[Plaintiffs, Appellee and Appellant] Plaintiff 1 and 6 others (Attorney-in-charge: Lee Sang-ho, You&I Law Firm)
[Defendant, Appellant and Appellee] Jungbu Express Co., Ltd. (Attorneys: Kim Yong-sang and 2 others)
[Judgment Below] Daejeon High Court Decision 2014Na3236 decided November 5, 2015
[Order]
Among the judgment below, the parts other than the plaintiffs' claims for full-attendance allowance, paid holiday allowance for paid holidays other than Workers' Day, and basic pay are reversed, and this part of the case is remanded to the Daejeon High Court. All remaining appeals by the plaintiffs are dismissed.
[Reasoning] The grounds of appeal are examined.
1. Overview of the Case
A. The Plaintiffs are persons who were employed by the Defendant, worked as bus drivers, and subsequently retired.
B. The provisions concerning working hours and wages in the 2009 Collective Bargaining Agreement and the 2009 and 2010 Wage Agreements (hereinafter “the Collective Bargaining Agreement and Each Wage Agreement in this Case”) concluded between the Defendant and the △△△△ Branch under the ○○ Chapter of the Federation of Korean Motor Workers' Unions, to which the Plaintiffs belonged, are as follows.
1) The daily working hours of union members shall be 8 hours, provided that extended work of up to 30 hours per week may be performed, and the extended working hours include up to 3 hours per week of night work.
2) The daily working hours serving as the basis for calculating wages consist of 8 basic working hours plus 5 hours of extended work (of which 30 minutes are night work hours).
3) The “Wage Structure and Calculation Standards,” which form part of Each Wage Agreement in this Case, provide as follows regarding the weekly holiday allowance:
- Weekly holiday allowance: equivalent to 12 hours (8 hours + 4 hours) per week
- Weekly holiday allowance: 8 hours × 150/100 = 12 hours
C. The Defendant treated the basic hourly wage calculated according to Each Wage Agreement in this Case as the hourly ordinary wage, determined the “daily wage amount” including the basic pay, extended work allowance, night work allowance, and weekly holiday allowance calculated on the basis of the basic hourly wage, and then paid the monthly basic pay by multiplying the daily wage amount by the number of days the Plaintiffs worked.
D. The Plaintiffs worked the agreed working hours, which exceeded the standard working hours prescribed by the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법), on each working day, and in addition to the monthly basic pay, they received various fixed allowances in the form of monthly or daily wages as compensation for the agreed working hours.
E. The Plaintiffs asserted that the various fixed allowances (seniority allowance, driving allowance, New Year allowance, driver mutual aid association dues, meal allowance, bonus) that the Defendant excluded from the ordinary wage constitute ordinary wages, and, based on this, claimed extended work allowance, night work allowance, weekly holiday allowance, full-attendance allowance, and paid holiday allowance recalculated accordingly.
2. Issues
A. The Labor Standards Act prescribes “ordinary wage” as the basis wage for calculating additional pay for extended, night, and holiday work, dismissal notice allowance, and annual leave allowance, among others. Given that in the reality of our country it is not rare for workers to regularly perform extended, night, and holiday work, the most important function that the Labor Standards Act thereby confers on the ordinary wage is that it serves as the basis wage for calculating additional pay for extended, night, and holiday work (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 2012Da89399 delivered on December 18, 2013). Since additional pay for extended, night, and holiday work must be paid in proportion to the hours of such work provided, accurately determining the hourly rate of the ordinary wage forms the basis for calculating the additional pay.
B. The core issue in this case concerns the calculation of the “total number of working hours,” which serves as the standard for converting a fixed allowance into the hourly ordinary wage, in a case where a worker received a fixed allowance in the form of a monthly or daily wage having the nature of ordinary wage as compensation for agreed working hours exceeding the standard working hours prescribed by the Labor Standards Act, and the employer excluded such fixed allowance from the ordinary wage, but it was determined through the hearing that the fixed allowance has the nature of an ordinary wage.
3. Judgment on the Grounds of Appeal of the Plaintiffs and the Defendant Concerning the Calculation of the Hourly Ordinary Wage
A. The Position of Existing Supreme Court Precedents
The Supreme Court has held that where a worker received a fixed monthly allowance as compensation for agreed working hours exceeding the standard working hours under Article 50 of the Labor Standards Act, the fixed allowance includes a portion corresponding to paid holidays under Article 55 of the former Labor Standards Act (Act No. 15513, before amendment on March 20, 2018; hereinafter “the former Labor Standards Act”) and a portion corresponding to extended and night work under Article 56 of the Labor Standards Act, which cannot be regarded as ordinary wage, making it difficult to determine the ordinary wage; therefore, in such a case, it is permissible to calculate the total working hours by deeming the worker to have worked on the paid holiday and adding this to the agreed working hours, and then to calculate the hourly ordinary wage by dividing the fixed allowance by the total number of working hours, and when calculating the extended work hours and night work hours included in the agreed working hours among the total working hours, the ‘premium rate’ for calculating additional pay must be taken into account (see Supreme Court Decision 2010Da91046 delivered on March 29, 2012, Supreme Court Decision 2011Da6106 delivered on July 26, 2012, Supreme Court Decision 2013Da74363 delivered on August 28, 2014, etc.; hereinafter “the Prior Decisions”).
B. Judgment of the Court Below
1) The court below calculated the hourly ordinary wage in the following manner in accordance with the judgment of the Prior Decisions above.
A) In the case of fixed allowances set as daily wages
Fixed Allowance ÷ [8 hours of basic work + (4.5 hours of extended work × 150%) + (0.5 hours of extended and night work × 200%)]
B) In the case of fixed allowances set as monthly wages
Fixed Allowance ÷ {[40 hours of weekly basic work + 8 hours deemed weekly holiday work + (22.5 hours of extended work × 150%) + (2.5 hours of extended and night work × 200%)] × 365 days ÷ 12 months ÷ 7 days}
2) In this manner, the court below included in the total number of working hours for calculating the hourly ordinary wage the extended work hours reflecting the ‘premium rate’ of 150% and the extended and night work hours reflecting the ‘premium rate’ of 200%.
Meanwhile, in calculating the total number of working hours for determining the hourly ordinary wage of the fixed allowance paid in the form of monthly wages, the court below included the average monthly hours deemed to be weekly holiday work, but reflected only 8 hours per week without taking into account the ‘premium rate’ of 150% specified for the weekly holiday allowance in Each Wage Agreement in this Case.
C. Judgment of the Supreme Court
1) A) When a fixed allowance paid in the form of a monthly wage, as compensation for agreed working hours exceeding the standard working hours prescribed by the Labor Standards Act, is converted into an hourly ordinary wage, in calculating the agreed working hours included in the total number of working hours serving as the basis for calculating the hourly ordinary wage, unless otherwise specifically provided, the actual number of hours that the worker agreed to provide labor must be aggregated as is; the number of extended work hours and night work hours reflecting the ‘premium rate’ for calculating additional pay must not be aggregated. The relevant portion of the judgment in the Prior Decisions is unjust and can no longer be maintained. The reasons are as follows.
(1) Unless there are special circumstances, such as where a collective bargaining agreement, rules of employment, or employment contract, in connection with a fixed allowance, clearly specifies the hourly wage for prescribed work within the standard working hours and the hourly wage for extended work and night work, it is most consistent with the principles of ordinary wage calculation, and most equitable and reasonable, to regard the wage for hours of labor provided as being set at the same amount. It is the principle that the value assessment per hour for time during which ‘identical labor’ is provided should be regarded as the same. To hold otherwise without a special basis, such as statute or the parties’ agreement, amounts to an arbitrary assessment of the value of labor.
