attention to the problem of sexual violence within the military; accordingly, the Military Criminal Act was amended by Act No. 9820 of November 2, 2009. At that time, the Military Criminal Act newly established "Chapter 15, Crimes of Rape and Molestation," introducing provisions for aggravated punishment of sexual violence crimes such as rape and forcible molestation against soldiers, etc., and raised the maximum term of imprisonment prescribed under Article 92 of the originally enacted Military Criminal Act from one year to two years, while relocating it as one of the provisions under "Chapter 15, Crimes of Rape and Molestation" (Article 92-5), thereby changing the systematic position of the provision. In the current provision, further amended on April 5, 2013, the phrase "against a soldier, etc." was added, as with other provisions punishing sexual violence crimes, using language that distinguishes between the subject and object of the act.
Considering comprehensively the structure and wording of the current provision, the history of its amendment, and the fact that, in light of the change in the normative legal evaluation of same-sex sexual acts, it has become difficult to regard consensual sexual acts between same-sex soldiers as unconditionally infringing on military discipline, it should be held that the protected legal interest of the current provision includes, in addition to the traditional legal interest of "the sound life and discipline of the military community," also "the soldier's right of sexual self-determination."
In a case such as the present, where a soldier engaged in a consensual sexual act of his own free will in his private space, namely his single-person quarters, an interpretation that subjects to punishment even a case where infringement of the legal interest of the soldier's right of sexual self-determination cannot be found, nor infringement of the legal interest of the sound life and discipline of the military community, cannot be permitted.
(3) The Constitution and the overall legal order
Article 11, Paragraph 1 of the Constitution (헌법) provides: "All citizens shall be equal before the law. There shall be no discrimination in political, economic, social or cultural life on account of sex, religion or social status," thereby declaring the principle of equality and simultaneously guaranteeing the right to equality to all citizens. Article 2, Subparagraph 3 of the National Human Rights Commission Act (국가인권위원회법), in defining "discriminatory acts infringing on the right to equality," expressly lists "sexual orientation" as one of the grounds of discrimination, thereby prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation without reasonable grounds.
Article 10 of the Constitution provides: "All citizens shall be assured of human dignity and worth and have the right to pursue happiness. It shall be the duty of the State to confirm and guarantee the fundamental and inviolable human rights of individuals." Article 17 provides: "The privacy of no citizen shall be infringed." Article 37, Paragraph 2 provides: "The freedoms and rights of citizens may be restricted by Act only when necessary for national security, the maintenance of law and order, or for public welfare. Even when such restriction is imposed, no essential aspect of the freedom or right shall be violated."
The right of self-determination is a right protected by an individual's personality rights and right to pursue happiness as prescribed in Article 10 of the Constitution (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 2009Da17417 delivered May 21, 2009, among others). Among these, the right of sexual self-determination is the right, based on a self-chosen view of life and the like, for each person to independently establish his or her own concept of sexuality within the social community, and, in accordance therewith, in the sphere of private life, to choose a partner and engage in sexual acts based on one's own sexual decisions made on one's own responsibility (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 2015Do9436 delivered August 27, 2020; Constitutional Court en banc Decision 99Hun-Ba40, etc. delivered October 31, 2002). This right of sexual self-determination is a universal right that is naturally recognized even for soldiers who are subject to the Military Criminal Act, and even where it is restricted by Act to the extent necessary for national security, the maintenance of law and order, or public welfare accompanying the status of a soldier, its essential content may not be infringed.
In light of the above-described normative legal evaluation of same-sex sexual acts, it should be held that imposing criminal punishment even in a case involving consensual sexual acts between same-sex soldiers that do not directly and specifically infringe on the sound life and discipline of the military community is not permitted in light of the overall legal order including the Constitution. Punishing such acts, without reasonable grounds, excessively restricts the right of sexual self-determination for the sole reason of being a soldier, thereby raising the concern of infringing on the constitutionally guaranteed right to equality, human dignity and worth, and the right to pursue happiness.
In particular, the current provision applies also to career soldiers such as officers and noncommissioned officers, and since career soldiers are subject to the Military Criminal Act for a long period of time, the degree of restriction on fundamental rights is very significant. Furthermore, where anal sex or other sexual acts by mutual consent between soldiers are carried out discreetly in a private space, an investigation into an act that is squarely within the realm of private life becomes essential in order to punish such acts, and such an investigation is difficult to permit as it excessively restricts a soldier's privacy of secrecy and freedom.
However, whether the current provision should, on grounds of the right to equality, be extended in its application to acts between persons of the opposite sex as well, is not an issue in this case, and moreover, since this raises the issue of expanding the scope of punishment under the current provision, we decline to make a determination on this point.
D. Change of precedent
Insofar as they are inconsistent with the view of this Decision, Supreme Court Decision 2008Do2222 delivered May 29, 2008 and Supreme Court Decision 2012Do3980 delivered June 14, 2012, which held to the effect that Article 92 of the originally enacted Military Criminal Act and Article 92-5 of the former Military Criminal Act apply to sexual acts, including anal sex, between male soldiers on the sole ground that such acts objectively cause disgust to the general public and are contrary to sound sexual morality, without examining whether such acts were consensual and carried out in a private space, along with other Supreme Court decisions to the same effect, are hereby overruled to that extent.
E. Determination as to this case
(1) According to the reasoning of the judgment below and the record, the following facts may be found.
Defendant 1 and Non-indicted Person (rank 1 omitted), and Defendant 2 (rank 2 omitted), met through the same-sex dating application (name omitted), and did not belong to the same unit. The Defendants and Non-indicted Person engaged in anal sex and other sexual acts, at the time of the acts, in the Defendants' single-person quarters, on holidays or after working hours, based on consent formed on the basis of their free will. In the process, there was no assault, intimidation, deception, or abuse of power, and there was no circumstance whatsoever raising an issue as to whether the acts were against their will. It has not been proved that the Defendants' acts occurred in a public or work-related sphere within the military community, or in a situation equivalent thereto, such that they directly and specifically infringed on the sound life and discipline of the military community.
(2) In light of the legal principles set forth above, these circumstances show that the Defendants' acts do not constitute "anal sex or other molestation" as prescribed to be punished under the current provision.
Nevertheless, the court below upheld the judgment of the first instance court, which found the above charges against the Defendants guilty on the ground that the Defendants' acts constituted "anal sex or other molestation" as defined in the current provision. Such determination contains an error of misapprehending the legal principles concerning "anal sex or other molestation" as prescribed in Article 92-6 of the Military Criminal Act, thereby affecting the judgment. The Defendants' argument pointing this out in their grounds of appeal is justified.
3. Conclusion
Without examining the remainder of the Defendants' grounds of appeal, the portion of the judgment below finding Defendant 1 guilty, and the portion concerning Defendant 2, are reversed, and this part of the case is remanded to the court below for further hearing and determination; the military prosecutor's appeal is dismissed as being without merit; it is so decided as set forth in the Order. Regarding this Decision, apart from the separate opinions of Justice Ahn Cheol-sang and Justice Lee Heung-gu, the separate opinion of Justice Kim Sun-su, and the dissenting opinions of Justice Cho Jae-yeon and Justice Lee Dong-won, the opinions of the participating Justices were unanimous, and there is a supplementary opinion by Justice Kim Jae-hyung, Justice Noh Jeong-hee, Justice Cheon Dae-yeop, and Justice Oh Kyung-mi concerning the majority opinion.
4. Separate opinion of Justice Ahn Cheol-sang and Justice Lee Heung-gu
A. The issue in this case and the summary of the separate opinion
(1) The issue in this case is how the current provision, which punishes "anal sex or other acts of molestation" against soldiers, etc., should be interpreted.
The Military Criminal Act, with respect to the crime of molestation, has undergone amendments changing the location of the provision, its terminology, and the range of punishment, and limiting its scope of application to acts between soldiers, etc., but the framework of its constituent elements has remained unchanged from the time of original enactment to the current law. Regarding this crime of molestation under the Military Criminal Act, the Supreme Court has held that "the primary protected legal interest is not an individual's sexual freedom but rather the social legal interest of the sound life and discipline of the military community" (see Supreme Court Decision 2008Do2222 delivered May 29, 2008; Supreme Court Decision 2012Do3980 delivered June 14, 2012, among others), and the Constitutional Court has taken the same position as the Supreme Court regarding the protected legal interest, holding that, since the Supreme Court has interpreted this provision as applying only to sexual acts between same-sex soldiers, it is not contrary to the principle of clarity (see Constitutional Court en banc Decision 2008Hun-Ga21 delivered March 31, 2011; Constitutional Court en banc Decision 2012Hun-Ba258 delivered July 28, 2016, among others). Both the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court held that the crime of molestation under the Military Criminal Act applies regardless of whether the act was consensual.
Today, homosexuality is also accepted as a natural sexual orientation. It is said to be formed through a complex interaction of innate and acquired factors, and is not something chosen by a person's free will. Globally as well, except for some countries such as those in the African region, homosexuality is not punished, and there are even countries that legally allow same-sex marriage. Although the current provision is not a provision intended to punish homosexuality or any particular sexual orientation, it results in restricting the right of sexual self-determination, which is a constitutional right, thereby raising a question of unconstitutionality. In light of the historical development that has expanded human sexual freedom and the global trend of prohibiting discrimination or punishment on grounds of a particular sexual orientation, if the current provision is applied as it is, there is a possibility of a constitutional violation.
