Workbear재주넘는곰
대법원 94다29942

Severance Pay (퇴직금) Dispute퇴직금

Decided1994. 11. 11. Court대법원Worker won (with differentiated interest rates applied for delayed payment based on the two time periods)
AI-generated English translation (summary, key points, decision summary and full text) for reference only — not an official translation and without legal effect. The Korean original below is authoritative.
AI Easy read — AI summary of this decision
AI-generated summary for reference only — the Korean original below is authoritative.

This Supreme Court (대법원) case concerned a lawsuit over unpaid severance pay (퇴직금), in which the employer contested its obligation to pay. The court found that the employer's objection (항쟁) had substantial grounds, since a prior appellate court—before the case was remanded—had actually accepted the employer's argument. As a result, while the worker ultimately won the case, different interest rates for delayed payment (지연손해금) were applied depending on the time period involved.

Key takeaways
  • CaseIncident: A worker who had not received severance pay (퇴직금) filed a lawsuit against the company to claim payment.
  • OutcomeResult: The court divided the period into two parts—one during which the company's objection had substantial grounds, and one after—applying delayed payment interest rates of 5% per annum and 25% per annum, respectively.
  • LessonLesson: In severance pay (퇴직금) disputes, a lower interest rate may apply for the period during which the employer's objection has reasonable grounds, so resolving the dispute early can be advantageous for both parties.
Issues
  • Validity of an amendment to the company's remuneration regulations concerning payment of severance pay (퇴직금)
  • Standard for recognizing an employer's 'substantial grounds for objection' (항쟁의 상당성) under the Act on Special Cases Concerning Expedition of Legal Proceedings (소송촉진등에관한특례법)
  • How to divide the time periods for applying different interest rates on delayed payment (지연손해금)
Key reasoning

The Supreme Court held that if an employer's argument had once been accepted by a lower appellate court prior to remand, this itself demonstrates that the employer's objection to the payment obligation had 'substantial grounds' (항쟁의 상당성), even if that argument later conflicted with Supreme Court precedent. Because such substantial grounds existed for contesting the obligation, the general civil interest rate of 5% per annum under the Civil Act (민법) should apply during that period, rather than the higher 25% per annum rate under the Act on Special Cases Concerning Expedition of Legal Proceedings (소송촉진등에관한특례법). Once the substantial grounds no longer existed, the higher 25% special statutory rate should apply going forward. This reasoning establishes a clear standard for distinguishing periods of legitimate legal dispute from periods of unjustified delay in payment.

Summary of Decision (English, AI translation)

[1] The phrase “when it is deemed reasonable for the obligor to contest the existence or scope of the obligation to perform” under Article 3, Paragraph 2 of the Act on Special Cases concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings (소송촉진등에관한특례법) is to be construed as meaning a case where the obligor's assertion contesting the existence or scope of the obligation to perform is found to have a reasonable basis. Accordingly, whether it is reasonable for the obligor to contest as above is a matter concerning the court's fact-finding and evaluation with respect to the case at issue. Meanwhile, “the relevant scope” under the latter part of the same provision means “the scope of the period reasonable for the obligor to contest,” and since the period during which the obligor may contest in the fact-finding court (the first instance or the appellate court) of the case at issue should be deemed to extend up to the time of pronouncement of the fact-finding court's judgment, application of Article 3, Paragraph 1 of the same Act cannot be excluded for any reason after such pronouncement; however, so long as it falls between the day following service of the complaint or a document equivalent thereto on the obligor and before the pronouncement of the judgment of that instance, the court may appropriately determine the scope of the period reasonable for such contestation.

