[Defendant] Defendant
[Appellant] Defendant
[Defense Counsel] Haegwang Law Firm (LLC) and 1 other
[Judgment Below] Seoul Central District Court Decision 2021No363, decided May 20, 2022
[Order]
The appeal is dismissed.
[Reasoning]
The Court determines the grounds for appeal.
1. Determination on the argument of misapprehension of legal principles regarding the right to participate in the procedure for voluntary submission of information storage devices
가. Related legal principles
1) The importance of electronic information contained in an information storage device derives from due process, the principle of warrant requirement, and the principle of proportionality, which the Constitution and the Criminal Procedure Act (형사소송법) seek to realize, together with the secrecy and freedom of private life and the right to self-determination of information.
Where an investigative agency receives, by voluntary submission, an information storage device or a copy thereof in which electronic information subject to seizure and electronic information not subject to seizure are intermingled, and moves such information storage device, etc. to the investigative agency's office or the like to search, copy, or print it out, the investigative agency must, in the course of that series of processes, guarantee the party subject to the execution of a warrant of seizure and search under Articles 219 and 121 of the Criminal Procedure Act (hereinafter "person subject to seizure") or their defense counsel an opportunity to participate, prepare and deliver a list of seized items specifying the file details of the seized electronic information, and take appropriate measures to prevent arbitrary copying of electronic information unrelated to the suspected criminal facts, thereby complying with the principle of warrant requirement and due process. If such measures are not taken, the seizure and search cannot be evaluated as lawful, unless there are special circumstances such as the person subject to seizure having explicitly expressed an intention not to participate, or the purport and progress of the voluntary submission or the nature and content of the process in which the procedural violation occurred being such that it cannot be found that the purport of guaranteeing procedural participation was substantially infringed. This conclusion is not altered even if the investigative agency copied or printed out only the electronic information related to the suspected criminal facts from the information storage device or its copy.
Where a third party such as a victim voluntarily submits an information storage device belonging to the ownership or management of a suspect, it is difficult to view the suspect, who is the actual person subject to seizure, as having consented to the investigative agency's unlimited search of all of the electronic information; moreover, in comparison with the case where the suspect personally submits the device voluntarily, in which case the suspect's right to participate, etc. must be guaranteed, appropriate measures must be taken, absent special circumstances, to guarantee the suspect's procedural rights, such as guaranteeing the right to participate and delivering a list of the seized electronic information (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 2016Do348, decided November 18, 2021, etc.).
2) The term "information storage device belonging to the ownership or management of the suspect," in respect of which the right to participate must be guaranteed to the suspect in addition to the person subject to seizure who voluntarily submitted the information storage device even though the suspect is not the person who submitted it, means a case in which the suspect actually possessed and managed the relevant information storage device at the time of, or up to a time point close in time to, the seizure and search, while holding and exercising exclusive rights of management and disposition over the electronic information as a whole stored in the information storage device, and has not otherwise transferred or abandoned it to a third party according to his or her own intention, such that the suspect can be evaluated as the actual party to the seizure and search with respect to the electronic information as a whole stored in the information storage device. Whether this is the case must be determined based on the externally and objectively recognizable factual state at the time of the seizure and search, rather than through a legal and retrospective determination based on the attribution of rights under civil law. Apart from such externally and objectively recognizable state of dominion and management over the information storage device, the mere fact that the suspect or some other third party was involved in the past in the use of the information storage device or in the creation or use of individual electronic information, or falls under the data subject identified by electronic information generated in that process, does not mean that they must be treated as the actual party subject to the seizure and search (see Supreme Court Decision 2021Do11170, decided January 27, 2022, etc.).
나. Facts found
The following facts may be found from the reasoning of the judgment below and the evidence lawfully adopted.
1) Around August 27, 2019, the investigative agency, starting with the seizure and search of (Name 2 omitted) University, the office of (Name 3 omitted), and (Name 1 omitted) academy, etc. in connection with allegations of admissions and academic misconduct concerning the children of Non-indicted 1 and Non-indicted 2, allegations of misconduct related to private equity fund investment, allegations of misconduct at (Name 1 omitted) academy, etc., began investigating various suspicions in earnest.
2) In preparation for investigations such as seizure and search, Non-indicted 1, in order to conceal the computers, etc. in which electronic information relating to the suspected facts was stored, around August 31, 2019, handed over to Non-indicted 3 three information storage devices (hereinafter "the instant hard disks") that Non-indicted 1, Non-indicted 2, and Non-indicted 4 (hereinafter collectively "Non-indicted 1, etc.") had used at their residence—namely, one of the two information storage devices (one HDD) removed from the computer in the study, and two information storage devices (one HDD and one SSD) removed from the computer of the son, Non-indicted 4—instructing Non-indicted 3 to "hide them until the investigation is over." Non-indicted 3 hid the instant hard disks in, among other places, a personal locker at a gym located in the basement level 1 of a commercial building in Yangcheon-gu, Seoul.
3) The instant hard disks stored evidence that Non-indicted 1 had sought to conceal, namely internship confirmation letters used for the children's college and graduate school admissions, and text messages of persons concerned, including Non-indicted 4 and the Defendant.
4) Around September 10, 2019, the investigative agency placed Non-indicted 3 under investigation as a suspect for the offense of concealment of evidence. On September 11, 2019, Non-indicted 3 voluntarily submitted the instant hard disks to the investigative agency.
5) In the course of the voluntary submission of the instant hard disks and the search, copying, and printing out of the electronic information stored therein, the investigative agency confirmed Non-indicted 3's and his defense counsel's intention to participate and afforded them an opportunity to participate, thereby guaranteeing the right to participate, but Non-indicted 3's side expressed an intention not to participate in the search, copying, and printing-out process. The investigative agency did not confirm such intention to participate with, or afford an opportunity to participate to, Non-indicted 1, etc.
다. Determination
Considering the foregoing legal principles together with the following circumstances discernible from the facts found above, it cannot be found that the right to participate must be guaranteed to Non-indicted 1, etc., who were not the persons who voluntarily submitted the instant hard disks, in addition to Non-indicted 3, who, as the suspect in the offense of concealment of evidence, voluntarily submitted the instant hard disks. In the same vein, the determination of the court below, which recognized the admissibility as evidence of the electronic information stored in the instant hard disks, can be accepted as justified.
1) Non-indicted 3, as the suspect in the offense of concealment of evidence, which is the criminal suspicion that gave rise to the voluntary submission, voluntarily submitted the instant hard disks in the course of the investigation into himself. Although the instant hard disks and the electronic information stored therein constitute evidence relating to the suspected facts of the principal offenders, Non-indicted 1, etc., they simultaneously constitute the direct object of the act of concealment, and thus also constitute evidence relating to Non-indicted 3's suspected offense of concealment of evidence. Accordingly, Non-indicted 3 is a person with a substantial interest in the instant hard disks and the electronic information stored therein. Non-indicted 3 has an interest in participating throughout the entire process, from the voluntary submission of the instant hard disks themselves to the search, copying, and printing out of the electronic information relating to the suspected offense of concealment of evidence.
2) When the investigation into himself and Non-indicted 2, etc. began in earnest, Non-indicted 1 instructed Non-indicted 3 to conceal the instant hard disks and handed them over to him. Non-indicted 3, on his own initiative, hid the instant hard disks in a place known only to himself so that they would not be discovered. Thereafter, when Non-indicted 3 was placed under investigation as a suspect for the offense of concealment of evidence, he disclosed the fact of concealment to the investigative agency and voluntarily submitted the instant hard disks. In light of the circumstances of the concealment and voluntary submission of the instant hard disks and the degree of involvement of Non-indicted 3 and Non-indicted 1, etc. in that process, it must be said that the person who actually possessed the instant hard disks at the time of, or at a time close to, the seizure and search was Non-indicted 3. Furthermore, inasmuch as Non-indicted 3 actually possessed the instant hard disks around that time under the circumstances described above, it may also be found that, absent other special circumstances, the person in a position to actually hold and exercise rights of management and disposition over the electronic information stored therein was likewise Non-indicted 3.
3) Non-indicted 1 was not the suspect in the offense of concealment of evidence, which was the criminal suspicion giving rise to the voluntary submission; moreover, for the purpose of concealing the very existence of the instant hard disks, he handed over the instant hard disks to Non-indicted 3, vaguely requesting that they be concealed "until the investigation into himself is over." This may be viewed as expressing an intention, for the purpose of concealing and severing the external connection between himself and the instant hard disks and the electronic information stored therein, to abandon or wholly transfer to Non-indicted 3 the exclusive dominion and management rights over the instant hard disks, if necessary to achieve that purpose, until the indefinite time limit of "the end of the investigation." As a result, Non-indicted 3 came to be in a position to actually hold and exercise actual and factual dominion over the instant hard disks and exclusive rights of management and disposition over the electronic information stored therein as a whole, and he actually exercised that authority by concealing the instant hard disks in a place of his own choosing and subsequently voluntarily submitting them to the investigative agency.