Meanwhile, from the standpoint of national security and defense of the territory, there is a need to prevent the weakening of the military's combat power resulting from soldiers, etc. pursuing indiscriminate sexual desires. The Constitutional Court, in holding Article 92-5 of the former Military Criminal Act to be constitutional, has held that whether a sexual act between same-sex soldiers in a specific case falls under this provision is an ordinary matter of statutory interpretation and application by the courts, to be determined by comprehensively considering all relevant circumstances (see Constitutional Court en banc Decision 2012Hun-Ba258 delivered July 28, 2016).
Therefore, so long as there is no Constitutional Court decision holding the current provision unconstitutional, the courts have a duty to remove the unconstitutionality of the current provision and provide a reasonable statutory interpretation that maintains its protected legal interest.
(2) The summary of the separate opinion is as follows.
First, the current provision should be reasonably interpreted, within the bounds of the constitutional order, including the guarantee of fundamental rights and the principle of separation of powers, giving full consideration to the special purpose of the Military Criminal Act, namely securing combat power for victory in war, and to the protected legal interest of the current provision, namely the sound life and discipline of the military.
Second, while the majority opinion takes "the sound life and discipline of the military community" as the standard for determining whether the current provision applies, it holds that the current provision does not apply where anal sex or other acts of molestation between same-sex soldiers are carried out in a private space based on "voluntary mutual consent." However, it is difficult to agree with treating the existence of consent as one of the negative factors for the application of the current provision, as this amounts to a de facto legislative act that goes beyond statutory interpretation.
Third, the majority opinion includes the right of sexual self-determination within the protected legal interest of the current provision. According to this, where the above-described sexual acts of soldiers, etc. are not based on voluntary consent, they may still become subject to the current provision even if carried out in a private space. However, this amounts to newly establishing a crime of nonconsensual molestation under the Military Criminal Act, and introducing this without sufficient discussion or formation of social consensus is difficult to readily accept, as it would cause significant controversy in the criminal justice system.
Fourth, considering the Military Criminal Act system and the protected legal interest based on a constitutional interpretation, it is reasonable to determine the scope of application of the current provision based on the circumstances at the time of the act. Accordingly, it is reasonable to hold that the current provision basically applies in situations such as in the presence of the enemy, or in wartime or during an insurrection, while in peacetime it applies only in situations involving military training, sentry duty, or other situations equivalent thereto where there is a risk of directly and specifically infringing on military discipline.
B. The desirable direction of interpretation of the current provision
(1) National security is one of the State's most important duties. Article 5, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution provides: "The Armed Forces shall be charged with the sacred mission of national security and defense of the land, and their political neutrality shall be maintained," and Article 39, Paragraph 1 provides: "All citizens shall have the duty of national defense under the conditions as prescribed by Act." That is, the Constitution expressly provides that the sovereign citizens bear the constitutional duty to defend the State from external enemies and to safeguard the political independence and territorial integrity of the State, and this constitutional sacred duty of national security and defense of the land cannot be overemphasized, since if the existence of the State is lost, the foundation for the guarantee of fundamental rights collapses (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 2016Do10912 delivered November 1, 2018).
In order to carry out its original mission of victory in combat, the military requires a special organization and discipline commensurate therewith, and the Military Criminal Act, premised on this special nature of the military, has as its ultimate purpose maintaining and preserving the military's organization and discipline through the sanction of criminal punishment, while enabling the military to preserve and exercise its combat power to the maximum extent. Ultimately, securing combat power for victory in war is the core purpose of the Military Criminal Act, and this can be said to constitute the protected legal interest under the Military Criminal Act; thus, such special purpose is the most important guiding ideology in the interpretation and application of the Military Criminal Act (see Constitutional Court en banc Decision 92Hun-Ba45 delivered October 26, 1995).
(2) As stated above, the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court have consistently held that the protected legal interest of the crime of molestation under the Military Criminal Act is "not an individual's sexual freedom but the sound life and discipline of the military community." From Article 92 of the originally enacted Military Criminal Act to the current provision, the crime of molestation under the Military Criminal Act, on the basis of the special importance of securing combat power for the national army, which bears the sacred duty of national security and defense of the land, provides for punishment on the ground that sexual acts between male soldiers, even if consensual, carry a risk of infringing on the sound life and discipline of the military community.
As the majority opinion points out, changes have occurred in the wording and structure of the current provision through two amendments; however, in light of the specific circumstances of the amendments (the 2009 amendment was merely a relocation of the provision resulting from the introduction of other provisions and an increase in the statutory penalty, and the 2013 amendment was merely a refinement of terminology and a clarification that the other party must also be a soldier, etc.), the current provision still punishes sexual acts between same-sex soldiers regardless of consent, and it cannot be said that there has been a fundamental change in the protected legal interest. Ultimately, the interpretation that consensual acts cannot be punished amounts to altering an essential, core element of the current provision, which is equivalent to a partial abolition of the statutory provision. Therefore, it is difficult to accept, on the ground of the unconstitutionality of the current provision, treating consent as a negative factor for the application of the current provision, as this constitutes a de facto legislative act exceeding the bounds of statutory interpretation.
(3) It cannot be denied that the right of sexual self-determination is one of the fundamental rights under the Constitution, and a universal right naturally recognized even for soldiers. However, even such a fundamental right may be restricted by Act to the extent necessary for national security and the maintenance of law and order. Therefore, even if the right of sexual self-determination of soldiers, etc. is restricted by the punishment of consensual sexual acts, if, as will be discussed below, based on a constitutional interpretation, the current provision is interpreted as applying only to a situation at the time of the act where there is a risk of directly and specifically infringing on the protected legal interest of the sound life and discipline of the military community, this constitutes a restriction by Act within the necessary scope and cannot be said to be unconstitutional.
C. The current provision and the right of sexual self-determination
(1) The Military Criminal Act, as a special law to the Criminal Act prescribing crimes and punishments, is a statute applicable to soldiers, etc., not to civilians. The Military Criminal Act can be divided into provisions that modify what exists in general criminal law to fit soldiers, etc., and provisions that exist uniquely in the Military Criminal Act. While crimes under the Criminal Act are classified according to protected legal interests into personal, social, and national legal interests, crimes under the Military Criminal Act have as their basic protected legal interest the normal functioning of the military organization and the maintenance of the hierarchical order and command system necessary therefor. Therefore, crimes under the Military Criminal Act are fundamentally based on a national legal interest, and even if other protected legal interests can be conceived, they should be regarded as incidental to the national legal interest.
When the Military Criminal Act was amended on November 2, 2009 to newly establish provisions imposing aggravated punishment for sexual violence crimes such as rape and forcible molestation against soldiers, it provided that these were crimes requiring a complaint by the victim (former Military Criminal Act Article 92-8); however, while placing the crime of molestation under Article 92-5 of the former Military Criminal Act in the same chapter, it did not, unlike other provisions punishing sexual violence crimes, provide that it was a crime requiring a complaint by the victim. The reason the crime of molestation under Article 92-5 of the former Military Criminal Act was not provided as a crime requiring a complaint by the victim, even though its statutory penalty was lower than that for sexual violence crimes such as rape and forcible molestation, is that the crime of molestation is a provision that punishes even consensual sexual acts, so that a victim as the holder of the right to file a complaint cannot be envisioned.
(2) The right of sexual self-determination derived from Articles 10 and 17 of the Constitution has a positive aspect, namely the right to decide on the sexual act one wishes to engage in, and a negative aspect, namely the right to refuse an unwanted sexual act (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 2015Do9436 delivered August 27, 2020). Although both use a shared concept, they must be clearly distinguished.
The right of sexual self-determination as the protected legal interest in sex crimes refers to this negative aspect. Since the current provision subjects even consensual sexual acts to punishment, thereby restricting the positive aspect of sexual freedom, the right of sexual self-determination may be discussed in the process of determining whether such restriction is constitutional. However, in the current provision, for which a victim cannot be envisioned, there is no room for the negative aspect of the right of sexual self-determination to be at issue as a protected legal interest. Therefore, it cannot be said that the right of sexual self-determination is included in the protected legal interest of the current provision.
(3) However, the majority opinion includes the right of sexual self-determination within the protected legal interest of the current provision. According to this, where anal sex or other similar acts by soldiers, etc. are not based on voluntary consent, they may become subject to the current provision even if carried out in a private space. This amounts to recognizing what is called a crime of nonconsensual molestation.
There is a division of opinion as to whether crimes of nonconsensual sexual intercourse or molestation should be newly established in the Criminal Act and elsewhere, punishing sexual acts carried out against one party's will without other coercive means such as assault, intimidation, deception, or abuse of power. Some argue that the introduction of crimes of nonconsensual sexual intercourse or molestation is necessary for the full protection of the right of sexual self-determination and to eliminate gaps in punishment, while others oppose it on grounds such as the ambiguity of the constituent element of "consent" and excessive intervention by the State's power to punish into private life. In the 20th National Assembly alone, ten bills were introduced but failed to pass and were discarded upon expiration of the term, and in the 21st National Assembly as well, several bills have been introduced and are under discussion.
This matter should preferably be resolved through the National Assembly's legislative process after sufficient discussion and the formation of social consensus. Therefore, including the sexual self-determination right of the other party to the act within the protected legal interest of the current provision amounts to introducing, not through legislation but through statutory interpretation, a "crime of nonconsensual molestation" applicable only to soldiers, etc. Moreover, it would introduce not a general crime of nonconsensual molestation, but a crime of nonconsensual molestation limited to anal sex or similar acts. This is difficult to readily accept, as it would cause significant controversy in the criminal justice system.
