[Plaintiffs, Appellees] As stated in the attached list of plaintiffs. (Attorney Park Hoon for the plaintiffs)
[Defendant, Appellant] Gaya I.B.S Co., Ltd. (Law Firm Gwangjang, Attorneys Lee Kyu-hong et al., for the defendant)
[Judgment Below] Busan High Court Judgment 2013. 8. 30., 2012Na2647 (Changwon)
[Order]
The part of the judgment below against which the Defendant lost is reversed, and this part of the case is remanded to the Busan High Court.
[Reasoning] The grounds of appeal are examined.
1. As to the First Ground of Appeal
A. The ordinary wage, which the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법) prescribes as the basis for calculating additional pay for extended, night, and holiday work, dismissal notice allowance, annual leave allowance, and the like, and as the minimum standard for average wage, refers to wages that are paid regularly, uniformly, and fixedly as money or goods agreed to be paid in exchange for prescribed work (or, in the case of workers paid on a piece-rate basis, total work), which is the work ordinarily provided by the employee during prescribed working hours.
Wages paid regularly means wages continuously paid at fixed intervals; in the case of wages paid at a fixed periodic interval, such as regular bonuses, the mere fact that the payment cycle exceeds one month does not mean that such wages are excluded from ordinary wages.
Fixed wages, regardless of their name, means the minimum wage that is naturally and definitely paid as consideration for one day's work to an employee who works the prescribed working hours on any given day, even if that employee retires the very next day. Therefore, wages for which payment or the amount of payment is predetermined so that payment is naturally scheduled to be made upon an employee's provision of prescribed work on any given day, regardless of whether any additional condition is fulfilled, may be regarded as possessing fixedness. Here, "condition" refers to a condition whose fulfillment is not yet determined at the time an employee provides extended, night, or holiday work on any given day. Therefore, where a condition is added based on a pre-existing fact whose fulfillment has already been determined at that point in time, such as possessing a specific career history or having reached a certain period of continuous service, this does not constitute an obstacle to recognizing fixedness. Also, where it is determined that a fixed amount of wage will be paid for each working day, such that the wage is calculated on a pro-rata basis according to the number of days worked, although the amount paid varies depending on the actual number of days worked, since it is determined that a fixed amount will be paid so long as the employee provides the prescribed work on any given day, such wages constitute fixed wages.
However, wages that are determined to be paid only to employees who remain in employment on the payment date or some other specific point in time, regardless of whether the employee provided the prescribed work, have as a qualifying requirement for receipt of the wage the condition of being employed at that specific point in time. Such wages are generally not paid to a person who provided work in the past but is not employed at the specific point in time, whereas they are generally paid to all persons employed at that specific point in time regardless of the content of work previously provided. If wages are paid subject to such a condition, it is difficult to regard such wages as having the character of consideration for so-called "prescribed work," and moreover, since even if an employee provides work on any given day, if the employee retires before the arrival of the specific point in time the employee will not receive the wage at all, it is uncertain, at the time the employee provides extended, night, or holiday work on any given day, whether the payment condition will be fulfilled. Therefore, such wages must also be regarded as lacking fixedness (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 2012Da89399, decided December 18, 2013, etc.).
B. According to the reasoning of the judgment below and the record, it can be seen that the Defendant, in accordance with the collective bargaining agreement, paid a continuous service allowance of 15,000 won per month for each year to employees with one year or more of continuous service, regardless of full attendance, and paid a transportation and bathing allowance of 2,000 won per day to drivers for each day on which they actually reported to work and worked.
Applying the legal principles set forth above to these facts, although the payment and the amount of the above continuous service allowance vary depending on the period of continuous service, for employees who have reached a certain period of continuous service, a fixed amount of continuous service allowance is definitely paid, and it can be seen that payment thereof is determined so long as the prescribed work is provided. As for the transportation and bathing allowance, although the amount paid varies depending on the number of days worked, since it is determined that a fixed amount will be paid so long as the prescribed work is provided on a working day, both constitute ordinary wages, being fixed wages paid regularly and uniformly.
