[Plaintiffs, Appellants and Appellees] As indicated in Nos. 1 through 16 and 18 through 40 in the attached "List of Plaintiffs." (Attorneys Kim Hyun-ik and 1 other, Counsel for the Plaintiffs)
[Plaintiff, Appellee] As indicated in No. 17 in the attached "List of Plaintiffs."
[Defendant, Appellee and Appellant] Korea Wide Gyeongbuk Co., Ltd. (former trade name: Gyeongbuk Coach Service Co., Ltd.) (Attorney Kim In-su, Counsel for the Defendant)
[Judgment Below] Daegu High Court Decision 2011Na826, decided May 1, 2014
[Order]
The part of the judgment below dismissing the claims of the plaintiffs other than Plaintiff 17 is reversed, and this part of the case is remanded to the Daegu High Court. The Defendant's appeal is dismissed in its entirety. The costs of the appeal with respect to Plaintiff 17 shall be borne by the Defendant.
[Reasoning] The grounds of appeal (including the supplementary brief on the grounds of appeal filed after the expiration of the period for submitting the grounds of appeal, to the extent it supplements the grounds of appeal) are examined as follows.
1. Determination on the Defendant's grounds of appeal
A. As to the first ground of appeal
The court below calculated the unpaid weekly holiday allowance based on ordinary wages.
Upon examining the record in light of the relevant legal principles, there is no error in the above determination of the court below, such as a misunderstanding of the legal principles concerning weekly holiday allowance and ordinary wages, or a failure to conduct necessary deliberation, as alleged in the grounds of appeal.
B. As to the second ground of appeal
The court below determined that a weekly holiday must necessarily be granted at least once per week, and that there was no proof of a collective agreement provision or employee consent for a lawful substitution of holidays.
Upon examining the record in light of the relevant legal principles, there is no error in the above determination of the court below, such as a misunderstanding of the legal principles concerning the number of holiday work days, or a mistake in fact-finding that exceeds the limits of the principle of free evaluation of evidence in violation of the rules of logic and experience, as alleged in the grounds of appeal.
C. As to the third ground of appeal
The court below determined that the Defendant was obligated to pay the Plaintiffs the unpaid additional holiday work allowance calculated by adding 50/100 of the ordinary wage for holiday work, and then, for the reasons stated in the judgment, rejected the Defendant's argument that it had paid a larger amount than the additional statutory holiday work allowance as holiday work allowance.
Upon examining the record in light of the relevant legal principles, although there is a somewhat inappropriate part in the reasoning of the court below, there is no error in the court below's determination recognizing the Defendant's obligation to pay the unpaid additional holiday work allowance, such as a misunderstanding of the legal principles concerning holiday work wages, or a mistake in fact-finding that exceeds the limits of the principle of free evaluation of evidence in violation of the rules of logic and experience, thereby affecting the judgment, as alleged in the grounds of appeal.
D. As to the fourth ground of appeal
The court below determined that the efficiency allowance at issue in this case does not substitute for the additional allowance for holiday work, but is a wage in the nature of compensation for work exceeding 21 full working days per month, so that payment of the efficiency allowance at issue cannot be regarded as payment of the additional holiday work allowance, and that there was no material to show that the Gyeongsangbuk-do Bus Transport Business Association agreed to pay the efficiency allowance at issue by mistake despite having no obligation to do so.
Upon examining the record in light of the relevant legal principles, there is no error in the above determination of the court below, such as a misunderstanding of the legal principles concerning additional holiday work allowance and set-off, or a mistake in fact-finding that exceeds the limits of the principle of free evaluation of evidence in violation of the rules of logic and experience, as alleged in the grounds of appeal.
E. As to the fifth ground of appeal
The court below determined that, even after the statutory standard working hours under the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법) were changed from 44 hours to 40 hours per week, since the Plaintiffs' actual working hours remained unchanged, the Defendant was obligated to pay the Plaintiffs an additional 4 hours of extended work allowance per week.
Upon examining the record in light of the relevant legal principles, there is no error in the above determination of the court below, such as a misunderstanding of the legal principles concerning deemed working hours and extended working hours, or a mistake in fact-finding, made without conducting necessary deliberation, that exceeds the limits of the principle of free evaluation of evidence in violation of the rules of logic and experience, as alleged in the grounds of appeal.
