Workbear재주넘는곰
대법원 2003다4815, 4822, 4839

Wages (Union Full-Time Officer's Pay Claim During Strike)임금

Decided2003. 09. 02. Court대법원Case reversed and remanded to the High Court (Employer/Company prevailed on the core legal issue)
AI-generated English translation (summary, key points, decision summary and full text) for reference only — not an official translation and without legal effect. The Korean original below is authoritative.
AI Easy read — AI summary of this decision
AI-generated summary for reference only — the Korean original below is authoritative.

In this case, a full-time union officer (노동조합 전임자) — an employee released from regular duties to work exclusively on union affairs — sought payment of compensation for the period during which the union was on strike. The Supreme Court (대법원) held that payments made to full-time union officers do not qualify as 'wages' (임금) in the legal sense, and that a collective bargaining agreement (단체협약) clause stating officers should be treated 'equivalent to general union members' must be interpreted to mean that if general members receive no pay due to the strike under the no-work, no-pay principle, the full-time officer likewise has no right to claim pay. The Court reversed the lower court's decision and remanded the case to the High Court.

Key takeaways
  • CaseA full-time union officer demanded that the company pay him compensation even during a period when the union was on strike.
  • OutcomeThe Supreme Court ruled that pay given to full-time union officers is not 'wages,' and that officers cannot claim payment when general union members receive no pay due to the strike.
  • LessonEven a full-time union officer is subject to the same no-work, no-pay principle as ordinary union members during a strike.
Issues
  • Whether payments made to a full-time union officer (노동조합 전임자) constitute 'wages' (임금) under labor law
  • How to interpret a collective bargaining agreement clause stating officers are to be treated 'equivalent to general union members,' and whether this entitles the officer to claim pay during a strike period
Key reasoning

A full-time union officer is exempted from the duty to provide labor and, correspondingly, the employer is exempted from the duty to pay wages — a status functionally similar to an unpaid leave of absence. Because of this, any money paid to such an officer under a collective bargaining agreement is not considered 'wages' in the traditional employment law sense, but rather a benefit granted through labor-management agreement. The clause providing that officers be treated 'equivalent to general union members' is meant to ensure they are not treated less favorably than ordinary members — not to guarantee them income regardless of circumstances. Therefore, when general union members receive no wages during a strike under the no-work, no-pay principle, the full-time officer cannot claim compensation either, since doing so would place the officer in a more favorable position than ordinary members, contrary to the intent of the clause.

Summary of Decision (English, AI translation)

[1] A full-time union official (노동조합 전임자) maintains the basic labor relationship with the employer and retains his status as an employee, but since he is exempted from the duty to provide labor and the employer is likewise exempted from the duty to pay wages, his position is similar to that of an employee who is on a leave of absence. Even if the employer pays a certain amount of money to the full-time union official pursuant to a collective agreement (단체협약) or the like, such payment cannot be deemed wages that constitute consideration for labor.

[2] Where a collective agreement concluded between a company and a labor union provides, with respect to the treatment of full-time union officials, that "the Company shall not subject an employee to any disadvantageous treatment on the ground of his full-time union service" and that "the period of full-time union service of a union executive shall be deemed continuous service, and the treatment regarding wages and other welfare benefits during the period of full-time service shall be equivalent to that of general union members," such provisions should be construed as meaning that a certain amount of wages is to be paid to full-time union officials only to the extent necessary to ensure that they are not treated less favorably than general union members who are engaged in the original work of providing labor under the employment contract. Treating full-time union officials more favorably than general union members would be inconsistent with what both labor and management originally intended in light of the purpose and intent of such provisions of the collective agreement. Moreover, in a situation where general union members are unable to receive wages during a strike period pursuant to the principle of "no work, no pay," it can never be recognized as legitimate, even in relation to the general union members, for full-time union officials—who may be regarded as executives of the labor union composed of those very members—to claim that they alone should receive their wages. Therefore, it is reasonable to interpret each of the above provisions of the collective agreement as meaning that, where general union members are unable to receive wages from the employer for the strike period pursuant to the principle of "no work, no pay," full-time union officials likewise cannot claim wages from the employer, just as general union members cannot.

