[Defendant] Defendant 1 and 2 others
[Appellant] Defendant 2, Defendant 3, and the Prosecutor
[Defense Counsel] Attorney Lee Nam-su of Gangnam Law LLC
[Judgment Below] Uijeongbu District Court Decision 2024No2093, decided July 10, 2025
[Order]
The judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Uijeongbu District Court.
[Reasoning]
The grounds of appeal are examined.
1. Summary of the Facts Charged Against the Defendants
Defendant 1 is the representative of ○○○ Co., Ltd. (hereinafter "the Company in this case"), which registered as an international marriage brokerage business on July 27, 2018; Defendant 2 is the spouse of Defendant 1 and a team leader at the Company in this case; and Defendant 3 is an employee of the Company in this case.
A marriage broker shall not engage in advertising containing content that is likely to cause discrimination or foster prejudice on the basis of nationality, race, sex, age, occupation, etc., or content that is likely to raise concerns of human trafficking or human rights violations.
Nevertheless, the defendants, acting in conspiracy, committed the following acts: Defendant 2, around March 9, 2020, delivered to Defendant 1 a USB drive containing facial photographs, height, weight, and other information of women of Vietnamese nationality, which had been sent by international mail from a partner business (trade name omitted) located in Hai Duong, Vietnam; Defendant 1 delivered this to Defendant 3, who had it transmitted to persons who had entered their names and other personal information on the website of the Company in this case and become members; and Defendant 3, on May 12, 2021 and July 30, 2021, respectively, transmitted the facial photographs, height, weight, and other information of the Vietnamese women received as above to Kim ○-seong, a member registered on the aforementioned website, via KakaoTalk messenger.
Thus, the defendants, in conspiracy, engaged in advertising containing content likely to cause discrimination or foster prejudice on the basis of nationality, race, sex, age, occupation, etc., or content likely to raise concerns of human trafficking or human rights violations, by using photographs to inform or present to the general public, through telecommunications, matters revealing the face, height, weight, and other characteristics of the persons intended to be introduced.
2. As to the Grounds of Appeal by Defendant 2 and Defendant 3 Concerning Status Offenses and Accomplices
A. Judgment of the Court Below
The court below, for the reasons stated in its judgment, found Defendant 2 and Defendant 3, who are non-status offenders, guilty of the charges against them by applying the penal provision at issue in this case (Article 26(2)(6) and Article 12(1) of the Act on the Management of Marriage Brokerage Agencies, hereinafter "the Marriage Brokerage Act") together with Articles 33 and 30 of the Criminal Act, on the premise that they committed the violation in this case as co-principals together with the Company in this case, which is a status offender qualifying as a marriage broker.
B. Judgment of the Supreme Court
The judgment of the court below is difficult to accept for the following reasons.
1) A) The Marriage Brokerage Act aims to soundly guide and manage the marriage brokerage business and to prevent harm to users of such services, thereby protecting users and contributing to the formation of a sound marriage culture (Article 1). "Marriage brokerage business" means engaging in the business of marriage brokerage for a fee, membership dues, or other valuable consideration (Article 2(2) of the same Act). "Marriage broker" means "a person who has filed a report for domestic marriage brokerage business pursuant to Article 3(1) of the Marriage Brokerage Act or has registered for international marriage brokerage business pursuant to Article 4(1) of the same Act" (Article 2(5) of the same Act). Thus, in order to soundly guide and manage the marriage brokerage business, the Marriage Brokerage Act requires "a person who intends to engage in domestic marriage brokerage business" to meet certain standards and report to the head of a Special Self-Governing City, mayor, head of a Si/Gun/Gu (Article 3(1)), and requires "a person who intends to engage in international marriage brokerage business" to meet certain standards and register with the head of a Special Self-Governing City, mayor, head of a Si/Gun/Gu (Article 4(1)); and it then provides for prohibitions or obligations applicable only to a "marriage broker" who has completed such reporting or registration (Articles 8, 9, 10, 10-4, 12, 14, etc.). In addition, the Marriage Brokerage Act sets out prohibitions or obligations applicable only to an "international marriage broker" (Articles 10-3, 10-5, 11, 12-2, 15(2), 24-3(2), etc.) or to "a person who is or was engaged in the marriage brokerage business" (Article 13), thereby designating different persons subject to each provision according to the specific purpose of each prohibition or obligation provision, and also prescribing different sanctions for violations, such as corrective orders, revocation of registration, closure of business premises, suspension of business, criminal punishment, and administrative fines.