D. Constitutional interpretation of the current provision
(1) In light of the historical development that has expanded freedom and the global trend of prohibiting discrimination or punishment on grounds of a particular sexual orientation, applying the current provision as it is, even though it is not a provision enacted to punish a particular sexual orientation, results in restricting the positive aspect of the right of sexual self-determination, which is a constitutional right, and imposes a social stigma on minorities, thereby raising a possibility of constitutional violation.
The Constitutional Court has held that "other molestation" under Article 92-5 of the former Military Criminal Act, a provision to the same effect as the current provision, ultimately means, excluding forcible molestation by assault or intimidation or quasi-forcible molestation by taking advantage of a state of unconsciousness or inability to resist, an act of sexual gratification between same-sex soldiers not amounting to sodomy that objectively causes disgust to the general public and is contrary to sound sexual morality, thereby infringing on the sound life and discipline of the military community, and that whether a sexual act between same-sex soldiers in a specific case falls under the provision at issue is an ordinary matter of statutory interpretation and application by the courts, to be determined by comprehensively considering all relevant circumstances, such as the actor's intent, the specific manner of the act, the relationship between the actors, the effect of the act on communal life or military discipline, and the sexual morality of the times (see Constitutional Court en banc Decision 2012Hun-Ba258 delivered July 28, 2016).
The current provision is not a provision intended to punish homosexuality or a particular sexual orientation. The purpose of introducing this provision can be said to be to prevent the weakening of combat power that may result from the pursuit of indiscriminate sexual desires in the course of closed communal living between persons of the same sex. However, the fact that applying the current provision results in an infringement of the constitutional right of sexual freedom cannot be disregarded. It is also necessary to prevent the resulting effect of social stigma. Therefore, there is a need for a constitutional interpretation limiting punishment to situations where there is a risk of directly and specifically infringing on military discipline.
(2) Since the Military Criminal Act must prepare for emergency situations such as being in the presence of the enemy and wartime or insurrection, it often prescribes differently for peacetime and emergency situations. For example, in the case of desertion (Article 30 of the Military Criminal Act), the punishment is imprisonment for not less than one year and not more than ten years in peacetime, but imprisonment for a definite term of not less than five years in wartime, and up to the death penalty in the presence of the enemy.
Furthermore, since the Military Criminal Act is intended to achieve the purposes of the military, it sometimes punishes acts that would be mere grounds for disciplinary action in general society. For example, in the case of feigning illness for the purpose of avoiding duty, i.e., so-called malingering (Article 41, Paragraph 2 of the Military Criminal Act), while ordinarily punishable by imprisonment for not more than one year, in the presence of the enemy it is aggravated to imprisonment for not more than ten years.
As such, the Military Criminal Act sometimes regulates by criminal punishment acts that would be mere grounds for disciplinary action in general society, or punishes the same act differently depending on the circumstances at the time of the act. This is permitted by the special purpose of the Military Criminal Act, namely securing combat power for victory in war. Therefore, even if a specific provision of the Military Criminal Act does not distinguish between circumstances at the time of the act for purposes of punishment, the circumstances at the time of the act may be considered when interpreting and applying that provision.
(3) The current provision does not apply automatically merely because there was anal sex or a similar sexual act between soldiers, etc.; rather, it is reasonable, based on a constitutional interpretation and considering the Military Criminal Act system and protected legal interest discussed above, to determine whether it applies based on the circumstances at the time of the act. In particular, since the role of the military and the significance of its importance are entirely different between emergency situations and peacetime situations, these circumstances must be fully considered.
In short, it is reasonable to hold that the current provision basically applies in situations such as in the presence of the enemy, or in wartime or during an insurrection, while in peacetime it applies only in situations involving military training, sentry duty, or other situations equivalent thereto where there is a risk of directly and specifically infringing on military discipline. Therefore, during free time after completing duty or during leave, since there is no risk of directly and specifically infringing on military discipline, it should be held that the current provision does not apply.
E. Examination of this case
At the time the Defendants and Non-indicted Person committed the acts stated in the charges, it was not an emergency situation, and they were neither in training nor on duty. The Defendants and Non-indicted Person were all career soldiers who did not belong to the same unit, became acquainted with each other personally, and engaged in the acts stated in the charges in the Defendants' single-person quarters on holidays or after working hours, and there were no other circumstances in the process that would directly and specifically infringe on the life and discipline of the military community.
In light of the above circumstances, it is reasonable to hold that the current provision cannot be applied to punish the Defendants' acts.
F. Sub-conclusion
As discussed above, we share the conclusion of the majority opinion that the judgment below finding this part of the charges guilty should be reversed; however, since our reasoning and grounds differ, we set forth this separate opinion.
5. Separate opinion of Justice Kim Sun-su
I agree with the conclusion of the majority opinion that the current provision cannot be applied to punish the Defendants. However, since the majority opinion appears to leave room for imposing criminal punishment under the current provision even where two persons engaged in the sexual act by mutual consent, I express the view that such an interpretation exceeds the bounds of possible textual interpretation and cannot be permitted.
A. The sentence structure of the current provision and its meaning
In interpreting the text of a penal provision, it must be done in a manner that an average person with sound common sense in our society can understand and accept, based on the reading of such an average person. This is because if a court's statutory interpretation becomes divorced from the understanding and perception of the average person, it cannot have persuasive force or normative force for the people.
The sentence structure of the current provision is: "A person (the actor) who commits anal sex or other molestation (the constituent act) against a soldier, etc. (the other party to the act) shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than two years (the punishment)." Given the syntactic structure of this sentence, the component modified by "who committed anal sex or other molestation" is "person," that is, "the actor"; therefore, the current provision is a provision punishing the "actor." Since it is syntactically impossible for "who committed anal sex or other molestation" to modify "the other party to the act," the current provision cannot be viewed as punishing "the other party to the act." That is, the current provision clearly distinguishes between the actor (A) and the other party (B), limits the other party to the act to the object of the postposition equivalent to "against," and, further, does not punish the other party but punishes only the actor. Interpreting the current provision as a basis provision for punishing not only the actor but also the other party to the act exceeds the bounds of possible textual interpretation and clearly violates the principle of legality (죄형법정주의).
The summary of this part of the charges, which the court below found guilty, is: ① Defendant 1 committed molestation with (not "against") Non-indicted Person by means of kissing, oral sex, anal sex, etc. (hereinafter "the acts in this case"); and ② Defendant 2 committed molestation with (not "against") Defendant 1 by means of the acts in this case.
"The actor (A) committing the acts in this case against the other party (B)" and "the actor (A) committing the acts in this case with the other party (B)" are clearly distinguished, and the two cannot be treated as identical.
[Reasoning]
The dissenting opinion states that the meaning of adding "against military personnel, etc." when the Military Criminal Act (군형법) was amended in 2013 was merely to specify the other party of the act as "military personnel, etc." However, as a means of limiting the status of the other party of the act, there is not only the method of using the postposition-equivalent expression "against" (에 대하여) but also the method of using the comitative postposition "with" (과). For this reason, the significance of the 2013 amendment should not be understood merely as limiting the status of the other party, but attention should be paid to the fact that such limitation was expressed using the postposition-equivalent expression "against" rather than the comitative postposition "with." While the supplementary opinion to the majority opinion points out the above, it grasps its meaning only to the extent that the actor's intent should be given importance, but the sentence structure of the current provision, which uses the postposition-equivalent expression "against," carries a more important meaning than that.
Where the postposition-equivalent expression "against" is used as in the current provision, the other party merely becomes the object affected by the influence of the predicate act performed by the subject, and the unidirectionality of the act is highlighted, so it cannot be interpreted in connection with the meaning of interactivity or mutual consent between the subject and the object. In other words, an interpretation that the provision can also apply where two persons act by mutual consent cannot be derived from the meaning of the postposition-equivalent expression "against." Ultimately, under the current provision as amended to "against," it must be held that only the person who performed the act can be punished, and the other party cannot be punished. This interpretation follows from the objectively manifested sentence structure and form of the current provision and the meaning and content of its language, and is a matter of course even if the legislator did not intend it, so long as the legislator's intent is not objectively expressed in the statutory language.
Furthermore, since it is difficult to establish an actor and the other party in "sexual acts performed by mutual consent" based on the interpretation of the meaning of the phrase "to mutually consent," it must ultimately be held that the current provision cannot be applied where two persons performed a sexual act by mutual consent. If, where two persons performed the act at issue in this case by mutual consent, it is impossible to distinguish which of the two is the actor and which is the other party, it is reasonable to interpret, in accordance with the principle of nulla poena sine lege, that neither of the two falls within the scope of punishment. Nevertheless, applying the current provision to fictively treat both persons as actors and punishing them clearly violates the principle of nulla poena sine lege.
The reason the military prosecutor failed to specify, in this part of the charged facts, that the Defendants committed indecent acts by performing the act at issue in this case "against the other party" but instead specified that they committed indecent acts by performing the act at issue in this case "with the other party" is because the Defendants performed the act at issue in this case together with the other party by mutual consent. According to the record, it can be seen that the Defendants performed the act at issue in this case by mutual consent and voluntarily, either between the Defendants themselves or between Defendant 1 and the non-indicted person.