Full text (English, AI translation) 12,638 chars

[Plaintiffs, Appellees] Plaintiff 1 and 2 others (Litigation representative: Myeongin Law Firm, attorneys in charge Yoon Jong-hyun and 2 others)
[Defendant, Appellant] E-Land Co., Ltd. (Litigation representative: Kwangjang Law Firm, attorneys in charge Park Woo-dong and 3 others)
[Judgment Below] Seoul High Court Decision 2002Na3916, 3923, 3930, rendered December 18, 2002

[Order]

The judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Seoul High Court.

[Reasoning]

1. The summary of the facts found by the court below, based on a comprehensive consideration of the evidence adopted in its judgment, is as follows.

(1) Members of the labor union of the Defendant company went on strike for about nine months from June 16, 2000, over issues such as wage agreements for non-regular workers, and ended the strike on March 7, 2001, after reaching a labor-management agreement with the Defendant company. At the time, Plaintiff 3 served as the union chairperson, Plaintiff 2 as the union secretary-general, and Plaintiff 1 as the head of the union's education and public relations office, each working as a full-time union official (노동조합 전임자, "full-time union official").

(2) When the labor union of the Defendant company entered into a labor-management agreement (이하 '이 사건 노사합의', hereinafter "the instant labor-management agreement") on March 7, 2001 with all the affiliated companies of the E-Land group to which the Defendant company belongs, since the Defendant company accepted most of the union's other demands, the union agreed to accept the "no work, no pay" principle asserted by the Defendant company with respect to the strike period, on the condition that the Defendant company agreed to pay each union member 1,000,000 won as a subsistence support payment, and a written labor-management agreement (Defendant's Exhibit 1) recording the terms of this agreement was drawn up.

(3) In accordance with the instant labor-management agreement, on March 24, 2001, the Defendant company paid most of the union members, including the Plaintiffs who were full-time union officials, 780,000 won each, being the agreed subsistence support payment of 1,000,000 won less the 220,000 won withheld as income tax.

(4) Article 13 (Treatment of Full-time Union Officers), Item 1, of the collective agreement (단체협약, "Collective Agreement") concluded between the Defendant company's labor union and the Defendant company on August 20, 1997 (hereinafter "the instant collective agreement") provides that "the Company shall not subject a person to any disadvantageous treatment on the ground of full-time union service," and Item 2 provides that "the period of full-time service of a full-time union officer shall be deemed continuous service, and the salary and other treatment relating to welfare benefits during the full-time service period shall be governed in accordance with that of general union members."

2. The court below, comprehensively considering the evidence it adopted, found as follows: at the time of the instant labor-management agreement, the union side asserted that the salary of full-time union officials was different in nature from the wages of union members and that the "no work, no pay" principle could not apply thereto, and demanded that the Defendant company specify in the above agreement the payment of salary to full-time union officials during the strike period; however, the Defendant company strongly refused this, asserting that the "no work, no pay" principle should also apply to the salary of full-time union officials. When this issue became the final obstacle in the negotiations, Plaintiff 3 and others, who were union negotiating members, accepted the proposal made by the Defendant company's working-level negotiator, Non-party, and others, that the issue of salary for full-time union officials was not a subject of collective bargaining but a matter to be resolved as a matter of legal interpretation, and should not be included in the above labor-management agreement but dealt with separately, and accordingly did not raise the issue any further; as a result, the issue of salary for full-time union officials was not included in the above labor-management agreement. Based on these findings, the court below determined that it could not be found that there was an agreement, at the time of the instant labor-management agreement, as to whether salary would be paid to the full-time union officials, including the Plaintiffs, for the strike period, and that the mere fact that the Plaintiffs received the subsistence support payment that the Defendant company agreed to pay to union members could not be deemed to mean that the Plaintiffs, as full-time union officials, agreed together with the general union members to accept the "no work, no pay" principle, or that they voluntarily waived their salary for the strike period. According to the record, this finding and determination by the court below are justified, and there is no illegality such as a mistake of fact due to a violation of the rules of evidence, as alleged in the grounds of appeal.