Article 12(1) of the Marriage Brokerage Act, which is at issue in this case, provides that "a marriage broker shall not engage in false or exaggerated advertising, or advertising containing content that is likely to cause discrimination or foster prejudice on the basis of nationality, race, sex, age, occupation, etc., or content that is likely to raise concerns of human trafficking or human rights violations," thereby limiting the persons subject to this provision to "marriage brokers," and Article 26(2)(6) of the same Act provides for the punishment of a person who violates Article 12(1) of the same Act.
Considering comprehensively the legislative purpose and regulatory structure of the Marriage Brokerage Act, the wording and form of Article 12(1) of the Marriage Brokerage Act (the prohibition provision) and Article 26(2)(6) of the same Act (the penal provision), and the purpose and content of the obligation imposed by Article 12(1) of the Marriage Brokerage Act—which limits its applicability to marriage brokers, including the obligation to refrain from false or exaggerated advertising—the "marriage broker" subject to the penal provision at issue in this case must be understood to mean the "business owner" who has reported for domestic marriage brokerage business or registered for international marriage brokerage business pursuant to Article 3(1) or Article 4(1) of the Marriage Brokerage Act, and who becomes the subject to whom the profits of the business accrue by engaging in the business of marriage brokerage for a fee, membership dues, or other valuable consideration. Therefore, if the person who registered for international marriage brokerage business pursuant to Article 4(1) of the Marriage Brokerage Act is a "corporation," the corporate business owner becomes the marriage broker, and the representative, agent, employee, or other worker of that corporation is not included within the meaning of "marriage broker."
B) Article 27 of the Marriage Brokerage Act provides: "If the representative of a corporation, or an agent, employee, or other worker of a corporation or individual commits a violation under Article 26(2)(6) in connection with the business of the corporation or individual, not only shall the actor be punished, but the corporation or individual shall also be punished by a fine as prescribed in the relevant provision." The purpose of this provision is, where there exists a person who actually executes the relevant business without being a marriage broker subject to the penal provision at issue in this case, to extend the scope of persons subject to the penal provision at issue in this case to such a person who actually executes the relevant business, in order to secure the effectiveness of the penal provision at issue in this case, so that such a person, if he or she commits a violation of the penal provision at issue in this case in connection with the execution of such business, can be punished pursuant to the joint penal provision. This provision thus serves as both a provision for punishing the actor and a provision for punishing the marriage broker, who is the subject to whom the profits of the violation accrue (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 95Do2870, decided July 15, 1999; Supreme Court Decision 2017Do11564, decided December 5, 2017, etc.). Accordingly, where the marriage broker is a corporate business owner, if a statute specially provides for this purpose, such as through a joint penal provision, the corporate business owner, who is the subject to whom the profits of the violation accrue, may also be punished, in addition to the actual violator.
However, in such a case, the "corporation that is not the actor" is punished based on its direct liability or its own liability under a separate penal provision, grounded in its negligence in the duty of care and supervision to prevent the violation defined in the elements of the offense, as an object of the exercise of the State's power to punish; therefore, the relationship between the corporate business owner and the actor under the joint penal provision cannot be regarded as identical to the relationship between two or more persons who jointly realize a common element of an offense in an accomplice relationship (see Supreme Court Decision 2024Do15290, decided May 1, 2025). Accordingly, it must be held that the application of the provisions of the General Provisions of the Criminal Act concerning accomplice relationships is excluded with respect to the relationship between such a "corporate business owner" and the "actor."
2) According to the facts charged in this case and the evidence lawfully adopted, it can be seen that in this case, the marriage broker who registered for international marriage brokerage business pursuant to Article 4(1) of the Marriage Brokerage Act and who engages in the marriage brokerage business defined in Article 2(2) of the same Act is the Company in this case, while Defendant 1 is merely the representative of the Company in this case, Defendant 2 is merely a team leader of the Company in this case, and Defendant 3 is merely an employee of the Company in this case. Therefore, the court below's determination that the marriage broker is the Company in this case, not Defendant 1, is justified.