Therefore, when determining the hourly rate of a fixed allowance paid as compensation for specific working hours, it is, in principle, appropriate to determine the hourly value of the fixed allowance by dividing the amount of the fixed allowance by that specific number of working hours, and the premium rate for calculating additional pay should not be reflected therein.
(2) Article 56 of the Labor Standards Act merely provides that where a worker performs extended or night work, the employer must pay the statutory allowance therefor with an addition of at least 50% of the ordinary wage. There is no legal basis requiring that the premium rate for calculating additional pay be taken into account when determining the agreed working hours necessary for calculating the hourly rate of a fixed allowance paid in the form of a monthly wage. The Labor Standards Act also does not separately prescribe a premium rate applicable to the number of hours of extended, night, or holiday work.
Meanwhile, where the extended work allowance calculated under Article 56 of the Labor Standards Act is included in the monthly basic pay received by a worker, the hourly ordinary wage of the monthly basic pay can be obtained only by dividing the monthly basic pay by the total number of working hours obtained by adding the prescribed working hours, the extended work hours reflecting the premium rate, and the hours deemed to be weekly holiday work. This is a natural method for deducting the extended work allowance from the monthly basic pay, because the extended work allowance calculated according to the premium rate is already included in the monthly basic pay. However, among the fixed allowances that a worker paid on a daily wage basis receives monthly, in addition to the basic daily wage, as compensation for agreed working hours exceeding the standard working hours prescribed by the Labor Standards Act, the statutory allowance paid under Article 56 of the Labor Standards Act, namely the extended work allowance or night work allowance, is not necessarily included therein unless otherwise provided in the employment contract, collective bargaining agreement, etc. (see Supreme Court Decision 2014Da6275 delivered on August 20, 2014, Supreme Court Decision 2016Da204271 delivered on December 27, 2018, etc.). Therefore, there is no reasonable ground to take the premium rate into account when calculating the agreed working hours included in the total number of working hours for the purpose of determining the hourly ordinary wage of such fixed allowance.
(3) An employer generally determines the hourly ordinary wage in order to accurately calculate and pay statutory allowances. However, where an employer has calculated and paid statutory allowances without including a fixed allowance in the form of a monthly wage in the ordinary wage, there is no reason for the employer to have determined the hourly rate of such fixed allowance, and thus it is difficult to find that an intention regarding the method of calculating the hourly rate has been formed. Even if such fixed allowance was paid pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement, it is likewise difficult to find that the labor union had an intention regarding the method of calculating the hourly rate of the fixed allowance, just as with the employer. Where, as such, the intention of the parties to the employment relationship regarding the hourly rate of a fixed allowance has not been determined, the most reasonable and objective method of calculating the hourly rate must be sought, and the hourly rate must not be calculated by deeming an intention disadvantageous to one party without a special basis.
Moreover, when interpreting a disposal document such as a collective bargaining agreement, since a collective bargaining agreement is concluded through collective bargaining between a labor union, as an autonomous organization of workers, and an employer for the purpose of maintaining and improving workers' working conditions and promoting their welfare so as to enhance their economic and social status, the explicit provisions thereof may not be interpreted in a manner disadvantageous to workers by distorting their meaning (see Supreme Court Decision 2009Da102452 delivered on October 13, 2011, etc.). Therefore, the intention of the parties, which is not disclosed in the collective bargaining agreement or wage agreement, must not be arbitrarily deemed without a special basis so as to bring about a result disadvantageous to the workers.
(4) The following unreasonable results arise under the Prior Decisions.
① Where working hours are agreed within the scope of the standard working hours, the hourly rate is derived by dividing the fixed allowance in the form of a monthly wage by the total number of working hours obtained by adding the agreed monthly working hours and the hours deemed to be weekly holiday work. On the other hand, where working hours exceeding the standard working hours are agreed, according to the Prior Decisions, the premium rate must be reflected in the extended work hours and night work hours when calculating the monthly agreed working hours. Comparing the latter with the former, since the actual hours worked are greater, not only does the hourly rate decrease as a matter of calculation, but the hourly ordinary wage becomes even smaller beyond that.
The purpose of the Labor Standards Act's provision requiring an employer to pay at least 50% in addition to the ordinary wage for extended, night, and holiday work is, on the one hand, to discourage extended, night, and holiday work, and, on the other hand, because such work causes greater fatigue and tension to the worker than work performed within the statutory standard working hours and restricts the worker's free time in daily life, to protect the worker by providing corresponding monetary compensation (see Supreme Court Decision 90Daka12493 delivered on December 26, 1990, Supreme Court en banc Decision 2012Da89399 delivered on December 18, 2013, etc.). However, according to the Prior Decisions, contrary to the purpose of this provision of the Labor Standards Act, agreeing to working hours exceeding the standard working hours results in the hourly ordinary wage being calculated at less than its actual value, which runs counter to the purpose of protecting workers.
② If the purport of the Prior Decisions is consistently applied, an unreasonable result arises where, although working hours exceeding the standard working hours are not agreed, all or part of the prescribed work is agreed to be provided at night. Between a worker who provides prescribed work during the daytime and a worker who provides all or part of the prescribed work at night in the same workplace, the total number of working hours for calculating the hourly ordinary wage of a fixed allowance paid in the form of a monthly wage would differ, such that the hourly ordinary wage would differ even though the same amount is received as the fixed allowance. Such a result is difficult to consider justifiable.
B) The above legal principle applies equally to the calculation of the hourly ordinary wage for a fixed allowance paid in the form of a daily wage as compensation for agreed working hours exceeding the standard working hours.
C) Accordingly, the Prior Decisions, namely Supreme Court Decision 2010Da91046 delivered on March 29, 2012, Supreme Court Decision 2011Da6106 delivered on July 26, 2012, Supreme Court Decision 2013Da74363 delivered on August 28, 2014, etc., which held to the effect that, when converting into an hourly rate a fixed allowance in the form of a monthly or daily wage paid as compensation for agreed working hours exceeding the standard working hours, the total number of working hours must be calculated by taking into account the ‘premium rate’ applicable to the number of extended work hours and night work hours, are all hereby overruled to the extent they conflict with this Decision.
2) Where a premium rate for the weekly holiday allowance is specified by a collective bargaining agreement, rules of employment, etc., this merely signifies an intention to pay the basic weekly holiday allowance with a certain percentage added thereto when paying the weekly holiday allowance, and thus the above legal principle applies equally in this case as well. Accordingly, when calculating the number of hours deemed to have been worked on the weekly holiday that must be included in the total number of working hours, the premium rate specified for the weekly holiday allowance should not be taken into account.
D. Judgment on This Case
1) Examining the facts recognized above in light of the above legal principle, in calculating the hourly ordinary wage for a fixed allowance paid in the form of a monthly or daily wage that constitutes ordinary wage, the ‘premium rate’ of 150% for extended work hours and the ‘premium rate’ of 200% for extended and night work hours should not be taken into account in the total number of working hours. Furthermore, since Each Wage Agreement in this Case sets the Plaintiffs' basic weekly holiday allowance as equivalent to 8 hours of the basic hourly wage and agreed upon a ‘premium rate’ of 150% thereon, in calculating the total number of working hours for determining the hourly ordinary wage of the fixed allowance paid in the form of a monthly wage that constitutes ordinary wage, 8 hours per week deemed to be weekly holiday work should be added without taking into account the ‘premium rate’ for the weekly holiday allowance. Ultimately, the hourly ordinary wage must be calculated as follows.