2. Determination on the remaining grounds of appeal
The court below upheld the judgment of the court of first instance, which found the facts charged in this case guilty, for the reasons stated therein. Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the relevant legal principles and the evidence lawfully adopted, it cannot be found that the court below, without exhausting the necessary deliberation, exceeded the limits of the principle of free evaluation of evidence in violation of the rules of logic and experience, or erred by misapprehending the legal principles regarding the relevance between the seized items and the suspected facts, abuse of the power to prosecute, the principle of presumption of innocence and the principle of trial based on evidence with respect to the falsity of the confirmation letter at issue in this case, deception and the risk of occurrence of a result in the offense of interference with business, intent and joint principal offenders, and the admissibility of secondary evidence, thereby affecting the judgment.
3. Conclusion
Therefore, the final appeal is dismissed, and the judgment is rendered as stated in the Order. The Justices' opinions were unanimous except for the dissenting opinion of Justice Min Yu-suk, Justice Lee Heung-gu, and Justice Oh Kyung-mi. There is a supplementary opinion to the majority opinion by Justice Ahn Cheol-sang, Justice Noh Tae-ak, and Justice Cheon Dae-yeop, and a supplementary opinion to the dissenting opinion by Justice Oh Kyung-mi.
4. Dissenting opinion of Justice Min Yu-suk, Justice Lee Heung-gu, and Justice Oh Kyung-mi
가. Summary of the dissenting opinion
1) The majority opinion holds that, since Non-indicted 3, who voluntarily submitted the instant hard disks, has a substantial interest in the electronic information stored therein as the suspect in the offense of concealment of evidence, and, by actually possessing them, is in a position to actually hold and exercise rights of management and disposition over the relevant electronic information, it is sufficient that his right to participate in the seizure and search procedure was guaranteed, and that Non-indicted 1, etc., who handed over the instant hard disks to Non-indicted 3 in order to conceal evidence relating to the suspected facts against himself, do not fall under actual persons subject to seizure entitled to the guarantee of the right to participate, inasmuch as they abandoned or transferred the exclusive rights of management and disposition over the hard disks.
2) However, we cannot agree with this. The majority opinion narrowly construes the "actual person subject to seizure," who is the subject entitled to the right to participate, by focusing on the suspect in the criminal suspicion that gave rise to the seizure and search, which is inconsistent with the purport and direction of precedent. Moreover, according to the majority opinion, the constitutional requirement to realize due process and the principle of warrant requirement in the investigative agency's compulsory measures concerning electronic information, which is of increasing importance to individuals and enterprises in modern society, is disregarded, thereby permitting an unconstitutional result in which the fundamental rights of the actual person entitled to manage and dispose of the electronic information—such as the secrecy and freedom of private life—are infringed.
3) In Supreme Court en banc Decision 2016Do348 (hereinafter "en banc Decision 2016Do348") and Supreme Court Decision 2021Do11170, etc., the Supreme Court held that the actual person subject to seizure, who is the subject entitled to the guarantee of the right to participate in the seizure and search of electronic information, is a person who actually possesses and manages the relevant information storage device while holding and exercising exclusive rights of management and disposition over the electronic information as a whole stored in the information storage device, such that the person can be evaluated as the actual party to the seizure and search of that information. According to the legal principles and purport of this precedent, where, in addition to the actual possessor and custodian of the information storage device, who is the direct party to the compulsory measure and the formal person subject to seizure, there exists a separate owner or manager whose secrecy and freedom of private life, right to self-determination of information, property rights, etc. with respect to his or her electronic information are at risk of being infringed by the compulsory measure, that owner or manager must be regarded as the actual person subject to seizure entitled to the guarantee of the right to participate. In this case, it is not required that the actual person subject to seizure be the suspect in the criminal suspicion that gave rise to the seizure and search.
4) Accordingly, where a person who committed the offense of concealment of evidence, having been instigated by the principal offender to conceal evidence, possessed and kept an information storage device owned or managed by the principal offender and voluntarily submitted it to the investigative agency in the capacity of a suspect, and the principal offender may be evaluated as having a substantial interest in not having his or her secrecy and freedom of private life, etc. infringed at the time of the search, copying, and printing out of the electronic information stored in the information storage device, the right to participate must be guaranteed not only to the person who committed the offense of concealment of evidence, who is both the person who voluntarily submitted the device and the suspect, but also to the principal offender, who has such a substantial interest.
In this respect, we differ in view from the majority opinion. The detailed grounds are as follows.
나. The purport of guaranteeing the right to participate in the seizure and search of electronic information and the concretization of the right to participate
The legal principle concerning the right to participate in the seizure and search of electronic information established by precedent has evolved in the direction of protecting the person actually subject to infringement of fundamental rights, etc. by the compulsory measure—that is, the actual party to the seizure and search—centering on the person subject to seizure who is the direct object of the State's compulsory measure.
1) The Supreme Court first set forth, in Supreme Court Order 2009Mo1190, decided May 26, 2011, in connection with the seizure and search of an information storage device located in the office of the Korean Teachers and Education Workers' Union, the legal principle guaranteeing the right to participate to the person subject to seizure who was the object of the compulsory measure, or to his or her defense counsel. Subsequently, through Supreme Court en banc Order 2011Mo1839, decided July 16, 2015, concerning the seizure and search of Chong Kun Dang Co., Ltd., the Court reaffirmed the legal principle of guaranteeing the right to participate centering on the person subject to seizure who was the object of the compulsory measure, and declared that where there is a procedural illegality excluding the right to participate of the person subject to seizure, the admissibility of evidence is, in principle, excluded.
In the above Supreme Court Order 2009Mo1190 and Supreme Court en banc Order 2011Mo1839, the Supreme Court, while noting that the Korean Teachers and Education Workers' Union and Chong Kun Dang Co., Ltd. were not in the position of a suspect, emphasized that they were in the position of a person subject to seizure having a substantial interest in not having their right to self-determination of information, property rights, etc. infringed by the investigative agency's seizure and search, and thus recognized them as the subjects to whom the right to participate belonged. Thereafter, in several cases in which the person subject to seizure and the suspect were the same person, the Supreme Court recognized the right to participate of the person subject to seizure, who was the object of the compulsory disposition regarding the information storage device (see Supreme Court Decision 2015Do12400, decided September 21, 2017; Supreme Court Decision 2017Do3449, decided November 14, 2017; Supreme Court Decision 2018Do20504, decided July 11, 2019, etc.), and finally, through en banc Decision 2016Do348, held that, in a case where the person subject to seizure and the suspect were not the same person, and a compulsory measure was taken with respect to an information storage device owned or managed by the suspect with a third party as the person subject to seizure, appropriate measures, such as guaranteeing the right to participate and delivering a list of the seized electronic information, must be taken with respect to the suspect, who is the actual person subject to seizure, thereby expanding the subjects entitled to the guarantee of the right to participate to include the actual person subject to seizure. In Supreme Court Order 2016Mo587, decided May 31, 2022, in the course of the investigative agency's seizure and search, with Kakao Corp., an internet service company, as the person subject to seizure, of the KakaoTalk conversation content, etc. of a service user (suspect) stored on its servers, the Court recognized the service user as having the status of the actual person subject to seizure who is the subject to whom the right to participate belongs. Meanwhile, in the above Supreme Court Decision 2021Do11170, the Court held that, where a third party voluntarily submits to the investigative agency an information storage device used by the suspect, if it can be found that the rights of management and disposition were transferred to the third party, it is sufficient that an opportunity to participate is afforded to the third party (the person who voluntarily submitted the device), rather than the suspect.
2) The reason the Supreme Court has established the concept of the right to participate centering on the "person subject to seizure" in the procedure for seizure and search of electronic information and has expanded the subject to whom it belongs to include the actual person subject to seizure is that, in information storage devices such as large-capacity computers, servers, and other information processing systems, and smartphones, which are widely used today in the business of enterprises or individuals, electronic information relating to an individual's daily life or corporate management unrelated to the criminal suspicion (hereinafter "unrelated information") is widely intermingled with electronic information relating to the suspected facts subject to seizure (hereinafter "related information"), and this is a response to the constitutional requirement that procedural measures are urgently needed to prevent the investigative agency, which carries out compulsory measures such as seizure and search with respect thereto, from searching, copying, and printing out even unrelated information, in order to protect the legal interests of individuals and enterprises concerned, such as the secrecy and freedom of private life and the right to self-determination of information, property rights, etc.
In this vein, the Supreme Court has declared that, where a third party voluntarily submits an information storage device owned or managed by the suspect, the scope of what is subject to seizure must be interpreted as further limited to related information, because "an information storage device stores everything relating to personal legal interests, such as the secrecy and freedom of one's private life and the right to self-determination of information, and if seizure and search were permitted without restriction even though the subject of the voluntary submission is merely a possessor or custodian rather than the owner, there would be a risk of significant infringement of the suspect's personal legal interests; considering this, in cases where there is a risk that the act of submission may significantly infringe the secrecy of private life or other personal legal interests of the owner, special consideration must also be given to the legal interests of the owner who did not consent to the voluntary submission, together with the necessity of seizure and search based on the voluntary submission" (see en banc Decision 2016Do348; Supreme Court Decision 2019Do7342, decided November 25, 2021, etc.).