However, in light of the legal principles set out above, Defendant 2 and Defendant 3, if they are actual persons who executed the relevant business of the Company in this case, which engages in international marriage brokerage business, and who committed the violation of the penal provision at issue in this case in connection with the execution of such business, can only become subject to the penal provision at issue in this case pursuant to the joint penal provision under Article 27 of the Marriage Brokerage Act. It is not permissible to punish Defendant 2 and Defendant 3, who are not marriage brokers, for violation of the penal provision at issue in this case by applying Articles 33 and 30 of the Criminal Act on the premise that they are in a co-principal relationship with the Company in this case, the corporate business owner, with respect to the acts stated in the charges.
3) Nevertheless, the court below, premising that Defendant 2 and Defendant 3, who are non-status offenders, committed the violation of the penal provision at issue in this case as co-principals together with the Company in this case, the corporate business owner having the status, rejected the argument of Defendant 2 and Defendant 3 to the effect that they, not being marriage brokers, could not be subject to the penal provision at issue in this case, and upheld the first-instance judgment, which applied the penal provision at issue in this case together with Articles 33 and 30 of the Criminal Act to the acts of Defendant 2 and Defendant 3 as charged. This determination by the court below contains an error affecting the judgment by misapprehending the legal principles concerning the scope of application of the penal provision at issue in this case, co-principals, and the joint penal provision. The argument in the grounds of appeal of Defendant 2 and Defendant 3 pointing this out is with merit.
3. As to the Prosecutor's Grounds of Appeal Concerning the Defendants
A. Judgment of the Court Below
The court below, for the reasons stated in its judgment, reversed the first-instance judgment, which had found the charges against Defendant 1 guilty, and rendered a not-guilty verdict, while finding the charges against Defendant 2 and Defendant 3 guilty.
B. Judgment of the Supreme Court
The judgment of the court below is difficult to accept for the following reasons.
1) Under the principle of no trial without accusation (불고불리의 원칙), a court cannot adjudicate a case without the prosecutor's institution of prosecution, and the court must adjudicate only the case for which the prosecutor has instituted prosecution; therefore, the prosecutor must clarify the purport of the prosecution by clearly specifying the facts charged and the applicable statutory provisions, etc., in the indictment. What act the prosecutor has indicted must be determined basically on the basis of the description in the indictment itself, but the progress of the trial and the content of the prosecutor's arguments, etc., must also be taken into consideration. Where the purport of the prosecution is clear, the court need not exercise its right to seek clarification in this regard; however, where the purport of the prosecution is likely to cause misunderstanding or is unclear, the court must exercise its right to seek clarification from the prosecutor pursuant to Article 141 of the Regulation on Criminal Procedure (형사소송규칙) to clarify such purport (see Supreme Court Decision 2011Do10468, decided November 10, 2011; Supreme Court Decision 2014Do2727, decided December 23, 2015; Supreme Court Decision 2017Do3448, decided June 15, 2017, etc.).
The Criminal Procedure Act (형사소송법), in Article 254(3), provides that upon institution of prosecution, the indictment must state not only the name of the offense and the facts charged but also the applicable statutory provisions, so as to determine the scope of the prosecution; and in Article 298, it provides that the prosecutor may, with the permission of the court, add, withdraw, or amend the facts charged or the applicable statutory provisions stated in the indictment (paragraph 1), and that the court, if it deems it appropriate in light of the progress of the trial, must request the addition or amendment of the facts charged or the applicable statutory provisions (paragraph 2), thereby providing for measures to be taken where the legal construction or applicable statute regarding the charged criminal facts changes during the pendency of the proceedings. The reason why the indictment is required to necessarily state the applicable statutory provisions in this manner is to serve an auxiliary function in clarifying the legal evaluation of the facts charged so as to determine the scope of the prosecution, and to guarantee the defendant's right of defense. Accordingly, where, in the course of the dynamic and evolving criminal procedure, the "facts charged" and the "applicable statutory provisions" stated in a single indictment are premised on different elements of the offense or different legal evaluations, thereby revealing disharmony or inconsistency to a degree that affects the determination of guilt or innocence or impedes the defendant's exercise of the right of defense, the court needs to require the prosecutor to clarify the problems or errors in the facts charged and the applicable statutory provisions, so that the prosecutor may properly supplement the indictment, and then conduct a thorough hearing and render its judgment accordingly.
