[Plaintiff, Appellee]
[Defendant, Appellant] Government Employees Pension Service
[Lower Court Judgment] Seoul High Court Judgment 2010Nu17108, decided November 25, 2010
[Order]
The part of the lower court judgment against which the Defendant lost is reversed, and this part of the case is remanded to the Seoul High Court.
[Reasoning]
The grounds of appeal are examined.
1.
The statute of limitations runs from the time a right objectively arises and can be exercised, and does not run while the right cannot be exercised. Here, the inability to exercise a right refers to cases where there is a legal impediment to exercising the right, such as the non-arrival of a period or non-fulfillment of a condition. Even if a person was factually unaware of the existence of the right or the possibility of exercising it, and even if such unawareness was not due to negligence, this does not constitute a legal impediment (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 84Nu572, decided December 26, 1984; Supreme Court en banc Decision 91Da32053, decided March 31, 1992). Accordingly, the right to claim retirement benefits under the Public Officials Pension Act (공무원연금법), which arises at the time a public official is automatically dismissed upon receiving a criminal sentence, must be deemed to run from the time of the automatic dismissal (see Supreme Court Decision 98Du16118, decided December 23, 1998).
Meanwhile, the exercise of a defense based on the statute of limitations by an obligor is also governed by the principle of good faith and the prohibition of abuse of rights, which are fundamental principles of our Civil Act. Thus, where there are special circumstances such as: the obligor having made it impossible or significantly difficult for the obligee to exercise the right or interrupt the running of the statute of limitations before its completion; the obligor having engaged in conduct that led the obligee to believe that such measures were unnecessary; the existence of an objective impediment preventing the obligee from exercising the right; the obligor, after the completion of the limitation period, having displayed an attitude suggesting that it would not invoke the statute of limitations, thereby causing the right holder to reasonably rely on such belief; or circumstances where the need to protect the obligee is great and other obligees under the same conditions have received payment of their obligations, such that recognizing a refusal to perform the obligation would be manifestly unjust or inequitable — in such cases, the obligor's assertion of the completion of the statute of limitations may be held impermissible as an abuse of rights, contrary to the principle of good faith. However, since applying such general principles to exclude the operation of specific systems established by law risks undermining legal stability, which is another fundamental principle in legal interpretation, caution must be exercised in its application (see Supreme Court Decision 2004Da71881, decided May 13, 2005; Supreme Court Decision 2009Da86147, decided March 11, 2010, among others).
2. According to the reasoning of the lower court judgment, the lower court, based on the evidence it adopted, found the facts as stated in its judgment, and then determined as follows: that the right to claim retirement benefits of an automatically dismissed public official does not run for the statute of limitations at least during the period the person was factually working as a public official, and it is reasonable to view that the statute of limitations begins to run only from the time an order of retirement is issued to the automatically dismissed public official; and that even assuming the statute of limitations for the right to claim retirement benefits began running from November 5, 1999, when the grounds for the Plaintiff's automatic dismissal arose, such that the five-year limitation period prescribed in Article 81(1) of the Public Officials Pension Act had elapsed, in light of the following circumstances: (1) the head of the Dongjak-gu Office, the Plaintiff's supervising agency head, issued the Plaintiff an unrecorded warning (불문경고) on December 21, 1999, regarding the criminal judgment that constituted the ground for automatic dismissal, and thereafter the Plaintiff was reinstated of civil rights with respect to the criminal judgment and was granted amnesty for the unrecorded warning, and, in recognition of his faithful service, went on a six-month meritorious service leave; (2) the Plaintiff was notified by the Defendant of an estimated amount of retirement pay, or was able to check the estimated retirement pay on the Defendant's website; and (3) the Special Act on Payment of Retirement Compensation, etc. to Public Officials Disqualified from Appointment, etc. (임용결격공무원 등에 대한 퇴직보상금지급 등에 관한 특례법, hereinafter the "Special Act") was enacted, providing that retirement compensation shall be paid to persons who, despite grounds for automatic dismissal arising from disqualification for appointment while serving as public officials, continued to work de facto as public officials and satisfy certain requirements; however, in the Plaintiff's case, because his period of de facto service ended after the period of application of the Special Act, he failed to satisfy the requirements for payment of retirement compensation under the Special Act, and there is room to view that he was placed at a significantly unfavorable or inequitable position compared to other automatically dismissed public officials who are subject to the Special Act. In light of these circumstances, the lower court found that the need to protect the Plaintiff as obligee was great, and that there existed special circumstances such that other obligees under the same conditions had received payment of their obligations, such that recognizing the refusal of performance of the obligation would be manifestly unjust or inequitable; therefore, the Defendant's assertion of the completion of the statute of limitations against the Plaintiff was held to be impermissible as an abuse of rights contrary to the principle of good faith. Accordingly, the lower court determined that either the statute of limitations for the right to claim retirement benefits for the Plaintiff's period of service from July 5, 1976, when he was first appointed, until November 5, 1999, does not begin to run until after the Plaintiff's actual retirement, or, alternatively, that the Defendant's assertion of the completion of the statute of limitations constitutes an abuse of rights and is thus impermissible; and that, consequently, the part of the Defendant's disposition in this case denying payment of retirement benefits for the period of service from July 5, 1976, to November 5, 1999, is unlawful.