[2] In a case where the court of first instance accepted the plaintiffs' assertions and granted their claims, whereas the court below prior to remand accepted the defendant's assertion and rejected the plaintiffs' claims, and upon the plaintiffs' appeal, the judgment of the court below prior to remand was reversed, resulting in a judgment on remand granting the plaintiffs' claims being rendered by the court below after remand: in such a case, given that the defendant's assertion had been accepted by the court below prior to remand to that extent, it is reasonable to view that the defendant had, at least prima facie, a reasonable basis for contesting the existence or scope of the obligation to perform. Even if the defendant's assertion was contrary to the Supreme Court's prior precedents on related or similar cases, this does not warrant a different conclusion. In this vein, the court below after remand was justified in finding that it was reasonable for the defendant to contest the existence of the obligation to perform, and further in determining that the period reasonable for such contestation extended up to the date of pronouncement of the judgment on remand, thereby ordering payment of damages for delay at the rate of 5% per annum under the Civil Act (민법) from the day following service of a copy of the complaint until the date of pronouncement of the judgment on remand, and at the rate of 25% per annum under the Act on Special Cases concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings from the following day until the date of full payment.

Full text (English, AI translation) 4,704 chars

[Plaintiffs, Appellants] Plaintiff 1 and 16 others, Plaintiffs' Attorney Lee Kwang-su
[Defendant, Appellee] Korea Airport Authority, Defendant's Attorney Choi Deok-bin
[Judgment Below] Seoul High Court Decision 94Na4297 rendered on May 3, 1994

[Order]

All appeals are dismissed. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiffs.

[Reasoning]

The grounds of appeal are examined.

The phrase "when it is deemed reasonable for the debtor to contest the existence or scope of the obligation to perform" under Article 3(2) of the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings (소송촉진등에관한특례법) is construed to mean cases where the debtor's assertion contesting the existence or scope of the obligation to perform is found to have reasonable grounds. Accordingly, whether it was reasonable for the debtor to so contest is a matter concerning the court's fact-finding and evaluation with respect to the case at issue. Meanwhile, "the reasonable scope thereof" in the latter part of the same provision means "the scope of the period during which it was reasonable for the debtor to contest," and since the period during which the debtor may contest at the fact-finding instance (the court of first instance or the appellate court) of the case at issue must be deemed to extend until the pronouncement of the judgment of that fact-finding instance, application of Article 3(1) of the said Act may not be excluded for any reason after such pronouncement. However, as long as it is after the day following service of the complaint or a document equivalent thereto on the debtor and before the pronouncement of the judgment of that instance, the court may appropriately determine the scope of the period reasonable for such contestation (see this Court's en banc Decision 86Daka1876 rendered on May 26, 1987, etc.).

According to the record, this case is one in which the issue in dispute was whether there had been implied consent or ratification by the workers, and whether there existed reasonableness in social norms sufficient to substitute for the consent of the collective body of workers, all revolving around whether the amendment of the Defendant Authority's remuneration regulations concerning payment of retirement allowances, made disadvantageously to the workers, was valid. It can be seen that the court of first instance accepted the Plaintiffs' assertions and upheld their claims, whereas the court below prior to remand accepted the Defendant's assertions and rejected the Plaintiffs' claims; upon the Plaintiffs' appeal therefrom, the judgment of the court below prior to remand was reversed, and thereafter the court below after remand rendered a judgment upholding the Plaintiffs' claims. Given that the Defendant's assertions were to such an extent accepted by the court below prior to remand, it would be reasonable to view, at least prima facie, that there were reasonable grounds for the Defendant to contest the existence or scope of the obligation to perform, and this conclusion should not be altered merely because the Defendant's assertions were contrary to the Supreme Court's precedents in related or similar cases. In this vein, the court below after remand, having found it reasonable for the Defendant to contest the existence of its obligation to perform, and further having determined the period reasonable for such contestation to extend until the date of pronouncement of the aforementioned remand judgment, ordered payment of delay damages at the rate of 5% per annum as prescribed by the Civil Act (민법) from the day following service of a copy of the complaint in this case until the date of pronouncement of the remand judgment, and at the rate of 25% per annum as prescribed by the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings from the day thereafter until the date of full payment. This determination is justified and acceptable, and there is no illegality therein as argued in the grounds of appeal.