3. The court below further determined as follows: the provision of Article 13, Item 2, of the instant collective agreement, that "the period of full-time service of a full-time union officer shall be deemed continuous service, and the salary and other treatment relating to welfare benefits during the full-time service period shall be governed in accordance with that of general union members," merely means that salary shall be paid in accordance with the wage level paid to general union members holding the same rank and pay grade as the full-time union officials such as the Plaintiffs during their period of service, and that they shall likewise be treated in the same manner with respect to welfare benefits; it cannot be construed as a provision to the effect that, where the "no work, no pay" principle applies to general union members, the same principle shall equally apply to full-time union officials such as the Plaintiffs, so that they would not be paid salary during the period of a labor dispute. Accordingly, the court below determined that the Defendant is obligated to pay the Plaintiffs, who are full-time union officials, their salary for the strike period.

However, the above determination by the court below cannot be accepted.

A full-time union official maintains the basic labor relationship with the employer and retains the status of an employee, but is exempted from the obligation to provide labor, and the employer is likewise exempted from the obligation to pay wages; in this respect, such official is similar to an employee on leave of absence, and even if the employer pays a certain amount of money to the full-time union official pursuant to a collective agreement or the like, such payment cannot be regarded as wages, which are the consideration for labor (see Supreme Court Decision 94Da54566, delivered on November 10, 1995; Supreme Court Decision 97Da54727, delivered on April 24, 1998).

In this case, Article 24(2) of the former Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act (노동조합 및 노동관계조정법, "Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act") (enacted as Act No. 5310 on March 13, 1997), which was in effect at the time the above collective agreement was concluded, provided that a full-time union official shall not receive any salary from the employer during the period of full-time service; moreover, the latter part of the main text of Article 81(4) of the same Act designated an employer's act of supporting the salary of a full-time union official as one type of unfair labor practice, and Article 90 of the same Act provided for the criminal punishment of a person who violates this provision. However, in consideration of the existing practice, Article 6(1) of the Addenda merely deferred, until December 31, 2001, the application of the above provision prohibiting the support of salary to full-time union officials, in the case of businesses or workplaces where the employer was supporting the salary of a full-time union official as of the enforcement date of the above Act (March 13, 1997) (thereafter, by Act No. 6456 of March 28, 2001, the application of Article 24(2) and Article 81(4) of the above Act was further suspended until December 31, 2006). Under these circumstances, provisions such as Article 13, Paragraphs 1 and 2, of the instant collective agreement were established based on a labor-management agreement to the effect that, if a full-time union official such as the Plaintiffs, having been permitted by the Defendant company, the employer, to serve full-time in union affairs, and thereby exempted from the obligation to provide the labor originally owed under the employment contract, were to receive no consideration whatsoever therefor, this would result in an unjust outcome, such as disadvantages in the living conditions of the full-time union official, and that, in order to avoid such an outcome, it was deemed appropriate to provide salary equivalent to that paid to general union members who are engaged in their original duties under the employment contract.

If so, Article 13, Paragraphs 1 and 2, of the instant collective agreement should be construed as providing for the payment of a certain salary to full-time union officials only to the extent that they are not treated less favorably than general union members who provide the original labor stipulated in the employment contract; therefore, treating full-time union officials more favorably than general union members does not accord with what both labor and management originally intended, in light of the purpose and intent of establishing such provisions in the collective agreement. Furthermore, in a situation where general union members are unable to receive wages due to a strike, in accordance with the "no work, no pay" principle, it can never be recognized as legitimate, even in relation to the general union members, for full-time union officials, who may be regarded as officers of the labor union composed of those very members, to insist on receiving their own salary alone.