A) In the case of fixed allowances set as daily wages
Fixed Allowance ÷ [8 hours of basic work + 4.5 hours of extended work + 0.5 hours of extended and night work]
B) In the case of fixed allowances set as monthly wages
Fixed Allowance ÷ {(40 hours of weekly basic work + 8 hours deemed weekly holiday work + 22.5 hours of extended work + 2.5 hours of extended and night work) × 365 days ÷ 12 months ÷ 7 days}
2) Nevertheless, contrary to the above, the court below erred by including, in the total number of working hours for calculating the hourly ordinary wage of the fixed allowance paid in the form of a monthly or daily wage, the extended work hours and night work hours reflecting each premium rate, thereby misapprehending the legal principle concerning the calculation of the hourly ordinary wage, which error affected the judgment. The Plaintiffs' ground of appeal pointing this out is with merit.
As the court below included in the total number of working hours for determining the hourly ordinary wage of the fixed allowance paid in the form of a monthly wage the average monthly hours deemed to be weekly holiday work without taking into account the premium rate for the weekly holiday allowance, there is no error in this part of the court below's determination regarding the misapprehension of the legal principle concerning the calculation of the hourly ordinary wage.
4. Judgment on the Grounds of Appeal of the Plaintiffs and the Defendant Concerning the Scope of Ordinary Wage (the Seniority Allowance, Meal Allowance, and Bonus up to January 2011, and the Seniority Allowance, Driver Mutual Aid Association Dues, and Bonus from February 2011 Onward)
The court below determined, for the reasons stated in its judgment, that the seniority allowance, meal allowance, and bonus paid by the Defendant from April 2009 to January 2011 all constitute ordinary wage as regular, uniform, and fixed wages. It also determined that the seniority allowance, driver mutual aid association dues, and bonus paid from February 2011 onward do not constitute ordinary wage.
Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the relevant legal principles, there is no error in the above determination, such as a misapprehension of the legal principle concerning the scope of ordinary wage or a violation of the rules of logic and experience exceeding the limits of free evaluation of evidence, as asserted in the grounds of appeal.
5. Judgment on the Plaintiffs' Grounds of Appeal Concerning the Claims for the Full-Attendance Allowance and the Paid Holiday Allowance for Paid Holidays Other than Workers' Day
[Reasoning]
The court below rejected all of the Plaintiffs' claims for unpaid full-attendance allowance and unpaid paid-holiday allowance for paid holidays other than Workers' Day, on the ground that the full-attendance allowance and the paid-holiday allowance for paid holidays other than Workers' Day are "agreed allowances" whose payment is determined by agreement between labor and management, and that the agreement in the collective bargaining agreement (단체협약) at issue and each wage agreement to calculate the amount thereof based on the agreed daily wage amount is valid.
Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the relevant legal principles, there is no error in the above determination, such as a misunderstanding of the legal principles concerning full-attendance allowances and paid-holiday allowances, or a violation of the rules of logic and experience exceeding the limits of free evaluation of evidence, as alleged in the grounds of appeal.
6. Determination on the Plaintiffs' grounds of appeal concerning whether the driver's mutual aid association dues paid from April 2009 to January 2011 constitute ordinary wages, and concerning the claim for unpaid basic pay
Since the appellate court may examine and determine only within the scope of the objections raised in the grounds of appeal, the appellant's brief of grounds of appeal must specify the grounds of appeal and set out concrete and explicit reasons as to what point of the judgment below violated which laws and in what manner. Where the brief of grounds of appeal submitted by the appellant fails to contain such concrete and explicit reasons, it must be treated as if no brief of grounds of appeal had been submitted (see Supreme Court Decision 97Da55126, decided March 27, 1998; Supreme Court Decision 2007Du23187, decided January 24, 2008).
The Plaintiffs' petition of appeal in this case contains no statement of grounds of appeal concerning the "driver's mutual aid association dues paid from April 2009 to January 2011" or the "unpaid basic pay." In the section entitled "Summary of the Judgment Below and Summary of Grounds of Appeal" in the brief of grounds of appeal submitted by the Plaintiffs, it is merely stated that, as to the "driver's mutual aid association dues paid from April 2009 to January 2011," "inclusion is justified," and as to the "unpaid basic pay," it "should be recognized." The section entitled "Specific Grounds of Appeal" likewise contains no statement as to what point of the judgment below, concerning the "driver's mutual aid association dues paid from April 2009 to January 2011" and the "unpaid basic pay," violated which laws.
In light of the legal principles set out above, such statements in the brief of grounds of appeal fail to specify the grounds of appeal or to set out concrete and explicit grounds as to which part of the judgment below violated which laws and in what manner, and therefore cannot be regarded as a lawful statement of grounds of appeal.
7. Determination on the Defendant's grounds of appeal concerning the agreement on the comprehensive wage system (포괄임금제)
The court below determined that, comprehensively considering the wage system and its contents under the collective bargaining agreement and each wage agreement at issue, as well as the Defendant's method of wage payment, it is difficult to conclude that there was an agreement on a comprehensive wage system merely from the fact that there was a prior agreement concerning working hours exceeding the prescribed working hours.
Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the relevant legal principles, there is no error in the above determination, such as a misunderstanding of the legal principles concerning the formation of an agreement on a comprehensive wage system, or a violation of the rules of logic and experience exceeding the limits of free evaluation of evidence, as alleged in the grounds of appeal.
8. Scope of Reversal
As to the portions of the judgment below in which the Plaintiffs lost, excluding the portions concerning the Plaintiffs' claims for full-attendance allowance, paid-holiday allowance for paid holidays other than Workers' Day, and basic pay, the grounds for reversal set out above exist. The Defendant appealed against the entirety of the portion of the judgment below in which the Defendant lost, disputing that the Plaintiffs' claim for payment of additional statutory allowances, etc., calculated by including bonuses in ordinary wages, violates the principle of good faith (신의칙). Since this defense of the Defendant based on the principle of good faith needs to be examined and determined together with the portion of the Plaintiffs' claims that is to be reversed for the reasons set out above, the entirety of the portion of the judgment below in which the Defendant lost is reversed together.
9. Conclusion
Therefore, without determining the remaining grounds of appeal, the portion of the judgment below other than the portions concerning the Plaintiffs' claims for full-attendance allowance, paid-holiday allowance for paid holidays other than Workers' Day, and basic pay is reversed, and this portion of the case is remanded to the court below for further hearing and determination; the remainder of the Plaintiffs' appeal is entirely dismissed. It is so decided as set forth in the Order. As to the method of calculating the hourly ordinary wage (see 3. above), Justice Lee Ki-taek dissents, while the opinions of the participating Justices are otherwise unanimous, and there is a supplementary opinion by Justice Park Sang-ok, Justice Min Yu-sook, and Justice Kim Sun-soo concerning the majority opinion.
10. Dissenting Opinion of Justice Lee Ki-taek on the Method of Calculating the Hourly Ordinary Wage
A. First, I examine the Plaintiffs' grounds of appeal on this point.
1) The majority opinion determined that, when calculating the total number of working hours used to determine the hourly ordinary wage of a fixed allowance paid as compensation for agreed working hours exceeding the statutory working hours, the aggregate of overtime working hours and night working hours should not, in principle, take into account the premium rate used for calculating premium allowances. However, the logic of the majority opinion is not persuasive, for the following reasons.