Although the current provision defines the constituent element as the actor performing the act at issue in this case "against the other party," this part of the charged facts states that the actor performed the act at issue in this case "with the other party," and thus this part of the charged facts cannot in itself be said to satisfy the constituent elements. The court below should have sought clarification from the military prosecutor as to whether the bill of indictment would be amended to conform to the constituent elements of the current provision, i.e., that the Defendants committed indecent acts by performing the act at issue in this case "against the other party," and then rendered judgment according to the military prosecutor's response. Since the current charged facts do not include the content that the Defendant committed indecent acts by performing the act at issue in this case "against (the other party)," there is also room to view this case as falling under the grounds for a ruling of dismissal of prosecution set forth in Article 328(1)(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act (형사소송법), namely, "where the facts stated in the bill of indictment, even if true, do not include facts constituting a crime."
B. The systematic position of the current provision and the significance of the chapter title
The name of a statute or the title of a chapter or article serves the role of an advance organizer, that is, the role of presenting in advance introductory material of a high degree of abstraction, generality, and comprehensiveness in order to lay the groundwork for incorporating new information into the cognitive structure. Understanding the protected legal interest of the current provision as solely "protection of military discipline" ignores the role or function as an advance organizer performed by the name of the statute called the Military Criminal Act, the provision on the persons subject to application in Article 1, and the titles of each chapter and each provision.
In light of the name of the statute, the Military Criminal Act, and the provision of Article 1, the legal interest of "protection of military discipline" is the common basic protected legal interest of all chapters and all provisions of the Military Criminal Act, and thus it is reasonable to interpret that the crimes in each chapter and each provision additionally protect their own independent legal interests based on the common protected legal interest of "protection of military discipline." It is extremely reasonable, considering the overall system of the Military Criminal Act and the position and title of the current provision, to interpret that Chapter 15, which provides for "Crimes of Rape and Indecent Acts," and the current provision, which among these provides for the crime of indecent acts, protect, in addition to "protection of military discipline," which is the protected legal interest of all crimes under the Military Criminal Act, "sexual freedom" or "the right to sexual self-determination," which is the protected legal interest unique to that chapter.
An interpretation that regards the protected legal interest of the current provision as solely "protection of military discipline" and understands it as entirely unrelated to the "sexual freedom" or "right to sexual self-determination" of military personnel might have been valid under the original Military Criminal Act, where the crime of indecent acts, with its constituent element of "a person who commits sodomy or other indecent acts," was provided in the chapter of "Other Crimes" together with the "quasi-crime of subordinate's crime" and the "crime of political involvement," but it is no longer correct as an interpretive theory for the current provision, in which the constituent element indicator "against military personnel, etc." has been added and which is provided in the chapter of "Crimes of Rape and Indecent Acts" together with the "crime of rape."
C. The meaning of "indecent act"
The Standard Korean Dictionary defines "indecent act" (醜行) as "① dirty and unclean conduct, ② rape or similar acts." Definition ② implies a meaning contrary to the will of the other party, whereas definition ① does not imply such a meaning. Therefore, where two persons performed a sexual act, such as the act at issue in this case, by mutual consent, the possibility of falling under the "indecent act" of definition ② is fundamentally excluded, while the possibility of falling under the "indecent act" of definition ① remains.
Which of the above two definitions the "indecent act" in the current provision corresponds to must be determined by considering all relevant circumstances. Given that the title of Chapter 15, which contains each provision of Article 92 of the Military Criminal Act (Articles 92 through 92-8), is "Crimes of Rape and Indecent Acts," assuming that this title properly performs the role of an advance organizer, Article 92 as a whole should be understood as meaning punishment for acts against the will of the other party. Therefore, it is reasonable to interpret the "indecent act" in the current provision also according to definition ②, which includes the meaning of being against the will of the other party.
Even if the meaning of "indecent act" used in the current provision is understood according to definition ①, it is not reasonable, as an awareness that fails to reflect changes of the times, to evaluate a sexual act performed by mutual consent between two persons as "dirty and unclean conduct." What constitutes "dirty and unclean conduct" cannot be determined uniformly, and can only be determined by comprehensively considering various factors. The Supreme Court has stated regarding the concept of "indecent act" in sex crimes that "an indecent act refers to an act that objectively causes sexual shame or disgust to ordinary people and is contrary to sound sexual morality, thereby infringing on the victim's sexual freedom, and whether an act falls under this must be carefully determined by comprehensively considering the victim's intent, gender, age, the prior relationship between the actor and the victim, the circumstances leading to the act, the specific manner of the act, the surrounding objective circumstances, and the sexual moral concepts of the era, among other factors" (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2015Do6980, decided September 10, 2015). Since one of the important factors to consider in determining whether something falls under "indecent act" is "the sexual moral concepts of the era," "the sexual moral concepts of this era" must also be considered in determining whether something falls under "indecent act" in the current provision. It is essential for courts, when interpreting statutes, to consider the current legal consciousness of this era in order to interpret and apply the law validly in specific cases.
In light of the change in our society's perception of homosexuality as explained in the majority opinion and its supplementary opinion, consensual sexual acts between adults of the same sex cannot be evaluated as "dirty and unclean conduct" in light of the sexual moral concepts of this era. No matter how much the special characteristics of the military are taken into account, only acts that cause specific harm against the will of one party, as with indecent acts under the Criminal Act, should be evaluated as "dirty and unclean conduct" under the current provision as well. This is fully possible and absolutely necessary in the process of statutory interpretation to determine the meaning of the normative concept of "indecent act," and does not exceed the scope of textual interpretation or the court's power of interpretation.
The dissenting opinion states that the language, legislative history, and protected legal interest of the current provision are clear, leaving no room for other interpretations, but even the Supreme Court Decision 73Do1915, cited by the dissenting opinion as the legislative background for the amendment of the current provision, stated that the language of the "crime of indecent acts," which provided for "a person who commits sodomy or other indecent acts," was unclear, and interpreted restrictively, considering the legislative purpose and protected legal interest of that provision, that it does not apply to "acts with civilians." While the dissenting opinion goes to great lengths to deny that the acts punished by the current provision are limited to acts of homosexuals, it, on the other hand, as pointed out by the supplementary opinion to the majority opinion, gives a restrictive interpretation that it applies to acts of "male" military personnel, etc., which appears nowhere in the language. According to the dissenting opinion's own logic, this too would not be free from the criticism that it exceeds the scope of textual interpretation or the court's power of interpretation.
Meanwhile, the criticism that an interpretation whereby the current provision should apply only where it is against the will of one party would introduce a crime of non-consensual indecent acts solely within the military, thereby causing great controversy in the criminal justice system, is not valid. The above interpretation is intended to establish the scope of application of the current provision through a reasonable interpretation of its sentence structure, system, and the meaning of "indecent act," and does not introduce any new crime. Furthermore, since the above interpretation merely seeks to prevent the current provision from being unjustly applied contrary to its language and sentence structure by clarifying its scope of application, it cannot be said to cause controversy in the criminal justice system.
D. Whether a gap in punishment arises
Even if it is interpreted that the current provision cannot be applied to punish sexual acts performed by two persons by mutual consent where such acts specifically and directly infringe on military discipline, no gap in punishment arises.
Where the act at issue in this case can be evaluated as infringing on military discipline because it was performed publicly, the actors can be punished for the crime of public indecency. Where the two persons' performance of the act at issue in this case results in desertion, neglect of duty, or the like, thereby specifically and directly infringing on military discipline, they can be punished by applying the relevant provisions governing desertion, neglect of duty, and the like. Furthermore, where the infringement of military discipline does not reach the point of requiring criminal punishment, military discipline can be sufficiently established, if necessary, through appropriate disciplinary action.
Rather, if the current provision is applied uniformly even to cases where two persons acted by mutual consent, there is a constant risk of abuse of the state's power to punish military personnel. This case began when the Army Headquarters Central Investigation Team, while investigating and booking one (rank 3 omitted) for same-sex sexual conduct, obtained information about the homosexual partner soldier and expanded the scope of investigation, investigating dozens of military personnel, etc. regarding their past conduct, and then indicting more than a dozen military personnel, etc. According to the record, the military personnel, etc. subject to investigation at the time, including the Defendants, appear to have been serving without any particular problems, and no circumstances justifying the investigative agency's commencement of investigation, other than the current provision, can be found. It is doubtful whether investigating and punishing by digging into the secret private life of a soldier who is serving faithfully without any problems truly has a positive effect on establishing and protecting military discipline.
Therefore, it must be said that applying the current provision, under the name of "protection of military discipline," which is the common protected legal interest of all provisions of the Military Criminal Act, to criminally punish both persons even where two persons performed a sexual act by mutual consent, violates the principle that criminal punishment should be the last resort.
E. Finally, it should be pointed out that when interpreting any penal statute, an accurate interpretation of the language from a linguistic standpoint should precede reference to foreign legislative examples, and that prior review by language experts is also necessary in the National Assembly's legislative process.
6. Dissenting Opinion of Justice Cho Jae-yeon and Justice Lee Dong-won
A. The essence of this case and the gist of the dissenting opinion
The essence of this case does not lie in discussing homosexuality, an individual's sexual orientation, or the right to sexual self-determination. It is a matter concerning the maintenance of discipline in the special society that is the military.