F. As to the sixth ground of appeal
The court below determined that, since the instant lawsuit, which included the existing claim for extended work allowance, was filed, the statute of limitations was also interrupted with respect to the claim for the additional 24 hours of extended work allowance per month.
Upon examining the record in light of the relevant legal principles, there is no error in the above determination of the court below, such as a misunderstanding of the legal principles concerning the statute of limitations for claims for extended work allowance, or a mistake in fact-finding that exceeds the limits of the principle of free evaluation of evidence in violation of the rules of logic and experience, as alleged in the grounds of appeal.
2. Determination on the grounds of appeal of the plaintiffs other than Plaintiff 17
A. As to the effect of the provision of the labor-management agreement on "criteria for exclusion from bonus payment eligibility," within the first ground of appeal
The court below rejected the argument of the plaintiffs other than Plaintiff 17 (hereinafter, in this Section 2, referred to as "the Plaintiffs") that each provision of the labor-management agreement on "criteria for exclusion from bonus payment eligibility" (hereinafter referred to as "the exclusion criteria at issue") concluded between the Defendant and the Gyeongbuk Express Bus Labor Union, etc. affiliated with the Gyeongbuk Regional Automobile Labor Union, is invalid because it is a provision less favorable than the bonus provision under the collective agreement at issue, and determined whether the bonus at issue constitutes ordinary wages on the premise that the exclusion criteria at issue are valid.
Upon examining the record in light of the relevant legal principles, there is no error in the above determination of the court below, such as a misunderstanding of the legal principles concerning the effect of collective agreements, or a mistake in fact-finding that exceeds the limits of the principle of free evaluation of evidence in violation of the rules of logic and experience, as alleged in the grounds of appeal.
B. As to whether the bonus at issue constitutes ordinary wages, within the first ground of appeal
1) Even if a collective agreement, rules of employment, etc. provide for grounds restricting the payment of a specific wage to employees on leave, employees returning to work, or employees subject to disciplinary action, this merely restricts the payment of such wage in consideration of the individual circumstances of the relevant employee, and therefore such circumstance alone cannot be used to conclude that a specific wage paid to an employee maintaining a normal employment relationship does not constitute a fixed wage. Furthermore, the length of service is not a condition whose fulfillment is uncertain at the time an employee provides extended, night, or holiday work on any given day, but rather a pre-existing fact in which the length of service is already fixed; therefore, an employee who has reached a certain length of service can be assured of receiving a wage linked to the length of service upon providing work on any given day, regardless of the fulfillment of any other additional condition, and thus fixedness is recognized. Accordingly, the circumstance that the payment or amount of a wage is linked to the length of service does not constitute an obstacle to regarding such wage as falling within ordinary wages.
Where it is determined that a fixed amount of wage will be paid for each working day, such that the wage is paid on a pro-rata basis according to the number of actual working days, although the amount to be paid varies depending on the actual number of working days, such wage constitutes a fixed wage, since it is assured that a certain amount will be paid to an employee who provides the prescribed work on any given day. However, a wage that is paid only upon satisfying a certain number of working days is paid only upon the fulfillment of an additional condition—satisfaction of a certain number of working days—in addition to the provision of the prescribed work, and whether such condition is fulfilled is an uncertain matter that cannot be determined at the time of providing extended, night, or holiday work on any given day, and therefore cannot be said to possess fixedness. Meanwhile, even where the method of calculation or the amount to be paid varies based on a certain number of working days, if it is assured that at least a certain minimum amount of wage will be paid upon the provision of the prescribed work, fixedness may be recognized to the extent of that minimum assured amount. On the other hand, where, without separately determining the method of calculation based on the number of working days, the wage is simply paid on a pro-rata basis according to the number of working days, there is no substantial difference from the case of payment for each working day as discussed above, and thus fixedness may be recognized (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 2012Da89399, decided December 18, 2013).
2) Examining the following facts and circumstances ascertainable from the reasoning of the judgment below and the record in light of the above legal principles, the bonus at issue in this case constitutes ordinary wages.