2) According to the reasoning of the judgment below and the record, the following facts can be ascertained.
A) The prosecutor who instituted the prosecution in this case, Min Ae-ri (hereinafter "the prosecuting prosecutor"), premised the prosecution on the fact that the Company in this case, a corporate business owner, had registered for international marriage brokerage business, and instituted prosecution against the defendants, its representative, team leader, and employee, for violation of the Marriage Brokerage Act with respect to the acts stated in the charges, stating in the indictment, as the applicable statutory provisions against each defendant, Article 27 of the Marriage Brokerage Act (the joint penal provision), the penal provision at issue in this case, and Article 30 of the Criminal Act.
B) However, after the institution of prosecution, the prosecutor who participated in the trial (hereinafter "the trial prosecutor"), Heo Seong-jun, submitted, on November 17, 2023, a written opinion to the effect that since the penal provision at issue in this case limits the subject of the act to a "marriage broker," a violation of the penal provision at issue in this case constitutes a genuine status offense; that Defendant 1, who had registered the Company in this case for international marriage brokerage business at the time of the offense in this case, corresponds to a "marriage broker"; and that Defendant 2 and Defendant 3, who participated in Defendant 1's offense, could be punished pursuant to the main text of Article 33 of the Criminal Act.
C) In response, defense counsel for the defendants submitted, on February 19, 2024, a written opinion to the effect that: (1) although the prosecutor argued that Defendant 1 corresponds to a marriage broker, Defendant 1 is merely the representative of the Company in this case, the marriage broker, and is not himself a marriage broker; and (2) although the prosecutor argued that Defendant 2 and Defendant 3, who participated in the offense of Defendant 1, a status holder as a marriage broker, could be punished pursuant to Article 33 of the Criminal Act, Article 33 of the Criminal Act was not included among the applicable statutory provisions in the indictment, and therefore the defendants could not be punished for violation of the penal provision at issue in this case.
D) Thereupon, the trial prosecutor, Kim Bo-ra, filed an application for permission to amend the indictment against the defendants on February 26, 2024, adding Article 33 of the Criminal Act to the applicable statutory provisions against Defendant 2 and Defendant 3, while maintaining Article 27 of the Marriage Brokerage Act (the joint penal provision) as an applicable statutory provision against each defendant as it was, and also maintaining the existing facts charged against the defendants unchanged, except for a change to the date on which Defendant 3 transmitted the facial photographs, etc., of the Vietnamese women to Kim ○-seong. The first-instance court granted permission for the amendment of the indictment at the fourth trial date on June 11, 2024.
E) On July 4, 2024, the first-instance court found all the charges against the defendants guilty, stating as the applicable statutory provisions against Defendant 1 the penal provision at issue in this case and Article 30 of the Criminal Act, and as the applicable statutory provisions against Defendant 2 and Defendant 3 the penal provision at issue in this case and Articles 33 and 30 of the Criminal Act, respectively, while omitting reference to Article 27 of the Marriage Brokerage Act, which functions as the provision for punishing the actor under the joint penal provision, with respect to the defendants.
F) In response, the defendants submitted a statement of grounds of appeal stating, among other things, that since the defendants, not being marriage brokers, could not be the subjects of the penal provision at issue in this case, which constitutes a genuine status offense, the first-instance court's determination was unlawful in that it misapprehended the legal principles concerning genuine status offenses.
G) The court below, having concluded the pleadings at the first trial date, held that it was clear that the marriage broker in the facts charged in this case was not Defendant 1 but the Company in this case; that the prosecutor, through the amendment of the indictment and the written opinion, had clearly stated that Defendant 1 corresponded to the marriage broker in the facts charged in this case, and had not added Article 33 of the Criminal Act to the applicable statutory provisions against Defendant 1 on the ground that he was a status holder; and that to add Article 33 of the Criminal Act ex officio and find Defendant 1 guilty would substantially infringe upon Defendant 1's exercise of the right of defense and thus would not be permissible; and on these and other grounds, reversed the first-instance judgment, which had found the charges against Defendant 1 guilty, and rendered a not-guilty verdict.