This part of the charged facts, which the court below found guilty, is that the Defendants, who are male soldiers, engaged in anal intercourse and indecent acts with each other. Article 92-6 of the Military Criminal Act provides for the punishment of the act of "anal intercourse or other indecent acts" by "military personnel, etc." against "military personnel, etc." The "anal intercourse" in the current provision is itself clear in its language, and "other indecent acts" can also be interpreted as an act equivalent to anal intercourse in accordance with the exemplary legislative form, while there are no particular limitations on the constituent elements regarding the coercive nature of the act or the time and place. Furthermore, the acts punished by the current provision are anal intercourse or other indecent acts between male "military personnel, etc.," including acts by non-homosexuals, and are not limited to acts by homosexuals.
Therefore, in this case, the only issue is whether the Defendants' acts fall under "anal intercourse or other indecent acts" punished by the current provision, and it is not appropriate to restrictively interpret the constituent act or to consider an individual's sexual orientation or right to sexual self-determination, such as homosexuality.
The majority opinion states that the current provision does not apply where anal intercourse or other similar acts between soldiers of the same sex, performed in a private space through voluntary mutual agreement, are difficult to view as directly and specifically infringing on the sound life and discipline of the community that is the military (hereinafter "military discipline").
However, this majority opinion cannot be agreed with, as it exceeds the possible meaning of the language of the current provision and departs from the limits of the power of statutory interpretation granted to courts. The specific reasons are as follows.
B. Interpretation of the current provision
(1) Principles of statutory interpretation
Statutory interpretation is the work of clarifying the meaning of the statutory language written in the code, and its purpose is to elucidate the objective meaning inherent in the statute itself. Therefore, in principle, statutory interpretation should be faithful to the ordinary meaning of the language used in the statute to the extent possible, and further, systematic and logical interpretation methods that consider the legislative purpose and objective, the history of enactment and amendment, harmony with the legal order as a whole, and relationships with other statutes should be added to ensure a valid interpretation that meets the demands of statutory interpretation. This is a principle also cited by the majority opinion.
However, if the language itself consists of relatively clear concepts and is not logically contradictory, in principle there is no further need to utilize other interpretive methods, or their use is necessarily limited (see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Decision 2015Do8335, decided December 21, 2017; Supreme Court en banc Decision 2019Do11294, decided August 27, 2020). Even in cases of teleological interpretation or constitutionally conforming interpretation, in order for such interpretation to remain statutory interpretation rather than legislation, it must not go beyond the limits of the meaning of the language and context, except in exceptional cases such as: where a matter was not provided for, or was insufficiently provided for, because the legislator could not have anticipated it at the time of enactment; where there is a clear error in the statute or the contents of the statute are mutually contradictory or conflicting; where the result of applying the statutory language as it stands is judged to be extremely unreasonable, deviating from the legislative intent; or where literal application is actually impossible.
(2) Specific interpretation of the current provision
The current provision provides that a person who commits anal intercourse or other indecent acts against "military personnel, etc." shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than two years, and Article 1 of the Military Criminal Act defines the persons subject to application of the Military Criminal Act as "military personnel, etc." Therefore, the current provision is a penal statute whose constituent element is the act of "military personnel, etc." committing "anal intercourse or other indecent acts" against "military personnel, etc.," and ultimately, among the constituent elements of the current provision, the part requiring interpretation concerns the "act" element of "anal intercourse or other indecent acts," among the subject, object (the other party), and act.
(A) First, let us examine the language.
The current provision expressly states its title as "Indecent Acts," and takes the exemplary legislative form of citing "anal intercourse" as the representative constituent act, followed immediately by "other indecent acts," using the somewhat general term "indecent act." The major premise that the legislator intends to regulate is "indecent act," and "anal intercourse" is cited as its typical and representative act, so "anal intercourse" serves as an interpretive guideline for what "indecent act" in the current provision means. Meanwhile, the current provision does not place any limitation on other constituent elements such as the coercive nature of the constituent act or the time and place of the act.
Where there is no definitional provision for a term used in a statute, in principle, the term must be construed according to its dictionary definition or other generally accepted meaning (see the above Supreme Court en banc Decision 2015Do8335, etc.). The Military Criminal Act has no definitional provision including, as to the meaning of "anal intercourse" or "indecent act," elements such as that the act was performed against the will of the other party or the time and place of the act.
If so, insofar as concerns the constituent elements regarding whether the act is coercive or the time and place of the act, on which there is no textual limitation, the principle is that there is no exception to the constituent act of the current provision. This means that the legislator, at the legislative stage, did not allow room for judgment and evaluation in that area by not recognizing exceptions with respect to certain constituent elements, and thus the court's power of interpretation cannot extend to that area.
(B) Next, let us examine the legislative history.
The crime of indecent acts existed from the time of the original Military Criminal Act, and was provided in its last chapter, Chapter 15, "Other Crimes." At that time, although the then-effective Criminal Act's Chapter 32, "Crimes Concerning Chastity," provided for the crime of forcible indecent acts (Article 298), the crime of quasi-forcible indecent acts (Article 299), and the crime of indecent acts by deception or force against a person of diminished mental capacity (Article 302), the original Military Criminal Act separately established Article 92 (Indecent Acts) and set a statutory penalty lower than that of each of the above crimes under the Criminal Act. Furthermore, unlike each of the above crimes under the Criminal Act, the original Military Criminal Act did not provide for the crime of indecent acts as an offense requiring a complaint (親告罪). The former Military Criminal Act, as amended by Act No. 9820 of 2009, newly established Chapter 15, "Crimes of Rape and Indecent Acts," within which it separately newly established the crime of forcible indecent acts (Article 92-2), punishing a person who commits indecent acts against military personnel, etc. by violence or intimidation, and the crime of quasi-forcible indecent acts (Article 92-3), punishing a person who commits indecent acts by taking advantage of a state of unconsciousness or inability to resist of military personnel, etc., setting statutory penalties higher than those under the Criminal Act, while providing that these crimes require a complaint (Article 92-8). However, the former Military Criminal Act, while moving the provision on the crime of indecent acts from Article 92 to Article 92-5, only raised the statutory penalty from imprisonment for not more than one year to imprisonment for not more than two years, maintaining as they were the content regarding the constituent elements of the crime of indecent acts and the exclusion from offenses requiring a complaint. Article 92-5 (Indecent Acts) of the former Military Criminal Act was, through the amendment by Act No. 11734 of 2013, again moved in provision number to Article 92-6, while "against military personnel, etc." was added to the language, and the term "sodomy" (계간) was changed to "anal intercourse" (항문성교), and "etc." (기타) was changed to "and the like" (그 밖에), thereby becoming the current provision.
The 2013 amendment refined the term (sodomy) that demeaned same-sex sexual conduct, while at the same time resolving the previous interpretive controversy as to whether, since the pre-amendment provision did not specify the object of the indecent act, "other indecent acts" meant only indecent acts "between soldiers" or also included indecent acts "between soldiers and civilians who are not soldiers," and reflected the Supreme Court's determination (Supreme Court Decision 73Do1915, decided September 25, 1973) that it was reasonable to interpret that "the above provision does not apply to acts of perverse sexual gratification in private life relationships with civilians." Accordingly, the current provision expressly limited the other party of the indecent act to "military personnel, etc." and added the phrase "against" to mean that only acts between "military personnel, etc." are punished.
In light of the above legislative history, "anal intercourse" in the current provision can be said to still refer to the act of "anal intercourse" between male "military personnel, etc.," just as under the crime of indecent acts under the original Military Criminal Act and the former Military Criminal Act. The 2013 amendment merely expressly limited the other party while changing "sodomy" to "anal intercourse" for the "refinement of terminology" of the representative constituent act, and did not add language stating that certain cases would be excluded from the scope of punishment, considering the coercive nature of the act or the time and place, even where the act constitutes "anal intercourse or other indecent acts."
Under the original Military Criminal Act and the former Military Criminal Act, the Supreme Court determined whether an act fell under "sodomy or other indecent acts" without any particular limitation regarding the coercive nature of the act or the time and place (see Supreme Court Decision 2008Do2222, decided May 29, 2008; Supreme Court Decision 2012Do3980, decided June 14, 2012), and the Constitutional Court also rendered decisions of constitutionality premised on such interpretation (see Constitutional Court en banc Decision 2001Hun-Ba70, decided June 27, 2002; Constitutional Court en banc Decision 2008Hun-Ga21, decided March 31, 2011). Under these circumstances, if the legislator had made a legislative decision, as the majority opinion suggests, to exclude certain cases from the scope of punishment, the legislator would have clearly indicated in the language of the current provision, at the time of the 2013 amendment, that the scope of punishment should be limited differently from the interpretation under the original Military Criminal Act and the former Military Criminal Act, rather than merely stating "refinement of terminology" as the reason for the amendment. However, the legislator did not adopt such a legislative form, and thus it cannot be said that the current provision includes a legislative decision to exclude certain cases from the scope of punishment, as asserted by the majority opinion. Nevertheless, limiting the scope of application of the current provision based on reasons not found in the statutory language amounts to modifying the constituent elements set forth by the statute, and thus cannot be accepted as a matter of statutory interpretation theory.
(C) Next, let us examine the protected legal interest of the current provision.
The Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court have consistently stated that the primary protected legal interest of the crime of indecent acts under the original Military Criminal Act and the former Military Criminal Act is not the personal legal interest of "an individual's sexual freedom" but the social legal interest of "military discipline" (see the above Supreme Court Decision 2008Do2222; the above Constitutional Court en banc Decision 2001Hun-Ba70, etc.). This determination has been consistently reaffirmed on numerous occasions and is already established. Furthermore, in light of the history of amendments leading up to the current provision as described above, it is difficult to interpret that the amendments included a change in the status among protected legal interests taking into account the personal legal interest of the right to sexual self-determination, or a meaning limiting the constituent elements regarding the coercive nature of the act or the time and place. No legislative materials can be found showing that such an essential change was intended for the current provision. Therefore, it is difficult to find special circumstances sufficient to change, with respect to the current provision, the determination of the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court regarding the protected legal interest of the crime of indecent acts under the original Military Criminal Act and the former Military Criminal Act, and the previous determination remains valid with respect to the current provision as well.