A) The majority opinion, which holds that where the hourly wage of a fixed allowance paid in the form of a monthly or daily wage is not specifically stipulated in a collective bargaining agreement or employment contract, it is most reasonable and appropriate, in converting the fixed allowance into an hourly wage, simply to divide the fixed allowance by the number of hours the employee agreed to provide labor, fails to take into account the intention of the parties to the employment relationship regarding the determination and payment of the fixed allowance, and is therefore incorrect.
(1) Matters concerning wages, such as the content of wages, the criteria for payment, and the method of calculation, are matters that the parties may freely determine through freedom of contract and autonomy of collective bargaining, so long as they do not conflict with mandatory statutory provisions. The criteria and amount according to which a fixed allowance is to be paid and received are basically freely determined by agreement between the parties through a collective bargaining agreement or employment contract. Ultimately, how to convert the fixed allowance at issue in this case into an hourly wage is nothing more than a matter of ascertaining the parties' intention regarding the content and method of calculation of the fixed allowance by interpreting the collective bargaining agreement or employment contract that formed the basis for its payment, which was determined through the parties' agreement. Even where the hourly wage of the fixed allowance is not specifically stipulated in the collective bargaining agreement or employment contract, such that this intention is not explicitly manifested, the appropriate hourly value of the fixed allowance must be calculated by comprehensively examining all relevant circumstances—including the background and conditions of payment of the fixed allowance, the method of calculating the basic pay and other elements at the workplace concerned, wage payment practices, and the form of labor at the workplace—and objectively and reasonably interpreting the parties' intention. If it is to be interpreted that, at the stage of determining the content or method of calculation of the fixed allowance, the parties reflected the premium rate in relation to compensation for overtime and night work, then in such a case, the hourly wage of the fixed allowance must naturally be calculated by dividing the fixed allowance by the number of agreed working hours reflecting the premium rate, and it cannot be said to be an appropriate method simply to divide it by the number of hours agreed to be worked as such. Ultimately, the logic of the majority opinion—that, in calculating the hourly wage of a fixed allowance, dividing the fixed allowance by the number of agreed working hours is, in principle, the most reasonable or appropriate method—is difficult to accept, as it disregards the already-existing intention of the parties to the employment relationship regarding the content or method of calculation of the fixed allowance.
(2) Meanwhile, the majority opinion relies, as an important ground, on the proposition that where, as in this case, the employer and the labor union agreed to calculate and pay statutory allowances such as overtime and night work allowances without including the fixed allowance paid in the form of a monthly or daily wage in the ordinary wage (hereinafter referred to as an "agreement to exclude from ordinary wage"), it is difficult to find that the parties had formed any intention regarding the method of calculating the hourly wage of the fixed allowance.
However, an agreement between the employer and the labor union to exclude a fixed allowance from the ordinary wage is nothing more than an agreement not to convert that fixed allowance into an hourly wage and use it as a basis for calculating various statutory allowances. Rather, it is reasonable to view that, at the stage of determining the wage in relation to the fixed allowance, the parties already had some degree of agreement, even if only implicit, regarding the content or method of calculation of the fixed allowance; it should not be viewed that no intention whatsoever had been formed in that regard.
Furthermore, even assuming, as the majority opinion holds, that in cases where there is an agreement to exclude the allowance from the ordinary wage, the parties' intention regarding the hourly value of the fixed allowance has not been formed, this absence of the parties' intention regarding the hourly wage of the fixed allowance, arising in the process of decision-making concerning the fixed allowance, is, in the absence of any separate default rule applicable thereto, nothing more than a matter that can be supplemented by objectively and reasonably inferring the parties' intention through comprehensive consideration of the various circumstances relating to the fixed allowance. Unless the absence of such intention is of a degree that would render invalid the agreement on payment of the fixed allowance under the collective bargaining agreement or employment contract, what the parties' intention regarding the hourly value of the fixed allowance was must be objectively and reasonably ascertained.
Ultimately, even where there is an agreement to exclude the allowance from the ordinary wage, there is no reason for the method of calculating the hourly ordinary wage of the fixed allowance to differ. The majority opinion, which proceeds from a different and erroneous premise, is difficult to accept.
(3) Let me explain by taking this case as an example. First, the fixed allowance in the form of a monthly or daily wage at issue in this case is an allowance paid in consideration of overtime and night work exceeding the statutory working hours as well, but the hourly wage of this fixed allowance is not specified in the collective bargaining agreement or each wage agreement at issue in this case. However, looking at the composition of the "daily wage amount" corresponding to the Plaintiffs' basic pay, it can be seen that the daily wage amount was determined by treating the basic hourly wage as the ordinary hourly wage and paying 1.5 times the basic hourly wage for the overtime and night work pre-agreed with the employee. It is objectively and reasonable to interpret that the parties' intention to pay 1.5 times the basic hourly wage for overtime and night work in this manner is likewise reflected in the fixed allowance. There exists no special circumstance to view the parties' intention regarding the composition of the basic pay differently solely with respect to the fixed allowance. As will be mentioned again below, there is no reason to view this differently merely because the fixed allowance is an agreed allowance rather than a statutory allowance. Therefore, it must be held that, among the fixed allowance in the form of a monthly or daily wage at issue in this case, the hourly value for overtime and night work is composed of 1.5 times the hourly value for daytime work within the statutory working hours. In other words, when calculating the total number of working hours for the purpose of calculating the hourly wage of this fixed allowance, it is not permissible simply to aggregate the number of hours the employee actually agreed to work; rather, the number of overtime hours and night working hours must be aggregated after taking into account the premium rate of 1.5, which is used for calculating premium allowances.
Ultimately, as can be seen from the example of this case as well, the majority opinion—that the hourly wage should, in principle, be converted by dividing the fixed allowance by the number of hours agreed to be worked, without ascertaining the parties' intention—is not persuasive.
(4) To emphasize again, what the hourly wage of the fixed allowance is remains, after all, a matter to be determined according to the agreement between the parties to the employment relationship. Even if the legal principle set out in the majority opinion is declared, that legal principle would have no room for application where labor and management have specifically fixed the hourly wage of the fixed allowance through a collective bargaining agreement. The issue in this case is one of ascertaining the parties' intention, but the majority opinion appears to erroneously understand the issue in this case as if it were a matter of legal principle under the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법).
B) I also find it difficult to agree with the majority opinion from the perspective of a fair evaluation of the value of labor.
(1) Article 56 of the Labor Standards Act provides that an employer must pay an employee an amount not less than 50/100 in addition to the ordinary wage for overtime work and night work. Of course, as pointed out by the majority opinion, this provision is one that establishes the premium rate applicable when paying statutory premium allowances, and is not a provision for determining the number of overtime and night working hours needed to calculate the hourly ordinary wage of a fixed allowance.
However, one of the important legislative purposes of Article 56 of the Labor Standards Act is to provide corresponding monetary compensation because overtime and night work cause greater fatigue and tension to employees and restrict the free time in daily life that employees would otherwise enjoy, compared to work performed within the statutory prescribed working hours (see the above Supreme Court Decision 90Daka12493; Supreme Court en banc Decision 2012Da89399, etc.). Considering this purpose, Article 56 of the Labor Standards Act may be understood as declaring that, in terms of the value of labor, one hour of overtime or night work has a value equal to or greater than 1.5 hours of daytime work within the statutory prescribed working hours. Moreover, considering these characteristics of overtime and night work, which are distinct from daytime work within the statutory prescribed working hours, it cannot generally be said that daytime work within the statutory prescribed working hours has the same value as overtime or night work. Ultimately, the majority opinion, which proceeds on the premise that daytime work within the statutory prescribed working hours and overtime/night work are basically hours during which "identical labor" was provided, is unsound from the outset in its very premise, and is also inconsistent with the position of precedent, which indirectly established, in relation to the purpose of Article 56 of the Labor Standards Act, that the value of overtime and night work is superior to the value of daytime work within the statutory prescribed working hours.