Therefore, it is reasonable to construe the provisions of Article 13, Paragraphs 1 and 2, of the instant collective agreement as meaning that, where general union members are unable to receive wages from the employer for the strike period in accordance with the "no work, no pay" principle, full-time union officials likewise cannot claim salary from the employer, in the same manner as general union members. The judgment below, which determined otherwise, contains an error of law that misapprehended the legal principles concerning the interpretation of collective agreements, thereby affecting the judgment, and the ground of appeal pointing this out is well-founded.

Moreover, Supreme Court Decision 96Da26671, delivered on December 6, 1996, cited by the court below, was a case in which the issue was whether the judgment violated precedent, which is a ground of appeal permitted in small claims cases; in that case, the court below had determined that it was unjust for the employer not to pay wages for the period during which a full-time union official engaged in illegal union activities, and the employer appealed, arguing that this determination was contrary to Supreme Court en banc Decision 94Da26721, delivered on December 21, 1995, and other decisions declaring the "no work, no pay" principle. However, the above Supreme Court en banc Decision and others declared the "no work, no pay" principle with respect to general employees, and thus could not serve as precedent applicable to that case, which concerned a full-time union official who had no obligation to provide labor; accordingly, that decision merely held that the above ground of appeal did not constitute a legitimate ground of appeal under the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Procedure for Trial of Small Claims (소액사건심판법, "Act on Special Cases Concerning the Procedure for Trial of Small Claims"); it was not a decision declaring that salary must be paid to full-time union officials even during a period of industrial action, or that the "no work, no pay" principle should not apply to them, and therefore it cannot serve as precedent for this case (see Supreme Court Decision 2003Da10100, 10117, delivered on April 25, 2003).

4. Therefore, without rendering judgment on the remaining grounds of appeal, the judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court below, as set forth in the Order.

Justice Lee Yong-woo (Presiding Justice), Seo Seong, Bae Gi-won, Park Jae-yun (Justice in charge)

【판결요지】

[1] 노동조합 전임자는 사용자와의 사이에 기본적 노사관계는 유지되고 근로자로서의 신분도 그대로 가지는 것이지만 근로제공의무가 면제되고 사용자의 임금지급의무도 면제된다는 점에서 휴직상태에 있는 근로자와 유사하고, 사용자가 단체협약 등에 따라 노동조합 전임자에게 일정한 금원을 지급한다고 하더라도 이를 근로의 대가인 임금이라고 할 수는 없다.

[2] 회사와 노동조합 사이에 체결된 단체협약이 노동조합 전임자의 대우에 관하여 '회사는 전임을 이유로 일체의 불이익처우를 하지 않는다.', '노조전임간부의 전임기간은 계속 근무로 간주하며 전임기간 중의 급여, 기타 후생복지에 관한 제 대우는 일반조합원에 준한다.'고 각 규정하고 있는 것은, 노동조합 전임자를 근로계약상 본래의 근로제공업무에 종사하는 일반조합원보다 불리한 처우를 받지 않도록 하는 범위 안에서 노동조합 전임자에게 일정한 급여를 지급하기로 한 것이라고 할 것이므로, 노동조합 전임자를 일반조합원보다 더욱 유리하게 처우하는 것은 위와 같은 단체협약의 규정을 둔 목적이나 취지에 비추어 볼 때 노사 쌍방이 당초 의도한 바와 합치하지 아니한다고 할 것이고, 또 파업으로 인하여 일반조합원들이 무노동 무임금 원칙에 따라 임금을 지급받지 못하게 된 마당에 그 조합원들로 구성된 노동조합의 간부라고 할 수 있는 노동조합 전임자들이 자신들의 급여만은 지급받겠다고 하는 것은 일반조합원들에 대한 관계에 있어서도 결코 정당성이 인정될 수 없는바, 위 단체협약 각 규정은 일반조합원들이 무노동 무임금의 원칙에 따라 사용자로부터 파업기간 중의 임금을 지급받지 못하는 경우에는 노동조합 전임자도 일반조합원과 마찬가지로 사용자에게 급여를 청구할 수 없다는 내용으로 해석함이 상당하다.