The argument points to considerations of equity with other related or similar cases and to the fact that the Defendant did not appeal in such cases, but such circumstances cannot be said to bear a direct relation to the determination, in this case, of whether there were reasonable grounds for the Defendant to contest the existence or scope of the obligation to perform.

The argument is without merit.

Therefore, all appeals are dismissed, and the costs of appeal shall be borne by the losing parties. This judgment is rendered as stated in the Order by the unanimous opinion of the participating Justices.

Justice Lee Yong-hoon (Presiding Justice), Park Man-ho, Park Jun-seo (Justice in Charge), Kim Hyung-sun

【판결요지】

가. 소송촉진등에관한특례법 제3조 제2항 소정의 “채무자가 그 이행의무의 존부나 범위에 관하여 항쟁함이 상당하다고 인정되는 때”라고 하는 것은 그 이행의무의 존부나 범위에 관하여 항쟁하는 채무자의 주장에 상당한 근거가 있는 것으로 인정되는 때라고 풀이되므로, 채무자가 위와 같이 항쟁함이 상당한 것인지의 여부는 당해 사건에 관한 법원의 사실인정과 그 평가에 관한 문제라고 할 것이고, 한편 같은 조항 후단의 “그 상당한 범위”는 “채무자가 항쟁함에 상당한 기간의 범위”를 뜻하는 것으로서 채무자가 당해 사건의 사실심(제1심 또는 항소심)에서 항쟁할 수 있는 기간은 사실심 판결선고시까지로 보아야 하므로 그 선고시 이후에는 어떤 이유로든지 같은 법 제3조 제1항의 적용을 배제할 수 없으나 소장 또는 이에 준하는 서면이 채무자에게 송달된 다음날부터 그 심급의 판결선고 전이기만 하면 법원은 그 항쟁함에 상당한 기간의 범위를 적절히 정할 수 있다.

나. 제1심이 원고들의 주장을 받아들여 그 청구를 인용하였음에 반하여 환송 전 원심은 피고의 주장을 받아들여 원고들의 청구를 배척하였고, 이에 대하여 원고들이 상고한 결과 환송 전 원심판결이 파기되어 그 환송 후 원심에서 원고들의 청구를 인용하는 판결이 선고된 경우, 이와 같이 피고의 주장이 환송 전 원심에 의하여 받아들여진 적이 있을 정도였다면 일응 피고가 이행의무의 존부나 범위에 관하여 항쟁함에는 상당한 근거가 있었다고 봄이 타당할 것이고, 설사 피고의 주장이 관련 또는 유사사건에 대한 종전의 대법원 판례와 배치되는 것이었다고 하여 달리 볼 것은 아니므로, 이와 같은 취지에서 환송 후 원심이 피고가 그 이행의무의 존부에 관하여 항쟁함이 상당하다고 보고 나아가 그 항쟁함에 상당한 기간을 환송판결선고일까지로 정하여 소장부본송달 다음날부터 환송판결선고일까지는 민법 소정의 연 5푼의, 그 다음날부터 완제일까지는 소송촉진등에관한특례법 소정의 연 2할 5푼의 각 비율에 의한 지연손해금의 지급을 명한 것은 정당하다고 한 사례.

【참조조문】

가.나. 소송촉진등에관한특례법 제3조 / 나. 민법 제379조

【참조판례】

가. 대법원 1984.2.14. 선고 83다카875,876,877 판결(공1984,502), 1987.5.26. 선고 86다카1876 판결(공1987,1058)

【주문】·【이유】 전문 1,684자 · 펼쳐 보기

【원고, 상고인】 원고 1 외 16인 원고들 소송대리인 변호사 이광수

【피고, 피상고인】 한국공항관리공단 소송대리인 변호사 최덕빈

【원심판결】 서울고등법원 1994.5.3. 선고 94나4297 판결

【주 문】

상고를 모두 기각한다. 상고비용은 원고들의 부담으로 한다.