H) On the other hand, the court below found the charges against Defendant 2 and Defendant 3 guilty, on the ground that, considering that not only the defendants but also the Company in this case would be punished pursuant to Article 27 of the Marriage Brokerage Act (the joint penal provision) if it neglected its duty of care and supervision, even though Article 12(1) of the Marriage Brokerage Act designates its subject as a "marriage broker," persons such as representatives, agents, and employees who substantially participated in the violation, even without such status, could also be punished pursuant to the main text of Article 33 and Article 30 of the Criminal Act.
3) Examining these facts and the progress of the litigation in light of the legal principles set out above:
The purport of the institution of prosecution and the amendment of the indictment against the defendants can be regarded as a case where the "facts charged" and the "applicable statutory provisions" are premised on different elements of the offense or different legal evaluations, thereby revealing disharmony or inconsistency to a degree that causes confusion, affects the determination of guilt or innocence, or impedes the defendants' exercise of the right of defense, and is thereby unclear. Therefore, the court below, in consideration of the specific progress of the litigation in this case, needed to exercise its right to seek clarification from the prosecutor pursuant to Article 141 of the Regulation on Criminal Procedure, in order to clarify the litigation relationship, and to make clear whether the facts charged against the defendants, who are not marriage brokers, were premised on "the direct application of the penal provision at issue in this case, which applies to marriage brokers," or whether they were premised on the position that "the defendants, although not marriage brokers, correspond to the actual actors who conspired to commit the violation of the penal provision at issue in this case, and are thereby subject to the penal provision at issue in this case pursuant to the joint penal provision under Article 27 of the Marriage Brokerage Act, which functions as a provision for punishing the actor." And if the prosecution was premised on the application of the joint penal provision, the court below should have examined and determined whether the defendants corresponded to the actual actors who conspired to commit the violation of the penal provision at issue in this case, and then determined the defendants' criminal liability accordingly. The specific reasons are as follows.
A) Considering comprehensively the facts charged and the applicable statutory provisions stated by the prosecuting prosecutor in the indictment, it can be understood that the prosecuting prosecutor, on the premise that the Company in this case, the corporate business owner that registered for international marriage brokerage business, corresponds to the "marriage broker," and that Defendant 1, as its representative, and Defendant 2 and Defendant 3, as its agents, employees, or workers, conspired to commit the violation of the penal provision at issue in this case, stated in the applicable statutory provisions against each defendant Article 27 of the Marriage Brokerage Act (the joint penal provision), which functions as a provision for punishing the actor, and Article 30 of the Criminal Act, which indicates that the actors are co-principals among themselves.
B) However, considering comprehensively the content of the written opinion and the application for permission to amend the indictment submitted by the trial prosecutor after the institution of prosecution, there is room for understanding that the trial prosecutor, on the premise that Defendant 1 corresponds to the "marriage broker" and that Defendant 2 and Defendant 3, as non-status holders, participated as co-principals in Defendant 1's violation of the penal provision at issue in this case, added Article 33 of the Criminal Act to the applicable statutory provisions only against Defendant 2 and Defendant 3 through the amendment of the indictment. However, this legal construction is inconsistent with the relevant legal principles examined in Section 2 above, according to which the defendants are not included in the meaning of "marriage broker" and can only become subject to the penal provision at issue in this case pursuant to the joint penal provision, which is a provision for punishing the actor; moreover, it also differs from the purport of the prosecuting prosecutor's original institution of prosecution.
C) Furthermore, despite the above amendment of the indictment, the trial prosecutor maintained Article 27 of the Marriage Brokerage Act (the joint penal provision) as an applicable statutory provision against the defendants as it was. However, "being directly punished for violation of the penal provision at issue in this case as a marriage broker, or being punished as a co-principal with the marriage broker" is different in its constituent elements, and also differs in its means of defense, and is premised on a different legal construction or evaluation, from "being punished for violation of the penal provision at issue in this case pursuant to the joint penal provision under Article 27 of the Marriage Brokerage Act as a representative, agent, employee, or other worker of the marriage broker who committed a violation in connection with the business of the marriage broker."
