[Plaintiff, Appellee and Appellant] Plaintiff (Attorney Kim Dong-guk and 3 others of Law Firm Rotec, Counsel for the Plaintiff)
[Defendant, Appellant and Appellee] Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering Co., Ltd. (Attorney Kim Kyung-jong and 2 others, Counsel for the Defendant)
[Judgment Below] Seoul High Court Decision 2010Na10766 rendered on April 29, 2011
[Order]
The part of the judgment below against the Plaintiff concerning retirement allowance of 51,581,250 won, performance-sharing bonus of 77,463,000 won, and child tuition subsidy of 1,238,700 won, together with the delay damages thereon, is reversed, and that part of the case is remanded to the Seoul High Court. The remainder of the Plaintiff's appeal and the Defendant's appeal are all dismissed.
[Reasoning]
The grounds of appeal are examined as follows.
1. Judgment on the Defendant's grounds of appeal
A. Judgment on the point of misapprehension of the legal principles regarding Article 27 of the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법), etc.
Article 27 of the Labor Standards Act provides that an employer's dismissal of a worker shall be effective only if the reasons for dismissal and the timing of dismissal are notified in writing. This is intended to require the employer to exercise care in dismissing a worker through the written notification of the reasons for dismissal, etc., and at the same time to clarify the existence, timing, and reasons for the dismissal so that any subsequent disputes thereover may be resolved properly and easily, and also to enable the worker to respond appropriately to the dismissal. Accordingly, when an employer notifies the reasons for dismissal, etc. in writing, the worker must be able to know specifically, from the worker's standpoint, what the reasons for the dismissal are; in particular, in the case of disciplinary dismissal, the specific facts or misconduct that constitute the substantive grounds for the dismissal must be stated, and merely listing the provisions of the collective agreement or the rules of employment that the person subject to discipline violated cannot be deemed sufficient.
According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below, based on the evidence indicated therein, found the facts concerning the contents of the notice sent by the Defendant requesting the Plaintiff's attendance before the Personnel Subcommittee for disciplinary action against the Plaintiff, the notice communicating the results of the deliberation of the Personnel Subcommittee conducted without the Plaintiff's participation, and the notice of dismissal dated November 5, 2008, and then determined that, since none of these documents contained any specific content as to what conduct of the Plaintiff constituted a violation of the company rules and thus formed the grounds for discipline and dismissal, the Defendant's dismissal of the Plaintiff in this case was procedurally unlawful in violation of Article 27 of the Labor Standards Act.
In light of the legal principles set forth above and the record, the fact-finding and determination of the court below are justified, and there is no error of misapprehending the legal principles regarding Article 27 of the Labor Standards Act as alleged in the grounds of appeal. Therefore, this ground of appeal is not accepted.
B. Judgment on the points of insufficient deliberation and violation of the rules of evidence, and misapprehension of legal principles, regarding the existence of grounds for disciplinary action against the Plaintiff and the propriety of the disciplinary measure
According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below determined that, among the grounds for the disciplinary dismissal in this case, there was insufficient evidence to establish that the Plaintiff had defamed the Defendant and its management and unilaterally drafted the audit results, and had leaked the Defendant's business secrets and audit contents to third parties. As for the remaining grounds for discipline, namely unauthorized use of the corporate card and unauthorized absence, the court below, based on the evidence indicated therein, found facts concerning the details and extent of the Plaintiff's use of the corporate card, the Defendant company's rules and practices regarding executives' use of corporate cards, the comprehensive nature of the duties handled by the Plaintiff as the Head of the Audit Office, and the circumstances of the Plaintiff's standby assignment and the unspecified nature of the standby location, and thereupon determined that there was insufficient evidence to establish the relevant grounds for discipline, and that even if such grounds for discipline were established, in light of the Plaintiff's duties and the circumstances leading to the dismissal in this case, it was difficult to find that the Plaintiff bore responsibility of such a degree, based solely on the grounds for discipline found above, that the employment relationship could not be continued according to social norms.