【참조조문】

[1] 근로기준법 제14조, 제18조

[2] 노동조합및노동관계조정법 제24조 제2항, 제81조 제4호, 제90조

【참조판례】

[1] 대법원 1995. 11. 10. 선고 94다54566 판결, 대법원 1998. 4. 24. 선고 97다54727 판결(공1998상, 1456)

【주문】·【이유】 전문 4,569자 · 펼쳐 보기

【원고, 피상고인】 원고 1 외 2인 (소송대리인 법무법인 명인 담당변호사 윤종현 외 2인)

【피고, 상고인】 주식회사 이랜드 (소송대리인 법무법인 광장 담당변호사 박우동 외 3인)

【원심판결】 서울고법 2002. 12. 18. 선고 2002나3916, 3923, 3930 판결

【주 문】

원심판결을 파기하고, 사건을 서울고등법원에 환송한다.

【이 유】 1. 원심이 그 판결에서 채용하고 있는 증거들을 종합하여 인정한 사실의 요지는 다음과 같다.

(1) 피고 회사 노동조합의 조합원들은 2000. 6. 16.부터 약 9개월간 비정규직의 임금 협약 등 문제로 파업을 하다가 2001. 3. 7. 피고 회사와 사이에 노사합의를 하고 파업을 마쳤는데, 당시 원고 3은 노조 위원장, 원고 2는 노조 사무국장, 원고 1은 노조 교육홍보실장 등 노동조합 전임자로 근무하였다.

(2) 피고 회사 노동조합은 2001. 3. 7. 피고 회사가 속한 이랜드 전체 계열 회사와 노사합의(이하 '이 사건 노사합의'라 한다)를 함에 있어 피고 회사가 노조의 다른 요구사항들을 대부분 수용하자, 피고 회사가 주장하는 파업기간 동안의 무노동 무임금 원칙을 수용하기로 하되, 피고 회사가 조합원들에게 생계비 지원금으로 100만 원씩을 지급하기로 약정하여 그 합의내용을 기재한 노사합의문(을 제1호증)을 작성하였다.

(3) 피고 회사는 이 사건 노사합의에 따라 2001. 3. 24. 노동조합 전임자인 원고들을 포함한 노조원들 대부분에게 약정한 생계비 지원금 100만 원 중 소득세 22만 원을 원천징수한 나머지 78만 원씩을 각 지급하였다.

(4) 피고 회사 노조와 피고 회사 사이에 1997. 8. 20. 체결된 단체협약(이하 '이 사건 단체협약'이라 한다) 제13조(전임간부에 대한 처우) 제1호는 '회사는 전임을 이유로 일체의 불이익처우를 하지 않는다.'고 규정하고 있고, 제2호는 '노조전임간부의 전임기간은 계속 근무로 간주하며 전임기간 중의 급여, 기타 후생복지에 관한 제 대우는 일반조합원에 준한다.'고 규정하고 있다.