Furthermore, it is proper that this evaluation of the value of overtime and night work also be taken into account in the process of calculating the hourly wage of a fixed allowance paid as compensation for agreed working hours exceeding the statutory prescribed working hours. Although the fixed allowance is an agreed allowance paid pursuant to agreement between the parties rather than pursuant to the Labor Standards Act, so long as it is a wage given as compensation for labor based on an evaluation of the quantity and quality of the labor provided by the employee, it cannot be determined independently of the value of the labor. In other words, it is not the case that, merely because it is an agreed allowance, the amount of the allowance is determined without regard to a fair evaluation of the value of labor. Absent any other material that clearly establishes the parties' intention regarding the hourly wage of the fixed allowance, it is most reasonable to calculate the hourly wage of the fixed allowance, which is an agreed allowance, by taking the value of the labor provided as an important criterion.
Moreover, considering this evaluation of the value of overtime and night work, it is reasonable to hold that, among the fixed allowance, the hourly value for overtime and night work is composed of at least 1.5 times the hourly value for daytime work within the statutory prescribed working hours. Therefore, a fair hourly ordinary wage for the fixed allowance cannot be calculated by dividing the fixed allowance by the number of agreed working hours without taking the premium rate into account.
Ultimately, the logic of the majority opinion is, in this respect, fundamentally inconsistent with the content and purpose of the regulation set out in Article 56 of the Labor Standards Act concerning overtime and night work, and is also inconsistent with the characteristics of overtime and night work. The majority opinion, which proceeds from the erroneous premise—without considering these circumstances at all—that the hourly value of overtime/night work and daytime work within the statutory prescribed working hours is generally the same, and that the two are basically the same labor, is difficult to accept.
(2) Meanwhile, the majority opinion argues that the method of calculating the hourly ordinary wage of a fixed allowance under the prior decision is, rather, unjust as it runs counter to the purpose of protecting employees under Article 56 of the Labor Standards Act; this too is incorrect.
Specifically, the majority opinion argues that, under the legal principle of the prior decision, when comparing a case such as this one, where working hours were agreed exceeding the statutory prescribed working hours, with a case where working hours were agreed within the statutory prescribed working hours, since the actual number of working hours is greater, the result is that the hourly ordinary wage becomes smaller not merely in proportion to the calculation but by an even greater degree, which is unjust. This is understood as an argument that, if the premium rate is taken into account in calculating the hourly ordinary wage, then as the number of agreed working hours exceeding the statutory prescribed working hours increases, the total number of working hours increases proportionally more in accordance with the premium rate, and as a result, the hourly value of the fixed allowance decreases proportionally correspondingly more, which is an unjust result contrary to the purpose of Article 56 of the Labor Standards Act.
However, as emphasized above, considering the purpose of Article 56 of the Labor Standards Act, the value of overtime/night work and the value of daytime work within the statutory prescribed working hours must generally be evaluated differently. Furthermore, where the parties to the employment relationship, in determining and paying the fixed allowance, have already evaluated the hourly value for overtime and night work within the fixed allowance more highly than the value for daytime work within the statutory prescribed working hours by reflecting the premium rate, in keeping with the purpose of Article 56 of the Labor Standards Act, it is likewise natural to take the premium rate into account in the process of calculating the hourly wage of such fixed allowance. That is the correct method of calculating the hourly ordinary wage of the fixed allowance, and it cannot be said to run counter to the purpose of Article 56 of the Labor Standards Act.
Ultimately, this part of the majority opinion's logic criticizing the prior decision is persuasive only on the premise that the premium rate was not taken into account at all in calculating the compensation for overtime/night work exceeding the statutory prescribed working hours within the fixed allowance paid pursuant to agreement. However, as repeatedly emphasized above, this premise is difficult to accept, both in terms of the intention of the parties to the employment relationship regarding the fixed allowance including compensation for overtime and night work, and in terms of a fair evaluation of the value of overtime and night work.
[Reasoning]
To summarize, the majority opinion's logic—that, in the process of converting the fixed allowance into an hourly wage, without any consideration of the method of calculating the amount of the fixed allowance, the intentions of the parties surrounding it, or the value of overtime and night work, but focusing solely on the arithmetic change in the number of working hours, the prior judgment leads to an unjust result when calculating the hourly wage of the fixed allowance—is incorrect. It is not appropriate to say that the prior judgment is contrary to the purpose of protecting workers under Article 56 of the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법). In this case, it is rather the majority opinion, which fails to take the premium rate into account, that constitutes an unjust method of calculating the hourly wage.
(c) The problems with this majority opinion will be explained using a simplified hypothetical example.
(1) Consider, in the same workplace, Worker A, who works 20 hours of daytime work and 10 hours of night work per week, and Worker B, who works 35 hours of daytime work per week. In this case, both workers must be paid wages equal to at least 35 hours' worth of the hourly ordinary wage. It cannot be said to be unreasonable for the employer to understand both workers' labor as "labor with a value of 35 hours per week" and to pay them the same amount of fixed allowance. Rather, considering the characteristics of night work as distinguished from daytime work within the standard working hours, this is a reasonable method of calculation under Article 56 of the Labor Standards Act. If the employer, without any other special circumstances, paid A and B different amounts of fixed allowance, this would appear difficult to socially accept in terms of a fair evaluation of the value of labor, and neither the employer nor Workers A and B, nor the labor unions to which they belong, would be able to understand it. If the majority opinion's position is that, absent any special agreement between Workers A and B, it is natural and fair to pay them different amounts of fixed allowance in proportion to their weekly working hours, then this is difficult to accept, because—while focused solely on what method would not be disadvantageous to the worker with respect to the calculation of the hourly ordinary wage—it completely disregards the distinctive value of overtime and night work as distinguished from daytime work within the standard working hours, precisely at the stage where the employer pays the fixed allowance.
(2) In this hypothetical example, suppose that the employer paid Workers A and B the same fixed allowance without any explicit agreement on the hourly rate of the fixed allowance, and that this fixed allowance has the character of ordinary wages. In this case, under the majority opinion, which converts the fixed allowance solely by the number of working hours without any consideration of the value of the labor, the resulting hourly ordinary wage of Worker A would be greater than that of Worker B. Although both provided labor worth 35 hours of the hourly ordinary wage and received the same amount of fixed allowance, their hourly ordinary wages differ. As a result, Worker A would receive more of the various statutory allowances calculated based on ordinary wages than Worker B. This produces the unreasonable result that A becomes a higher-paid worker than B. This unjust result arises because the majority opinion excessively emphasizes only the number of hours of labor provided, without properly considering the value of night work as distinguished from daytime work within the standard working hours. It appears difficult for not only the parties to the employment relationship but also members of society in general to agree with the majority opinion's method of calculating the hourly ordinary wage, which makes A a higher-paid worker than B.
(3) Furthermore, let us modify the above hypothetical example to suppose, in accordance with the majority opinion's logic, that the employer paid Workers A and B fixed allowances in proportion to their respective weekly working hours. In this case, although the two workers receive different fixed allowances, the hourly ordinary wage related to the fixed allowance is calculated to be the same for both. As a result, the various statutory allowances calculated based on ordinary wages are calculated to be the same, provided other conditions are not different. However, comparing the total wages of the two workers, due to the difference in the amount of the fixed allowance, the result is that Worker A is a lower-paid worker who receives less wages than Worker B.