다. The meaning of the actual person subject to seizure, who is the subject to whom the right to participate belongs, and the criteria for determining this
The actual person subject to seizure, who is the subject to whom the right to participate in the seizure and search of electronic information belongs, must be understood as a person who, up to the time of the seizure and search, dominates and manages the relevant information storage device while holding and exercising exclusive rights of management and disposition over the electronic information as a whole within the information storage device, and who possesses the secrecy of private life or other personal legal interest entitling him or her to exclude the investigative agency's search and printing-out, etc. with respect to unrelated information intermingled with electronic information lawfully subject to seizure in the information storage device.
1) The right to participate of the person subject to seizure who is the object of the compulsory measure
It is sufficient that the subject to whom the right to participate belongs is the actual possessor or custodian of the information storage device, etc. that is the object of the compulsory measure and the person entitled to manage and dispose of the stored electronic information, being the actual counterparty to the compulsory measure; it is not required that this person also be the suspect in the criminal suspicion that gave rise to the seizure and search.
가) Our Constitution provides that "no citizen shall be subject to ... seizure or search ... except as provided by Act" (Article 12, Paragraph 1, second sentence) and that "in case of arrest, detention, seizure or search, a warrant issued by a judge through due procedures upon the request of a prosecutor shall be presented" (Article 12, Paragraph 3, main text), thereby declaring the principles of due process and warrant requirement with respect to seizure and search. The Criminal Procedure Act, in order to concretely realize due process and the principle of warrant requirement in seizure and search, has established detailed provisions restricting the investigative agency's procedures for seizure and search, including the manner of issuance of a seizure and search warrant, the presentation of the warrant in the execution procedure, participation by the parties and prior notice to those entitled to participate, and participation by a responsible person (Articles 219, 114, 118, 121, 122, and 123). In particular, Article 215, Paragraph 1 of the Criminal Procedure Act provides that "where necessary for the investigation of a crime, a prosecutor may conduct seizure, search, or inspection pursuant to a warrant issued by a judge of the district court upon request, limited to circumstances sufficient to suspect that the suspect committed the offense and items recognized as relevant to the case concerned," thereby establishing the so-called "principle of relevance."
Focusing on the particular characteristics of seizure and search of an information storage device in which related information and unrelated information are intermingled, the Supreme Court, in order to effectively deter the unlawful search and collection of unrelated information and thereby firmly uphold the normative force of the Constitution and the Criminal Procedure Act, examined the fundamental purport of Article 12 of the Constitution regarding due process and the principle of warrant requirement together with the numerous procedural provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act, including the provisions guaranteeing the participation of "the suspect and his or her defense counsel" in the seizure and search procedure and requiring that "with respect to seized items, appropriate measures shall be taken to prevent their loss or damage" (Articles 219, 121, and 131), and thereby established the legal principle that "the person subject to seizure and his or her defense counsel" may participate in the procedure for seizure and search of electronic information, and expanded the scope of this guarantee to include the "actual person subject to seizure."
Even before Article 243-2 of the Criminal Procedure Act, the provision concerning the right of defense counsel to participate, was newly enacted, the Supreme Court, under the former Criminal Procedure Act (before amendment by Act No. 8496 of June 1, 2007, hereinafter the same), recognized the right of defense counsel to participate in the suspect interrogation procedure by analogically applying the provisions of the former Criminal Procedure Act concerning the right of a detained defendant or suspect to communicate with counsel, based on the constitutional principle of due process, even though there was no express provision on the right of defense counsel to participate in the suspect interrogation procedure at that time (see Supreme Court Order 2003Mo402, decided November 11, 2003). Recognizing the right of the person subject to seizure to participate in the procedure for seizure and search of electronic information, and expanding it to the actual person subject to seizure, is an extension of this consistent position of the Supreme Court, which has interpreted the Criminal Procedure Act in conformity with the Constitution so as to protect the fundamental human rights of the subject of the State's compulsory measure from infringement.
나) Since the constitutional freedom of residence and the secrecy and freedom of private life are guaranteed to everyone, and the object of protection under the principle of warrant requirement is not limited to suspects (Articles 12, 16, and 17 of the Constitution), it is not required that the "actual person subject to seizure," who is the subject to whom the right to participate—a procedural right established to realize due process and the principle of warrant requirement under the Constitution—belongs, be in the position of the suspect in the criminal suspicion that gave rise to the seizure and search. Just as, in a typical seizure and search of a residence or office, the actual owner or manager of the residence, etc. that is the object of the compulsory measure receives protection of the secrecy and freedom of private life, etc., so too, in the procedure for seizure and search of electronic information, the owner or manager of the information storage device, etc. that is the object of the compulsory measure must receive procedural guarantees such as the right to participate, in accordance with the principle of warrant requirement. This is because the owner or manager of the information storage device has no reason to tolerate the State agency investigating the criminal suspicion of a third party (the suspect) broadly searching, copying, and printing out unrelated information from his or her information storage device merely because he or she is not the suspect. Permitting this would produce a result tantamount to permitting a general warrant.
다) According to the position of precedent regarding the purport and scope of recognition of the right to participate, in determining the subject to whom the right to participate belongs, it is not particularly important who submitted the relevant information storage device to the investigative agency, or whether that person is in the position of a suspect. This is because the necessity of guaranteeing the right to participate to the person entitled to manage and dispose of the electronic information, who is the person subject to seizure or the actual person subject to seizure, in order to substantially protect his or her secrecy of private life or other personal legal interest, is the same regardless of whether the person entitled to manage and dispose of the electronic information directly submits the information storage device to the investigative agency, or a third party such as a victim, who happened to possess or keep it for some reason, submits it to the investigative agency.
[Reasoning] (continued)
The en banc Decision 2016Do348 recognized the right to participate for the suspect in a case where a victim, who had removed without authorization an information storage device belonging to the suspect's ownership and management, voluntarily submitted it, because the suspect, as the owner/manager of the information storage device and the person with the right to manage and dispose of the electronic information, stood in the position of being the substantial subject of the compulsory disposition, that is, the "status of the person subject to seizure." A person who holds the right to manage and dispose of unrelated information existing within an information storage device, even if not the suspect, is a substantial party to the search and seizure and has an interest in blocking infringement of his or her personal legal interests, etc., arising from the compulsory disposition. Conversely, even a suspect, unless he or she is the person with the right to manage and dispose of the information, does not have such an interest.
The Supreme Court, in a case where investigative agencies received the voluntary submission from a lodging business operator of a disguised camera device, secretly installed in a guest room solely for the purpose of illegal filming and capable of filming nudity or sexual acts, without providing an opportunity to participate to the suspect who had secretly installed it, held that, because given the function and nature of the relevant information storage device, there was virtually no room for a mixture of electronic information that would be a lawful subject of seizure following voluntary submission, viewed from the perspective of the privacy of the owner or other personal legal interests, and electronic information that would not be such a subject—in other words, where in practice almost only electronic information subject to seizure was stored—the mere fact that an opportunity to participate was not guaranteed to a person subject to seizure other than the possessor/custodian, and that a list of seized electronic information was not prepared and delivered, does not by itself immediately deny admissibility (see the above Supreme Court Decision 2019Do7342). In the case of an information storage device storing only related information, there is virtually no risk of arbitrary search or copying of unrelated information, and therefore there is no concern that the purpose of guaranteeing the right to participate would be undermined. By holding that even the suspect, who is the person with the right to manage and dispose of the electronic information, is not subject to the guarantee of the right to participate in such a case, the above Supreme Court decision confirmed that the basis for the attribution of the right to participate lies not in the status of being a suspect, but in the status of a person who suffers substantial infringement of the privacy or other personal legal interests by becoming the subject of a compulsory disposition such as search and seizure.
Ra) As described above, the right to participate of the person subject to seizure, which is guaranteed in the procedure for the seizure and search of electronic information under our criminal justice system and investigative practice, has become established as a practical and essential procedural right and institution capable of constitutionally controlling the compulsory dispositions of investigative agencies. By giving the person subjected to a compulsory disposition the opportunity to directly confirm the manner of execution of seizure on site and to raise objections, the search for and collection of unrelated information in violation of the principle of warrant requirement can be effectively deterred. In order for the right to participate to function substantively in accordance with its purpose, it is necessary to grant the right to participate to the person to whom the legal interests that may be infringed by the search, copying, printing, etc., of unrelated information—such as the secrecy and freedom of private life—are attributed.
Ma) The majority opinion, on the basis that the hard disk in this case and the electronic information stored therein are evidence relating to the facts of Non-indicted 3's suspected offense of concealment of evidence, held that Non-indicted 3 falls under a "person with a substantial interest" with respect to the hard disk in this case and the electronic information stored therein, and has an "interest in participation" throughout the entire process of search, copying, and printing, and that therefore, as long as the right to participate was guaranteed to Non-indicted 3, the search and seizure procedure was lawful even without the participation of the owner, Non-indicted 1 and others. This finds the basis for "substantial interest in electronic information" or "interest in participation," which is the ground for guaranteeing the right to participate, in the fact that the compulsory disposition concerns evidence "related to" the suspect's status or the facts of the suspected crime. However, this is contrary to the legal doctrine of precedent concerning the basis and subject of the guarantee of the right to participate, and is improper. As examined above, precedent limited the object of seizure to electronic information relating to the facts of the suspected crime and declared the guarantee of the right to participate in order to prevent the arbitrary copying, etc., of information "unrelated" thereto; accordingly, the interest in participation under precedent lies in the protection of interests concerning "unrelated evidence." The above Supreme Court Decision 2019Do7342 also did not regard an interest limited to electronic information "related to the suspected facts," that is, related information, as an "interest in participation."
