[Plaintiff (Selected Party), Appellee and Appellant] Plaintiff (Selected Party) 1 and 1 other (Attorney-in-fact: Law Firm Yu & I, in charge attorney Lee Sang-ho)
[Defendant, Appellant and Appellee] Geumnam Express Co., Ltd. (Attorneys: Kim Yong-sang and 2 others)
[Judgment Below] Daejeon High Court Judgment 2015. 2. 13., 2013Na70
[Order]
The part of the judgment below concerning overtime allowance, night-shift allowance, weekly holiday allowance, and paid holiday allowance for Workers' Day, and the part concerning retirement allowance for the remaining Plaintiffs (Selected Parties) and Selected Parties excluding Selected Party 19, are each reversed, and this part of the case is remanded to the Daejeon High Court. The remainder of the Plaintiffs' (Selected Parties') appeal is dismissed.
[Reasoning] The grounds of appeal are examined.
1. Determination on the grounds of appeal by the Plaintiffs (Selected Parties, hereinafter "Plaintiffs") and the Defendant regarding the scope of ordinary wages
A. The court below determined, for the reasons stated therein, that the length-of-service allowance and CCTV allowance (with respect to Plaintiff 1 and Selected Parties 4, 11, and 12, 16) paid by the Defendant up to January 2011, and the meal allowance and bonus paid up to May 2012, constitute ordinary wages as they are regular, uniform, and fixed wages. It further determined that the length-of-service allowance, CCTV allowance, and driver's mutual aid association dues paid from February 2011 onward do not constitute ordinary wages.
Upon examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the relevant legal principles and the record, there is no error in the above determination of the court below, such as misunderstanding the legal principles concerning ordinary wages or exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence in violation of the rules of logic and experience, as alleged in the grounds of appeal.
B. However, the determination of the court below that the driver's mutual aid association dues up to January 2011 constitute ordinary wages is difficult to accept for the following reasons.
1) Wages that are set to be paid only to employees who are employed on the payment date or at some other specific point in time, regardless of whether the employee actually performed the prescribed work, have continued employment at that specific point in time as a qualifying requirement for receiving the wage. Such wages are, as a general matter, not paid to a person who provided work in the past but is not employed at the specific point in time, whereas they are paid to a person who is employed at that specific point in time regardless of the content of the work previously provided. Wages paid under such conditions can hardly be regarded as having the character of consideration for so-called prescribed work, and moreover, since an employee who retires before the arrival of the specific point in time will not receive the wage at all even if he or she provided work on any given day, such wages must be regarded as lacking fixedness (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 2012Da89399, delivered on December 18, 2013).
2) According to the reasoning of the judgment below and the record, it can be seen that the 2009 and 2010 wage agreements provided that "an employee who joins in the relevant month shall pay the mutual aid association dues, and a retiring employee shall not pay them," thereby establishing that the Defendant bore the driver's mutual aid association dues only for employees who were employed as of the last day of each month. Therefore, there is substantial room to find that, with respect to the driver's mutual aid association dues up to January 2011, a labor-management agreement was reached, or such a practice was established, to pay the dues only to employees employed at a specific point in time and not to employees not employed at that point in time.
3) Nevertheless, the court below determined that the driver's mutual aid association dues up to January 2011 constitute ordinary wages solely for the reasons stated in its judgment, without examining how the dues were handled with respect to employees who had retired before that time. This determination of the court below contains an error affecting the judgment, in that it misunderstood the legal principles concerning ordinary wages and failed to exhaust the necessary examination. The Defendant's ground of appeal pointing this out has merit.
2. Determination on the Plaintiffs' ground of appeal regarding the calculation of hourly ordinary wages
A. When converting into hourly ordinary wages a fixed allowance paid in the form of a monthly or daily wage as consideration for agreed working hours exceeding the standard working hours prescribed by the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법), in calculating the number of agreed working hours to be included in the total number of working hours that serves as the basis for calculating hourly ordinary wages, unless otherwise specifically agreed, the actual number of hours that the employee agreed to work must be aggregated as such; the number of overtime hours and night-shift hours, adjusted to reflect the premium rate applicable for calculating the premium allowance, should not be aggregated. Furthermore, where a collective agreement sets a premium rate for the weekly holiday allowance, this merely signifies that, when paying the weekly holiday allowance, a certain rate is to be added to the basic weekly holiday allowance; therefore, the same legal principle applies equally in this case. Accordingly, when calculating the number of hours deemed to have been worked on the weekly holiday, which must be included in the total number of working hours, the premium rate set for the weekly holiday allowance should not be taken into account (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 2015Da73067, delivered on January 22, 2020).