Thus, under the majority opinion, in the former hypothetical example, where the employer pays the two workers the same fixed allowance, A becomes a higher-paid worker than B; whereas in the latter, modified hypothetical example, where the employer pays the two workers different fixed allowances, A instead becomes a lower-paid worker—resulting in an extremely unnatural legal relationship. It is difficult to know whether the majority opinion recognizes that it leads to this conclusion, or whether it intends to normatively accept such a result.
(4) In conclusion, as mentioned above, considering together the purpose of Article 56 of the Labor Standards Act and the value of labor that night work has, the hourly value of labor of the two workers should be regarded as the same, and it is reasonable that the same wages, including the same fixed allowance, be paid to both workers. It is difficult to agree with the majority opinion, which leads to a different result.
2) The prior judgment held that, when adding together the number of hours of overtime work and night work included in the total number of working hours for calculating the hourly ordinary wage of the fixed allowance paid as wages for the agreed working hours exceeding the standard working hours, the premium rate for calculating the premium allowance must be taken into account, but did not explicitly state the reasons therefor. However, like the present case, the case underlying the prior judgment was also one in which, with respect to the fixed allowance paid for agreed working hours exceeding the standard working hours, the intention of the parties to the employment relationship had to be interpreted as having decided to pay compensation for overtime and night work by taking into account the premium rate prescribed by the Labor Standards Act. As a result, these were cases in which it was appropriate to convert the fixed allowance into an hourly wage using the number of hours of overtime and night work that took the premium rate into account. Of course, the conclusion of the prior judgment, which took the premium rate into account, is also appropriate from the standpoint of a fair evaluation of the value of labor. Therefore, the prior judgment, to this effect, is correct, and there is no need to change the legal doctrine of the prior judgment as the majority opinion does.
B. Next, I examine this part of the Defendant's grounds of appeal.
The majority opinion holds that the legal doctrine that the premium rate for calculating the premium allowance should not be considered when adding together the number of hours of overtime work and night work applies equally even where a premium rate is set for the weekly holiday allowance, and determined that, in the case at hand, when calculating the total number of working hours, the basic deemed weekly holiday working hours (8 hours), which do not take the premium rate into account, should be added. However, I also find it difficult to agree with this majority opinion. The reasons are as follows.
1) The fixed allowance paid in the form of a monthly salary includes a portion corresponding to the paid holiday under Article 55 of the former Labor Standards Act (구 근로기준법). Therefore, in order to obtain the hourly ordinary wage of the fixed allowance, the portion corresponding to the paid holiday must be excluded from the fixed allowance, and the remaining portion must be divided by the number of prescribed monthly working hours; where it is difficult to exclude the corresponding portion, the hourly ordinary wage may be calculated by deeming the employee to have worked on the paid holiday, adding the deemed weekly holiday working hours to the agreed working hours to calculate the total monthly working hours, and then dividing the fixed allowance received in the form of a monthly salary by that total number of working hours (see Supreme Court Decision 97Da28421, decided April 24, 1998, etc.).
In this regard, the "portion corresponding to the paid holiday" under Article 55 of the former Labor Standards Act, among the fixed allowance paid in the form of a monthly salary, means the "portion corresponding to the hours treated as paid." Therefore, the scope to be excluded from the fixed allowance must be determined according to the number of hours treated as paid for the weekly holiday, and this must also be reflected as is in the calculation of the total number of working hours. The majority opinion, which stands on a different premise, is difficult to accept.
Taking this case as an example, each of the wage agreements at issue in this case clearly provides for the weekly holiday allowance as "12 hours' worth (of the basic hourly wage)" per week. This means that the Defendant pays 12 hours' worth of the basic hourly wage as the weekly holiday allowance—in other words, that the number of hours treated as paid on the weekly holiday is 12 hours. Therefore, in order to calculate the hourly ordinary wage of the fixed allowance paid in the form of a monthly salary, the total number of working hours must be calculated by adding 12 hours of deemed weekly holiday working hours per week.
2) The majority opinion appears to understand that each of the wage agreements at issue in this case set the weekly holiday allowance at "8 hours' worth (of the basic hourly wage)" and decided to apply a 150% premium rate when paying the weekly holiday allowance. However, this majority opinion is not appropriate, for the following reasons.
First, each of the wage agreements at issue in this case provides for the weekly holiday allowance as "12 hours' worth (8 hours + 4 hours)," "8 hours × 150/100 = 12 hours." If a collective agreement or the like provided that "the weekly holiday allowance is 12 hours' worth of the basic hourly wage," there could be no dispute that, in calculating the hourly ordinary wage, 12 hours of deemed weekly holiday working hours per week must be reflected. It is difficult to see what difference there is between the above provisions of each of the wage agreements at issue in this case and a provision stating that "the weekly holiday allowance is 12 hours' worth of the basic hourly wage."
Second, the same conclusion follows even if each of the wage agreements at issue in this case is understood as the majority opinion does. The deemed weekly holiday working hours mean the number of hours treated as paid on the weekly holiday because, although the worker does not actually provide labor, the employer pays the weekly holiday allowance. If a premium rate is set for the weekly holiday allowance, the weekly holiday allowance increases accordingly, and correspondingly the number of hours treated as paid on the weekly holiday increases; therefore, in the end, the number of hours treated as paid, taking the premium rate into account, must be reflected in the calculation of the hourly ordinary wage.
C. I consider the significance of the courts' statutory interpretation in handling workers' wage claim cases, and elaborate on the correct direction of interpretation.
First, insofar as a court's judgment determines rights and obligations relating to past legal relationships, the position that the court takes on a particular issue in a wage claim case may produce results that are either advantageous or disadvantageous to the worker. With respect to the method of calculating the hourly ordinary wage, which is the issue in this case, if the prior judgment were changed and the position of the majority opinion adopted, the Plaintiffs, as workers, would be able to receive more wages from the employer for the past period for which they seek various statutory allowances, which would be advantageous to them. This cannot be denied.
However, viewed from the perspective that a court's judgment performs the important function of settling the legal doctrine on a particular issue and shaping the future legal order, it cannot necessarily be said that the position the court takes on a particular issue is directly linked to whether it is advantageous or disadvantageous to the Plaintiffs as workers. This is because, based on the legal doctrine declared by the Supreme Court, the parties to employment relationships will in the future newly conclude collective agreements or employment contracts, and in that process will determine new working conditions suited to their circumstances on the premise of that legal doctrine. For example, if in this case a legal doctrine were declared, in accordance with the majority opinion, that the hourly ordinary wage of the fixed allowance must be calculated by a method that does not take the premium rate into account in calculating the total number of working hours, then the employer, who thereby bears the burden of increased wage costs, would, absent other circumstances, have a strong incentive to shape new working conditions by reducing various fixed allowances or delaying the timing of their increase; and under the working conditions determined accordingly, workers would, as a result, not substantially enjoy the benefit of increases in various statutory allowances. Likewise, even if the State, with the intention of raising wages, were to legislate that a premium rate of 300% must be guaranteed as the minimum standard for overtime allowances, etc., under Article 56 of the Labor Standards Act, if the parties to employment relationships, who will shape future working conditions in accordance with such legislation, respond by lowering the hourly ordinary wage, the result of raising workers' wage levels may not occur. In the end, it is not in fact possible for the courts, through the formation of precedent, to perform the policy function of raising workers' future wages. From the standpoint of shaping the future legal order, the only methods conceivable for ensuring that workers are in the future allocated more wages or an equivalent amount are for the State to control the lower limit of the wage amount by raising the minimum wage through legislation, or to pay wage subsidies from the State budget.
