[Plaintiffs, Appellants] Plaintiff 1 and 1 other; Plaintiffs' Attorney: Oh Seung-geun
[Defendant, Appellee] Kangwon Industries Co., Ltd.
[Judgment Below] Seoul High Court Decision 90Na2736, decided August 22, 1990
[Order]
The part of the judgment below against the Plaintiffs is reversed, and this part of the case is remanded to the Seoul High Court.
[Reasoning] As to the grounds of appeal by the Plaintiffs' attorney
1. As to the Plaintiffs' claim for statutory allowances in this case, the court below, citing the first instance judgment, held as follows. The Plaintiffs asserted that, during the period from April 1985 to January 1988 for which they claimed statutory allowances, they performed a certain number of days of holiday work in addition to normal work, and that on all days they reported to work, they worked 12 hours a day from 06:00 to 19:00, excluding 1 hour for meals and rest, in accordance with the Defendant's instructions, thereby working 4 hours in excess of the prescribed 8 working hours per day; based on this, they sought payment of overtime work allowance and holiday work allowance. In response, the court below, based on the evidence adopted, found that the Plaintiffs performed holiday work for the number of days as stated in the judgment in addition to normal work during the claim period, and that, because the Plaintiffs' work was affected significantly by seasonal factors such that they sometimes worked beyond the prescribed working hours even during peak seasons, but the exact overtime hours could not be calculated, the Defendant had paid overtime allowance for 25 hours per month on the basis that the workers performed overtime work of an average of 1 hour per day. The court below found that this method of paying overtime allowance was reasonable in light of the nature of the Plaintiffs' work, and accordingly held it appropriate to find that the Plaintiffs performed 1 hour of overtime work per working day, and calculated the Plaintiffs' overtime work allowance and holiday work allowance on this basis.
However, according to the entries in, among the evidence adopted by the court below, particularly Defendant's Exhibits No. 1-29 through 1-34 (Plaintiff 1's payroll ledger) and Defendant's Exhibits No. 2-29 through 2-34 (Plaintiff 2's payroll ledger), it can be seen that the Defendant, as found by the court below, paid overtime allowance for 25 hours per month on the basis that the workers performed an average of 1 hour of overtime work per day up until July 1987, but from August 1987, the Defendant increased the overtime hours by 1 hour per day from the previous level, and began paying overtime allowance for 25 hours per month on the basis that the workers performed an average of 2 hours of overtime work per day, and maintained this until January 1988, when the Plaintiffs retired.
If so, the above factual finding of the court below is justified for the period up to July 1987, but cannot be considered justified for the period from August 1987 to January 1988; for this period, the court below should have found 2 hours of overtime work per working day and calculated the corresponding overtime work allowance and holiday work allowance. The judgment below on this point violated the rules of evidence and thereby affected the outcome of the judgment, and the argument is well-founded to this extent.
Furthermore, in calculating the amounts of the overtime work allowance and holiday work allowance, the court below calculated the overtime work allowance at 150% of the hourly ordinary wage for all overtime hours across both normal working days and holiday working days, and calculated the holiday work allowance by adding 150% of the hourly ordinary wage for the prescribed 8 hours of holiday work plus an additional 50% premium of the hourly ordinary wage for overtime hours that were also holiday hours. As argued, where holiday work and overtime work overlap, the prescribed premium wages must each be paid; however, it is clear that the above calculation method of the court below, with respect to the portion where holiday work and overtime work overlap, calculated by adding the premium wage for holiday work and the premium wage for overtime work respectively, and therefore the judgment below cannot be said to contain an error of law due to misapprehension of the legal principles concerning Article 46 of the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법).
2. According to the reasoning of the judgment below, with respect to the period of continuous service used in calculating the retirement allowance for Plaintiff 1, the court below noted the Plaintiff's argument as follows: the Plaintiff joined the Defendant company as an employee of the Transportation Section of the Mangu Factory on July 20, 1968, and while working there, submitted a letter of resignation on July 31, 1974, and re-joined the following day, from which date he was dispatched to work at the Transportation Department of the Sampyo Ready-Mixed Concrete Business Office; on February 28, 1978, in the course of reorganizing the Transportation Department of the Sampyo Ready-Mixed Concrete Business Office into the Transportation Department of the Defendant company's Ready-Mixed Concrete Business Office, all employees belonging to that Transportation Department, including the Plaintiff, submitted letters of resignation and re-joined the following day, continuing to work until retiring on January 31, 1988; the Plaintiff argued that, although on paper he took the form of submitting a resignation letter and being newly hired at each of the resignations on July 31, 1974 and February 28, 1978, he did not actually undergo the substantive hiring procedures such as taking an employment examination, and continued to perform the same work, such that in reality his employment relationship with the Defendant continued without regard to these interim resignations, and therefore, in calculating the Plaintiff's retirement allowance, the period of continuous service should be deemed to be 19 years and 7 months, from July 20, 1968 to January 31, 1988. However, the court below found that the evidence cited in support of the fact that the Plaintiff worked as alleged since joining the Defendant company on July 20, 1968 was difficult to believe; rather, according to the evidence adopted, it could be recognized that the Plaintiff joined Samkang Transportation Co., Ltd. (삼강운수주식회사), a corporate entity separate from the Defendant, on July 20, 1968, and while working there, retired on July 31, 1974, re-joined the same company the following day and continued working, then retired from that company on February 28, 1978, and even received retirement allowance therefrom, before finally joining the Defendant company on March 1, 1978, and working there until retiring on January 31, 1988. The court below held that, absent other special circumstances, the Plaintiff's act of joining the Defendant company after retiring from Samkang Transportation Co., Ltd., a corporate entity separate from the Defendant, could not be regarded, in relation to the Defendant, as merely taking the form of resignation and re-hiring while in substance constituting continuous service at the Defendant company with only a change in position; and accordingly determined that the period of continuous service for calculating the Plaintiff's retirement allowance upon his retirement from the Defendant company was 9 years and 11 months, from March 1, 1978 to January 31, 1988.