While emphasizing the importance of electronic information within information storage devices in modern society, along with due process and the principle of warrant requirement that the Constitution and the Criminal Procedure Act (형사소송법) seek to realize, as well as the protection of the secrecy and freedom of private life and the right to self-determination of information, the majority opinion takes the contradictory position of interpreting the meaning of "substantial person subject to seizure," who is the subject entitled to the guarantee of the right to participate, very narrowly, centered on the suspect of the facts of the suspected crime that gave rise to the search and seizure. As a result, the majority opinion has substantially neutralized the achievements that precedent had accomplished thus far in declaring the legal doctrine of guaranteeing the right to participate in compulsory dispositions by investigative agencies concerning electronic information and expanding the scope of the subjects to whom it is attributed, in response to the constitutional demand to realize due process and the principle of warrant requirement. As a result, the door of the procedural right called the right to participate, which the Supreme Court had opened to protect the fundamental rights of the person subject to seizure or the substantial person subject to seizure in the search and seizure procedure for electronic information, has been half-closed again. Saying that it is sufficient to guarantee the right to participate only to the suspect, who is the direct, formal party to the compulsory disposition but has no particular interest in preventing the arbitrary search, etc., of unrelated information, and that there is no need to guarantee the right to participate even to the owner/manager of the information storage device, cannot be an appropriate measure to carry through the "principle of relevance" in the search and seizure of information storage devices, and is tantamount to abandoning the protection of due process and the principle of warrant requirement with respect to the infringement of personal legal interests concerning unrelated information that may occur to the owner/manager of the information storage device.
2) Guarantee of the right to participate where the formal person subject to seizure and the substantial person subject to seizure are separated
Where, in addition to the actual possessor/custodian of the information storage device who is the formal person subject to seizure and who became the direct object of the compulsory disposition by the investigative agency, there exists separately an owner/manager, it is necessary to regard the latter as the substantial person subject to seizure and to guarantee the right to participate to that person as well.
Ga) As the portability and mobility of information storage devices have increased with the development of technology, cases in which an owner/manager exists separately from the actual possessor/custodian of the information storage device have become common. First, there are cases in which the information storage device departs from the owner/manager irrespective of his or her intent and comes to be in the possession/custody of a third party. This includes cases where the owner/manager loses the information storage device, or it becomes the object of a criminal act such as theft or embezzlement of lost property, or a third party takes the information storage device without the consent of the owner/manager. Meanwhile, there are also cases in which the information storage device comes to be in the possession/custody of a third party based on a possession-mediating relationship formed according to the intent of the owner/manager. Examples would include where the owner/manager requests a specialized repair shop to repair the information storage device or deposits it in a paid safe of a bank, etc.; where a child temporarily borrows and uses a parent's mobile phone; or where the owner/manager entrusts his or her information storage device to a non-cohabiting family member or acquaintance for safekeeping. The case where the principal offender, in order to conceal evidence relating to the facts of his or her suspected offense, hands over an information storage device that he or she owned/managed to a person who conceals evidence may also fall under the latter category, in that it is based on a possession-mediating relationship formed according to the intent of the principal offender, who is the owner/manager.
Na) In the en banc Decision 2016Do348, in a case where a third party such as the victim removed, without the suspect's knowledge, an information storage device belonging to the suspect's ownership/management from the scene of the crime and voluntarily submitted it to the investigative agency—that is, a case falling under the former category, where the information storage device departed from the owner/manager's possession irrespective of his or her intent—the suspect, who was the owner/manager of the information storage device, was regarded as the substantial person subject to seizure and was granted the right to participate. This legal doctrine should likewise apply to the latter type of case, where a third party possesses/holds custody of the information storage device based on a possession-mediating relationship formed according to the intent of the owner/manager, and a compulsory disposition is carried out against the third party. In determining whether a person falls under the object of the guarantee of the right to participate, there is no reason to treat differently the case where the separation between the owner/manager of the information storage device and the actual possessor/custodian occurred according to the intent of the owner/manager and the case where it did not. This is because, in both cases, the person with the right to manage and dispose of the electronic information is identically the subject to whom the personal legal interests that may be infringed by the investigative agency's arbitrary copying, etc., of unrelated information are attributed.
3) Criteria for determining the substantial person subject to seizure
Ga) Whether a person falls under the substantial person subject to seizure, as the subject to whom the right to participate is attributed, must be determined based on the outwardly and objectively recognizable factual state at the time of the search and seizure—namely, who actually had dominion/control over the relevant information storage device up to the time of the search and seizure or a time closely proximate thereto in time, and whether, based on the progress of the investigation at the time and the objective circumstances surrounding the departure of possession or the possession-mediating relationship of the information storage device, the investigative agency could have recognized that an owner/manager existed separately from the possessor/custodian of the information storage device. Internal, subjective circumstances between the persons concerned that the investigative agency could not have recognized at the time of the search and seizure, or legal, retrospective determinations concerning the attribution of rights under civil law, are not matters to be considered. Furthermore, even a person who had actually had dominion/control over the information storage device is excluded from the subjects to whom the right to participate is attributed if he or she, according to his or her own intent, transferred it to a third party or abandoned the right of dominion/control (see the above Supreme Court Decision 2021Do11170).
Na) When whether a person is a substantial person subject to seizure is determined based on the objectively and outwardly recognizable factual state at the time of the search and seizure in this manner, there is little concern of causing confusion or adverse effects in investigative practice, such as an inability to specify the person entitled to participate, or an unreasonable expansion of the scope of the guarantee of the right to participate to a multitude of persons. Unless there are special circumstances suggesting the existence of a separate person with the right to manage and dispose, it is permissible to regard the actual possessor/custodian of the information storage device at the time of the search and seizure as the person with the right to manage and dispose of the electronic information, and it suffices to regard a person as the substantial person subject to seizure only where there exist special circumstances, based on the objectively and outwardly recognizable factual state, allowing recognition that an exclusive right holder to manage and dispose of the electronic information exists separately from the actual possessor/custodian of the information storage device. Examples include cases where it is objectively and outwardly evident in itself that the actual possessor/custodian and the exclusive right holder to manage and dispose of the electronic information are separate—such as a customer's information storage device kept by a bank in a safe, or a client's computer temporarily kept by a computer repair company that received it for repair—or cases where the investigative agency can recognize, through the statements of the actual possessor/custodian of the information storage device, the progress of the investigation, etc., that an exclusive right holder to manage and dispose of the electronic information exists separately.
Da) The majority opinion held that, in light of the circumstances of the concealment and voluntary submission of the hard disk in this case, the person who actually possessed the hard disk in this case at the time of the search and seizure or a time closely proximate thereto was Non-indicted 3, and that therefore, absent other special circumstances, the person in the position to actually hold and exercise the right to manage and dispose of the electronic information stored in the hard disk in this case was also Non-indicted 3; however, this is not proper. This is because, in light of the progress of each investigative procedure regarding the principal offenders, Non-indicted 1 and others, and the person who concealed evidence, Non-indicted 3, in this case, the content of the statements made by Non-indicted 3 to the investigative agency at the time of voluntarily submitting the hard disk in this case, and other factual states objectively and outwardly recognizable by the investigative agency, the investigative agency was able to recognize, at the time of receiving the voluntary submission, that in addition to Non-indicted 3, who was the actual possessor/custodian of the hard disk in this case, Non-indicted 1 and others existed as the exclusive right holders to manage and dispose of the electronic information. This is particularly so in that the fact that the investigative agency, while investigating the facts of the suspected offense of the principal offender, made the person who was concealing an information storage device owned/managed by the principal offender the suspect of the offense of concealment of evidence and received a voluntary submission of the concealed item, itself means that, at the time of the voluntary submission, the investigative agency was aware of the existence of the principal offender, which is a constituent element of the offense of concealment of evidence by a third party, and that the concealed item was owned/managed by the principal offender.
Ra. Scope of the guarantee of the right to participate in the case of a principal offender and a person concealing evidence
1) The legal doctrine of guaranteeing the right to participate should likewise apply to a case where the principal offender, in order to conceal evidence relating to the facts of his or her suspected offense, delivers an information storage device that he or she owned/managed to a person concealing evidence while instigating the concealment of evidence, and the person concealing evidence, while possessing/holding custody of and concealing it, submits it to the investigative agency in the form of seizure or voluntary submission. In this case, the principal offender, being in a typical possession-mediating relationship vis-à-vis the person concealing evidence, who is the actual possessor/custodian of the concealed item, is an owner/manager of the information storage device who has an interest in protecting rights such as the secrecy and freedom of private life by preventing the search and collection of unrelated information, etc., in the search and seizure process, and thus falls under the substantial person subject to seizure. Even if the person concealing evidence voluntarily submitted it to the investigative agency in the status of a suspect of the offense of concealment of evidence, since the substantial person subject to seizure is the principal offender, the right to participate must also be guaranteed to the principal offender. Since the person concealing evidence, who is not the subject to whom the personal legal interests concerning unrelated information within the information storage device that is the concealed item are attributed, has no incentive to actually exercise the right to participate even if it is guaranteed to him or her, guaranteeing the right to participate only to that person, excluding the principal offender, cannot realize the purpose of guaranteeing the right to participate for the sake of carrying through the principle of warrant requirement. It is also difficult, in the search and seizure procedure for the information storage device that is the concealed item, to block the possibility that unrelated information concerning the principal offender's private life may be extensively and indiscriminately collected by the investigative agency. In this case as well, Non-indicted 3, the person concealing evidence, waived the exercise of the right to participate.