Even if a sexual act is performed in a private space by the free consent of the actors, so long as the person who performed such act is a member of the community that is the military, it must be viewed as infringing on the social legal interest of "military discipline." What the legislator primarily intends to protect by providing for the special "crime of indecent acts" that exists only in the Military Criminal Act, separately from the Criminal Act, and punishing acts falling thereunder, is the maintenance of "military discipline," a social legal interest not protected under the Criminal Act. In order for a sexual act performed in a private space by free consent not to fall under the constituent elements or to have its illegality excluded, the personal legal interest must basically be the primary protected legal interest. If the primary protected legal interest is a national or social legal interest, then even if a personal legal interest is partially related, it cannot be said that the other party's consent or the private nature of the space results in the exclusion of the constituent elements or illegality.
(D) Furthermore, let us examine this through organic and systematic interpretation with other provisions of the Military Criminal Act and other penal provisions.
The former Military Criminal Act separately provided for the crime of forcible indecent acts in Article 92-2 and the crime of quasi-forcible indecent acts in Article 92-3, thereby enabling forcible indecent acts by violence or intimidation, or quasi-forcible indecent acts taking advantage of a state of unconsciousness or inability to resist, to be punished under these provisions. With the amendment by Act No. 11734 of 2013, each of the above crimes was moved to Articles 92-3 and 92-4, respectively, and the crime of quasi-rape was separately newly established in Article 92-2, so that anal intercourse by violence or intimidation came to be punished under Article 92-2. When the Act on the Punishment of Sexual Crimes and Protection of Victims Thereof (성폭력범죄의 처벌 및 피해자 보호 등에 관한 법률) was enacted on January 5, 1994, the crime of indecent acts by abuse of occupational authority, etc. was newly established in Article 11, which came to be placed in Article 10 of the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Punishment of Sexual Crimes (성폭력범죄의 처벌 등에 관한 특례법), enacted on April 15, 2010, and was converted into a non-complaint offense in the full amendment of the above Act on December 18, 2012. Meanwhile, while the statutory penalty of the current provision is imprisonment for not more than two years, the statutory penalties of Article 92-2 (quasi-rape), Article 92-3 (forcible indecent acts), and Article 92-4 (quasi-forcible indecent acts) of the Military Criminal Act are imprisonment for a limited term of not less than three years or not less than one year, and the statutory penalty for the crime of indecent acts by abuse of occupational authority, etc. is imprisonment for not more than three years or a fine of not more than 15 million won.
In light of the fact that the statutory penalty of the current provision is markedly lower than the statutory penalties for crimes related to indecent acts accompanied by coercion as above, it is reasonable to view that the current provision punishes, as an act of lesser punishability than each of the above crimes, indecent acts not accompanied by coercion. Adding to this the purport of Article 4 of the Military Criminal Act, which provides that, regarding a crime committed by a person subject to the Military Criminal Act, if there is no special provision in the Military Criminal Act, other statutes shall govern, it can be seen that the independent significance of the current provision lies, in effect, in punishing anal intercourse and other indecent acts that are not against the will of the other party. However, if, as the majority opinion holds, acts performed in a private space by voluntary mutual agreement are excluded from the constituent act of the current provision, then, separately from the question of whether the current provision should be abolished or amended, there would in effect be almost no room to apply the current provision. This amounts to the court disregarding the written penal statute and, through interpretation, rendering a living statute a dead letter in order to shed a provision it finds unsatisfactory, and considering the constitutional principle of the binding of judges by statute, this is not something that can be adopted as a proper interpretive theory.
(E) Meanwhile, the "change in the normative legal evaluation of same-sex sexual conduct" referred to by the majority opinion cannot be regarded as a standard for interpreting the constituent elements of the current provision.
It may be possible to make the normative evaluation that "same-sex sexual conduct performed in a private space by free consent, as a normal act of sexual gratification, does not constitute conduct that causes disgust to society in general and is contrary to sexual moral concepts," or that "punishing such conduct may be contrary to the spirit of the Constitution." However, the current provision, in its language, merely takes anal intercourse as the representative constituent act and provides for indecent acts equivalent thereto as the object of punishment, and does not have language that differentiates the evaluation of the act according to the means, time, and place of the act, or that can be viewed as implying such purport. As far as the current provision is concerned, the interpretive standard raised by the majority opinion would result in the exercise of authority beyond the scope delegated to judicial institutions.
C. The court's mission and the limits of statutory interpretation
(1) The limits of teleological interpretation and constitutionally conforming interpretation
(A) The majority opinion states that there is a need for a so-called teleological restrictive interpretation and constitutionally conforming interpretation of the current provision, on the grounds that applying the current provision as it stands does not conform to the trend of the times, infringes on the human rights of sexual minorities, and is otherwise inconsistent with the Constitution.
However, teleological interpretation or constitutionally conforming interpretation is also possible only within the limits of the ordinary meaning of the language. If, according to the language, only one interpretation is possible and no other interpretation is possible, then no interpretation other than either accepting that one interpretation (constitutional) or not accepting it (unconstitutional) is possible. Constitutionally conforming interpretation of a particular legal norm is, after all, only the principle that where the statutory language is ambiguous such that there is room to interpret it either unconstitutionally or constitutionally, it should not be determined to be unconstitutional; it does not mean that one can, by forced interpretation exceeding the general meaning of the statutory language or contrary to the clear will and purport of the enacting authority in light of the purpose of the statute's enactment, intervene even in matters falling within the scope of the enacting authority's legislative discretion.
As seen above, the current provision is clear in itself in its language, and organic and systematic interpretation together with the Military Criminal Act and other related penal statutes only further clarifies the literal meaning; it does not fall under a case where multiple interpretations are possible or where the provision is silent regarding certain situations. Therefore, interpreting the current provision in a manner that exceeds the possible meaning of the language cannot be said to fall within the court's power.
(B) There may be areas requiring the court's law-forming activity, such as where a matter was not provided for, or was insufficiently provided for, because the legislator could not have anticipated it at all at the time of the statute's enactment, or where the result of applying the statutory language as it stands is judged to be extremely unreasonable, deviating from the legislative intent.
The current provision, even though the Military Criminal Act was enacted in 1962 and amended in 2009 and 2013, has consistently not included in its statutory language any limitation based on whether the act was against the will of the other party or based on time and place. Considering this legislative history and consistent manner of provision of the current provision, it cannot be said that the legislator, without at all anticipating the issue of the right to sexual self-determination of sexual minorities within the military, enacted legislation such as the current provision, thereby creating a gap in the statute or providing for it insufficiently. Nor can it be said that the result of applying the language of the current provision as it stands is an unreasonable case deviating from the legislator's intent. Rather, it is more consistent with the principles of statutory interpretation to interpret that, in consideration of the special characteristics of military life, such as the fact that, due to the nature of military service relationships premised on strict discipline of superior-subordinate relations and collective communal life, sexual acts between "military personnel, etc." are highly likely to appear as sexual acts by coercion disguised as consent, the means constituting "anal intercourse or other indecent acts" and other elements were not limited. This is also true in light of the fact that the Military Criminal Act, in some instances, criminalizes even acts not criminalized under the general Criminal Act, such as the crime of unauthorized absence (Article 79), the quasi-crime of subordinate's crime (Article 93), and the crime of political involvement (Article 94), and sets a higher degree of punishment compared to the same types of crimes under the general Criminal Act.
(C) Therefore, an interpretation that uses teleological restrictive interpretation or constitutionally conforming interpretation methods, as in the majority opinion, to alter the constituent elements of the current provision beyond the possible meaning of the language, should be held impermissible. That is, once an act falls under "anal intercourse or other indecent acts" as defined in the current provision, it thereby becomes subject to the above provision, and there is no basis for further differentiating whether it applies depending on whether it "directly and specifically infringed on military discipline," taking into account circumstances such as "whether it was in a private space" and "whether it was by voluntary mutual agreement," as the majority opinion does. Interpreting in the manner of the majority opinion is equivalent to the court establishing a proviso not found in the statutory language. This clearly exceeds the limits of the court's power of statutory interpretation by pursuing law formation or statutory amendment contrary to the express provision. The majority opinion can be considered as a matter of legislative theory, but is difficult to accept as an interpretive theory of the current provision, and it can be said to be treating a matter of legislative policy as a matter of statutory interpretation.
(2) The court's authority and mission
The court must apply a statute enacted by the National Assembly unless and until it is held unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court, and this is all the more so where, as with the crime of indecent acts under the Military Criminal Act, constitutionality has already been upheld on several occasions.
The Constitutional Court has, on three occasions, rendered decisions upholding the constitutionality of Article 92 of the original Military Criminal Act and Article 92-5 of the former Military Criminal Act, premised on the interpretation that there is no separate limitation regarding whether the act was consensual or regarding the time and place of the act (see the above Constitutional Court en banc Decision 2001Hun-Ba70; the above Constitutional Court en banc Decision 2008Hun-Ga21; Constitutional Court en banc Decision 2012Hun-Ba258, decided July 28, 2016), and the Supreme Court has also repeatedly expressed interpretive theories to the same effect (see the above Supreme Court Decision 2008Do2222; the above Supreme Court Decision 2012Do3980). Such interpretations in the previous Constitutional Court decisions and Supreme Court precedents are valid, and since that interpretation is effective not only with respect to Article 92 (Indecent Acts) of the original Military Criminal Act but also with respect to the current provision, it should be maintained as it is unless there is separate legislative action.