D) As such, insofar as it became apparent, through the amendment of the indictment during the course of the first-instance trial, that the facts charged and the applicable statutory provisions were premised on different elements of the offense or different legal evaluations, thereby revealing disharmony or inconsistency, the court below, having determined that the marriage broker was the Company in this case, needed to require the prosecutor to properly supplement the indictment by clarifying the problems or errors in the facts charged and the applicable statutory provisions that could affect the determination of guilt or innocence or impede the defendants' exercise of the right of defense, so as to make clear whether the purport of the institution of prosecution against the defendants, who are not marriage brokers, was "still to directly apply the penal provision at issue in this case, which applies to marriage brokers, or to apply the accomplice provisions in relation to the marriage broker," or "to be premised on the joint penal provision, which functions as a provision for punishing the actual actors, while applying the accomplice provisions among the defendants, who are the actors," and then to conduct its hearing and render its judgment accordingly.
E) Even assuming, contrary to the position of the prosecuting prosecutor, that there is an aspect of the written opinion submitted by the first-instance trial prosecutor that could be misunderstood as premised on the application of only the penal provision at issue in this case, and not the joint penal provision, against the defendants, the written opinion submitted by the trial prosecutor is merely a document stating the trial prosecutor's opinion on the facts charged, and is distinct from the application for permission to amend the indictment. And insofar as the trial prosecutor subsequently maintained the joint penal provision in the applicable statutory provisions in the application for permission to amend the indictment, the court below needed to exercise its right to seek clarification from the trial prosecutor as to the precise purport of the joint penal provision stated in the applicable statutory provisions in the application for permission to amend the indictment, whether the joint penal provision functions as a "provision for punishing the actor" as the conclusion of the legal evaluation of the facts charged, and whether the addition of Article 33 of the Criminal Act through the amendment of the indictment conflicts with the purport of the prosecuting prosecutor's original institution of prosecution.
F) In particular, the court below, while determining that the marriage broker was "the Company in this case," and while acknowledging that not only the defendants but also the Company in this case would be punished pursuant to Article 27 of the Marriage Brokerage Act (the joint penal provision) if it neglected its duty of care and supervision, and that the defendants, who could correspond to the "actor" defined in the joint penal provision, conspired to commit the violation of the penal provision at issue in this case, nevertheless, under the erroneous premise that the provisions of the General Provisions of the Criminal Act concerning accomplice relationships could apply to the relationship between the corporate business owner and the actor under the joint penal provision, found Defendant 1 not guilty on the ground, among others, that Article 33 of the Criminal Act was not stated in the applicable statutory provisions in the application for permission to amend the indictment, while finding Defendant 2 and Defendant 3, for whom Article 33 of the Criminal Act was stated in the applicable statutory provisions, guilty on the premise that they were in a co-principal relationship with the Company in this case. In other words, there is substantial room to view that the court below's exclusion of the application of the joint penal provision (Article 27 of the Marriage Brokerage Act), which had been explicitly stated in the applicable statutory provisions against the defendants from the original indictment, resulted from its misapprehension of the legal principles concerning the relationship between the corporate business owner and the actor under the joint penal provision, and its consequent erroneous determination that the accomplice provisions of the General Provisions of the Criminal Act (Articles 30 and 33 of the Criminal Act) could apply to them, leading it to consider only the penal provision at issue in this case as the applicable statute.
4) In the end, the court below, under the erroneous premise that the provisions of the General Provisions of the Criminal Act concerning accomplice relationships could apply to the relationship between the corporate business owner and the actor under the joint penal provision, concluded, without fulfilling its duty to seek necessary clarification and conduct a necessary hearing, that the prosecution against the defendants was instituted solely under the penal provision at issue in this case and not under the joint penal provision, which functions as a provision for punishing the actor; and, while acknowledging that the defendants, as actual actors, conspired to commit the violation of the penal provision at issue in this case, found Defendant 1, the representative of the Company in this case, not guilty, while finding Defendant 2 and Defendant 3, the team leader and employee of the Company in this case, guilty as accomplices with the corporate business owner. This determination by the court below contains an error affecting the judgment, in that it misapprehended the legal principles concerning co-principals and the joint penal provision, and consequently failed to fulfill its duty to conduct the necessary hearing. The argument in the prosecutor's grounds of appeal pointing this out is with merit.
4. Conclusion
Without examining the remaining grounds of appeal of Defendant 2 and Defendant 3, the judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court below for further hearing and determination. This decision is rendered by the unanimous opinion of the Justices participating in the decision, as stated in the Order.
Justice Cheon Dae-yeop (Presiding Justice), Seo Kyung-hwan, Shin Suk-hee (Justice in Charge), Ma Yong-ju