[Plaintiff (Selected Party), Appellee] Plaintiff (Selected Party) (Attorneys Jung Jae-wook and 1 other, Counsel for the plaintiff (selected party))
[Defendant, Appellant] Korea Agricultural and Rural Infrastructure Corporation (Attorney Kang Hyun-joong, Counsel for the defendant)
[Judgment Below] Suwon District Court Judgment 2001Na9240 decided November 1, 2001
[Order]
The appeal is dismissed. The costs of the appeal are to be borne by the Defendant.
[Reasoning]
1. Upon examination of the record, the fact that the Plaintiff (Selected Party) and Selected Parties 2 and 3 (hereinafter referred to as “the Plaintiff, etc.”) are not workers to whom the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법) applies is a new factual assertion first raised by the Defendant at the appellate (Supreme Court) stage, and it is clear that no such assertion was made in the court below. Therefore, this point cannot constitute a lawful ground for appeal.
2. According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below found as follows: the predecessor of the Defendant, ○○ Farmland Improvement Association, had, in addition to general-service and technical-service employees (hereinafter “employees”), temporary workers hired pursuant to the Farmland Improvement Association Budget Formulation Guidelines (농지개량조합예산편성지침; hereinafter “the Guidelines”). While the Association paid retirement allowances to employees upon retirement in accordance with the payment standards set forth in the Farmland Improvement Association Remuneration Regulations Standard Rules (농지개량조합보수규정준칙; hereinafter “the Standard Rules”), it did not apply the Standard Rules to temporary workers such as the Plaintiff, etc., but instead paid them, as retirement allowance, only one month’s worth of remuneration at the end of each year pursuant to the Guidelines. The court below thus found that the Association maintained two different retirement allowance systems: one applicable to the numerically larger group of employees, and another applicable to the numerically smaller group of temporary workers. Based on this finding, the court below determined that, in light of the purpose of the provision prohibiting differential retirement allowance systems under Article 34(2) of the Labor Standards Act, retirement allowances should also be paid to the Plaintiff, etc. in accordance with the payment standards set forth in the Standard Rules.
Upon examination of the record and the relevant statutes, the above factual findings and determination of the court below are deemed justified and acceptable, and there is no error of misapprehension of the legal principles concerning retirement allowance payment regulations as alleged in the grounds of appeal. The precedent cited in the grounds of appeal (Supreme Court Decision 71Da10789 decided September 25, 1973) predates April 1, 1981, the date on which the provision prohibiting differential retirement allowance systems under Article 28(2) of the former Labor Standards Act (before its full revision by Act No. 5309 of March 13, 1997) took effect, and is therefore inapplicable to this case.
Furthermore, the argument in the grounds of appeal — that since the Standard Rules constitute mandatory rules with external binding force, and since the Standard Rules limit their scope of application to employees, the Association could not, in violation of the Standard Rules, pay retirement allowances to the Plaintiff, etc. in accordance with the standards set forth therein, and that therefore the Association's payment of retirement allowances to the Plaintiff, etc. at the rate prescribed under the Labor Standards Act did not violate the principle prohibiting differential retirement allowance systems under the Labor Standards Act — is, as noted above, an unpersuasive argument; moreover, it is a new argument that was not raised prior to the close of oral argument in the court below, and therefore cannot constitute a lawful ground for appeal either.
3. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of the appeal are to be borne by the losing party. This judgment is rendered as set forth in the Order, by the unanimous opinion of the participating Justices.
Justice Song Jin-hoon (Presiding Justice), Byun Jae-seung, Yoon Jae-sik (Justice in charge), Lee Gyu-hong