[Plaintiffs, Appellants] As listed in the attached list of plaintiffs. (Litigation Counsel: Attorney Kim Cha-gon)
[Defendant, Appellee] ○○○ Co., Ltd. (Litigation Counsel: Jeongse Law Firm, Attorneys Jeong Gi-jong and 2 others)
[Judgment Below] Daejeon High Court Decision 2010Na7216 rendered on April 21, 2011
[Order]
All appeals are dismissed. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiffs.
[Reasoning] The grounds of appeal (including the supplementary brief on grounds of appeal submitted after the expiration of the period for submitting the grounds of appeal, to the extent it supplements the grounds of appeal) are examined as follows.
1. As to Ground of Appeal No. 1
Article 44(1) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act (노동조합 및 노동관계조정법) provides that "an employer shall not be obligated to pay wages for the period during which an employee participated in an industrial action and did not provide labor." Article 2, Subparagraph 6 of the same Act provides that "'industrial action' means a strike, slowdown, lockout, or other act performed by a party to a labor relationship for the purpose of achieving its demands, and any counteracting act thereto, which impedes the normal operation of business." Furthermore, unless it is provided otherwise in a collective agreement or rules of employment regarding the payment of wages during an industrial action, or unless an agreement between the parties or a practice concerning such payment is recognized to exist, the employee's principal rights and obligations, including the duty to provide labor, are suspended, and thus the wage claim, as the employee's principal right corresponding to the duty to provide labor, does not arise during the period of the industrial action during which the employee did not provide labor (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 94Da26721 delivered on December 21, 1995). A slowdown (태업), which is a form of industrial action involving the incomplete provision of labor, may also be regarded as a partial suspension of the provision of labor, and it is therefore reasonable to hold that the principle of "no work, no pay" applies to it as well.
The court below's determination, to the same effect, that the Defendant, as employer, may deduct wages corresponding to the Plaintiffs' period of slowdown is justified, and there is no error of misapprehension of the legal principles concerning the "no work, no pay" principle during industrial action, as alleged in the grounds of appeal.
2. As to Ground of Appeal No. 2
The Plaintiffs argue that the calculation of the duration of their slowdown was erroneous; however, this argument ultimately amounts to no more than a challenge to the selection and evaluation of evidence and fact-finding, which fall within the exclusive authority of the court below as the fact-finding court, and thus cannot be regarded as a legitimate ground of appeal. Furthermore, upon examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the record, it does not appear that there is an error such as a violation of the rules of evidence or a misapprehension of facts due to insufficient deliberation, as alleged in the grounds of appeal.
3. As to Ground of Appeal No. 3
The court below, having found the facts as stated in its reasoning, determined as follows: in the case of a slowdown, which is a type of industrial action involving incomplete provision of labor, if the collective agreement and rules of employment do not provide for the level of wage reduction, it would be reasonable to calculate it by assessing the degree of incompleteness of the provision of labor for each individual employee; however, in this case, considering the following circumstances: (1) the Plaintiffs' form of labor provision is cooperative work, and given the manner in which such work is performed, the slowdown of an individual employee directly affects the productivity of other employees, such that it is not possible to calculate the degree of incompleteness of labor provision on an employee-by-employee basis, and the degree of incompleteness of labor provision must instead be assessed on the basis of the overall decline in productivity; (2) there is no evidence to suggest that any factor other than the slowdown caused the sharp decline in productivity during the Plaintiffs' period of industrial action, and it appears that the slowdown was the most significant factor in the decline in productivity; (3) even taking as the standard the person among the Plaintiffs with the longest slowdown hours, the monthly slowdown hours during the period of slowdown ranged from 20% to 66% of total working hours, whereas the rate of productivity decline during that period reached approximately 75% to 90%, and in light of this and the characteristics of the cooperative work performed by the Plaintiffs, it is reasonable to regard the degree of incompleteness of the labor provided during the slowdown hours as 100%, i.e., corresponding to the entirety of the slowdown hours; and (4) deducting from wages an amount calculated based on the ratio of each individual employee's slowdown hours, calculated on the basis of wages, is more favorable to the employees in this case than deducting from wages an amount calculated based on the ratio of each individual employee's slowdown hours, calculated on the basis of the decrease in production caused by the slowdown; taking these circumstances together, it cannot be said that it was unreasonable for the Defendant to calculate the entirety of the slowdown hours measured for each individual employee on a proportional basis and deduct the corresponding amount from wages.
Upon examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the record, the determination of the court below can be affirmed as justified, and there is no error such as misapprehension of the legal principles concerning the calculation of the degree of incompleteness of labor provision during a slowdown, as alleged in the grounds of appeal.
