[Defendants] Defendant 1 and 4 others
[Appellant] Prosecutor
[Defense Counsel] Kwon Du-seop and 1 other, Attorneys at Law, Law Firm Yeoneun
[Judgment Below] Daejeon District Court Decision 2014No390 Decided January 15, 2015
[Order]
The appeal is dismissed in its entirety.
[Reasoning]
The grounds of appeal are examined.
1. As to the point regarding Defendant 1's obstruction of business and refusal to leave in connection with the industrial action at the workplace of Non-indicted Corporation 1
A. The right to collective action is a fundamental right guaranteed under Article 33(1) of the Constitution and must be guaranteed to the maximum extent possible, but it may be restricted for public interest reasons such as national security, maintenance of order, or public welfare pursuant to Article 37(2) of the Constitution, and there is an inherent limitation that the exercise of such right must be legitimate (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 2007Do482 Decided March 17, 2011). Since the illegality of an industrial action is deemed to be justified as a legitimate act only in relation to the employer, in principle, legitimacy is not recognized where the legal interests of a third party are infringed. However, since a principal contractor is not, in principle, the employer of workers employed by a subcontractor, where an industrial action by workers employed by a subcontractor takes place at the workplace of the principal contractor and infringes upon the legal interests protected under the Criminal Act belonging to the principal contractor, the mere fact that the industrial action satisfies the requirements of legitimacy in relation to the subcontractor, who is the employer, cannot be deemed to mean that the illegality of the infringement of legal interests is negated as a legitimate act under the law even in relation to the principal contractor, who is not the employer.
However, the workplace of the principal contractor, as the place where workers employed by the subcontractor gather and provide labor together, constitutes the basis of livelihood for the workers employed by the subcontractor, and strikes or slowdowns, which are among the principal means of industrial action, inevitably take place at the workplace of the principal contractor. Moreover, although the principal contractor does not have a direct employment relationship with the workers employed by the subcontractor, the principal contractor enjoys certain benefits from the labor provided by the workers employed by the subcontractor, and in order to enjoy such benefits, the principal contractor has provided its workplace to the workers employed by the subcontractor as a place of labor; therefore, there may be cases where, even if the legal interests of the principal contractor are infringed to a certain extent due to an industrial action occurring at that workplace, such infringement should be tolerated according to social norms. Accordingly, where an industrial action that satisfies the requirements of legitimacy in relation to the subcontractor, who is the employer, takes place at the workplace of the principal contractor and infringes upon the legal interests of the principal contractor protected under the Criminal Act, such action is not always unlawful; where it falls under an act that may be tolerated in light of the spirit of the legal order as a whole or the social ethics or social norms underlying it, the illegality thereof is negated as "an act that does not violate social norms" under Article 20 of the Criminal Act. Whether a given case falls under such circumstances must be determined by comprehensively considering various factors, including the purpose and background of the industrial action, the manner, duration, and mode of the industrial action, the nature of the work performed at the relevant workplace and the size of the workplace, the number of workers participating in the industrial action and the size, characteristics, and customary use of the place or facility where the industrial action was conducted, the degree to which the industrial action restricted the principal contractor's facility management or business operations, and the customary practices of labor union activities within the principal contractor's workplace.
B. According to the reasoning of the judgment below and the record, the following facts may be found.
1) Since around 1998, Non-indicted Corporation 1 has entered into service outsourcing contracts with subcontractors to perform facility management, cleaning, and other services. Most of the workers employed by the subcontractors continued to work in the same positions at the workplace of Non-indicted Corporation 1, with their employment being succeeded to by new subcontractors even when the subcontractor changed.
2) The defendants are workers of Non-indicted Company 2, Inc., a facility management service provider, and Non-indicted Company 3, Inc., a cleaning service provider (hereinafter referred to as "Non-indicted Company 2" and "Non-indicted Company 3," respectively, and collectively as "the subcontractors in this case"), and are members of the ○○○○ Trade Union Federation △△△△△△△△△△△ Trade Union □□ Branch Non-indicted Corporation 1 Chapter (hereinafter referred to as "the labor union in this case" when referring to the trade union, and as "the Non-indicted Corporation 1 Chapter" when referring to the chapter level).