Therefore, viewed from the standpoint of shaping the legal order, which can be said to be the essence of court adjudication, what is basically required in resolving individual issues in wage claim cases is an objective and reasonable interpretation of the intention of the parties to the employment relationship within the bounds of mandatory statutory provisions, and, on that premise, a correct interpretation of the relevant statutes; the criterion for interpretation must never be whether a particular issue is advantageous or disadvantageous to the worker, without comprehensively examining the overall structure and process by which wages and other working conditions are determined, and the relationships among working conditions.
D. I examine the conclusion in this case.
There is no error, as alleged in the grounds of appeal, in the lower court's determination that misunderstood the legal doctrine on the calculation of the hourly ordinary wage and thereby affected the judgment, in including, in the total number of working hours for calculating the hourly ordinary wage of the fixed allowance paid in the form of a monthly or daily salary, overtime and night work hours that take into account the respective premium rates. On the other hand, the lower court's determination, in including the monthly average deemed weekly holiday working hours in the total number of working hours for calculating the hourly ordinary wage of wages paid in the form of a monthly salary, without taking into account the premium rate for the weekly holiday allowance, contains an error that misunderstood the legal doctrine on the calculation of the hourly ordinary wage and thereby affected the judgment. The Defendant's grounds of appeal on this point are well-founded. Therefore, the part of the lower court's judgment against the Defendant must be reversed, and this part of the case must be remanded to the lower court.
For the foregoing reasons, I state that I am unable to agree with the majority opinion.
11. Concurring Opinion of Justices Park Sang-ok, Min You-sook, and Kim Seon-su to the Majority Opinion
I supplement the majority opinion on the method of calculating the hourly ordinary wage.
A. In light of the meaning and function of ordinary wages, I reorganize the issue in this case.
The Labor Standards Act provides for "ordinary wages" as the standard wage for guaranteeing the minimum amount of average wages and for calculating premium wages for overtime, night, and holiday work, dismissal notice allowance, and annual leave allowance, etc. Whether a particular wage falls within ordinary wages must be determined according to its objective character, based on whether it is money or valuables paid to the worker as compensation for prescribed work, and paid regularly, uniformly, and in a fixed amount, and not according to formal criteria such as the name of the wage or the length of the payment cycle (Supreme Court en banc Decision 2012Da89399, decided December 18, 2013).
The Labor Standards Act has assigned ordinary wages the function of serving as the standard wage for calculating premium wages for overtime, night, and holiday work, etc. Accordingly, under the Labor Standards Act, wages for overtime, night, and holiday work must be at least [hourly ordinary wage × number of hours of overtime, night, or holiday work × premium rate (150%)].
In this case, the "hourly ordinary wage" must be obtained by dividing the "total amount of ordinary wages" for a specific period by the "standard number of hours for calculating ordinary wages" for that specific period. Here, the greater the "total amount of ordinary wages" and the fewer the "standard number of hours for calculating ordinary wages," the larger the amount of the hourly ordinary wage; conversely, the smaller the "total amount of ordinary wages" and the greater the "standard number of hours for calculating ordinary wages," the smaller the amount of the hourly ordinary wage. The issue in ordinary wage-related litigation brought by workers is generally whether a particular pay item falls within ordinary wages. This concerns the point that the "total amount of ordinary wages" should increase. By contrast, the issue in this case concerns the "standard number of hours for calculating ordinary wages."
B. I examine the validity of the dissenting opinion with respect to the Plaintiffs' grounds of appeal.
1) The dissenting opinion's assertion that the majority opinion disregards the parties' intention regarding the method of calculating the hourly ordinary wage is not valid.
(a) The dissenting opinion asserts that the majority opinion fails to consider the intention of the parties to the employment relationship regarding the determination and payment of the fixed allowance. I agree with the dissenting opinion's view that matters concerning wages are an area in which the parties may freely decide, so long as they do not conflict with mandatory statutory provisions, and that how to convert the fixed allowance into an hourly wage is likewise a matter that requires ascertaining the parties' intention by interpreting the collective agreement, employment contract, or the like that serves as the basis for its payment. If the parties' intention is ascertained, it is correct to follow that intention, so long as it does not conflict with mandatory statutory provisions.
[Reasoning]
However, the legal reasoning of the majority opinion presupposes a case in which it is difficult to find that the parties have formed an intention regarding the method of calculating the hourly rate of a fixed allowance. The reason an employer determines ordinary wages through a collective agreement or employment rules, and determines the hourly rate of such ordinary wages or the method of calculating the hourly rate, is to accurately calculate and pay statutory allowances. However, with respect to a fixed allowance that the employer has not treated as ordinary wages—that is, a fixed allowance that has not been used as the basis for calculating statutory allowances—the employer has no need to form any intention regarding the determination of an hourly rate or the method of calculating an hourly rate in the first place. Therefore, absent other circumstances, it cannot be interpreted that the parties to the employment relationship have formed an intention regarding the method of calculating the hourly rate of such a fixed allowance. In addition, where a fixed allowance was not set and paid on a time-unit basis but was set and paid on a daily or monthly basis, it must be concluded, all the more, that the parties have not even formed an intention as to what the hourly consideration is. Ultimately, the dissenting opinion's criticism that the majority opinion disregards an intention of the parties to the employment relationship that already exists is not persuasive.
As such, when converting into an hourly rate a fixed allowance paid as consideration for agreed working hours exceeding the standard working hours, so long as no special intention of the parties regarding the method of calculating the hourly rate of the fixed allowance is recognized, and further, no statutory regulation exists on this point, it is most reasonable and appropriate to divide the fixed allowance by the number of working hours that the parties agreed to provide as labor.
(b) The dissenting opinion draws a conclusion to the effect that, because in this case it was provided that 1.5 times the basic hourly wage would be paid for overtime and night work, the same intention is reflected in the fixed allowance as well. However, connecting the fact that the employer was paying statutory allowances based on the basic hourly wage with an intention regarding the hourly consideration of the fixed allowance is a logical leap. This is because the former is merely a result of the fact that Article 56 of the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법) compels the payment of at least 150% of the ordinary hourly wage for statutory allowances such as overtime and night work allowances, and this cannot be interpreted, on that basis, as an intention regarding the hourly consideration of the fixed allowance, which is an agreed allowance.
As emphasized above, in this case, where each of the wage agreements excludes various fixed allowances in the form of monthly or daily pay from ordinary wages, it must be interpreted that, with respect to such fixed allowances, no intention of the parties exists regarding the method of calculating the hourly ordinary wage. Nevertheless, the dissenting opinion, which emphasizes an intention of the parties regarding the hourly consideration of the fixed allowance, ultimately amounts not to a statement that "a specific intention regarding the hourly rate of the fixed allowance is confirmed" in the collective agreement and each wage agreement in this case, but merely to the position that "it must be deemed that there was a specific intention regarding the hourly rate of the fixed allowance." The dissenting opinion states that it suffices to objectively and reasonably infer the intention of the parties, but inferring an intention that does not exist is tantamount to fictionalizing a specific intention. Ultimately, the dissenting opinion amounts to an assertion that the intention of the parties must be fictionalized without any clear legal basis, and this is difficult to accept.