2. 원심은 채용 증거를 종합하여, 이 사건 노사합의 당시 노조측에서는 노동조합 전임자에 대한 급여는 조합원들의 임금과는 그 성격이 달라 무노동 무임금의 원칙이 적용될 수 없다고 주장하면서 피고 회사에 대하여 위 합의문에 파업기간 동안의 노동조합 전임자에 대한 급여 지급을 명시해 줄 것을 요구하였으나, 피고 회사는 노동조합 전임자에 대한 급여에도 무노동 무임금의 원칙이 적용되어야 한다는 이유로 이를 강력하게 거부하였는데, 위 문제가 협상의 마지막 걸림돌이 되자 노조 교섭위원이었던 원고 3 등은 노동조합 전임자의 급여 문제는 단체교섭의 대상이 아니고 법리적으로 해결할 문제이니 이를 위 노사합의문에 포함시키지 말고 별도로 처리하자는 피고 회사 실무교섭위원 소외인 등의 제의를 받아들여 더 이상 이를 문제삼지 않았고, 이에 따라 위 노사합의문에는 노동조합 전임자 급여 문제가 포함되지 아니한 사실을 인정한 다음, 위 인정 사실에 의하면 이 사건 노사합 당시 원고들을 포함한 노동조합 전임자들에게 파업기간 중의 급여를 지급할 것인지에 여부에 관한 합의가 있었다고 볼 수 없고, 피고 회사가 노조원들에게 지급하기로 약정한 생계비를 원고들이 지급받은 점만으로 노동조합 전임자인 원고들이 일반조합원들과 함께 무노동 무임금의 원칙을 받아들이기로 약정하였다거나 파업기간 중의 급여를 스스로 포기한 것이라고 볼 수 없다고 판단하였다. 기록에 의하면 이러한 원심의 인정 및 판단은 정당하고, 거기에 상고이유의 주장과 같은 채증법칙 위배로 인한 사실오인 등의 위법이 없다.

3. 이어서 원심은, 이 사건 단체협약 제13조 제2호가 '노조전임간부의 전임기간은 계속 근무로 간주하며 전임기간 중의 급여, 기타 후생복지에 관한 제 대우는 일반조합원에 준한다.'고 규정하고 있는 것은, 원고들과 같은 노동조합 전임자들이 근무하는 기간 동안 그들과 동일한 직급 및 호봉에 해당하는 일반조합원들에게 지급하는 임금수준에 준하여 급여를 지급하고 후생복지 역시 그와 같은 대우를 한다는 취지의 규정일 뿐이지 일반조합원들에게 무노동 무임금의 원칙이 적용되는 경우에는 원고들과 같은 노동조합 전임자들에게도 무노동 무임금의 원칙을 동일하게 적용하여 쟁의기간 중의 급여를 지급하지 않기로 하는 내용의 규정이라고는 볼 수 없으므로, 피고는 노동조합 전임자인 원고들에게 파업기간 중의 급여를 지급할 의무가 있다고 판단하였다.

그러나 원심의 위와 같은 판단은 수긍할 수 없다.

노동조합 전임자는 사용자와의 사이에 기본적 노사관계는 유지되고 근로자로서의 신분도 그대로 가지는 것이지만 근로제공의무가 면제되고 사용자의 임금지급의무도 면제된다는 점에서 휴직상태에 있는 근로자와 유사하고, 사용자가 단체협약 등에 따라 노동조합 전임자에게 일정한 금원을 지급한다고 하더라도 이를 근로의 대가인 임금이라고 할 수는 없다(대법원 1995. 11. 10. 선고 94다54566 판결, 1998. 4. 24. 선고 97다54727 판결 참조).

이 사건의 경우 위 단체협약이 체결될 당시의 노동조합및노동관계조정법(1997. 3. 13. 법률 제5310호로 제정된 것) 제24조 제2항은 노동조합 전임자는 그 전임기간 동안 사용자로부터 어떠한 급여도 지급받아서는 아니된다고 규정하고 있을 뿐만 아니라 같은 법 제81조 제4호 본문 후단은 사용자가 노동조합 전임자에게 급여를 지원하는 행위를 부당노동행위의 하나로 규정하고, 같은 법 제90조는 이를 위반하는 자에 대하여 형사처벌을 하도록 규정하면서, 다만 종래의 관행을 고려하여 부칙 제6조 제1항에서 위 법 시행 당시(1997. 3. 13.) 사용자가 노동조합 전임자의 급여를 지원하고 있는 사업 또는 사업장의 경우에는 2001. 12. 31.까지 위 노동조합의 전임자에 대한 급여지원 금지 규정의 적용을 유예하고 있을 뿐인바(그 후 2001. 3. 28. 법률 제6456호에 의하여 위 법 제24조 제2항 및 제81조 제4호의 규정을 2006. 12. 31.까지 적용하지 않기로 하였다), 위와 같은 사정 아래에서 이 사건 단체협약 제13조 제1항, 제2항과 같은 규정을 둔 것은, 만약 원고들과 같은 노동조합 전임자가 사용자인 피고 회사로부터 노동조합의 업무에 전임하도록 승낙받고도 근로계약상 본래 담당하는 근로제공의무를 면하고 있다는 이유로 아무런 대가도 지급받지 못한다면 그로 인하여 노동조합 전임자에게 초래될 생활상의 불이익 등 부당한 결과를 피하기 위하여 근로계약상 본래의 업무에 종사하고 있는 일반조합원에 준하는 급여를 제공하는 것이 적절하다는 노사합의에 기초한 것이라고 할 것이다.