3) After collective bargaining between the labor union in this case and the subcontractors in this case regarding wage increases and other matters broke down, and the labor dispute mediation procedure through the Labor Relations Commission also ended without resolution, the labor union, following a vote by members of the Non-indicted Corporation 1 Chapter, commenced a strike on June 25, 2012 (hereinafter "the strike in this case").
4) On the same day, from around 09:50 to around 12:30, 30 to 40 people, including Defendant 1, the chapter head of the Non-indicted Corporation 1 Chapter, and other members of the Non-indicted Corporation 1 Chapter, gathered on the sidewalk between the main building and the ◇◇◇◇◇◇◇◇ building within the workplace of Non-indicted Corporation 1, turned on loudspeakers installed on a vehicle, shouted slogans demanding wage increases and sincere bargaining from the subcontractors in this case, and sang labor songs accompanied by dance movements.
Similar rallies were held in the same manner at the same location for one hour beginning around 10:00 on the following day, June 26, 2012, and for about one hour and 20 minutes beginning around 10:00 on July 3, 2012, approximately one week later (hereinafter collectively "each of the rallies in this case").
C. Examining the above factual relations and the circumstances found in the record in light of the legal principles set forth above, even though Defendant 1 held each of the rallies in this case together with members of the Non-indicted Corporation 1 Chapter at the workplace of Non-indicted Corporation 1, such conduct is a legitimate act that does not violate social norms, and thus its illegality is negated.
1) Defendant 1 and other members of the Non-indicted Corporation 1 Chapter commenced the strike in this case and demanded wage increases and sincere bargaining in order to press their demands, including wage increases, against the subcontractors in this case. The strike in this case was intended to achieve the legitimate purpose of improving the working conditions and economic status of Defendant 1 and other members of the Non-indicted Corporation 1 Chapter. Each of the rallies in this case was held during the course of the strike in this case in order to maintain solidarity, appeal for the legitimacy of the industrial action, and encourage union members to participate in the industrial action.
2) After collective bargaining between the labor union in this case and the subcontractors in this case broke down and mediation through the Labor Relations Commission also failed to be reached, the union, following a vote by its members, decided to collectively refuse to provide labor and commenced the strike in this case. Defendant 1 and other members of the Non-indicted Corporation 1 Chapter expressed their collective will at the said location as part of the industrial action, using means ordinarily available at rallies or demonstrations, such as shouting slogans, singing labor songs, and marching, and such conduct was carried out peacefully over a relatively short period of time on a total of three days. Such conduct by the members of the Non-indicted Corporation 1 Chapter did not involve violence or destruction of facilities.
Moreover, the place where Defendant 1 and other members of the Non-indicted Corporation 1 Chapter temporarily held a sit-in through each of the rallies in this case was not the interior of the main building, which may be regarded as a key facility for the ☆☆☆☆ work of Non-indicted Corporation 1's employees, but rather the sidewalk between the main building and the ◇◇◇◇◇◇◇◇ building. This location was not a space exclusively used by Non-indicted Corporation 1 for the performance of its business, but a place where free passage was ordinarily permitted even to workers employed by the subcontractors in this case. Defendant 1 and other members of the Non-indicted Corporation 1 Chapter did not go so far as to occupy the location fully and exclusively, such as by excluding Non-indicted Corporation 1's right to manage its facilities.
3) Even if a certain level of noise was generated during each of the rallies in this case, given the nature of each rally in this case as a gathering of many people for a common purpose as part of the exercise of the constitutionally guaranteed right to collective action, a certain degree of noise is unavoidable; on the other hand, it is difficult to conclude that this substantially hindered Non-indicted Corporation 1's employees from performing their ☆☆☆☆ work and other duties normally.
Furthermore, in light of the location, manner, and mode of each of the rallies in this case, the restriction on Non-indicted Corporation 1's right to manage its facilities caused by each of the rallies in this case was also quite limited.
4) Non-indicted Corporation 1 has provided a labor union office in the basement of the main building within its workplace in order to guarantee the legitimate labor union activities of the Non-indicted Corporation 1 Chapter. In addition, the Non-indicted Corporation 1 Chapter conducted collective bargaining with the subcontractors in this case within the workplace of Non-indicted Corporation 1 prior to commencing the strike in this case, and even during the period of the strike in this case, Defendant 1 continued to conduct negotiations with the representative director of Non-indicted Company 3 and others within the workplace of Non-indicted Corporation 1.