A) According to Article 15, Item 3 of the salary provisions within the Defendant's rules of employment, payment of the bonus is restricted where the length of service falls short of the prescribed payment criteria. However, since the length of service is already a fixed, pre-existing fact, this cannot be used to deny the fixedness of the bonus at issue.
B) Article 15, Item 2 of the salary provisions within the Defendant's rules of employment provides that, for an employee who resigns midway before the bonus payment date, the bonus shall be calculated and paid on a monthly basis. However, this provision cannot be interpreted as excluding employees who resign midway from bonus payment eligibility; rather, similar to the base pay, etc., it can be understood to mean that, although the bonus cannot be paid for the period after retirement even if an employee retires during the bonus payment eligibility period, the bonus will be paid in proportion to the period of employment. Therefore, it cannot be said that the payment or amount of the bonus at issue is determined depending on the employee's actual work performance, etc.; rather, the amount is fixed, and thus it may constitute a fixed wage paid regularly and uniformly (see Supreme Court Decision 2010Da91046, decided March 29, 2012).
C) According to the exclusion criteria at issue, it is recognized that the bonus at issue was paid differentially to employees of the Incheon Airport team and general driving employees. However, since the Incheon Airport team employees and general driving employees merely have wage systems determined differently according to predetermined work content, it cannot be said that an uncertain condition that cannot be determined at the arbitrary time of providing extended, night, or holiday work is attached in connection with the payment of the bonus at issue.
D) Item 3 of the exclusion criteria at issue excludes from bonus payment eligibility persons subject to license disposition due to the combined penalty points of personally owned vehicles and business-use vehicles. However, this corresponds to an individual's special circumstance that does not ordinarily occur, and thus cannot constitute grounds for denying the fixedness of the bonus at issue.
E) Item 2 of the exclusion criteria at issue provides, with respect to general driving employees, that "if an employee fails to work for 57 days or more (amended to 54 days on September 14, 2009) due to personal reasons, disciplinary resolution, or illness, the bonus based on the standard of 57 days shall be apportioned and paid in proportion to the actual number of working days." On the other hand, Item 1 of the exclusion criteria at issue provides, in effect, that a person who is absent from work or on leave for personal reasons for 33 days or more (amended to 36 days on September 14, 2009) per quarter based on the number of working days shall be excluded from bonus payment eligibility. In light of the following circumstances ascertainable from the content of these provisions and the Defendant's practice of paying bonuses, the bonus at issue, notwithstanding Item 1 of the exclusion criteria at issue, in fact corresponds to a wage that is calculated and paid on a pro-rata basis according to the number of working days pursuant to Item 2 of the exclusion criteria at issue, even for employees who worked less than 57 days per quarter, and thus fixedness can be recognized.
(1) It is difficult to interpret the concept of "personal reasons" in Item 1 of the exclusion criteria at issue, which provides for pro-rata payment of the bonus, as differing from the concept of "personal circumstances" in Item 2 of the exclusion criteria at issue, which provides for grounds restricting bonus payment.
If, as stated in the judgment below, "personal reasons" in Item 1 of the exclusion criteria at issue is interpreted to mean personal reasons excluding disciplinary resolution and illness, the conclusion would be that, for a person who is absent from work for 33 days or more per quarter due to disciplinary resolution or illness, the bonus at issue is calculated and paid on a pro-rata basis pursuant to Item 2 of the exclusion criteria at issue, whereas for a person who is absent from work for 33 days or more per quarter due to other personal reasons, the bonus at issue is not paid at all pursuant to Item 1 of the exclusion criteria at issue. However, it is difficult to find a reasonable basis for treating the two differently in this manner, and treating them differently would rather mean giving preferential treatment, in relation to the payment of the bonus at issue, to an employee absent from work due to disciplinary action over an employee absent from work for other reasons, which is unreasonable.
(2) The Defendant has in fact never applied Item 1 of the exclusion criteria at issue even to persons absent from work or on leave for personal reasons for 33 days or more per quarter; rather, it has applied Item 2 of the exclusion criteria at issue, treating such persons as having worked less than 57 days, and has paid a bonus calculated as "bonus based on the 57-day standard × actual number of working days/57 days."
(3) In conclusion, it is difficult to conclude that Item 1 of the exclusion criteria at issue has significance, within the Defendant's workplace, as a provision separately establishing grounds for restricting bonus payment apart from Item 2 of the exclusion criteria at issue.