Upon examination of the record, the above fact-finding and determination of the court below are all justified and may be accepted. The argument in this part of the grounds of appeal concerning insufficient deliberation or violation of the rules of evidence ultimately amounts to nothing more than criticism of the fact-finding, which falls within the exclusive authority of the court below, and thus cannot constitute a legitimate ground of appeal. Nor can it be said that the determination of the court below contains an error of misapprehending the legal principles regarding the meaning of unauthorized use of a corporate card as a ground for discipline, the existence and scope of the duty to report to work during standby assignment, or the appropriateness of the disciplinary measure, such as to have affected the judgment. Therefore, this ground of appeal is also not accepted.
2. Judgment on the Plaintiff's grounds of appeal
A. Judgment on the points of misapprehension of legal principles regarding the legality of the abolition of the Audit Office and the standby assignment, and the point of omission of judgment regarding whether the Plaintiff was subject to discipline
The Plaintiff argues, as this part of the grounds of appeal, that the abolition of the Audit Office, which was the premise for the standby assignment of the Plaintiff, concerned the organization and operation of the Audit Committee and thus constituted an amendment to the Defendant company's "Audit Committee Operation Rules," and therefore required a resolution of the Audit Committee and a resolution of the Board of Directors, but since these procedures were not followed, the abolition was unlawful; that accordingly, the standby assignment in this case, premised on the abolition of the Audit Office, cannot be found to have had a justifiable ground; and that, since there is no legal basis for imposing a standby assignment or disciplinary measure on an executive officer, the standby assignment and disciplinary dismissal of the Plaintiff, who was an executive officer holding the position of Managing Director, were unlawful, and that the court below erred in law by determining these measures to be lawful or by omitting judgment thereon.
However, insofar as the court below determined, as noted above, that the misconduct which the Defendant relied upon as the grounds for the Plaintiff's disciplinary dismissal was either not established, or, even if established, was insufficient to constitute grounds for dismissal, and accordingly determined that the disciplinary dismissal of the Plaintiff in this case was invalid, this ground of appeal can have no effect whatsoever on the conclusion regarding the legitimacy of the dismissal in this case. Furthermore, with respect to the amount of consolation money, as will be seen below, the amount of consolation money determined by the court below can be accepted as justified, and thus likewise it cannot be said that there is an error affecting the conclusion. Ultimately, this ground of appeal is not accepted in its entirety.
B. Judgment on the point of misapprehension of legal principles regarding the method of calculating the retirement allowance
Where an employer establishes a retirement allowance system pursuant to Article 8 of the Act on the Guarantee of Workers' Retirement Benefits (근로자퇴직급여 보장법), the employer must pay the retiring worker a retirement allowance of not less than 30 days' average wages for each year of continuous service. Here, the "continuous service period" in principle refers to the worker's period of employment, and therefore excluding part of the period of employment from the years of service that form the basis for calculating the retirement allowance is not permissible unless such exclusion is provided for in a collective agreement or the rules of employment, and the amount of retirement allowance so calculated is not less than the amount of retirement allowance calculated in accordance with the Act on the Guarantee of Workers' Retirement Benefits, or other special circumstances exist (see Supreme Court Decision 2005Da28358 delivered on November 29, 2007).
According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below, in calculating the retirement allowance to be paid to the Plaintiff, excluded from the years of service forming the basis for calculating the retirement allowance the period during which the Plaintiff served as the so-called advisor of the Defendant company, i.e., from May 10, 2006 to March 31, 2007. This determination of the court below is difficult to accept.
That is, even according to the facts found by the court below, the Plaintiff was appointed as advisor and joined the Defendant company on May 10, 2006, was promoted on April 1, 2007 to Managing Director, a Daewoo executive position (non-registered executive), and had continuously served as the Head of the Audit Office since joining the Defendant company. According to the description of Exhibit A No. 6, while Item 7 of the Defendant company's Executive Management Regulations provides that "where a quasi-executive (chief section manager) is appointed to an executive position, he/she shall be deemed to have retired and shall be paid a retirement allowance," there is no evidence that the Plaintiff, while serving as advisor, fell within the category of quasi-executive (chief section manager) referred to in the said provision. Moreover, according to the record, when the Defendant appointed the Plaintiff as Managing Director on April 1, 2007, it did not have the Plaintiff go through any retirement procedure; rather, it can be seen that, at the time of the dismissal in this case, the retirement allowance was calculated using the Plaintiff's entire period of employment as the years of service. Accordingly, there is no basis for finding that the period during which the Plaintiff served as advisor is to be excluded from the years of service forming the basis for calculating the retirement allowance, and it is also difficult to find that the continuous service period was interrupted around the time of the Plaintiff's promotion to Managing Director on April 1, 2007.