B. According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the following facts can be ascertained.
1) The 2009 and 2011 collective agreements (hereinafter "the instant collective agreements") and the 2009, 2010, and 2011 wage agreements (hereinafter "the instant wage agreements") concluded between the Defendant and the Geumnam Express Branch under the Chungnam Chapter of the National Federation of Automobile Transport Workers' Unions, to which the Plaintiffs and Selected Parties belong, provided as follows with respect to working hours and wages.
A) Daily working hours shall be 8 hours, provided that overtime work of up to 30 hours per week (22.5 hours in the case of 2011) may be performed, and night-shift hours of up to 3 hours per week (2.5 hours in the case of 2011) shall be included within the overtime hours.
B) The daily working hours serving as the basis for wage calculation are 8 hours of basic working hours, 4 hours and 30 minutes of overtime working hours, and 30 minutes of night-shift working hours.
C) The weekly holiday allowance is calculated by multiplying the agreed basic hourly wage by 12 hours, which is calculated according to the formula "8 hours × 150/100" pursuant to the "Wage Structure and Calculation Standards," which is part of the instant wage agreements.
2) The Defendant treated the basic hourly wage calculated pursuant to the annual wage agreement as the hourly ordinary wage, determined a "daily wage amount" including the basic pay, overtime allowance, night-shift allowance, and weekly holiday allowance calculated on the basis of the basic hourly wage, and then paid the Plaintiffs and Selected Parties, as their monthly basic pay, an amount calculated by multiplying the daily wage amount by the number of days worked.
3) The Plaintiffs and Selected Parties received, in addition to their monthly basic pay, various fixed allowances in the form of monthly or daily payments as consideration for agreed working hours exceeding the standard working hours prescribed by the Labor Standards Act.
C. Examining these facts in light of the legal principles set forth above, in calculating the total number of working hours that serves as the basis for calculating hourly ordinary wages in relation to each of the above fixed allowances, only the number of overtime hours, night-shift hours, and hours deemed to have been worked on the weekly holiday, without reflecting the premium rate, should be aggregated as such; figures reflecting the premium rate should not be included in the total number of working hours.
Nevertheless, contrary to this, the court below included in the total number of working hours for calculating hourly ordinary wages, with respect to fixed allowances paid in daily wage form, the numbers of overtime hours and night-shift hours each reflecting the premium rate, and also included, with respect to fixed allowances paid in monthly wage form, the numbers of overtime hours, night-shift hours, and hours deemed to have been worked on the weekly holiday, each reflecting the premium rate.
This action of the court below contains an error affecting the judgment, in that it misunderstood the legal principles concerning the calculation of hourly ordinary wages. The ground of appeal pointing this out has merit.
3. Determination on the Plaintiffs' ground of appeal regarding the claims for full-attendance allowance, excess full-attendance allowance, and paid holiday allowance for paid holidays other than Workers' Day
The court below determined that the full-attendance allowance, excess full-attendance allowance, and paid holiday allowance for paid holidays other than Workers' Day are "agreed allowances" whose payment is determined by agreement between labor and management, and thus the agreement in the instant collective agreements and the instant wage agreements to calculate such amounts based on the agreed daily wage amount remains valid as is, and accordingly rejected all claims for paid holiday allowance in this regard.
Upon examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the relevant legal principles and the record, there is no error in the above determination of the court below, such as misunderstanding the legal principles concerning full-attendance allowance, excess full-attendance allowance, and paid holiday allowance, or exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence in violation of the rules of logic and experience, as alleged in the grounds of appeal.