(c) The logic of the dissenting opinion is also inappropriate in light of the course of litigation in this case. In the course of this litigation, neither the plaintiffs nor the defendant asserted or proved the intention of the parties or indirect circumstances supporting such intention, and this matter was never examined even up through the lower court. It is questionable how the Supreme Court can suddenly determine what the content of "the intention of the parties" is.
2) The reasoning of the dissenting opinion is also inappropriate when viewed from the perspective of a fair evaluation of the value of labor.
(a) Article 56 of the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법) is a provision setting the minimum level of statutory allowances—that is, providing that overtime and night work allowances must be at least 1.5 times the ordinary wage. Therefore, the overtime and night work allowances, which are statutory allowances, must be paid in an amount at least 1.5 times the ordinary wage recalculated by taking into account the hourly rate of the various fixed allowances included in ordinary wages. On the other hand, it is an unreasonable interpretation to understand Article 56 of the Labor Standards Act as a provision concerning the value of labor and to hold that such a value assessment must naturally be reflected even in fixed allowances, which are merely agreed allowances. According to the dissenting opinion, even while paying a fixed allowance that is not a statutory allowance, the employer must pay it such that the hourly rate for night work within the fixed allowance is 1.5 times the hourly rate for daytime work, and if it fails to pay in this manner, this is deemed unlawful. However, it is questionable on what basis such a restriction is imposed on an agreed allowance that is not a statutory allowance.
(b) The dissenting opinion gives the example, at a single workplace, of worker Gap (甲), who works 20 daytime hours and 10 night hours per week, and worker Eul (乙), who works 35 daytime hours per week, and assumes that "the employer understands the labor of both workers as 'labor having the value of 35 hours per week' and pays the same amount of fixed allowance."
The dissenting opinion first presupposes, through this hypothetical example, that paying the same fixed allowance to two workers who worked unequal hours is a matter of course from the standpoint of a fair evaluation of the value of labor. However, in principle, it is possible to pay these workers different amounts of fixed allowance under a collective agreement or employment contract, etc., taking into account the difference in their forms of labor. As mentioned above, such a method of paying agreed allowances does not violate the Labor Standards Act. It is difficult to agree with this logical premise of the dissenting opinion.
Moreover, this hypothetical example is a case in which the employer's intention has already been fixed as "hourly rate of fixed allowance = fixed allowance ÷ 35 hours." If the employer's intention is presupposed in this manner, there is no room to apply the legal reasoning set forth in the majority opinion. As repeatedly stated, the legal reasoning of the majority opinion presupposes that the parties' intention has not been formed. If, in this hypothetical example, it is assumed that the employer did not form an intention regarding the hourly rate of the fixed allowance, and the calculation is made according to the legal reasoning of the majority opinion, the result is that Gap's hourly ordinary wage becomes higher than Eul's hourly ordinary wage. However, this is a natural result flowing from the fact that Gap worked fewer hours than Eul while receiving the same amount of fixed allowance.
3) Considering the particular characteristics of the Defendant's workplace, where working hours exceeding the standard working hours were agreed upon, the reasonableness of the majority opinion can easily be understood.
Where a worker and an employer agree upon working hours within the standard working hours, excluding night work, the fixed allowance paid as consideration therefor is entirely ordinary wages. Therefore, dividing that fixed allowance by the prescribed working hours yields the hourly ordinary wage. Accordingly, at ordinary workplaces where working hours are agreed upon within the standard working hours, there is no room to apply the majority opinion's legal reasoning on hourly ordinary wages. However, the Defendant's workplace is one where long working hours exceeding the standard working hours were agreed upon. According to each of the wage agreements in this case, the daily working hours amount to 13 hours, and the weekly working hours amount to 65 hours (= 13 hours × 5 days). The average monthly working hours at a workplace operating under the standard working hours of 8 hours per day and 40 hours per week is approximately 173.8 hours. However, the average monthly working hours at the Defendant's workplace under each of the wage agreements in this case reaches approximately 282.44 hours. This is the actual number of hours labor was provided, and if one were to think in terms of the value of labor as the dissenting opinion does, it would be equivalent to providing labor for approximately 342.18 hours. The reason such long working hours are possible is that, although Article 53(1) of the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법) sets the limit on weekly overtime hours at 12 hours, the Defendant's workplace fell under the special exception businesses under Article 59 of the former Labor Standards Act (구 근로기준법), and thus the provision limiting overtime hours did not apply.
If a worker agreed to work 173.8 hours per month, then the monthly fixed allowance received by the worker is consideration for 173.8 hours of labor. However, where the parties did not reach any particular agreement regarding the hourly rate of the fixed allowance, and the worker agreed to work 282.44 hours, exceeding 173.8 hours, according to the dissenting opinion, the monthly fixed allowance suddenly becomes consideration not for 282.44 hours of labor, but for 342.18 hours of labor. As the overtime hours exceeding the standard working hours increase, the hours corresponding to the fixed allowance increase proportionally further, and the hourly consideration of the fixed allowance decreases proportionally to that extent. We wish to point out that the dissenting opinion is, in this way, an unreasonable interpretive theory that is not easily understood as a matter of common sense.
C. We examine the validity of the dissenting opinion with respect to the Defendant's grounds of appeal.
We explain this directly by way of the example of this case. The dissenting opinion understands that, because each of the wage agreements in this case sets the weekly holiday allowance as equivalent to 12 hours per week, this is the same as setting the deemed working hours for the weekly holiday at 12 hours; however, this is not correct.
It can be seen that each of the wage agreements in this case does not set the deemed working hours for the weekly holiday at 12 hours, but rather sets "weekly holiday allowance: 8 hours × 150/100 = 12 hours," meaning that the 8 hours' worth of the basic hourly wage was set as the basic weekly holiday allowance, with a 150% premium rate applied thereto. The agreement regarding the number of hours treated as paid on the weekly holiday—that is, the deemed working hours for the weekly holiday—is conceptually distinct from the setting of the premium rate for the weekly holiday allowance, which is a statutory allowance paid for the weekly holiday. Ultimately, it is difficult to view the provision setting the premium rate for the weekly holiday allowance as a provision mandating that the premium rate be reflected in the deemed working hours for the weekly holiday when calculating the hourly ordinary wage of a fixed allowance paid in the form of a monthly salary.
D. In lieu of a conclusion, we add the following.
From the standpoint of forming a legal order, there can be no disagreement that, in resolving the individual issues in a wage claim case, an objective and reasonable interpretation of the intention of the parties, and the interpretation of relevant statutes premised thereon, is fundamentally required. The majority opinion likewise, from the same standpoint, sought to establish a reasonable and appropriate standard by comprehensively considering the meaning and function of ordinary wages, the intention of the parties as revealed in the collective agreement and each wage agreement in this case, and the content of the provisions of the Labor Standards Act, and did not develop an unreasonable interpretive theory in order to reach a conclusion favorable to either party.
By contrast, the prior judgment did not state on what basis it took the premium rate into account, and it was also unclear whether that premium rate was the statutory premium rate under the Labor Standards Act or a premium rate set by agreement between the parties. We think that the prior judgment was, if anything, an unreasonable interpretive theory whose rational basis is difficult to find. It is appropriate to overrule the prior judgment.
We hereby state the foregoing supplementary opinion to the majority opinion.
Chief Justice Kim Myeong-su (Presiding Judge), Justices Cho Hee-dae, Kwon Soon-il, Park Sang-ok, Lee Ki-taek, Kim Jae-hyung, Park Jeong-hwa, Ahn Cheol-sang, Min Yu-sook (Presiding Justice for the Report), Kim Seon-su, Lee Dong-won, Roh Jeong-hee, Kim Sang-hwan