Therefore, the court below should have included the period from May 10, 2006 to March 31, 2007, during which the Plaintiff served as advisor of the Defendant company, in the years of service forming the basis for calculating the retirement allowance, and although the payment rate applicable to Managing Director need not have been applied, it should have added at least the retirement allowance corresponding to the statutory retirement allowance payment rate. Nevertheless, the court below misapprehended the legal principles concerning the continuous service period forming the basis for calculating the retirement allowance and excluded this period from the years of service, and this error in the judgment below clearly affected the judgment. Therefore, this ground of appeal by the Plaintiff has merit. However, the argument in the grounds of appeal premised on the assertion that the Plaintiff held the position of Managing Director from the time of joining the company on May 10, 2006, amounts merely to a challenge to the fact-finding, which falls within the exclusive authority of the court below, and thus cannot constitute a legitimate ground of appeal.
C. Judgment on the point of misapprehension of legal principles regarding whether the performance-sharing bonus, self-driving allowance, and child tuition subsidy constitute wages
(1) Where a dismissal disposition is invalid, since the employment relationship has continued to be valid during that period, and the worker was unable to provide labor due to a cause attributable to the employer, the worker may claim payment of the entirety of the wages that the worker would have received had he/she continued to work, and such wages refer to any and all money and valuables paid by the employer to the worker as consideration for labor (see Supreme Court Decision 92Da39860 delivered on December 8, 1992; Supreme Court Decision 93Da11463 delivered on December 21, 1993, etc.).
(2) First, as to the performance-sharing bonus:
The court below rejected this part of the Plaintiff's claim, on the ground that the performance-sharing bonus, which the Plaintiff sought as retroactive wages on the basis that the disciplinary dismissal in this case was invalid, was difficult to view as being paid as consideration for labor, and that, even if it could be viewed as being paid as consideration for labor, the Plaintiff could not satisfy the requirement of being employed on the date of actual payment, since the Plaintiff was not employed by the Defendant company on the actual payment date of the 2008 performance-sharing bonus.
However, this determination of the court below is difficult to accept.
That is, if a bonus is paid on an occasional basis where the occurrence of the grounds for payment is uncertain, it is difficult to regard it as wages; however, if it is paid continuously and periodically and the amount thereof is fixed, it must be regarded as having the nature of wages paid as consideration for labor (see Supreme Court Decision 2003Da54322, 54339 delivered on May 26, 2006). According to the record, the performance-sharing bonus paid by the Defendant to its workers is not only explicitly based on the Salary Regulations, which set forth in advance the grounds and standards for payment, but has also been paid periodically and continuously in accordance therewith since 2001.
Furthermore, while the court below determined that the Plaintiff could not satisfy the requirement of being employed on the actual payment date, since the Plaintiff was not employed by the Defendant company on the actual payment date of the 2008 performance-sharing bonus, there is no evidence to establish that the Defendant company limited the recipients of the performance-sharing bonus to those employed on the payment date; rather, according to the record, it can only be ascertained that the Defendant company determined the recipients of the performance-sharing bonus based on those employed as of December 31 of each year.
Therefore, the court below should have specifically examined the Defendant company's regulations and practices concerning the payment of the performance-sharing bonus, and determined whether, had the disciplinary dismissal in this case not occurred, the Plaintiff would have been included among the recipients of the 2008 performance-sharing bonus, and if so, what amount would have been paid to the Plaintiff, and thereupon determined the merits of this part of the Plaintiff's claim accordingly. Nevertheless, the court below, by misapprehending the legal principles concerning whether the performance-sharing bonus constitutes wages and the determination of the scope of its recipients, or by mistakenly finding facts not supported by the evidence and thereby erring as to the scope of recipients, dismissed the Plaintiff's claim without proceeding to the above deliberation, thereby committing an error that affected the judgment. This ground of appeal has merit.