2) Where a principal offender delivers an information storage device storing electronic information that is evidence relating to his or her own suspected facts to a person concealing evidence and instigates the act of concealment, absent other special circumstances sufficient to recognize that the principal offender has definitively and completely abandoned the right to manage and dispose of the electronic information, it cannot be concluded, merely from the circumstance that actual, direct possession of the information storage device was transferred to the person concealing evidence by such delivery, that the principal offender transferred or abandoned the right to manage and dispose of the electronic information, or that thereby the interest concerning the right to participate—by which one may exclude the investigative agency's search, etc., and be protected in personal legal interests such as the secrecy and freedom of private life, with respect to unrelated information mixed within the information storage device—was extinguished.
Considering the characteristics of information storage devices and electronic information, the purpose of the concealment, the circumstances of the concealment of evidence, whether the concealed evidence was scheduled to be returned, and the genuine intent of the parties, it is a natural interpretation, consistent with the empirical rule, that the principal offender merely temporarily entrusted custody to the person concealing evidence through the concealment of the information storage device until the risk of exposure/discovery of the related information disappears, and that where such risk disappears, the principal offender intends to recover actual dominion over the information storage device, including the electronic information that is unrelated evidence. Given the nature of the possession-mediating relationship formed between the principal offender and the person concealing evidence surrounding the concealment of an information storage device in which related information and unrelated information are mixed, in a situation where it is technically difficult for the principal offender to sort out and destroy/eliminate only the related information within the information storage device, it should be viewed that the principal offender had the intent to conceal the relevant information storage device with the purpose of avoiding his or her own criminal liability while also maintaining and preserving unrelated information having personal, individual value, with a view to receiving it back at an appropriate future time.
3) The majority opinion viewed that Non-indicted 1, the principal offender, delivered the hard disk in this case, which was evidence relating to the facts of the principal offender's suspected offense, to Non-indicted 3, requesting concealment "until the investigation into himself was concluded," for the purpose of concealing the very existence of the hard disk in this case, and thereby, with the aim of concealing/severing the outward connection between himself and the hard disk in this case, etc., expressed an intent to abandon his exclusive right of dominion/control over it, or to entirely transfer it to Non-indicted 3, until the uncertain deadline of "conclusion of investigation."
However, the majority opinion departs from the bounds of reasonable interpretation of intent in the typical possession-mediating relationship structure of "principal offender and person concealing evidence," and is not proper.
Furthermore, the majority opinion overlooks, in relation to the guarantee of the right to participate, the particularity and importance of the mixture of unrelated evidence that information storage devices have, and errs in evaluating this the same as instigating the concealment of a tangible object that is itself evidence relating to a suspected crime, such as a weapon used as a tool for a murder, or narcotics, syringes, etc., provided for a drug-related crime. If the significance, in the context of personal legal interests, of an information storage device in which related and unrelated evidence are mixed, for the purposes of a compulsory disposition such as search and seizure, had been the same from the outset as in the case of evidence such as the aforementioned weapon or narcotics, there would have been no need for precedent to establish the legal doctrine of guaranteeing the right to participate to the person subject to seizure in the search and seizure procedure for electronic information.
The majority opinion also confuses the issue of interpreting intent regarding the dominion/control of the electronic information that was the concealed item, as between the principal offender and the person concealing evidence in this case, or the issue of determining the subject to whom the right to participate is attributed, with the issue of evaluating the illegality or blameworthiness, or the recognition of criminal liability, for the act by which Non-indicted 1 infringed the judicial function relating to the investigation of the principal offender through instigating the concealment of evidence. If there had been no act by the principal offender of instigating the concealment of evidence—that is, if the principal offender had concealed the information storage device by delivering it for custody to an unaware third party while hiding his intent to conceal evidence—would the majority opinion truly take the same view and exclude the principal offender's right to participate? If the conclusion regarding the existence of the principal offender's right to participate differs between the two cases, this can only be seen as confusing the evaluation of the punishability of the act of instigating concealment with the issue of determining the subject to whom the right to participate is attributed.
4) In this case, the fact that the majority opinion, in a case where the investigative agency, while investigating the facts of the suspected offense of the principal offender, received the voluntary submission from the person concealing evidence of the information storage device owned/managed by the principal offender that the former had been concealing, overlooked the nature of the investigative procedure concerning the person concealing evidence as being substantially conducted as part of the investigative procedure concerning the principal offender, and treated the question of who is the substantial person subject to seizure to whom the right to participate is attributed in the possession-mediating relationship of the "principal offender and person concealing evidence" structure—a question of legal doctrine that should have been explored—as instead a question of interpreting intent as to whether the principal offender transferred or abandoned the right to manage and dispose to the person concealing evidence, avoiding the exploration of the doctrinal issue, is not a proper attitude for the Supreme Court, the bastion of the protection of human rights, to take.
Ma. Determination as to this case
1) In light of the following circumstances, based on the outwardly and objectively recognizable factual state at the time of the search and seizure following the voluntary submission of the hard disk in this case, the principal offenders, Non-indicted 1 and others, up to the time of Non-indicted 3's voluntary submission and a time closely proximate thereto, had dominion/control over the hard disk in this case based on actual possession or a possession-mediating relationship through Non-indicted 3, held and exercised, as the subjects to whom the legal interests were attributed, the exclusive right to manage and dispose of the electronic information stored therein, and had not lost the right to manage/dispose of, or ownership/dominion over, it. Accordingly, it is proper to view Non-indicted 1 and others as the substantial persons subject to seizure with respect to that electronic information.
Ga) The hard disk in this case was installed in each personal computer placed in the study, etc., within the residence of Non-indicted 1 and others. Examining the progress of the acts of concealment of evidence by Non-indicted 3 and Non-indicted 1, which occurred during the investigation into the facts of the principal offense suspected against Non-indicted 1 and others, and the content of the electronic information stored in the hard disk in this case, it can be seen that Non-indicted 1 and others were exclusively using the hard disk in this case until August 31, 2019, only 11 days before the date of Non-indicted 3's voluntary submission.
Na) The hard disk in this case, being an information storage device of a computer that Non-indicted 1 and others had personally used for a long period at their residence, stores, in addition to evidence relating to the facts of the principal offense suspected against Non-indicted 1 and others, various pieces of personal information of Non-indicted 1 and his family members. In light of the subjective value that the hard disk in this case has as personal information, it appears that Non-indicted 1's handing over of the hard disk in this case to Non-indicted 3 was to have it hidden in preparation for a future prosecutorial investigation, not to have it destroyed. Until just before voluntarily submitting the hard disk in this case to the investigative agency, Non-indicted 3, in accordance with Non-indicted 1's instructions to conceal it, kept and managed it in a personal locker at a fitness center, etc., and, in accordance with Non-indicted 1's request, returned a separate personal computer from the professor's office at (name 4 omitted) University that he had been concealing together with the hard disk in this case. In this manner, under the special form of possession-mediating relationship formed by receiving the hard disk in this case, Non-indicted 3 carried out the act of concealment while keeping the hard disk in this case with the intent to proceed with disposition in accordance with the purport of Non-indicted 1's instructions, such as returning it to Non-indicted 1 at any time if instructed to do so; accordingly, it is difficult to view that, at the time of the voluntary submission of the hard disk in this case, Non-indicted 1 and others had entirely lost the right to manage/dispose of, or ownership/dominion over, the hard disk in this case.
Da) In light of the progress of the investigation around that time, and Non-indicted 3's statement to the prosecution at the time of the voluntary submission, etc., it can be seen that the investigative agency also knew, or could sufficiently have known, at the time of seizing the hard disk in this case by voluntary submission, the status of its ownership/management and who its exclusive user was.
2) The investigative agency, while investigating the facts of the principal offense suspected against Non-indicted 1, received the voluntary submission of the hard disk in this case from Non-indicted 3 and seized it, and then, in the series of processes of searching for and extracting the electronic information stored therein, etc., was required to guarantee the opportunity to participate not only to Non-indicted 3, the person subject to seizure, but also to Non-indicted 1 and others, the substantial persons subject to seizure with respect to the hard disk in this case and the electronic information. However, in the course of that series of processes, the investigative agency did not guarantee the right to participate to Non-indicted 1 and others, the substantial persons subject to seizure, in addition to Non-indicted 3, the person subject to seizure.
Accordingly, the electronic information within the hard disk in this case seized by the investigative agency constitutes illegally obtained evidence and cannot be used as evidence of guilt. Nor is it easy to find other special circumstances warranting recognition of an exception thereto. The statements of the persons concerned, etc., collected by the investigative agency based on that illegally obtained evidence, also constitute secondary evidence based on illegally obtained evidence and likewise cannot be adopted as evidence for recognizing guilt.