3) Nevertheless, the court below determined that the bonus at issue does not constitute ordinary wages, on the grounds stated in the judgment, including that it cannot be regarded as a fixed wage. Such determination of the court below contains an error affecting the judgment, such as a misunderstanding of the legal principles concerning ordinary wages.
C. As to the second ground of appeal
1) The principle of good faith (hereinafter referred to as "the principle of good faith") refers to the abstract norm that parties to a legal relationship must not exercise rights or perform obligations in a manner or content that is inequitable or that betrays trust, with due consideration for the other party's interests. In order to deny the exercise of a right on the ground that it violates the principle of good faith, the party asserting the right must have conferred trust upon the other party, or the other party's holding of such trust must be objectively justified, and the exercise of the right in violation of such trust of the other party must have reached a degree that cannot be tolerated in light of the concept of justice.
Where the content of a labor-management agreement, such as a collective agreement, is invalid for violating a mandatory provision of the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법), if an assertion of such invalidity is rejected on the ground that it constitutes an exercise of rights in violation of the principle of good faith, this would result in undermining the legislative intent embodied in the mandatory provision; therefore, in principle, such an assertion cannot be regarded as violating the principle of good faith. However, this does not mean that the application of the principle of good faith is excluded without exception with respect to an assertion of invalidity of a labor-management agreement merely because the content of the labor-management agreement violates a mandatory provision of the Labor Standards Act. Only in exceptional cases where the general requirements for applying the principle of good faith as set forth above are satisfied, and there exist special circumstances that justify giving priority to the principle of good faith notwithstanding the mandatory nature of the Labor Standards Act, may an assertion of the invalidity of the labor-management agreement be deemed impermissible as violating the principle of good faith.
Where, in a labor-management agreement, it is agreed, on the premise that a fixed periodic bonus does not in itself constitute ordinary wages, to exclude the periodic bonus from the basis for calculating ordinary wages, and wage levels are determined on that premise, if the employees add the periodic bonus to ordinary wages and, on that basis, seek payment of additional statutory allowances, thereby imposing a new financial burden on the employer that causes serious managerial difficulties or jeopardizes the survival of the enterprise, this may be considered significantly contrary to good faith in light of the concept of justice and equity (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 2012Da89399, decided December 18, 2013).
However, in determining whether to give priority to the principle of good faith over the mandatory provisions governing labor relations, it is necessary to fully consider the legislative intent of the Labor Standards Act, etc., which is to guarantee and improve the basic living of employees by establishing minimum standards for working conditions. Furthermore, since the entity managing an enterprise is the employer, and the business circumstances of an enterprise may change from time to time according to various economic and social circumstances internal and external to the enterprise, if an employee's claim for additional statutory allowances arising from the recalculation of ordinary wages is rejected on the ground that it causes serious managerial difficulties or jeopardizes the survival of the enterprise, this could result in effectively shifting the risks arising from business management onto the employees. Therefore, whether an employee's claim for additional statutory allowances causes serious managerial difficulties for the employer or jeopardizes the survival of the enterprise so as to violate the principle of good faith must be determined prudently and strictly (see Supreme Court Decision 2015Da217287, decided February 14, 2019).
2) Examining the following circumstances ascertainable from the reasoning of the judgment below and the record in light of the above legal principles, it cannot be concluded that paying additional statutory allowances by including the bonus at issue in ordinary wages would cause serious managerial difficulties for the Defendant or jeopardize the survival of the enterprise; therefore, the Plaintiffs' claim for additional statutory allowances premised on the inclusion of the bonus at issue in ordinary wages cannot be regarded as violating the principle of good faith.
A) Considering that the additional statutory allowances sought by the Plaintiffs arose from around October 2006 to around October 2009, while the date on which the fact-finding proceedings in this case were closed was April 3, 2014, it appears that the statute of limitations would have run for most of the additional statutory allowance claims of the Defendant's employees who did not file an ordinary wage lawsuit.
B) It appears that the total amount of additional statutory allowances claimed by employees who filed ordinary wage lawsuits against the Defendant in wage claim cases other than that of the Plaintiffs would not reach approximately KRW 1 billion. While the Defendant's sales revenue has maintained a steady upward trend from 2009 through 2012, the scale of the above additional statutory allowances amounts to only about 1.2% of the Defendant's annual sales revenue in 2012.