4. As to Ground of Appeal No. 4
A. A full-time union official is similar to an employee on leave of absence in that, while the fundamental labor relationship with the employer is maintained and the employee retains his or her status as an employee, the obligation to provide labor is exempted, and in principle the employer's obligation to pay wages therefor is also exempted; therefore, even if the employer pays a certain amount of money to a full-time union official pursuant to a collective agreement or the like, such payment cannot be regarded as wages in the sense of consideration for labor (see Supreme Court Decision 94Da54566 delivered on November 10, 1995; Supreme Court Decision 97Da54727 delivered on April 24, 1998, among others), and whether the employer is obligated to pay salary to a full-time union official during a strike period must be determined individually in each specific case by taking into account the contents of the collective agreement or other labor-management agreements at the workplace concerned, as well as labor-management practices at that workplace (see Supreme Court Decision 2010Do10721 delivered on February 10, 2011).
The court below determined that, with respect to full-time union officials, the collective agreement in this case, which provides that "the Company shall not discriminate against union members on the ground of being a full-time official, and shall pay the full-time official's wages as well as a union activity allowance of KRW 100,000 per month to the union representative and KRW 50,000 per month to the full-time union official; the period of full-time service shall be included in the years of continuous service, and no disadvantage shall accrue on account of full-time service," was intended to provide a certain salary to full-time union officials only to the extent necessary to ensure that they are not treated less favorably than ordinary union members who perform the original work duties under the labor contract; therefore, treating full-time union officials more favorably than ordinary union members would be inconsistent with what both labor and management originally intended in light of the purpose and intent of such provision in the collective agreement, and moreover, in a situation where ordinary union members have not been paid part of their wages pursuant to the "no work, no pay" principle due to the slowdown, it cannot be recognized as legitimate, even vis-à-vis those ordinary union members, for the full-time union officials, who may be regarded as the leadership of the union composed of those members, to claim that their own salaries alone should be paid in full.
Upon examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the legal principles set forth above and the record, the determination of the court below is justified, and there is no error such as misapprehension of the legal principles concerning the employer's obligation to pay salary to full-time union officials during the period of slowdown, as alleged in the grounds of appeal.
B. Furthermore, the court below determined that Plaintiff 21, Plaintiff 36, and Plaintiff 55, who are full-time union officials, are merely exempted from the obligation to provide labor to the Defendant and have received salary from the Defendant at the same level as ordinary union members pursuant to the collective agreement; therefore, insofar as the wages of ordinary union members are reduced in correspondence with their slowdown hours due to the slowdown, the above Plaintiffs, who are full-time union officials, likewise cannot avoid a reduction of their salary at a corresponding rate, and it is reasonable to calculate the level of such reduction on the basis of the average slowdown hours of all union members.
Considering the circumstances cited by the court below together with the legal principles set forth above and the following circumstances ascertainable from the record: in the case of full-time union officials, since the obligation to provide labor is exempted, it is inherently impossible to calculate the degree of incompleteness of labor provision on an official-by-official basis; the provision of the collective agreement in this case was intended to pay a certain salary to full-time union officials only to the extent necessary to ensure that they are not treated less favorably than ordinary union members performing the original work duties under the labor contract; the purpose of reducing the salary of full-time union officials is to achieve equity with ordinary union members; in this case, it is difficult to measure the slowdown hours of each individual ordinary union member, and even if such measurement were possible, since each individual's slowdown hours would differ, the amount of wage reduction would also vary, making it difficult to take into account the individual reduction amount of each union member when reducing the salary of full-time union officials; and the full-time union officials in this case planned and led the slowdown; the determination of the court below as set forth above can be affirmed as justified, and it cannot be said that there is an error, such as misapprehension of the legal principles concerning the prohibition of discrimination between full-time union officials and union members, as alleged in the grounds of appeal, that affected the judgment.
5. As to Ground of Appeal No. 5
Article 55 of the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법) provides that "an employer shall grant a paid holiday of at least one day on average per week to employees," and Article 30 of the Enforcement Decree of the Labor Standards Act provides that "the paid holiday under Article 55 of the Act shall be granted to a person who has worked all of the prescribed working days during the week," thereby granting employees a weekly rest day so that they do not work for at least one day per week. In addition, a national holiday or the like may of course be separately designated as a paid or unpaid holiday by a collective agreement, rules of employment, employment contract, or the like.