3) In this case, there is room to view that, with the evidence lacking admissibility excluded, the remaining evidence alone is insufficient to prove the facts charged in this case to the degree of excluding reasonable doubt. Nevertheless, the court below, for the reasons stated in its judgment, upheld as is the judgment of the first instance court, which had found the facts charged in this case guilty. Such determination by the court below contains an error, affecting the judgment, of misunderstanding the legal doctrine concerning the right to participate in the seizure of voluntarily submitted items and the exclusionary rule of illegally obtained evidence, and of failing to exhaust the necessary examination.
For the reasons set forth above, we state that we cannot agree with the majority opinion.
5. Concurring Opinion of Justice Ahn Cheol-sang, Justice Noh Tae-ak, and Justice Cheon Dae-yeop supplementing the Majority Opinion
With respect to the subject of the right to participate for securing procedural legality in the process of search and seizure of electronic information, in light of the content and purport of the series of precedents that, where a suspect who is not the formal person subject to seizure falls under the "substantial person subject to seizure," guarantee the right to participate to the suspect, the scope of the search and seizure arising from Non-indicted 3's voluntary submission of the hard disk in this case is limited to evidence related to the "offense of concealment of evidence," which is the facts of the suspected crime that was the motive therefor; therefore, it is evident that procedural legality is recognized by guaranteeing the right to participate to Non-indicted 3, who is the suspect of the relevant suspected crime and the actual person with dominion/management over the information storage device that is the relevant evidentiary object, such that no further reasoning appears necessary in this regard. Below, we shall supplement the reasoning of the majority opinion, limited to those points among the matters raised in the dissenting opinion where it is necessary to clarify matters so that the purport of the majority opinion is not misunderstood.
Ga. The purport of precedent concerning the right to participate
[Reasoning] (continued)
The concept of the "substantial subject of seizure" established in precedent is a kind of instrumental concept devised, in the context of guaranteeing the right to participate in the seizure and search of electronic information—a situation not anticipated by the traditional seizure and search doctrine premised on tangible objects—to overcome the gap between the statutory text and reality, centered on the constitutional principles of due process and the warrant requirement.
The purport contained in the line of precedents concerning the right to participate is as follows: in the seizure and search of a storage medium in which it is difficult to identify to whom the numerous and various individual items of information embedded therein belong, the matter should in principle be regulated centering on the person subject to seizure, who is the holder of the right to manage and dispose of the electronic information as a whole; however, where the person subject to seizure has no substantial interest whatsoever in the criminal suspicion or the seized items, there is no reason for that person to participate in the seizure and search procedure, whereas a suspect who does have a substantial interest could be excluded from the right to participate merely because he or she is not the person subject to seizure, thereby creating the possibility that an indiscriminate seizure and search could be carried out without anyone's participation; the concept of the "substantial subject of seizure" was devised to resolve this problem.
In light of this attitude taken in precedent, where a person committing the offense of concealment of evidence voluntarily submits, in relation to the criminal suspicion of concealment of evidence, the information storage medium that was the object of the concealment act, it suffices to grant the right to participate to the person committing the offense of concealment of evidence, who is both the suspect in the criminal suspicion that was the motive and cause of the seizure and search resulting from the voluntary submission and, as the voluntary submitter, the person subject to seizure—even if the relevant information storage medium is owned by the principal offender—and there is no need to go further and recognize the principal offender as a "substantial subject of seizure" so as to grant the right to participate to that person as well. This is because, in such a case, the suspect who committed the offense of concealment of evidence voluntarily submits, in the course of an investigation into his or her own criminal suspicion being conducted, the information storage medium in his or her possession or under his or her management that is found to be related thereto, and thus, in the resulting seizure and search, the person who committed the offense of concealment of evidence, as both suspect and person subject to seizure, possesses a direct, substantial, and legal interest in every respect. The recognition, in the case underlying Supreme Court en banc Decision 2016Do348, of the right to participate as a "substantial subject of seizure" for a suspect who was not the formal subject of seizure was a case in which the formal subject of seizure who voluntarily submitted the item was merely the victim of the criminal suspicion, such that merely guaranteeing that person an opportunity to participate could not substantially realize the purport of guaranteeing the right to participate; this differs in its plane of discussion from the case of voluntary submission by a person who committed the offense of concealment of evidence.
In short, where a suspect in the criminal suspicion that gave rise to the seizure and search not only is related to the relevant suspected facts but also has a direct, substantial, and legal interest by controlling and managing the information storage medium and electronic evidence that are the subject of the seizure and search, if the right to participate is guaranteed to the suspect who concurrently holds the status of such an interested party and person subject to seizure, the procedural legality concerning the right to participate can be deemed thereby satisfied and completed. Absent other special circumstances, there is no need to separately posit a "substantial subject of seizure" in such a case.
Turning to the present case, the hard disk at issue was received by Non-indicted Person 3, who committed the offense of concealment of evidence, from Non-indicted Person 1, and while it was under Non-indicted Person 3's control and management, it was voluntarily submitted to the investigative agency in relation to Non-indicted Person 3's own criminal suspicion of concealment of evidence; Non-indicted Person 3 has a direct, substantial, and legal interest in the suspected facts that were the cause of the voluntary submission and in the hard disk that constitutes the relevant evidence. Therefore, insofar as the seizure and search procedure concerning the hard disk at issue was carried out with the participation of Non-indicted Person 3, who is the legitimate interested party, the legality of that procedure is in principle satisfied by granting Non-indicted Person 3 an opportunity to participate. Furthermore, the dissenting opinion's view—that failing to grant the right to participate even to Non-indicted Person 1 and others, who handed over the hard disk at issue for the purpose of destroying evidence, amounts to condoning an unconstitutional result in which their legal interests concerning the secrecy and freedom of private life are infringed—is difficult to accept.
B. Recognition of the Right to Participate Based on the Criminal Suspicion Underlying the Seizure and Search
The recognition of the right to participate, including the concept of the "substantial subject of seizure," should in principle be based on the criminal suspicion underlying the seizure and search. The scope and limits of the guarantee of the right to participate must be determined through a balancing of the purpose sought to be achieved through the procedure and the interests infringed thereby, while taking into account the characteristics of investigative procedure. This is because, while the purport of the right to participate is to minimize infringement of the legal interests of the person subject to seizure in the course of a disposition against property, at the same time, to the extent that no essential infringement of such legal interests is caused, the ideal of criminal justice of discovering the substantive truth through swift and effective investigation must also be realized in harmony therewith.
The dissenting opinion is to the effect that the right to participate in the seizure and search procedure for electronic information should be understood in isolation from the criminal suspicion underlying the seizure and search. However, the criminal suspicion is both the ultimate purpose and object to be clarified through compulsory investigation and the basis and cause for the seizure and search and issuance of the warrant, and the electronic information that is the object of exploration, duplication, and printing in the course of executing the warrant is also the direct object related to the relevant suspected facts; thus, the relevant criminal suspicion is indeed the most important factor to be considered in the procedure of exploring, duplicating, and printing the related electronic information, and yet failing to consider that most important factor in the very recognition of the right to participate, which is itself a procedural right in that criminal procedure, is not only significantly at odds with the significance and purport of the right to participate but is also unnatural. Although the relevant precedent's holdings are aimed at reasonably interpreting, in light of realistic and concrete circumstances, the provisions on seizure and search that are centered on tangible objects and thus fail to properly reflect the characteristics of electronic information and its storage medium, the dissenting opinion, by attributing excessive meaning to certain phrases in the precedent's holdings or understanding them superficially, ultimately develops an argument that is inconsistent with the text of the Criminal Procedure Act (형사소송법) and is also removed from the ideals of criminal justice, and is thus difficult to accept. This is because the fact that the seizure and search of electronic information related to the criminal suspicion and the guarantee of the right to participate are carried out centering on the information storage medium and the person who controls and manages it is an entirely different matter from understanding this in isolation from the criminal suspicion.
Furthermore, understanding the right to participate on the premise of the criminal suspicion is also consistent with warrant execution practice, in which on-site presence, promptness, timeliness, and confidentiality of operation are important, in that it allows the subject of the right to participate to be specified concisely and clearly. The above Supreme Court Decision 2021Do11170, on the premise of Supreme Court en banc Decision 2016Do348—which holds that where a third party voluntarily submits an information storage medium owned by a suspect in relation to the suspect's criminal suspicion, the right to participate must be guaranteed to the suspect as the substantial subject of seizure—provided that whether an information storage medium is one for which the suspect is to be recognized as having the right to participate should be determined based on the objectively and externally recognizable factual state. This, too, is aimed at harmoniously realizing the ideals of criminal justice, namely protection of fundamental rights and discovery of substantive truth, by setting the scope of the right to participate at a reasonable level in consideration of, among other things, the on-site nature of seizure and search. Determining the right to participate solely on the basis of the possibility of infringement of legal interests concerning unrelated information in the course of exploring, duplicating, and printing electronic information, as the dissenting opinion does, disregards the essential nature of the right to participate, which originates from the compulsory investigation procedure concerning the suspected facts, and presupposes that unlawful cases in which the investigative agency's seizure and search are carried out in an exploratory or fishing manner are the principal or general situation. While the concerns expressed can be sufficiently sympathized with, this is a matter to be resolved through reasonable interpretation of the relevant doctrine, including the right to participate, as well as through the strict application of the rules of evidence, and general doctrine cannot be constructed on the premise of such an exceptional situation.