Therefore, the court below's determination, to the same effect, that the above continuous service allowance and transportation and bathing allowance constitute ordinary wages, is justified, and there is no error of misunderstanding the legal principles concerning ordinary wages as alleged in the grounds of appeal.
C. However, it is difficult to accept the court below's determination, for the reasons stated in its judgment, that the kimjang bonus and summer vacation allowance constitute ordinary wages, for the following reasons.
According to the reasoning of the judgment below and the record, the Defendant, in accordance with the collective bargaining agreement, paid a kimjang bonus of 100,000 won to employees who had worked six months or more as of October 31, the commencement date of payment, and paid a summer vacation allowance of 100,000 won to employees who had worked six months or more as of July 31, the commencement date of payment. Although the collective bargaining agreement merely provides that such payments are to be made on each respective commencement date of payment, without any express provision excluding from the scope of payment employees who retired before the payment date, it can be seen that the Defendant did not pay these amounts to employees who retired before each respective commencement date of payment.
Applying the legal principles set forth above to these facts, there is room to find that there was an express or implied agreement between labor and management adding, as a qualifying requirement for the above kimjang bonus and summer vacation allowance, the condition of being employed on each respective commencement date of payment, or that such a practice had been established. If the wages were paid subject to such a condition, they should be regarded as not constituting ordinary wages, which are consideration for prescribed work.
If that is the case, the court below should have examined the circumstances under which the Defendant did not pay the above kimjang bonus, etc. to employees who retired before each respective commencement date of payment, and whether there were any instances in which the employees raised objections thereto, and should have examined whether an express or implied labor-management agreement adding the condition of being employed as a qualifying requirement, as described above, was reached, or whether such a practice had been established.
Nevertheless, the court below, without examining the above circumstances, determined that the above kimjang bonus and summer vacation allowance constitute ordinary wages solely for the reasons stated in its judgment. This determination by the court below contains an error of misunderstanding the legal principles concerning the requirements of ordinary wages, which affected the judgment. The Defendant's ground of appeal pointing this out is well-founded.
2. As to the Second Ground of Appeal
A. When calculating, as an hourly wage amount, the ordinary wage determined as a monthly wage amount, such calculation must be made by dividing that amount by the standard number of hours for calculating the monthly ordinary wage (the number of hours obtained by multiplying the standard hours for calculating the weekly ordinary wage by the average number of weeks per year and dividing the result by 12) (Article 6, Paragraph 2, Item 4 of the Enforcement Decree of the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법 시행령)). Therefore, in order to calculate the hourly ordinary wage, the ordinary wage determined as a monthly wage amount must first be ascertained. However, where an employee is paid a monthly wage as compensation for agreed working hours exceeding the standard working hours under Article 50 of the Labor Standards Act, or is paid a fixed monthly allowance together with a basic hourly wage, since such monthly wage or fixed monthly allowance includes wages for paid holidays under Article 55 of the Labor Standards Act and wages for extended and night work under Article 56 of the Labor Standards Act, which cannot be regarded as ordinary wages, making it difficult to ascertain the ordinary wage, in such cases it is permissible to calculate the hourly ordinary wage by the method of deeming work to have been performed on paid holidays, calculating the total working hours by adding such deemed working hours to the agreed working hours (considering the respective premium rates in the case of extended and night working hours), and then dividing the monthly wage or the fixed monthly allowance paid in the form of a monthly wage, which includes the portion having the character of wages for paid holidays and extended/night work allowances, by such total working hours (see Supreme Court Decision 2010Da91046, decided March 29, 2012, etc.).
According to the reasoning of the judgment below and the record, the 2008 collective bargaining agreement provided that "working hours shall in principle be 8 hours per day and 40 hours per week, but in consideration of the special characteristics of the passenger transportation business, extended work may be performed within the limits prescribed by statutes and regulations." The 2008 wage agreement and wage schedule table, elaborating on this, provided that, in consideration of the special characteristics of route bus operation, shortened or exceeded working hours (including night working hours) relative to the prescribed working hours of 9 hours shall be offset against each other on a monthly aggregate basis, and that an extended work allowance of 8,519 won and a night work allowance of 2,840 won shall be additionally paid for each 1 hour of extended and night work per day respectively, and an afternoon night work allowance of 2,840 won shall be additionally paid to afternoon shift workers. It can be seen that the 2009 and 2010 wage agreements likewise determined working hours in the same manner, thereby setting working hours exceeding the standard working hours prescribed by the Labor Standards Act as the working hours subject to wage calculation.