The holiday system under the Labor Standards Act is designed for the recovery of an employee's fatigue and health, and for the enjoyment of a social and cultural life as a human being through the use of leisure time, in the context of continuous work. Furthermore, a "paid holiday" refers to a holiday for which the payment of wages is guaranteed so as to enable the employee to fully make use of the holiday in keeping with the purpose of the holiday system, that is, a day on which wages are paid as though ordinary labor had been provided, even though the employee actually rests. In light of the purpose of providing for the holiday and paid holiday systems in the Labor Standards Act, it must be considered that the application of the special provision on paid holidays, which requires the payment of wages to an employee even without the provision of labor, naturally presupposes a normal labor relationship, that is, a state in which the employee has been providing labor and in which the continued provision of labor is expected. This legal principle concerning paid holidays applies equally to a strike, which is a form of industrial action during which, as in the case of a leave of absence, the employee's principal rights and obligations, including the duty to provide labor, are suspended and the employee's wage claim does not arise; therefore, an employee likewise cannot claim payment of wages for a paid holiday falling within the strike period (see Supreme Court Decision 2007Da73277 delivered on December 24, 2009). Moreover, this same legal principle applies equally to a slowdown, to which, as noted above, the "no work, no pay" principle applies in the same manner as to a strike; accordingly, an employee cannot claim payment of wages for a paid holiday corresponding to the period of slowdown.
The court below's determination, to the same effect, that with respect to paid holidays falling within the period of slowdown (Article 55, Subparagraph 1 of the collective agreement in this case provides that "Saturdays and Sundays shall be paid days off," and Article 58 designates every Sunday as the weekly rest day), the Defendant, as employer, may deduct wages corresponding to the slowdown hours falling short of the prescribed working hours for the relevant week, regardless of whether the Plaintiffs worked without absence, is justified, and there is no error of misapprehension of the legal principles concerning paid holidays, as alleged in the grounds of appeal.
6. As to Ground of Appeal No. 6
Upon examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the relevant legal principles and the record, the Defendant agreed to pay an annual regular bonus of 650% and a Chuseok bonus of KRW 350,000 to employees with four months or more of continuous service (Article 52 of the collective agreement in this case); since each of these bonuses was paid continuously and periodically at the time set forth in the collective agreement and the amount to be paid was fixed, they constitute wages as consideration for labor, and since, as a matter of principle, wages are not paid during the period of industrial action, the determination of the court below that the employer likewise has no obligation to pay the Plaintiffs the portion of each bonus corresponding to the slowdown hours falling within the calculation period of each bonus can be affirmed as justified, and there is no error such as misapprehension of the legal principles concerning the "no work, no pay" principle and labor practices relating to bonuses, or violation of the rules of evidence, as alleged in the grounds of appeal.
7. As to Ground of Appeal No. 7
The court below determined as follows: Article 8 of the collective agreement in this case provides that the Company shall recognize a union member's participation in "the general meeting, once a year (when the trade union convenes an extraordinary general meeting)" (Subparagraph 1) and "education and events conducted by the union or higher-level organization (to be conducted after consultation with the Company)" (Subparagraph 6), and that the hours and days during which the member was unable to work during such period shall be deemed to have been worked; however, even where the collective agreement contains such a provision deeming the time spent attending an extraordinary general meeting or the like as time worked, the trade union may not, without consulting with the Company during working hours, arbitrarily convene a general meeting of union members or conduct education at any time it wishes; therefore, it is difficult to construe the provision of the collective agreement relied upon by the Plaintiffs as guaranteeing to the Plaintiffs the right to participate in such a general meeting, education, or event at any time even without the Defendant's consent, and accordingly, it is reasonable to hold that the Plaintiffs' attendance at the extraordinary general meeting and the company sale briefing session, both held without the Defendant's consent, does not constitute "an act deemed to have been worked" as contemplated by Article 52 of the collective agreement.
Considering the circumstances cited by the court below together with the relevant legal principles and the following circumstances ascertainable from the record: the Defendant granted recognition, up to a limit of two hours in the morning, for the extraordinary general meeting of July 10, 2007, which the trade union had requested for the purpose of a vote on whether to engage in industrial action; meanwhile, with respect to "education and events conducted by the union or higher-level organization," such as the sale briefing session, the collective agreement provides that they are to be "conducted after consultation with the Company"; the sale-related report meeting that the trade union decided to hold for all union members, and the sale briefing session of July 11, 2007, were intended to use the entire afternoon, and holding the sale briefing session for all union members over the course of three days appears likely to have caused considerable disruption to the Defendant's operations; the extraordinary general meeting and the sale briefing session could have been held outside the workplace after working hours even without the Defendant's permission; and there is no material suggesting that it would have been difficult to achieve the purpose of the extraordinary general meeting and the sale briefing session unless they were held at that particular time; taking these circumstances together, the determination of the court below as set forth above can be affirmed as justified, and it cannot be said that there is an error such as misapprehension of the legal principles concerning the interpretation of the collective agreement, as alleged in the grounds of appeal.
8. Conclusion
Therefore, all appeals are dismissed, and the costs of appeal are to be borne by the losing parties, and it is so ordered as stated in the Order, by the unanimous opinion of the Justices participating in the adjudication.
[Attachment] List of Plaintiffs: Omitted
Justice Kim So-young (Presiding Justice), Shin Young-cheol, Lee Sang-hoon (Justice in Charge), Kim Yong-deok