C. Transfer of the Right to Manage and Dispose of Property and the Existence of the Right to Participate
Where a third party voluntarily submits an information storage medium belonging to the ownership or management of a suspect, in order for the suspect to be evaluated as the substantial party to the seizure and search of the electronic information stored in the entirety of that storage medium and thus to be guaranteed the right to participate, the suspect must, up to the time of the seizure and search or a time closely proximate thereto, actually control and manage the relevant information storage medium and hold and exercise an "exclusive" right to manage and dispose of the electronic information stored therein as a whole, and must not otherwise have transferred or waived such right to a third party of his or her own volition. Meanwhile, precedent has already made clear that the "right to manage and dispose of property" referred to here is intended to set a reasonable scope for the protection of the right to participate by harmonizing the ideals of protecting fundamental rights and discovering substantive truth in the seizure and search procedure for electronic information, and is not intended to determine private-law rights and obligations from a legal and retrospective viewpoint based on the attribution of rights under civil law (the above Supreme Court Decision 2021Do11170).
In light of this doctrine, the reason why Non-indicted Person 1 and others do not qualify as substantial subjects of seizure and are thus not recognized as having the right to participate in the voluntary submission and seizure of the hard disk at issue and the electronic information stored therein is self-evident. Since Non-indicted Person 1 handed over the hard disk at issue to Non-indicted Person 3 while instigating the concealment of evidence, and Non-indicted Person 3 concealed it, it is clear that Non-indicted Person 1 and others thereby lost actual control and management over the hard disk at issue; furthermore, the right to manage and dispose of the electronic information stored therein as a whole was transferred to Non-indicted Person 3, who in fact concealed the hard disk at issue in a location known only to himself, thereby placing the information storage medium and the electronic information stored therein as a whole in a situation where he could, at his own discretion, manage and dispose of them as he saw fit so as not to be exposed to the investigative agency; consequently, it cannot but be found that, at least as far as Non-indicted Person 1 and others are concerned, they reached a state in which they could no longer hold or exercise an "exclusive" right to manage and dispose of the property.
Moreover, the fact that the principal offender did not merely conceal the evidence himself but instigated the person committing the offense of concealment of evidence—the direct perpetrator—to bring about a state of concealment of evidence exceeds the scope of the legitimate right of defense, and in light of the fact that he intentionally created the state of separation of evidence even at the cost of infringing upon the State's judicial function, it is an interpretation consistent with the norm, and one that also accords with the ideal of criminal justice of harmonizing the discovery of substantive truth with the principle of due process and thereby realizing justice, to hold that the right to participate, which is a procedural right, and the right to manage and dispose of property that is its premise, are no longer reserved to the principal offender as a result of such an act infringing upon the State's judicial function. As examined above, this is all the more so given that Non-indicted Person 3 is a person having a direct, substantial, and legal interest in relation to the criminal suspicion that was the cause of the voluntary submission in this case or the hard disk at issue that constitutes the relevant evidence, such that the legality of the procedure can in principle be recognized by guaranteeing Non-indicted Person 3 an opportunity to participate in the seizure and search process concerning the hard disk at issue, and there are no special circumstances requiring that multiple separate holders of the right to participate be deemed to exist.
This is an evaluation based on the purport of precedent concerning the loss of the "exclusive" right of Non-indicted Person 1 and others to manage and dispose of the hard disk at issue, not an evaluation of the illegality of Non-indicted Person 1's act of instigating the concealment of evidence, and thus the dissenting opinion's criticism on this point is not correct. Likewise, the dissenting opinion's argument that a different conclusion could be reached based on civil-law doctrine such as the relationship of mediated possession is, for the same reason, difficult to accept, even without having to refute it by invoking the same civil-law doctrine concerning antisocial acts or payment for an illegal cause.
D. Other Circumstances
The other grounds put forth by the dissenting opinion likewise cannot be adopted as general doctrine, nor as the conclusion of this case, nor as doctrine for the application of precedent.
In this connection, one point should be added: the majority opinion does not take a different position even with respect to the direction of guaranteeing the right to participate in the seizure and search procedure that the dissenting opinion presents. Even in comparison with major foreign legislative examples or judicial practice, our doctrine on the right to participate in the seizure and search procedure is still in the process of being formed; its orientation lies in realizing the constitutional principles of the warrant requirement and due process in the seizure and search of electronic information and preventing the infringement of fundamental rights such as the secrecy and freedom of private life and the right to self-determination over information, but its essential function in the compulsory investigation procedure remains, after all, to secure procedural legality and legitimacy in the course of seizure and search related to a specific criminal suspicion. In addition, this must not be significantly at odds with the ideal of criminal justice of discovering substantive truth through swift and effective investigation, and thus a balance must be found amid harmonizing conflicting values; in that sense, it is necessary to approach the matter carefully so as not to lose sight of that orientation while also not departing from concrete reasonableness and common-sense conclusions. In that respect, it is merely that the dissenting opinion's position cannot be adopted at least in this case, and it is expressly noted that the majority opinion does not deny the entirety of the argument or purport developed by the dissenting opinion.
6. Concurring Opinion of Justice Oh Kyung-mi with the Dissenting Opinion
A situation could arise at any time in which a smartphone that you lost after leaving it behind in a taxi some time ago is unlawfully circulated and used in a voice phishing crime, and is then seized by an investigative agency. The same is true of a situation in which your child, who had borrowed your smartphone and was using it, is caught engaging in illegal filming on the subway and voluntarily submits it to an investigative agency. Where the investigative agency comes to know that the owner and manager of the smartphone is you and that your personal information is stored therein, is the procedural legality concerning the right to participate satisfied and completed merely by recognizing the right to participate in the exploration and extraction process, based on the criminal suspicion, only for the voice phishing offender or your child, who is the person subject to seizure and suspect having a "direct, substantial, and legal interest"? The concurring opinion of Justices Ahn Cheol-sang, Noh Tae-ak, and Cheon Dae-yeop with the majority opinion (hereinafter the "majority concurring opinion") answers in the affirmative. Can one accept, in such a situation, that the investigative agency explores and extracts your personal information from your smartphone without your even knowing it? Was the right to participate in the seizure and search of electronic information, as recognized by precedent, ever meant to be such a loose and merely formal right? The dissenting opinion answers that it was not. This is precisely the issue in this case.
A. On the Argument That the Right to Participate Should Be Recognized Based on the Criminal Suspicion
1) The majority concurring opinion's argument that the subject of the right to participate should be recognized centering on the criminal suspicion is, in the end, no different from recognizing the right to participate based on "suspect status." This argument not only runs contrary to the explicit position and trend of precedent concerning the purport of guaranteeing the right to participate, but also contradicts the majority concurring opinion's own reasoning.
Precedent has repeatedly and explicitly stated that the practical significance and purport of the right to participate lies in protecting the person subject to seizure, who is placed at risk of indiscriminate exploration and collection of information unrelated to the suspected facts underlying the seizure and search, at the opportunity of a lawful compulsory disposition concerning related information. The need for protection from such risk has nothing to do with whether the person subject to seizure is the suspect. Rather, from the standpoint of balancing, a person subject to seizure who is not the suspect would find it even more difficult to accept having to endure the disclosure of his or her private life for the sake of an investigation into another person (the suspect) unrelated to him or her. The above Supreme Court Decision 2019Do7342 made clear that, where there is no risk of infringement of the legal interests of the person subject to seizure concerning unrelated information, there is no practical benefit in guaranteeing the right to participate, by holding that there was no need to recognize the right to participate even though the suspect—who installed a disguised camera and the like covertly in lodging establishments solely for the purpose of illegal filming—was, as the holder of the right to manage and dispose of the electronic information, the substantial subject of seizure. Conversely, the majority concurring opinion's argument that the attribution of the right to participate should be determined centering on the criminal suspicion or suspect status may in fact be seen as running contrary to the doctrine of the above precedent.
Furthermore, even the majority concurring opinion states that the purport of precedent concerning the right to participate is that, in the seizure and search of an information storage medium, the matter should in principle be regulated centering on the person subject to seizure who is the holder of the right to manage and dispose of the electronic information as a whole, while instrumentally using the concept of the "substantial subject of seizure" to resolve the problem of the absence of a person entitled to participate where the person subject to seizure has no substantial interest in the criminal suspicion or the seized items. Yet the majority concurring opinion's argument that the subject of the right to participate should be recognized centering on the criminal suspicion is inconsistent with this.
2) The majority concurring opinion treats the "direct, substantial, and legal interest" in the criminal suspicion or seized items as an important indicator for recognizing the right to participate, but since such an interest has no bearing on the purport for which precedent recognized the right to participate or its area of protection, it is illogical to treat it as an indicator for the attribution of the right to participate.