(3) Next, as to the self-driving allowance:
Where a dismissal disposition is invalid, wages recoverable retroactively must exclude allowances of the nature of reimbursement for actual expenses. The self-driving allowance sought by the Plaintiff in this part of the claim, even according to the Plaintiff's own assertion in the grounds of appeal, is described as follows: "executives without a dedicated driver directly drive a vehicle provided by the company for commuting and business purposes, and accordingly the Defendant company uniformly pays a self-driving allowance to executives." It is therefore proper to regard such payment as intended to reimburse expenses incurred in connection with the operation of a vehicle provided by the company. Accordingly, even though the dismissal of the Plaintiff in this case is invalid, since the Plaintiff did not operate a vehicle, which is the requirement for payment of the self-driving allowance, during the period of dismissal, the Plaintiff cannot claim this allowance retroactively.
Ultimately, the determination of the court below dismissing this part of the Plaintiff's claim is justified, and it cannot be said that there is an error therein affecting the judgment as alleged in the grounds of appeal. Therefore, this ground of appeal is not accepted.
(4) Finally, as to the child tuition subsidy:
The court below rejected the Plaintiff's claim for the child tuition subsidy on the ground that there was no evidence to establish it. However, according to the description of Exhibit A No. 6, Item 8 of the Defendant company's Executive Management Regulations contains a provision that may be viewed as the basis for the payment of tuition, and moreover the Defendant does not appear to explicitly dispute the fact that tuition subsidies are uniformly provided to the children of executives and employees. Therefore, the court below should have examined whether, had the disciplinary dismissal in this case not occurred, the Plaintiff would also have received the child tuition subsidy in the same manner as other executives and employees, and if it were determined that this was the case, the court below had a duty to urge the Plaintiff to submit evidence or materials concerning tuition payments that the Plaintiff had clearly overlooked through inadvertence. Nevertheless, the court below, without proceeding to such examination, simply rejected this part of the Plaintiff's claim on the ground that there was no evidence to establish the alleged facts, thereby failing to exercise its authority to seek clarification and thus failing to conduct the necessary deliberation, which constitutes an error.
D. Judgment on the legality of the calculation of consolation money
Regarding the amount of consolation money for mental suffering caused by a tort, the court of fact-finding may determine such amount at its discretion, within its exclusive authority, upon consideration of various circumstances (see Supreme Court Decision 98Da41377 delivered on April 23, 1999).
The court below, in determining that the disciplinary dismissal of the Plaintiff in this case was invalid, considered various circumstances concerning the background thereof and recognized the Defendant's obligation to pay consolation money, and thereupon determined the amount thereof to be 10,000,000 won. Upon examination of the record, this determination of the court below can be accepted as justified, and it cannot be said that there is an error in the exercise of discretion to such an extent that the determination of the amount is markedly unreasonable. Therefore, this ground of appeal is not accepted.
3. Conclusion
Therefore, the parts of the judgment below against the Plaintiff concerning the retirement allowance, the performance-sharing bonus, and the child tuition subsidy cannot escape reversal. However, since the Plaintiff filed the appeal only with respect to part of the portion in which the Plaintiff lost regarding the retirement allowance and the performance-sharing bonus, the scope of reversal in this regard is limited to the purport of the appeal. Accordingly, the part of the judgment below against the Plaintiff concerning retirement allowance of 51,581,250 won, performance-sharing bonus of 77,463,000 won, and child tuition subsidy of 1,238,700 won, together with the delay damages thereon, is reversed, and that part of the case is remanded to the court below for further deliberation and determination. The remainder of the Plaintiff's appeal and the Defendant's appeal are dismissed. This judgment is rendered in accordance with the unanimous opinion of the Justices participating in this decision, as set forth in the Order.
Justices Ahn Dae-hee (Presiding Justice), Kim Neung-hwan, Min Il-young, Lee In-bok (Justice in charge)