5) In order to effectively guarantee the constitutional right to collective action of workers employed by the subcontractors in this case—including encouraging union members who had not participated in the industrial action to do so, preventing unlawful replacement labor, and maintaining solidarity during the period of the industrial action—it was necessary for the industrial action to take place at the workplace of Non-indicted Corporation 1, the place where the labor of these workers was actually provided. On the other hand, due to the location of the head offices or business offices of the subcontractors in this case, it was practically impossible for members of the labor union in this case to effectively exercise their right to collective action at the workplaces of the subcontractors in this case.
D. Therefore, there is no error in the judgment below, which found this portion of the charges against Defendant 1 to constitute a legitimate act and rendered a not-guilty verdict, such as misapprehending the legal principles regarding the legitimacy of industrial action, deviating from the limits of free evaluation of evidence by violating the rules of logic and experience, or omitting judgment, as alleged in the grounds of appeal.
2. As to the point regarding the defendants' obstruction of business in connection with preventing replacement labor
A. An employer may not hire or replace workers unrelated to the relevant business to perform work suspended due to an industrial action during the period of such action (Article 43(1) of the Act on the Establishment, Operation, etc. of Trade Unions and Labor Relations Adjustment (노동조합 및 노동관계조정법, the "Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act")). Where an employer hires or replaces workers unrelated to the relevant business to perform work suspended due to an industrial action, the exercise of a considerable degree of force by workers participating in the industrial action to prevent such unlawful replacement labor is negated as to its illegality, being a legitimate act, in light of the purport of the above provision, which is designed to ensure that industrial action can achieve its intended effect (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 91Da43800 Decided July 14, 1992). Whether the exercise of force to prevent unlawful replacement labor constitutes conduct tolerable in light of social norms, and thus a legitimate act, must be determined individually by comprehensively considering the background, purpose, means and methods, and resulting consequences thereof, examined purposively and reasonably under the specific circumstances.
B. The court below, having found that (1) the act of Non-indicted Company 3, the cleaning service subcontractor of Non-indicted Corporation 1, in deploying the replacement workers in this case to the main building of Non-indicted Corporation 1's head office, constituted unlawful replacement labor, and (2) considering the following circumstances, found that the defendants' obstruction of the work of the replacement workers in this case constituted a legitimate act involving the exercise of force within a reasonable scope to counter the unlawful deployment of replacement workers, and that its illegality was thereby negated not only in relation to Non-indicted Company 3 but likewise in relation to the replacement workers in this case and Non-indicted Corporation 1, and accordingly rendered a not-guilty verdict on this portion of the charges.
1) It appears that the defendants made several attempts to confirm whether the replacement workers in this case were existing workers employed by Non-indicted Company 3, and when, without any confirmation of their employee status from Non-indicted Company 3 or the replacement workers, the replacement workers attempted to perform the cleaning work and other duties suspended due to the strike in this case, the defendants resorted to the exercise of force to prevent this.
2) The defendants obstructed the cleaning work of the replacement workers in this case by blocking their path and shouting at them to stop cleaning and leave, and such conduct, being passive and defensive conduct that did not resort to violence, threats, or destructive acts, is found to fall within a reasonable scope for preventing the employer's unlawful replacement labor.
3) Although it is true that Defendant 2 and certain unidentified members of the Non-indicted Corporation 1 Chapter dumped garbage collected by the replacement workers in this case in the corridor, thereby temporarily damaging the appearance of part of the main building of Non-indicted Corporation 1 and causing inconvenience to the passage of Non-indicted Corporation 1's employees, this act of dumping garbage was also a passive act of resistance intended to deprive the replacement workers in this case of the benefit of their labor, and thus it is difficult to view this act alone as an exercise of force exceeding a reasonable scope.
C. Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the record, the judgment below's determination is based on the legal principles set forth above and is justified, and there is no error in the judgment below, such as misapprehending the legal principles regarding the requirements for a legitimate act, deviating from the limits of free evaluation of evidence by violating the rules of logic and experience, or omitting judgment, as alleged in the grounds of appeal.
3. Conclusion
Therefore, the appeal is dismissed in its entirety, and this Judgment is rendered by the unanimous opinion of the participating Justices, as set forth in the Order.
Justice Ahn Cheol-sang (Presiding Justice), Park Sang-ok, Noh Jeong-hui, Kim Sang-hwan (Justice in Charge)