Considering this together with the circumstances of payment of the continuous service allowance and its requirements, the continuous service allowance, being a fixed allowance paid in the form of a monthly wage, must be regarded as wages paid as consideration for agreed working hours including extended work and night work. Therefore, the hourly ordinary wage for the continuous service allowance paid as a monthly wage must be calculated by dividing the continuous service allowance by the total number of working hours calculated by adding together the monthly average standard working hours, the monthly average deemed working hours for weekly paid holidays, and the monthly average extended and night working hours (considering the respective premium rates).
The judgment of the court below, which calculated the hourly ordinary wage by the method of dividing the continuous service allowance by the number of working hours obtained by adding only the deemed working hours for weekly paid holidays to the standard working hours under the Labor Standards Act calculated on a monthly basis, without considering extended working hours and night working hours, contains an error of misunderstanding the legal principles concerning the calculation of ordinary wages, which affected the judgment. The Defendant's ground of appeal pointing this out is well-founded.
B. According to the reasoning of the judgment below and the record, it can be seen that: at the court of first instance, when the Plaintiffs' litigation representative calculated the amount claimed based on the wage ledger, etc., and submitted an application dated March 5, 2012 to amend the purport of the claim (expansion), the Defendant's litigation representative, while disputing that the allowances claimed by the Plaintiffs did not constitute ordinary wages, submitted a brief dated April 19, 2012 stating to the effect that "if the Plaintiffs' claims are all recognized as well-founded, there is no objection to the Plaintiffs' calculation of the amounts based on the details of the calculation basis," and made this statement at the fifth hearing date; the court of first instance accepted the Plaintiffs' argument concerning ordinary wages and determined that there was no dispute between the parties as to the total amount of the various allowances that the Defendant should additionally pay to the Plaintiffs; and, with respect to this, upon appeal, the Defendant argued that even if the continuous service allowance, etc. claimed by the Plaintiffs constitutes ordinary wages, the hourly ordinary wage for each of the above allowances, which are in the form of a monthly or annual wage, must be calculated by the method of dividing by the total number of working hours including the monthly average extended working hours and night working hours, etc.
A judicial admission refers to a statement by a party to litigation admitting a fact unfavorable to that party. A party's argument concerning the method of calculating, as an hourly wage amount, the ordinary wage determined as a monthly wage amount cannot be regarded as a statement concerning a fact that is subject to judicial admission (see Supreme Court Decision 90Daka7262, decided November 9, 1990; Supreme Court Decision 98Da6763, decided July 10, 1998, etc.). Furthermore, the statement that "there is no objection to the Plaintiffs' calculation of the amounts based on the details of the calculation basis" is not clear in its meaning itself, and moreover, since the specific details that could be regarded as the basis for the calculation, such as the Plaintiffs' number of working days, number of days of extended and night work, period of continuous service and amount of continuous service allowance, number of days of annual leave, number of days of paid leave, and amount of retirement allowance received, are too comprehensive, it is difficult to regard this as a judicial admission of such specific facts.
Nevertheless, the court below, in calculating the hourly ordinary wage of the fixed allowance paid as a monthly salary, treated the total working hours to be considered as having been admitted by the Defendant, and thereby did not permit the amendment of the argument thereon. This contains an error of misunderstanding the legal principles concerning judicial admission, which affected the judgment. The Defendant's ground of appeal pointing this out is well-founded.
3. Conclusion
The part of the judgment below against which the Defendant lost is reversed, and this part of the case is remanded to the court below for further hearing and determination. This Judgment is rendered as stated in the Order by the unanimous opinion of the Justices participating in the adjudication.
[Attachment] List of Plaintiffs: Omitted
Justice Lee Sang-hoon (Presiding Justice), Shin Young-cheol, Kim Yong-deok, Kim So-young (Justice in charge)