However, the record reveals the following facts: Plaintiff 1 joined Sampyo Transportation (삼표운수), a separate organization under the Defendant, as an assistant on July 20, 1968; as the Defendant company separated its own Transportation Section organization and merged it with the said separate Sampyo Transportation organization to establish Samkang Transportation Co., Ltd., the Plaintiff was appointed as of January 1, 1971 as a regular employee belonging to the Transportation Section of Samkang Transportation Co., Ltd., and worked there; when the Defendant lowered the existing progressive retirement allowance payment rate to the simple payment rate under the Labor Standards Act as of August 1, 1974, it required the collective submission of resignation letters to coincide with the timing of this change, and the Plaintiff accordingly submitted a resignation letter dated July 31, 1974, but was processed as having re-joined the following day, August 1, 1974, and continued to work as an employee of the Transportation Section of Samkang Transportation Co., Ltd.; when the Defendant, as of March 1, 1978, established the Transportation Department of the Sampyo Ready-Mixed Concrete Business Office within the Defendant company and, in the process, absorbed into it about 10 persons including the Plaintiff who were already working on dispatch at the Sampyo Ready-Mixed Concrete Business Office site, the Defendant required them to submit resignation letters collectively dated the day before, February 28, 1978, and the Plaintiff accordingly submitted a resignation letter, but was processed as having re-joined the following day, March 1, 1978, and continued to work in the same Transportation Department until retiring on January 31, 1988. Although the affiliation of the Transportation Section in which the Plaintiff worked changed as described above from Sampyo Transportation to Samkang Transportation Co., Ltd. and then to the Defendant company, the employees of the Transportation Section, including the Plaintiff, continued to perform the same work throughout the periods before and after the organizational changes; although the Plaintiff took the form of submitting a resignation letter and immediately re-joining each time at the Defendant's request, this was done for the Defendant's operational convenience regardless of the Plaintiff's own free will, and no substantive hiring procedures, such as taking an employment examination upon re-joining, were ever undergone; and Samkang Transportation Co., Ltd. (renamed Sampyo Industries Co., Ltd. on November 20, 1984), although formally a separate corporate entity from the Defendant company, was an affiliated company under the Defendant's group, to which the same standards as the Defendant company applied regarding retirement allowance payment rates and working conditions, and whose personnel and financial management, among other matters, were integratedly managed by the Defendant as the head company. These facts are clearly established, in particular, by the entries in Plaintiff's Exhibits No. 9-1, 9-2, No. 14, and No. 15, and Defendant's Exhibit No. 7-2, as well as the testimony of non-party witness 1 at the first instance and the testimony of non-party witness 2 at both the first instance and the court below.
Based on the foregoing facts, both of the Plaintiff's interim resignations dated July 31, 1974 and February 28, 1978, must be held void as sham declarations made by collusion (통정허위표시). Meanwhile, even where a business's human and material organization has been absorbed and merged, or its organizational structure has changed, so long as the business itself continues to exist while maintaining its identity without being abolished, this amounts to no more than a change of the managing entity, and the employment relationship is succeeded to by the new managing entity; therefore, the substantive employment relationship between the Plaintiff and the Defendant must be regarded as having continued without interruption before and after the said dates of resignation.
Accordingly, the period of continuous service for calculating Plaintiff 1's retirement allowance should be deemed to be 19 years and 7 months, from the date of initial joining, July 20, 1968, to the date of final retirement, January 31, 1988; nevertheless, the court below's determination that the Plaintiff's period of continuous service was 9 years and 11 months, from March 1, 1978 to January 31, 1988, must be said to be the result of a mistake of fact due to violation of the rules of evidence, or a misapprehension of the legal principles concerning the calculation of the period of continuous service in computing retirement allowance. The argument is well-founded.
Accordingly, the part of the judgment below against the Plaintiffs is reversed, and this part of the case is remanded to the court below, this judgment being rendered as stated in the Order by the unanimous opinion of the participating Justices.
Justices: Kim Sang-won (Presiding Justice), Park Woo-dong, Bae Seok, Yoon Young-chul