C) The Defendant generally recorded operating profits from 2009 through 2012. During the same period, net income has also continuously been generated, and the net income for 2012 reached approximately KRW 1.3 billion.
D) Looking also at the Defendant's cash flow, cash inflow from operating activities has been smooth from 2007 through 2012, and the Defendant's cash and cash equivalents as of the end of 2012 amounted to approximately KRW 1 billion; therefore, it is difficult to view that the Defendant would face significant difficulty in raising the funds necessary to pay the additional statutory allowances.
E) Even if, as stated in the judgment below, the wage increase rate would far exceed initial expectations due to the payment of such additional statutory allowances, in light of the Defendant's financial situation and the scale of the additional statutory allowances discussed above, such circumstance cannot provide sufficient grounds to conclude that the payment of the additional statutory allowances would cause serious managerial difficulties for the Defendant or jeopardize the survival of the enterprise.
3) Nevertheless, the court below determined, based solely on the circumstances stated in the judgment, that the Plaintiffs' claim for additional statutory allowances premised on the inclusion of the bonus at issue in ordinary wages could not be permitted as violating the principle of good faith. Such determination of the court below contains an error affecting the judgment, such as a misunderstanding of the legal principles concerning the principle of good faith.
D. As to the third ground of appeal
1) Where a lawsuit is filed with the intent clearly indicated that a judgment is sought only for a portion of a single claim, the effect of interruption of the statute of limitations by the filing of the lawsuit arises only with respect to that portion, and does not arise with respect to the remaining portion; however, even where only a portion of the claim is sought, if it is interpreted, in light of the purport thereof, that a judgment is sought for the entire claim, the amount claimed should be regarded as the entire claim constituting the subject matter of the lawsuit, and in such a case, it should be interpreted that the effect of interruption of the statute of limitations arises with respect to the entirety of the claim, within the scope of identity of that claim (see Supreme Court Decision 91Da43695, decided April 10, 1992).
2) Examining the following circumstances ascertainable from the reasoning of the judgment below and the record in light of the above legal principles, it is reasonable to view that the statute of limitations for the claim for additional holiday work allowance was also interrupted by the filing of the instant lawsuit on October 15, 2009.
A) The Plaintiffs filed the instant lawsuit on October 15, 2009, and, after documents concerning the additional holiday work allowance were submitted, submitted a written amendment of claim to the court below on July 19, 2013, during the pendency of the appeal, seeking the additional holiday work allowance at issue in this case.
B) The complaint in this case states that, on the premise that the "paid holiday work allowance," among other items, would be specified in accordance with a future document production order, and that the amount claimed would be calculated accordingly to specify and amend the claim, the Plaintiffs are, for the time being, claiming KRW 5 million per plaintiff, including various allowances, and delay damages thereon. In other words, the Plaintiffs made clear, through the statements in the complaint in this case, that they intended to claim the paid holiday work allowance in the future.
C) The claim for the additional paid holiday allowance sought by the Plaintiffs can be evaluated as falling within the scope of identity of the claim for holiday work allowance, which the complaint anticipated would be specified and amended in the future.
3) Nevertheless, the court below determined, based solely on the circumstances stated in the judgment, that the statute of limitations had run with respect to the portion of the claim for additional holiday work allowance arising before March 2008. Such determination of the court below contains an error affecting the judgment by misunderstanding the legal principles concerning interruption of the statute of limitations and failing to conduct the necessary deliberation.
3. Conclusion
Therefore, the part of the judgment below dismissing the claims of the plaintiffs other than Plaintiff 17 is reversed, and this part of the case is remanded to the court below for further deliberation and determination; the Defendant's appeal is dismissed in its entirety as being without merit; and the costs of the appeal with respect to Plaintiff 17 shall be borne by the losing party. This judgment is rendered as set forth in the Order, with the unanimous consent of the Justices participating.
[[Attachment] List of Plaintiffs: Omitted]
Justice Roh Jeong-hee (Presiding Justice), Park Sang-ok (Justice in Charge), An Cheol-sang, Kim Sang-hwan