[Plaintiffs, Appellees] Plaintiff 1 and 4 others, Plaintiffs' Attorney: Kyungil General Law Office, Attorney in charge Seo Seok-gu
[Defendant, Appellant] Gyerim Ceramics Co., Ltd., Defendant's Attorney: Attorney Yoon Jeong-bo
[Judgment Below] Daegu District Court Decision 94Na5807 rendered September 30, 1994
[Order]
The judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Panel Division of the Daegu District Court.
[Reasoning]
The grounds of appeal are examined.
1. Based on the evidence cited, the court below found the following facts: after the labor union was formed on December 1, 1987, disputes arose between labor and management, making normal operations impossible; accordingly, the Defendant company closed its business on December 30 of that year, and at that time, persuaded the employees, including the Plaintiffs who resisted the demand to submit resignation letters, by telling them to first submit resignation letters, promising that they would be reinstated once the dispute was resolved after resting for a few months, and thereafter processed the employees as dismissed. Subsequently, on February 29, 1988, the Defendant decided to resume production activities, and on March 16 of that year, resumed factory operations by going through the formality of newly hiring all workers, including the Plaintiffs, who wished to continue working. The workers who rejoined the Defendant company experienced no change in position, rank, seniority, or job duties before and after the closure, and in terms of wages as well, they continued to receive wages calculated on the premise of continuous employment. Based on these findings, the court below determined that the reason the Plaintiffs were unable to work for the Defendant company during the period of about two months from the date of closure to the date of resumption of production activities was solely because they followed the Defendant company's instruction to rest briefly until the labor-management dispute was resolved, even though the extreme measure of closure had been taken; and in light of the fact that the Plaintiffs held the same positions and performed the same duties before and after the closure, and had received wages calculated on the premise of continuous employment from before the closure, the court below determined that the Plaintiffs' employment relationship continued without interruption before and after the closure, and therefore retirement allowances should also be calculated from the date of initial employment.
2. The above factual findings and determination by the court below ultimately amount to a conclusion that the Defendant company had no genuine intention to close its business, but rather closed the business while temporarily processing employees as dismissed in order to weaken the labor union's activities, meaning that the Defendant company's closure was a sham closure.
However, the determination of the court below is difficult to accept for the following reasons.
In civil trials, although a court is not bound by facts recognized in judgments of other civil cases, facts recognized in a related civil case that has already become final and conclusive constitute compelling evidence absent special circumstances, and thus cannot be rejected without a reasonable statement of grounds (see Supreme Court Decision 92Da51372 rendered March 12, 1993; Supreme Court Decision 94Da33002 rendered January 12, 1995; Supreme Court Decision 94Da47292 rendered June 29, 1995, etc.).
Upon examination, according to the entries in Evidence Eul No. 1, 2, and 3, it can be seen that a certain individual (referred to below as "the non-party"), who was an employee of the Defendant company, filed a lawsuit against the Defendant company seeking confirmation of the invalidity of dismissal, arguing that the Defendant company's closure was a sham closure carried out as a retaliatory measure to dismantle the labor union and against the workers who participated in labor union activities, and that the dismissal of the said non-party based thereon was invalid; however, the evidence supporting that argument was rejected, and rather, based on other evidence, it was found that the Defendant company's closure was carried out through lawful procedures, including a resolution to close adopted at a general meeting of employees, under circumstances where normal operations had been impossible for an extended period, causing enormous damage to the company's management, and therefore the Defendant company's closure could not be deemed invalid as a sham closure; the non-party lost in both the first and second instance courts on these grounds, and although the non-party appealed to the Supreme Court, the appeal was dismissed and the judgment against the non-party became final. Furthermore, according to the record, among the evidence adopted by the court below to find the facts noted above, Evidence Gap No. 9-1, 9-2, 9-10, 9-14, and 9-18 are witness examination records containing testimony of witnesses that the court did not believe in the previous, now-final civil case; Evidence Gap No. 9-11, 9-12, 9-13, 9-15, and 9-16 are likewise written statements or certifications thereof that the court did not believe in the previous civil case; and Evidence Gap No. 9-9 and 9-17 are merely briefs stating the arguments of the said non-party, who was a party to the previous civil case. Moreover, even based on the other evidence adopted by the court below, no special circumstances can be found that would warrant recognizing facts different from those recognized in the previous civil case.
Nevertheless, the court below's act of making factual findings to an effect contrary to the facts recognized in the previous, final civil case constitutes a misapprehension of facts in violation of the rules of evidence, and this error affected the outcome of the judgment. The ground of appeal pointing this out has merit.
3. Where an employer closes the business enterprise it operates and, as a result thereof, dismisses the employees belonging thereto, such action is, in principle, valid as falling within the freedom of business management, unless it constitutes a sham closure aimed at obstructing the labor union's right to organize, etc., and thus the employment relationship between the employer and the employees is thereby terminated (see Supreme Court Decision 93Da7457 rendered June 11, 1993). Even if the employer subsequently resumes business and re-hires the employees, absent special circumstances indicating that the period of employment prior to the dismissal was to be included in the calculation of retirement allowance, the employment relationship is newly established from the date of re-employment, and therefore the retirement allowance following re-employment must be calculated from the date of re-employment.
As the employer, the Defendant company was free to determine the position, wage level, etc. of the employees after the resumption of business by taking into account all circumstances, including the employees' career, position, wages, and the period of closure prior to the closure, when resuming business and newly hiring employees. Therefore, even if, in this case where the period of closure was only slightly more than two months, the Plaintiffs held the same positions and performed the same duties before and after the closure and received wages calculated on the premise of continuous employment from before the closure, this fact alone cannot be deemed to constitute an expression of intent by the Defendant company that, in calculating retirement allowances for the re-employed workers, including the Plaintiffs, the period of employment prior to the dismissal would also be included.
Nevertheless, the judgment below, which determined that the employment relationship continued before and after the closure, misapprehended the legal principles concerning continuous employment under Article 28 of the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법), and this error affected the outcome of the judgment. The ground of appeal pointing this out also has merit.
4. Accordingly, the judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court below, with the unanimous concurrence of all participating Justices, as set forth in the Order.
Justice Lee Im-su (Presiding Justice), Kim Seok-su, Jeong Gwi-ho (Justice in charge), Lee Don-hee