[Plaintiffs, Appellee and Appellant] As stated in the attached "List of Plaintiffs." (Litigation representative: Attorney Byun Min-hyeok)
[Defendant, Appellant and Appellee] Continental Automotive Electronics Yuhan Hoesa (Litigation representatives: Attorney Choi Seung-uk and 3 others)
[Judgment Below] Daejeon High Court Decision 2015Na715, 722, 739 decided November 2, 2017
[Order]
The part of the judgment below against which the Defendant lost is reversed, and this part of the case is remanded to the Daejeon High Court. All appeals by the Plaintiffs are dismissed.
[Reasoning] The grounds of appeal are examined.
1. Regarding the Plaintiffs' grounds of appeal and the Defendant's ground of appeal No. 2(a)
Working hours refer to the time during which an employee provides labor under an employment contract while under the direction and supervision of the employer, and rest hours refer to the time during working hours during which an employee is released from the employer's direction and supervision and may freely use as he or she wishes. Accordingly, even standby time, rest time, or sleep time during which an employee is not actually engaged in work during working hours should be regarded as included in working hours if such time is not guaranteed for the employee's free use but is, in substance, time during which the employee remains under the employer's direction and supervision. Whether rest time or sleep time stipulated in an employment contract falls under working hours or rest hours should not be determined uniformly according to the particular industry or type of work. This must be determined specifically on a case-by-case basis by comprehensively considering various circumstances, including the contents of the employment contract, the provisions of the rules of employment and collective agreement applicable to the workplace concerned, the content of the work provided by the employee and the specific manner of performing work at the workplace concerned, whether the employer interferes with or supervises the employee during rest periods, whether a rest area that can be freely used is provided, and other circumstances and their degree that may indicate interference with the employee's substantial rest or the existence of the employer's direction and supervision (Supreme Court Decision 2014Da74254 decided December 5, 2017).
The court below determined that the rest time granted pursuant to Article 51(2) of the collective agreement in this case (10 minutes granted after 2 hours of work when overtime work of 3 hours or more is performed) does not fall under working hours, on the grounds, among others, stated in its reasoning that it could not be said that the employees were unable to escape from the Defendant's direction and command and were not substantially guaranteed free use of that time. On the other hand, the court below rejected the Defendant's argument that the 10 minutes granted as snack time before the commencement of overtime work also does not fall under working hours, on the grounds, among others, stated in its reasoning that it could not be determined whether the employees were released from the employer's direction and command and were substantially guaranteed free use of that time.
Upon examining the record in accordance with the legal principles set forth above, the above determination of the court below contains no error, as alleged in the grounds of appeal, of misapprehending the legal principles regarding working hours and rest hours or of exceeding the limits of free evaluation of evidence in violation of the rules of logic and experience.
2. Regarding the Defendant's ground of appeal No. 1
Whether a certain wage falls under ordinary wages should be determined according to its objective nature, based on whether it is money or valuables paid to an employee as "consideration for prescribed work" and is paid "regularly, uniformly, and in a fixed manner," and not by formal criteria such as the name of the wage or the length of its payment cycle. Here, "fixedness" means "the quality whereby it is predetermined that payment will necessarily be made for the labor provided by the employee, regardless of the employee's performance, achievement, or other additional conditions" (see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Decision 2012Da89399 decided December 18, 2013).
The court below determined that this bonus falls under ordinary wages, on the grounds, among others, stated in its reasoning that it was predetermined that a fixed amount of bonus would be paid, regardless of whether additional conditions were satisfied, so long as an employee who had reached a certain period of continuous service provided the prescribed work, and that the fact that different application rates were applied to employees on leave of absence or those who were absent from work merely reflected consideration of the individual circumstances of the relevant employees and could not serve as grounds for denying the character of the bonus as consideration for prescribed work.
Upon examining the record in accordance with the legal principles set forth above, the above determination of the court below contains no error, as alleged in the grounds of appeal, of misapprehending the legal principles regarding ordinary wages or of exceeding the limits of free evaluation of evidence in violation of the rules of logic and experience.
3. Regarding the Defendant's ground of appeal No. 2(b)
The court below rejected the Defendant's argument that the monthly leave allowance already paid should be deducted from the recalculated annual leave allowance, on the basis of the following circumstances, among others.
① Even after the monthly leave under the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법) was abolished by being merged into annual leave, the collective agreement in this case continued to maintain "monthly leave" separately from annual leave, and thus the monthly paid leave in this case is a right recognized solely by virtue of the collective agreement in this case.
② The allowance paid for unused monthly paid leave is not a right under the Labor Standards Act but merely a contractual right recognized by the collective agreement, and therefore the monthly leave used by the Plaintiffs cannot be deemed to have been used as annual leave; likewise, in calculating the unpaid annual leave allowance, the monthly leave allowance already paid should not be deducted.
Upon examining the record in accordance with the relevant legal principles, the above determination of the court below contains no error, as alleged in the grounds of appeal, of misapprehending the legal principles regarding statutory allowances or of failing to exhaust the necessary deliberation.
4. Regarding the Defendant's ground of appeal No. 2(c)
Article 55 of the former Labor Standards Act (before amendment by Act No. 15513 of March 20, 2018; hereinafter referred to as the "former Labor Standards Act") provides that "the employer shall grant employees at least one paid holiday per week on average." Since this weekly holiday allowance is also an allowance under the Labor Standards Act which is paid on the premise that the employee is deemed to have worked even though the employee did not actually work on the weekly holiday, it is reasonable to view it, by its nature, as an allowance to be calculated on the basis of ordinary wages (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2009Da74144 decided January 28, 2010; Supreme Court Decision 2010Da91046 decided March 29, 2012).
Upon examining the record in accordance with the legal principles set forth above, it was proper for the court below to calculate the weekly holiday allowance to be paid by the Defendant based on the ordinary wages recalculated to include the bonus in this case, and there is no error therein, as alleged in the grounds of appeal, of misapprehending the legal principles regarding weekly holiday allowances or of failing to exhaust the necessary deliberation.
5. Regarding the Defendant's ground of appeal No. 3
Under the former Labor Standards Act, holiday work hours should not be deemed included in the weekly standard working hours or weekly overtime hours, and therefore the additional wages for holiday work and the additional wages for overtime work may not be paid in duplication (Supreme Court en banc Decision 2011Da112391 decided June 21, 2018).
Nevertheless, the court below determined, contrary to the above, that the additional wages for holiday work and the additional wages for overtime work must be paid in duplication. This determination by the court below contains an error of misapprehending the legal principles regarding the meaning of "one week" as provided in Articles 50 and 53 of the former Labor Standards Act, and the legal principles regarding the payment of additional wages for holiday work and overtime work respectively under Article 56 of the former Labor Standards Act. The ground of appeal pointing this out is well-founded.
6. Conclusion
Therefore, without examining the Defendant's remaining grounds of appeal, the part of the judgment below against which the Defendant lost is reversed, and this part of the case is remanded to the court below for further hearing and determination, and all of the Plaintiffs' appeals are dismissed. This judgment is rendered as stated in the Order, with the unanimous consent of the Justices participating.
[Attachment: List of Plaintiffs: Omitted]
Justice Kim So-young (Presiding Justice), Park Sang-ok, Cho Jae-yeon (Justice in Charge), Noh Jeong-hee