4. Determination on the Defendant's ground of appeal concerning the agreement on the comprehensive wage system
The court below determined, for the reasons stated therein, that the mere fact that there was a prior agreement in the instant wage agreements regarding working hours exceeding the prescribed working hours, etc., is insufficient to recognize an agreement on a comprehensive wage system.
Upon examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the relevant legal principles and the record, there is no error in the above determination of the court below, such as misunderstanding the legal principles concerning the formation of an agreement on a comprehensive wage system, or exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence in violation of the rules of logic and experience, as alleged in the grounds of appeal.
5. Determination on the Defendant's ground of appeal concerning retirement allowance under the fixed-term (chotak-jik) employment contracts
A. Article 4, Paragraph 1 of the Act on the Guarantee of Employees' Retirement Benefits (근로자퇴직급여 보장법) provides: "An employer shall establish one or more of the retirement benefit systems in order to pay benefits to a retiring employee: Provided, That this shall not apply to an employee whose continuous service period is less than one year, or an employee whose average weekly prescribed working hours over a four-week period are less than 15 hours." Article 8, Paragraph 1 provides: "An employer who intends to establish a retirement allowance system shall establish a system capable of paying a retiring employee a retirement allowance of not less than 30 days' average wages for each year of continuous service." Accordingly, where the continuous service period is less than one year, no right to claim retirement allowance arises under the Act on the Guarantee of Employees' Retirement Benefits (see Supreme Court Decision 2016Da236285, delivered on December 29, 2016).
However, where, upon expiration of an employment contract term, a new employment contract is concluded renewing the contract term, or where employment contracts under identical conditions are repeatedly concluded, whether there was continuous service and the number of years of continuous service, as requirements for retirement allowance payment, must be determined by aggregating the renewed or repeatedly concluded contract periods; and even if there is some gap period between the renewed or repeatedly concluded employment contracts, if that period is not long in comparison to the entire contract period, and there is a reasonable reason attributable to seasonal factors, vacation periods, or the nature of the relevant work, or to a waiting period or a rest period for recuperation, etc., such that work was not provided or wages were not paid during that period, it is reasonable to view that the continuity of the employment relationship is maintained even during that period (see Supreme Court Decision 2009Da35040, delivered on April 14, 2011, among others).
B. According to the reasoning of the judgment below and the record, it can be seen that the Plaintiffs and Selected Parties 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9, after retiring from the Defendant company upon reaching the mandatory retirement age, each concluded a fixed-term (chotak-jik) employment contract with the Defendant that included an agreement to pay retirement allowance, and after completing service of less than one year, each received a retirement allowance equivalent to one year's worth.
Examining these facts in light of the statutory provisions and legal principles set forth above, it is reasonable to view that the requirement for the accrual of a right to claim retirement allowance under the Act on the Guarantee of Employees' Retirement Benefits—namely, that the continuous service period must be one year or more—is satisfied only where the continuity of the employment relationship is substantially maintained even during the gap periods between each fixed-term employment contract; conversely, if this is not the case, it is reasonable to view that no right to claim retirement allowance under the Act on the Guarantee of Employees' Retirement Benefits arises with respect to each period of service of less than one year under the fixed-term employment contracts.
C. Nevertheless, the court below, without examining and determining these circumstances, ordered payment of the difference between the retirement allowance already paid and the statutory retirement allowance with respect to each retirement allowance under the fixed-term employment contracts, on the premise that the Act on the Guarantee of Employees' Retirement Benefits directly applies thereto. This determination of the court below contains an error affecting the judgment, in that it misunderstood the legal principles concerning retirement allowance under the Act on the Guarantee of Employees' Retirement Benefits and failed to exhaust the necessary examination. The ground of appeal pointing this out has merit.
6. Determination on the Defendant's ground of appeal concerning the method of calculating retirement allowance
A. The provisions of the Labor Standards Act and the Act on the Guarantee of Employees' Retirement Benefits concerning retirement benefits prescribe the minimum amount of retirement allowance that an employer must pay to a retiring employee. Therefore, if there is a separate agreement between labor and management not to include, as a basis for calculating retirement allowance, a benefit that could otherwise be included in the average wage prescribed by the Labor Standards Act due to its nature, and if the retirement allowance amount calculated pursuant to that agreement exceeds the minimum amount guaranteed under the Act on the Guarantee of Employees' Retirement Benefits, such agreement cannot be deemed void as violating Article 8 of the Act on the Guarantee of Employees' Retirement Benefits; and such a separate agreement may also be made implicitly (see Supreme Court Decision 2003Da40538, delivered on December 11, 2003).