【이 유】 상고이유를 본다.

소송촉진등에관한특례법 제3조 제2항 소정의 “채무자가 그 이행의무의 존부나 범위에 관하여 항쟁함이 상당하다고 인정되는 때”라고 하는 것은 그 이행의무의 존부나 범위에 관하여 항쟁하는 채무자의 주장에 상당한 근거가 있는 것으로 인정되는 때라고 풀이되므로 채무자가 위와 같이 항쟁함이 상당한 것인지의 여부는 당해 사건에 관한 법원의 사실인정과 그 평가에 관한 문제라고 할 것이고, 한편 같은 조항 후단의 “그 상당한 범위”는 “채무자가 항쟁함에 상당한 기간의 범위”를 뜻하는 것으로서 채무자가 당해 사건의 사실심(제1심 또는 항소심)에서 항쟁할 수 있는 기간은 사실심 판결선고시까지로 보아야 하므로 그 선고시 이후에는 어떤 이유로든지 위 법 제3조 제1항의 적용을 배제할 수 없으나 소장 또는 이에 준하는 서면이 채무자에게 송달된 다음날부터 그 심급의 판결선고 전이기만 하면 법원은 그 항쟁함에 상당한 기간의 범위를 적절히 정할 수 있다 할 것이다(당원 1987.5.26. 선고 86다카1876 전원합의체 판결 등 참조).

기록에 의하면, 이 사건은 피고 공단의 퇴직금지급에 관한 보수규정이 근로자들에게 불이익하게 개정된 것이 유효한지 여부를 둘러싸고 근로자들의 묵시적 동의 내지 추인이 있었는지 여부 및 근로자집단의 동의를 대신할 만한 사회통념상의 합리성이 있었는지 여부가 쟁점이 되어 다투어진 사건으로서, 제1심이 원고들의 주장을 받아들여 그 청구를 인용하였음에 반하여 환송 전 원심은 피고의 주장을 받아들여 원고들의 청구를 배척하였고, 이에 대하여 원고들이 상고한 결과 환송 전 원심판결이 파기되어 그 환송 후 원심에서 원고들의 청구를 인용하는 판결이 선고되었음을 알 수 있는바, 이와 같이 피고의 주장이 환송전 원심에 의하여 받아들여진 적이 있을 정도였다면 일응 피고가 이행의무의 존부나 범위에 관하여 항쟁함에는 상당한 근거가 있었다고 봄이 타당할 것이고, 설사 피고의 주장이 관련 또는 유사 사건에 대한 종전의 대법원 판례와 배치되는 것이었다고 하여 달리 볼 것은 아니라 할 것이므로, 이와 같은 취지에서 환송 후 원심이 피고가 그 이행의무의 존부에 관하여 항쟁함이 상당하다고 보고 나아가 그 항쟁함에 상당한 기간을 위 환송판결선고일까지로 정하여 이 사건 소장부본 송달 다음날부터 환송판결선고일까지는 민법 소정의 연 5푼의, 그 다음날부터 완제일까지는 소송촉진등에관한특례법에 정한 연 2할 5푼의 각 비율에 의한 지연손해금의 지급을 명한 것은 정당한 것으로 수긍이 가고, 거기에 소론과 같은 위법이 있다 할 수 없다.

논지는 다른 관련 또는 유사사건과의 형평성 또는 그러한 사건에서 피고가 상고하지 아니한 점 등을 지적하나, 그와 같은 사정이 이 사건에서 피고가 이행의무의 존부나 범위에 관하여 항쟁함에 상당한 근거가 있는지 여부의 판단과 직접적인 관련이 있다고는 할 수 없다.

논지는 이유 없다.

그러므로 상고를 모두 기각하고, 상고비용은 패소자들의 부담으로 하기로 하여 관여 법관의 일치된 의견으로 주문과 같이 판결한다.

대법관 이용훈(재판장) 박만호 박준서(주심) 김형선

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