Even if the result of applying a statute is unsatisfactory, this should be resolved through decisions of the Constitutional Court and amendments to the law by the legislative body, and it is contrary to the constitutional spirit of separation of powers for the court to substitute for these institutions in the name of statutory interpretation. Refusing to apply the statute itself merely because the statute has become outdated or because the result of interpretation is unreasonable, and thereby limiting or modifying the clear meaning of the language of a penal statute, cannot be said to fall within the authority granted to the courts by the people. This is the same even if it is in a direction favorable to the defendant or, as a result, in the "correct" direction. This is an essential requirement of the principle of separation of powers, which is the foundation of democracy, and is a limit under Article 40 (legislative power), Article 103 (independence of judges), and Article 111 (authority of the Constitutional Court, etc.) of the Constitution.
D. Conclusion
The current provision should be interpreted as applying even to acts performed in a private space under voluntary mutual agreement. The judgment of the court below, which found the Defendants, male soldiers, guilty of the charged facts on the ground that their anal intercourse, oral sex, and mutual ejaculatory acts constitute "indecent acts" infringing on the social legal interest of military discipline, is justified.
The question of what act should be defined as a crime and how it should be punished is a matter for the legislator to decide by comprehensively considering various factors, including not only the nature of the crime and the protected legal interest but also our history and culture, the circumstances of the times at the time of legislation, the values and legal sentiments of the general public, and criminal policy considerations for crime prevention. It is not desirable for judges to determine whether a particular act should be resolved through disciplinary action or made subject to criminal punishment. This is not to say that the current provision should be maintained as it is from a legislative policy standpoint. A conclusion such as that of the majority opinion should be determined, not by a few judges, but in the form of a social consensus reached through sufficient discussion based on research by experts, by citizens of society as a whole who have a practical stake in the matter, through legitimate legislative procedures established by the Constitution and statutes. The majority opinion is difficult to accept because it seeks to achieve, through a judicial determination exceeding the statutory language, a conclusion that should be obtained through discussion and legislative procedures involving communication among civil society, academia, the legal profession, and the political sphere.
For the reasons stated above, it is stated that we cannot agree with the majority opinion.
7. Supplementary Opinion of Justice Kim Jae-hyung, Justice Noh Jeong-hee, Justice Cheon Dae-yeop, and Justice Oh Kyung-mi to the Majority Opinion
We wish to supplement the grounds of the majority opinion regarding the interpretation of the current provision, and to respond in several respects to the dissenting opinion's assertion that the majority opinion exceeds the limits of statutory interpretation.
A. Principles and limits of statutory interpretation
The authority to determine the meaning, content, and scope of application of statutes and apply them to specific cases, that is, the authority to interpret and apply statutes, is an essential content of judicial power, and judicial power belongs to the courts composed of judges (Article 101(1) of the Constitution). Since the courts' power of statutory interpretation is not unlimited, the courts must interpret statutes in a manner that respects the legislature's legislative discretion, but they are not bound by the legislator's intent at the time of the statute's enactment. Moreover, statutory provisions are not always clear, and applying a statute literally sometimes produces unreasonable results. In such cases, in order to find the proper meaning of the statute and apply it in a manner suited to reality, courts utilize various interpretive methods in addition to textual interpretation, including logical and systematic interpretation, historical interpretation, teleological interpretation, and constitutionally conforming interpretation. As seen in the majority opinion, when interpreting a statute, the legislative purpose and objective, the history of its enactment and amendment, harmony with the legal order as a whole, and relationships with other statutes must all be considered, and "the legal order as a whole" referred to here includes the legal consciousness of society in general, formed around the Constitution, the supreme norm, as its center.
The interpretation of statutes must reflect constitutional provisions and their purport. Where a given statutory provision is open to multiple interpretations, priority must be given to adopting, among those interpretations, the meaning that conforms to the Constitution, thereby engaging in constitution-conforming interpretation to eliminate unconstitutionality; furthermore, among the interpretations that conform to the Constitution, one must engage in constitution-oriented interpretation by adopting the meaning that best realizes constitutional principles and values (see the separate opinion of Justice Kim Jae-hyung in the Supreme Court en banc Decision 2016Du32992, decided September 3, 2020). Such interpretation is grounded in the legal principle that the Constitution, as the supreme norm of the State, must serve as the standard for statutory interpretation so as to secure the unity of the legal order; where the meaning of statutory language is so overly comprehensive that interpreting and applying it according to its literal wording would produce a result contrary to the Constitution, this can be corrected through constitutional interpretation that takes into account the legislative purpose and objective, the history of enactment and amendment, together with constitutional norms.
Statutes are formed on the basis of the legal consciousness generally prevailing in society at the time; accordingly, even statutes with identical content may have their concrete meaning, content, and scope of application change in accordance with changes in the circumstances of the times and society and changes in legal consciousness. In particular, in the case of statutes reflecting the ethical and moral conceptions of the social community, changes in values or legal consciousness may exert influence not only on legislation but also on the process of interpreting and applying the statute. The Supreme Court has stated, with respect to the concept of obscenity, that it is "a relative and fluid concept that varies according to changes in society and the times," and that in determining whether an expressive work is obscene, "an objective and normative evaluation must be made in accordance with the sound social consensus of the times" (see Supreme Court Decision 2006Do3558, decided March 13, 2008). As such, in determining whether to apply a statutory provision whose meaning may change with changes in society and the times, the sound social consensus of the times becomes an important standard.
In a case concerning whether a lawful wife is included within "woman," the object of the crime of rape under Article 297 of the former Criminal Code (Hyeongbeop) (before amendment by Act No. 11574 of December 18, 2012), the Supreme Court, giving significant weight to "changes in awareness of domestic sexual violence," overturned its prior precedent that had denied the establishment of the crime of rape in such cases, and held that a wife whose marital relationship is substantively maintained is also included within "woman" (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 2012Do14788, decided May 16, 2013). This is a representative example in which the Supreme Court changed its interpretation of criminal law in consideration of changes in social circumstances and legal consciousness.
With respect to the "indecent act" requirement at issue in this case, the Supreme Court has already held that whether an act constitutes an indecent act must be determined by taking into account the sexual morality of "that era" (see Supreme Court Decision 2001Do2417, decided April 26, 2002; Supreme Court Decision 2015Do6980, decided September 10, 2015, among others). This means that the meaning of "indecent act" is variable with the passage of time, such that its concept and scope may change. In interpreting a statute, taking into account, within the bounds that do not undermine legal stability, the current legal situation and changes in the general perception of society is essential in order to ensure that a statute enacted long ago can still possess concrete validity applicable to the present era.
In sum, statutory interpretation must not be bound by the subjective intent of the legislators at the time of enactment; rather, it must, through inquiry into the possible meanings of the statutory text, reflect the content and values of the Constitution as the supreme norm, and, taking into account the current legal situation and changes in legal consciousness with the passage of time, elucidate the proper meaning of the statute suited to the present era.
(b) Inquiry into the possible meanings of the statutory text
If the text of the current provision ("anal intercourse or other indecent acts") is applied literally, it must be concluded that even where a male and a female service member engage in anal intercourse by mutual consent, the elements of the offense are satisfied. This is because the current provision does not add any language excluding such a case from the scope of punishment.
The current provision exemplifies "anal intercourse" as the representative act of indecency, and then uses the expression "other indecent acts." If interpreted according to the literal meaning of "anal intercourse," anal intercourse between a male and a female service member by mutual consent cannot be excluded from the elements of the offense; therefore, there is room to interpret "other indecent acts," of which "anal intercourse" is the representative act, as including, by its text alone, sexual acts falling short of anal intercourse engaged in by a male and a female service member by mutual consent. In this way, the dictionary and general meaning of the text of the current provision is so overly comprehensive that interpreting and applying it literally would, contrary to the traditional interpretation of the current provision, bring about the unjust result of expanding the scope of punishment.
The dissenting opinion argues that, in light of the legislative history, "anal intercourse" should be interpreted as limited to acts between male service members and the like. The fact that even the dissenting opinion does not interpret "anal intercourse" according to the meaning literally expressed by the text, but instead narrows the meaning of the text by taking the legislative history into account and thereby limits its scope of application, demonstrates that a purposive interpretation taking into account the legislative history and purpose is necessary for the proper application of the current provision.
"Indecent act" is susceptible of multiple interpretations. What different people consider to be indecent may differ. Some think it refers to rape, forcible indecent act, sexual harassment, and the like, while others think it refers to lewd conduct. The same is true with respect to sexual indecency occurring within the military. Without regard to the relationship with the protected legal interest of military discipline, one might think it refers to any and all sexually licentious conduct within the military, or one might think it refers to any and all sexual acts against one's will. All of these are included within the possible meanings of the text. The very point that the term "indecent act" alone cannot yield all conclusions is the starting point of the majority opinion.