Although the purport of what the majority concurring opinion calls the "direct, substantial, and legal interest in the criminal suspicion or seized items" is not entirely clear, it appears to roughly mean, from the suspect's standpoint, "the interest in avoiding criminal liability by preventing 'evidence (the seized item)' relating to his or her own 'criminal suspicion' from being exposed to the investigative agency," that is, "the suspect's interest relating to the right of defense concerning related evidence." If so, this has no direct bearing on the purport of guaranteeing the right to participate that precedent has explicitly declared. What exists to protect this interest is the traditionally recognized principle of due process and the warrant requirement itself. That is precisely the principle that the "suspect's interest relating to the right of defense concerning related evidence" is not infringed except by a warrant lawfully issued by a judge through the specification and substantiation of the suspect's criminal suspicion. Once a warrant has been lawfully issued, both the suspect and third parties must submit to a compulsory disposition regarding related evidence, that is, evidence lying within the line drawn by the warrant—the "principle of relevance." This is the positive aspect of the warrant requirement as against the investigative agency. In this domain, the right to participate has no particular significance.
The right to participate operates in the negative aspect of the warrant requirement as against the investigative agency. That is, it is a force that restrains and denies the effect of a compulsory disposition by the investigative agency when it proceeds to unrelated evidence lying outside the line drawn by the warrant—outside the "principle of relevance." In this domain, the right to participate protects the interest that the subject of the compulsory disposition has in unrelated evidence lying outside that line.
In the end, what the majority concurring opinion calls "direct, substantial, and legal interest" is not significantly different from "relevance," which determines the scope of a warrant's effect, and at least with respect to recognition of the right to participate, it has no meaning beyond serving as a reference point for distinguishing related evidence from unrelated evidence. The area protected by the right to participate under precedent is the area of unrelated evidence, and this does not overlap at all with the area in which "direct, substantial, and legal interest in the suspected facts or seized items" is recognized.
B. On the Criticism of "Isolation from the Criminal Suspicion"
The majority concurring opinion points out that the dissenting opinion understands the right to participate in isolation from the criminal suspicion underlying the seizure and search, but this is a misunderstanding of the dissenting opinion and is an argument that cannot logically stand. The right to participate, forming one axis of the warrant requirement, cannot by its very nature be discussed "in isolation from the criminal suspicion."
Even under the dissenting opinion, the criminal suspicion substantially affects the setting of the scope or limits of the guarantee of the right to participate. In order to set the scope of the guarantee of the right to participate, related information and unrelated information must first be distinguished, and this is done based on the criminal suspicion. That is, the line of the "principle of relevance," which operates in the negative aspect of the warrant requirement as against the investigative agency, is set based on the criminal suspicion. The area outside that line is the domain of the right to participate. In the end, the concept of the substantial subject of seizure under the dissenting opinion is not at all understood in isolation from the criminal suspicion underlying the seizure and search; rather, it is a concept related to unrelated evidence that presupposes the criminal suspicion.
C. Implications for Investigative Practice Aimed at Protecting Fundamental Rights in an Advanced Information Society
A smartphone spends the entire day together with its owner and manager in daily life, storing his or her personal information in minute detail. Enterprises cannot conduct business activities without the exchange and storage of information through large-capacity computers, servers, and the internet. Furthermore, as portability and mobility increase, information storage media commonly leave the possession of their owner or manager, whether by that person's own volition or independently thereof, and come to be held or kept by another person. In the course of an investigative agency's seizure and search, it is a frequent occurrence for a suspect to conceal or destroy his or her own mobile phone, computer, or the like. The dissenting opinion posits, as situations giving rise to the issue of the right to participate, relationships of separation from possession or mediated possession concerning information storage media. It is not unusual, in such relationships, for the owner or manager of an information storage medium to be in conflict with the investigative agency.
With the rapid advancement of information technology, the problem situations surrounding information storage media will become even more complex in the future, and the proposition that the investigative agency's compulsory dispositions must be constitutionally controlled to develop investigative practice in a direction that guarantees fundamental rights has already become self-evident. The Supreme Court should present standards for the seizure and search procedure of electronic information that can meet the constitutional demand through the guarantee of the procedural rights required by this proposition, while also satisfying the ideal of criminal justice through the discovery of substantive truth. The dissenting opinion, reflecting the factors considered by precedent in developing the doctrine of the right to participate, has categorized situations of seizure and search of electronic information and, on the basis of the warrant requirement principle, established a unified standard capable of protecting the interests of the substantial subject of seizure. This can serve as a guideline for investigative practice to develop in response to the advancement of the information society, efficiently fulfilling its role of discovering substantive truth while also meeting the demand for guaranteeing fundamental rights.
D. The Relationship Between the Expansion of the Guarantee of the Right to Participate and the Ideal of Discovering Substantive Truth
The criticism that, under the dissenting opinion, investigative practice would be thrown into confusion and burdened, causing the other ideal of criminal justice—discovery of substantive truth—to retreat, is not correct. The scope of the guarantee of the right to participate has already been expanded to encompass the "substantial subject of seizure" under the doctrine of Supreme Court en banc Decision 2016Do348. This doctrine is evaluated as having achieved a balance and harmony between the ideal of criminal justice that fundamental rights of the person subject to seizure concerning unrelated information must be guaranteed through the implementation of the warrant requirement in the seizure and search procedure for electronic information, and the other ideal of discovering substantive truth. It is true that the investigative agency has come to bear a greater burden than before in determining the scope of the guarantee of the right to participate, but this circumstance cannot be said to constitute a retreat of the criminal justice ideal of discovering substantive truth. Criticizing the dissenting opinion, which sets the scope of the guarantee of the right to participate based on the above doctrine, as causing a retreat in the discovery of substantive truth is no different from leveling the same criticism against the doctrine of Supreme Court en banc Decision 2016Do348.
In practice, the seizure and search of electronic information is carried out by imaging the information storage medium at the site, removing it, and then exploring and printing the related information through a separate procedure conducted externally. The act of locating and seizing the information storage medium itself, a tangible object, at the site is not significantly different from traditional compulsory investigation concerning tangible objects, and thus the expansion of the right to participate does not impose any additional constraint on warrant execution practice. The portion where an additional burden arises is in the imaging procedure and the procedure, conducted separately externally, of exploring and printing related information. However, since this portion of the procedure is carried out separately after the investigative agency has securely obtained the information storage medium and the electronic information therein based on on-site presence and confidentiality of operation, it is difficult to see the expansion of the right to participate as imposing an additional obstacle to the on-site nature, promptness, timeliness, and confidentiality of operation of the investigative procedure, or as imposing a burden severe enough to cause the criminal justice ideal of discovering substantive truth to retreat. It is rather the majority concurring opinion that, by invoking the efficiency of investigative procedure and the discovery of substantive truth, is causing a retreat of the warrant requirement and the principle of due process that are required for the protection of the fundamental rights of individuals and enterprises in an advanced information society.
E. The Problem of the Right to Participate Arising from Acts of Concealing Information Storage Media, etc.
The investigative agency, while investigating the underlying offense, tracked down the location of a data storage device concealed by the principal offender and eventually secured it from a third party who was the offender of evidence concealment—does the principal offender, in that case, fail to be guaranteed the right to participate in the search and printing-out procedures conducted on that device? Is it not the case that regarding it as sufficient to guarantee the right to participate only to the third-party evidence-concealment offender applies the legal principles on the guarantee of the right to participate, as established by precedent, in an overly formalistic manner, thereby undermining their fundamental purpose? In such a situation, apart from guaranteeing the principal offender's right to participate, is there any device in place to ensure constitutional control over the execution of the warrant? What difference is there, in terms of the guarantee of the right to participate, between seizing a data storage device directly from the suspect himself and seizing it from a third party who had been entrusted with and had concealed it on behalf of the suspect? Is whether the third party who concealed the data storage device had the intent to conceal evidence—that is, whether the third party stands in the position of a suspect in the crime of evidence concealment—an essential element in determining whether the right to participate must be guaranteed to the principal offender? In all of these cases, should it not be considered that the principal offender, as the owner/manager of the data storage device, still retains the interest of participation aimed at excluding irrelevant information, as the exclusive holder of the right to manage and dispose of the electronic information? From the standpoint of the right to participate, are the investigative procedure against the principal offender and the investigative procedure against the evidence-concealment offender substantively completely independent and separate procedures, or is the latter in a relationship where it can, in fact, be subsumed as part of the former? Do the principal offender and the evidence-concealment offender each hold the status of a suspect while, at the same time, overlappingly holding the status of a third party in relation to the other's criminal suspicion, such that each can become a subject to whom the right to participate is attributed?
The structure involving a principal offender and an evidence-concealment offender presents various points of contention in determining the subject to whom the right to participate is attributed. The dissenting opinion, focusing on these various particularities, is the product of an effort to find, based on precedent concerning the guarantee of the right to participate, answers to the above questions as well as to identify what constitutes the essence of the right to participate and the core indicia of the subject to whom the right to participate is attributed. It is hoped that, building on the discussion developed in the dissenting opinion, this will serve as an occasion for vigorous further discussion of the scope and direction of the guarantee of the right to participate in the search and seizure procedures for data storage devices in an increasingly advanced information society.
For the foregoing reasons, this supplements the dissenting opinion.
Chief Justice Kim Myeong-su (Presiding Judge), Justices Ahn Cheol-sang, Min Yu-sook, Lee Dong-won, Noh Jeong-hee, Noh Tae-ak, Lee Heung-gu, Cheon Dae-yeop, Oh Kyung-mi (Justice in Charge), Oh Seok-jun, Seo Kyung-hwan, Kwon Young-jun