B. According to the relevant legal principles, as recognized by the court below, (i) the difference between the overtime allowance, etc. for the three months immediately preceding retirement for each of Selected Parties 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, and 20, recalculated based on the hourly ordinary wage recalculated by including the length-of-service allowance, etc. that was fixedly paid up to January 2011, or the meal allowance and bonus that continued to be fixedly paid even after February 2011, and (ii) the overtime allowance, etc. actually paid to the above Selected Parties for the same period, calculated based on the basic pay (agreed basic hourly wage) in the wage agreement, does constitute wages that should be included in the average wage prescribed by the Labor Standards Act.
However, according to the reasoning of the judgment below and the record, it can be seen that Article 44 of the 2009 collective agreement, applicable until January 31, 2011, and Article 49 of the 2011 collective agreement, applicable from February 1, 2011, each provided that 30 days' worth of average wages shall be paid as one year's retirement allowance, that the ordinary wage shall be the basic pay in the wage agreement, and that an additional retirement allowance shall be paid to employees who retire upon reaching mandatory retirement age and to employees with five or more years of continuous service; and that the Plaintiffs and the remaining Selected Parties, excluding Selected Party 19, received retirement allowance or additional retirement allowance in accordance with the content of the above provisions upon their retirement from the Defendant company.
Examining these facts in light of the legal principles set forth above, there is room to find that an express or implied agreement was reached to calculate the overtime allowance, etc. included in the average wage, which serves as the basis for calculating retirement allowance, based on the basic pay (agreed basic hourly wage) in the wage agreement. If so viewed, it is reasonable to compare the total amount received by Selected Parties 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, and 20, including the additional retirement allowance, at the time of their respective retirements, with the amount of retirement allowance guaranteed under the Act on the Guarantee of Employees' Retirement Benefits, and to deem the above agreement void as violating the Act on the Guarantee of Employees' Retirement Benefits only to the extent that the total amount already paid falls short of the amount of retirement allowance guaranteed under the Act on the Guarantee of Employees' Retirement Benefits.
C. Nevertheless, the court below, without properly examining whether an agreement existed to calculate the overtime allowance, etc. included in the average wage, which serves as the basis for calculating retirement allowance, based on the basic pay (agreed basic hourly wage) in the wage agreement, and without taking into account at all the additional retirement allowance already paid, granted the claim seeking payment of the difference in retirement allowance. Furthermore, while the court below, as stated in its judgment, rejected the argument that retirement allowance should be recalculated including the difference in annual leave allowance, it also erred by reflecting the difference in annual leave allowance in the calculations in its Attachments 4-9 through 4-19. This judgment of the court below contains an error affecting the judgment, in that it misunderstood the legal principles concerning the interpretation of collective agreements, the calculation of retirement allowance, etc., and failed to exhaust the necessary examination. The ground of appeal pointing this out has merit.
7. Regarding the claim for unpaid basic pay
The Plaintiffs appealed the entirety of the portion of the judgment below in which the Plaintiffs lost; however, no specific grounds of objection concerning this portion are stated in the petition of appeal or the appellate brief.
8. Conclusion
Therefore, without rendering a determination on the remaining grounds of appeal, the part of the judgment below concerning overtime allowance, night-shift allowance, weekly holiday allowance, and paid holiday allowance for Workers' Day, and the part concerning retirement allowance for the remaining Plaintiffs and Selected Parties excluding Selected Party 19, are each reversed, and this part of the case is remanded to the court below for further examination and determination; and the remainder of the Plaintiffs' appeal is dismissed in its entirety. This Judgment is rendered as stated in the Order by the unanimous opinion of the participating Justices.
[[Attachment] List of Selected Parties: Omitted]
Justices Kim Jae-hyung (Presiding Justice), Min Yu-sook, Lee Dong-won (Justice in Charge), Noh Tae-ak