The majority opinion, by comprehensively considering the content and structure of the current provision, the history of statutory amendment and the protected legal interest, and changes in the entire legal order including constitutional provisions, further narrows the scope of application and strictly interprets and applies the penal provision, thereby merely seeking to prevent the unjust result that would arise from subjecting to criminal punishment all matters that could be included within the text; it does not depart from the possible meaning of the text. Rather, the fact that the majority opinion, in determining the scope of application of the current provision, considers together both military discipline and whether the act was against the actor's will in determining whether it constitutes an indecent act, is grounded in textual interpretation.
By the amendment of November 2, 2009, the Military Criminal Act (Gunhyeongbeop) newly established "Chapter 15, Crimes of Rape and Indecent Acts," introducing provisions for aggravated punishment of sexual violence crimes such as rape and forcible indecent acts against service members and others. At that time, Article 92-2 of the former Military Criminal Act, the crime of forcible indecent acts against service members and others, provided for the punishment of a person who commits an indecent act "against a service member or other person" through violence or intimidation. At that time as well, Article 92-5 of the former Military Criminal Act did not use language distinguishing between the subject and the object of the act; however, when Article 92-5 of the former Military Criminal Act was amended into the current provision on April 5, 2013, its wording was changed, in the same manner as the crime of forcible indecent acts against service members and others, to punish a person who commits anal intercourse or other indecent acts "against a service member or other person." This can be viewed as reflecting, first of all, the precedent (see Supreme Court Decision 73Do1915, decided September 25, 1973) holding that the crime of indecent acts under Article 92 of the Military Criminal Act could not be applied to a service member's act of engaging in sexually deviant gratification with a civilian in a private, personal relationship. However, in light of the ordinary meaning of that text, it is natural to view it as distinguishing between the actor who is the subject of the criminal act and the counterpart who is the object of the criminal act. Accordingly, in determining whether an act is punishable under the current provision, whether the intentions of the actor and the counterpart coincided may be an important consideration.
(c) Reasons for considering the actor's intention
The military, in order to carry out its inherent mission of achieving victory in combat, requires a special organization and discipline corresponding thereto. Because the Military Criminal Act is a statute created on the premise of the special characteristics of the military, military discipline serves as an important standard in the enactment, amendment, and application of the Military Criminal Act. However, even for service members, the cases in which sexual activity engaged in of one's own free will, in an area having no substantive relationship to the preservation and maintenance of military discipline, directly and concretely infringes military discipline must necessarily be limited. Rather, looking at the circumstances and social discussion at the time of the 2009 amendment of the Military Criminal Act, sexual acts against one's will occurring as a form of harassment by superiors against subordinates within the military, where strict discipline of command and obedience prevails—that is, acts infringing a service member's sexual self-determination—were cited as the representative acts that markedly undermine the morale of service members and harm the health and discipline of the military community. It can be seen that punishing sexual acts performed against the will of one party, without other coercive force such as violence, intimidation, deception, or force, so as to prevent infringement of a service member's sexual self-determination, also substantively contributes to the protection of military discipline.
Another reason for considering the actor's intention under the current provision lies in the aim of establishing a scope of application with concrete validity. Given the nature of the military, whose essence lies in strict discipline of command and obedience and communal group life, there is no small possibility that sexual activity between service members and others may in fact be sexual activity compelled through coercion disguised as consent. If, without giving full consideration to the actor's intention, it is interpreted that the current provision applies immediately whenever there is sexual activity such as anal intercourse between male service members, then even a substantive victim who was coerced into an indecent act against his will under the guise of consent could become subject to punishment. In order to prevent such an unjust result as well, it is necessary to give significant weight to the actor's intention in determining whether the current provision applies.
(d) The proper meaning of the current provision considering constitutional norms and the present legal consciousness
The dissenting opinion states that the essence of this case does not lie in discussing homosexuality, sexual orientation, or sexual self-determination, but rather concerns the maintenance of discipline in the special society that is the military. The majority opinion does not disregard the importance of military discipline necessary for maintaining discipline in the special society that is the military; it merely holds that the scope of punishment must not be determined based on blind negative evaluation and prejudice against a particular sexual orientation such as homosexuality. This is because, without presupposing a negative evaluation of homosexuality or that sexual orientation itself, one cannot explain why sexual activity engaged in a private space, based on the free and mutual consent of service members of the same sex, infringes military discipline.
In 1962, when the Military Criminal Act was enacted, homosexuality was treated as an abnormal and perverted inclination, and Article 92 of the Military Criminal Act referred to sexual acts between males as "sodomy (鷄姦)," regarding it as an "indecent act" carrying the meaning of "filthy and unclean conduct," and provided for its punishment. However, 60 years later, as of 2022, the perception of homosexuality both domestically and internationally is not the same as it was at the time the Military Criminal Act was enacted.
As seen in the majority opinion, the Supreme Court, in the reasoning of its decision, has acknowledged that societal perceptions of homosexuality are changing. Except for certain countries in Africa, the Middle East, and elsewhere, it is difficult to find countries that criminally punish consensual sexual acts between persons of the same sex. This change in social perception regarding homosexuality and other particular sexual orientations is not only a worldwide trend but has already been reflected in the norms within our own military. Chapter 7 of Part 4 of the Ministry of National Defense Directive on Unit Management (Budae Gwalli Hunryeong) contains detailed provisions regarding "Service of Homosexual Soldiers," and Article 253(1) thereof provides: "Homosexual soldiers within the barracks shall be treated equally, and shall not be discriminated against on the ground of having a homosexual orientation." This is an institutional device, under current statutes and regulations, that recognizes the existence of service members with a homosexual orientation and guarantees that they may serve without discrimination.
The nature and mission of criminal law as a legal norm lies in protecting the fundamental values indispensable to the existence and maintenance of society. Even conduct that presents a clear danger to a significant legal interest or conduct that causes great harm to society should desirably be made subject to the regulation of criminal law only when it cannot be resolved through other norms or means of social control (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 2020Do6085, decided September 9, 2021). Public perception and moral evaluation of homosexual sexual orientation and homosexual acts may vary according to individual views. However, it cannot be said that it is the current legal consciousness of our society that same-sex sexual activity, in itself alone, clearly presents a danger to a significant legal interest or causes such great harm to society that it must necessarily be treated as a criminal offense subject to punishment.
In sum, in our society today, anal intercourse or other sexual activity engaged in consensually between male service members in a private space cannot, by itself alone, readily be regarded as constituting the conceptual marker of an "indecent act," namely "conduct that objectively arouses in ordinary persons a sense of sexual shame or aversion and is contrary to sound sexual morality"; and, absent other special circumstances such as being conducted openly during training, it cannot be said to directly and concretely infringe the sound communal life and discipline of the military as a community. Applying the current provision, without regard to its protected legal interest or elements, to the entirety of anal intercourse or other voluntary and consensual sexual activity between male service members, and treating such conduct as subject to punishment, amounts, without reasonable grounds, to discriminating against persons with a particular sexual orientation, thereby infringing the essential content of sexual self-determination and violating the right to equality. The majority opinion, reflecting the meaning and values of constitutional norms and taking into account the legal consciousness of our society today, is a legitimate interpretation made within the scope of the courts' authority to interpret statutes, in order to eliminate the unconstitutionality of the current provision and rationally establish the scope of punishment.
(e) The authority and duty of the courts
The dissenting opinion, while acknowledging that a normative evaluation is possible to the effect that punishing sexual activity between persons of the same sex engaged in by free mutual consent may run contrary to the spirit of the Constitution, states that this is a matter that must be resolved through legislative amendment by the legislative branch, and that the majority opinion's reliance on such a normative evaluation as grounds for its interpretation of the scope of application of the current provision exceeds the authority to interpret statutes that the people have conferred upon the courts.
However, as seen in (a) above, the authority to determine the interpretation of a statute and its scope of application in a specific case constitutes an essential element of judicial power. The reason the people have conferred this authority upon the judiciary is to ensure that the State faithfully carries out its constitutional duty to confirm and guarantee the inviolable human rights of individual citizens (Article 10, second sentence of the Constitution) by reaching, in specific cases, conclusions that conform to constitutional norms. The reasoning of the dissenting opinion—which, while acknowledging that punishing conduct such as that of the Defendant may run contrary to the spirit of the Constitution, nevertheless narrowly construes the courts' authority to interpret statutes and argues that the appeal should be dismissed while awaiting statutory amendment by the legislature—is difficult to accept.
The judiciary must not, and cannot, take it upon itself to resolve, in the realm of politics, all matters that ought to be resolved through legislation. However, it is the position of the majority opinion that the problem we now face is one that can be resolved, within the framework of the Constitution and statutes, through statutory interpretation. The courts must, in accordance with the Constitution, statutes, and their conscience (Article 103 of the Constitution), make every effort to interpret and apply statutes so as to reach conclusions with concrete validity, so long as legal stability is not undermined. Even upon recognizing the unconstitutionality of a statute, the courts must not turn away from the path available to relieve the parties before them merely on the ground that they must idly await statutory amendment. That is precisely the authority and duty that the people have conferred upon the judiciary.
The foregoing sets forth the supplementary opinion to the majority opinion.
Chief Justice Kim Myeong-su (Presiding Justice), Justice Kim Jae-hyung (Justice in charge), Justice Cho Jae-yeon, Justice Park Jeong-hwa, Justice Ahn Cheol-sang, Justice Min Yu-sook, Justice Kim Seon-su, Justice Lee Dong-won, Justice Noh Jeong-hui, Justice Noh Tae-ak, Justice Lee Heung-gu, Justice Cheon Dae-yeop, Justice Oh Kyung-mi