[Plaintiffs, Appellants] Plaintiff 1 and 39 others (Attorneys for the Plaintiffs: Duksoo Law Firm, Attorneys Kim Chang-guk and 7 others)
[Defendant, Appellee] ○○○ Co., Ltd. (Attorneys for the Defendant: Shin & Kim Law Firm, Attorneys Hwang Sang-hyun and 2 others)
[Judgment Below] Seoul High Court Decision 2000Na7990 rendered on February 8, 2001
[Order]
All appeals are dismissed. The costs of the appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiffs.
[Reasoning]
Where the working conditions provided for in the rules of employment (취업규칙) are altered to the disadvantage of employees, and there is no labor union composed of a majority of the employees, the consent of a majority of the employees must be obtained through a meeting-type procedure; however, such meeting-type procedure need not necessarily take the form of all employees of one business or workplace gathering together at one time to hold a meeting. It is also permissible for employees to exchange opinions among themselves, free from the intervention or interference of the employer, by organizational unit or department within a single business or workplace, to consolidate opinions for and against the change, and then to compile these results overall (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 91Da25055 rendered on February 25, 1992). Here, "intervention or interference by the employer" refers to cases where the employer, through express or implied means, coerces consent to a degree that impairs the employees' autonomous and collective decision-making; where the employer merely explains and publicizes to the employees the content of the rules of employment to be changed, this cannot be regarded as unjust intervention or interference by the employer.
According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the lower court found, based on the evidence it adopted, as follows: the Defendant Company had been paying its employees an annual bonus of 700% pursuant to its salary regulations; however, in the face of the so-called IMF financial crisis, the Defendant Company suffered a net loss of KRW 15.7 billion in 1997 and a net loss of KRW 3.2 billion in the first half of 1998, resulting in an accumulated deficit of KRW 57.6 billion from the time of the company's establishment in 1989 through the first half of 1998; as cancellations of insurance contracts surged and its financial condition rapidly deteriorated, the Defendant Company, as part of its self-rescue efforts to overcome this management crisis, amended its salary regulations on January 9, 1998 to newly establish Article 4, Paragraph 4, providing that no bonuses whatsoever would be paid for the six-month period from January 1, 1998 to June 30, 1998 (hereinafter referred to as the "First Amendment"); since the Defendant Company had no labor union at the time, it sent to each department at its Seoul headquarters and to each of its branch offices nationwide a document entitled "Our Stance Under the Emergency Management System," which stated that, in the crisis situation of IMF control, the employees would actively comply with measures for the company's survival and consented without objection to the above amendment of the salary regulations; the Defendant Company explained the purpose and necessity of the amendment to the salary regulations and then obtained signatures of employees at the bottom of the document by department, compiling them overall, thereby obtaining the consent of all 554 employees then employed; that even after the period of bonus reduction under the First Amendment had elapsed, the business environment and financial condition did not improve, and so the Defendant Company decided to further reduce employees' bonuses for an additional one year and six months; that some employees of the Defendant Company, centered around the Employee Council, demanded that the Defendant Company present grounds for the additional bonus reduction and requested that, even if a bonus reduction were unavoidable, it should not lead to a reduction in retirement allowances; that in response, the Defendant Company met with the officers of the Employee Council to explain the necessity of the additional bonus reduction, while also explaining the worsening business environment, including the tightening of the standards for calculating the payment capacity of insurance companies by the Financial Supervisory Commission, and the crisis facing the Defendant Company's financial condition; that the Defendant Company accepted the Employee Council's demand and prepared a document entitled "Recent Business Environment and Our Reality," stating that retirement allowances for the period up to June 30, 1998 would be calculated using the average wage applicable before the bonus reduction, and explained the necessity of the additional bonus reduction to employees nationwide; that the Defendant Company again amended its salary regulations on July 29, 1998, newly establishing Article 4, Paragraph 5, providing that no bonuses whatsoever would be paid for the one-year-and-six-month period from July 1, 1998 to August 30, 1999, and Article 8, providing that retirement allowances for the period from January 1, 1998 to June 30, 1998 would be calculated using the average wage based on the bonus payment rate applicable before the First Amendment (hereinafter referred to as the "Second Amendment"); that, since the Defendant Company still had no labor union organized at that time, it sent to each department at its headquarters and to each of its branch offices nationwide a document entitled "Resolution," which stated that, recognizing the national economic crisis and the Defendant Company's vulnerable financial structure, the employees consented without objection to the above amendment of the salary regulations in order to save the company; that the Defendant Company repeatedly explained the purpose and necessity of the Second Amendment to the salary regulations and then obtained signatures of employees at the bottom of the document by department, compiling them overall, thereby obtaining the consent of 467 out of 471 employees then employed; and that, at the time of the First and Second Amendments, department heads first signed themselves before their subordinate employees signed, and in some cases stepped aside while their department's employees signed, while in other cases remained present at the place where their department's employees signed. Based on these findings, the lower court determined that, inasmuch as the Defendant Company's employees signed their consent by department after listening to the Defendant Company's explanation of the necessity of the bonus reduction, which was carried out as part of self-rescue efforts through management rationalization, and fully recognizing the circumstances, through free exchange of opinions and their own judgment, it must be found that there was no interference or intervention by the Defendant Company, and therefore each of the above amendments had obtained the lawful consent of a majority of the employees.
Examining the record in light of the above legal principles, even taking into account the content and form of the respective documents prepared by the Defendant Company to obtain employees' signatures at the time of the First and Second Amendments as noted above, and the fact that some department heads remained present at the place of signing, insofar as it cannot be said that the Defendant Company, beyond explaining and publicizing to its employees the necessity of the amendment to the salary regulations, coerced the employees' signatures of consent by express or implied means, it cannot be found that there was intervention or interference by the Defendant Company to a degree that unjustly impaired the autonomous and collective decision-making of the Defendant Company's employees. Furthermore, in light of the circumstances under which all employees signed their consent at the time of the First Amendment and most employees signed their consent at the time of the Second Amendment, it is reasonable to view that the Defendant Company's employees, recognizing the company's situation and out of a sense of crisis, agreed to bear the burden of the bonus reduction as unavoidable, and that a majority consented to the amendment of the salary regulations. Accordingly, the lower court's fact-finding and determination made to the same effect are justified and acceptable, and there is no illegality therein, as argued in the grounds of appeal, in the form of a violation of the rules of evidence resulting in a mistaken finding of fact, or a misapprehension of the legal principles concerning disadvantageous amendments to rules of employment.
Therefore, all appeals are dismissed, and the costs of the appeal are to be borne by the losing parties. This Judgment is rendered as set forth in the Order by the unanimous opinion of the participating Justices.
Justice Ko Hyun-cheol (Presiding Justice), Byun Jae-seung, Yoon Jae-sik (Justice in Charge), Kang Shin-wook