그렇다면 이 사건 단체협약 제13조 제1항, 제2항은 노동조합 전임자를 근로계약상 본래의 근로제공업무에 종사하는 일반조합원보다 불리한 처우를 받지 않도록 하는 범위 안에서 노동조합 전임자에게 일정한 급여를 지급하기로 한 것이라고 할 것이므로, 노동조합 전임자를 일반조합원보다 더욱 유리하게 처우하는 것은 위와 같은 단체협약의 규정을 둔 목적이나 취지에 비추어 볼 때 노사 쌍방이 당초 의도한 바와 합치하지 아니한다고 할 것이고, 또 파업으로 인하여 일반조합원들이 무노동 무임금 원칙에 따라 임금을 지급받지 못하게 된 마당에 그 조합원들로 구성된 노동조합의 간부라고 할 수 있는 노동조합 전임자들이 자신들의 급여만은 지급받겠다고 하는 것은 일반조합원들에 대한 관계에 있어서도 결코 정당성이 인정될 수 없다.

따라서 이 사건 단체협약 제13조 제1항, 제2항의 규정은 일반조합원들이 무노동 무임금의 원칙에 따라 사용자로부터 파업기간 중의 임금을 지급받지 못하는 경우에는 노동조합 전임자도 일반조합원과 마찬가지로 사용자에게 급여를 청구할 수 없다는 내용으로 해석함이 상당하다고 할 것인바, 이와 달리 판단한 원심판결에는 단체협약의 해석에 관한 법리를 오해하여 판결에 영향을 미친 위법이 있고, 이 점을 지적하는 상고이유의 주장은 이유 있다.

그리고 원심이 들고 있는 대법원 1996. 12. 6. 선고 96다26671 판결은 소액사건의 상고이유인 판례위반 여부가 쟁점이 된 사건으로서, 그 사건의 원심판결이 노동조합 전임자가 근무기간 동안 비합법적인 노동조합 활동을 하였음을 이유로 사용자가 그 활동기간의 임금을 지급하지 아니한 것이 부당하다고 판단한 데 대하여 사용자측이 이는 무노동 무임금 원칙을 선언한 대법원 1995. 12. 21. 선고 94다26721 전원합의체 판결 등에 어긋나는 판단을 한 경우라고 주장하면서 상고를 한 사건인데, 위 대법원 전원합의체 판결 등은 일반 근로자에 관한 무노동 무임금의 원칙을 선언한 것이므로 근로제공의무가 없는 전임자에 관한 그 사건에 적용될 선례라고 할 수 없어 위의 상고이유는 소액사건심판법 소정의 적법한 상고이유가 되지 아니한다고 한 판결에 지나지 않고, 노동조합 전임자에 대하여 쟁의행위 기간 중에도 급여가 지급되어야 한다거나 무노동 무임금 원칙이 적용되어서는 안된다는 취지를 선언한 판결이 아닌만큼 이 사건의 선례가 될 수 없다(대법원 2003. 4. 25. 선고 2003다10100, 10117 판결 참조).

4. 그러므로 나머지 상고이유에 대한 판단을 생략한 채 원심판결을 파기하고, 사건을 원심법원에 환송하기로 하여 주문과 같이 판결한다.

대법관 이용우(재판장) 서성 배기원 박재윤(주심)

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