3. However, the lower court's determination as above is difficult to accept for the following reasons.
A. First, in light of the legal principles set forth above, the Plaintiff's right to claim retirement benefits under the Public Officials Pension Act must be deemed to run from November 5, 1999, the date of the Plaintiff's automatic dismissal.
B. Next, the circumstances cited by the lower court as grounds for determining that the Defendant's assertion of the statute of limitations constitutes an abuse of rights are problematic for the following reasons: (1) the Plaintiff was automatically dismissed upon the finalization of the aforementioned criminal judgment, and the subsequent unrecorded warning disposition is void ab initio; the mere fact that the Plaintiff continued to work after receiving only the unrecorded warning disposition from his supervising agency head cannot be deemed to constitute an implied reappointment or a cure of the defect constituting the ground for automatic dismissal; and it cannot be deemed unjust or unlawful for the Defendant to have refused to pay retirement benefits to the Plaintiff, who, for the aforementioned reasons, did not hold lawful status as a public official; (2) the Defendant's notification to the Plaintiff of an estimated amount of retirement pay, or the provision enabling the Plaintiff to check the estimated retirement pay on the Defendant's website, merely presupposed that the Plaintiff held lawful status as a public official, and this did not definitively give rise to the Plaintiff's right to claim retirement benefits or fix the amount thereof; and (3) the differing outcomes between the Plaintiff and other automatically dismissed public officials subject to the Special Act arose because the Special Act was enacted in the form of a temporary statute (한시법), and while the Plaintiff was also subject to the Special Act, he merely failed to obtain relief because he himself did not properly recognize that he fell within the scope of grounds for automatic dismissal, which he could have easily ascertained through the statutory provisions; it is difficult to view the retirement compensation received by other automatically dismissed public officials under the Special Act as constituting receipt of payment in satisfaction of the right to claim retirement benefits; and the Plaintiff himself may claim, as unjust enrichment, the amount equivalent to retirement pay under the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법) for his work performed after the automatic dismissal. In light of these matters, it is difficult to find that there exist special circumstances such that recognizing the Defendant's refusal to perform the obligation would be manifestly unjust or inequitable.
Nevertheless, the lower court determined, based solely on the above reasoning, that the statute of limitations for the Plaintiff's right to claim retirement benefits for the period from July 5, 1976, to November 5, 1999, had not been completed, or that the Defendant's assertion of the statute of limitations constitutes an abuse of rights. This determination by the lower court erroneously construed the legal principles concerning the statute of limitations and abuse of rights, thereby affecting the outcome of the judgment.
4. Therefore, the part of the lower court judgment against which the Defendant lost is reversed, and this part of the case is remanded to the lower court for further hearing and determination. This judgment is rendered by the unanimous opinion of the Justices participating in the decision, as set forth in the Order.
Justice Lee Hong-hoon (Presiding Justice), Kim Neung-hwan, Min Il-young (Justice in charge), Lee In-bok