Workbear재주넘는곰
대법원 95다13708

Confirmation of Invalidity of Dismissal, etc.해고무효확인등

Decided1996. 02. 23. Court대법원Worker won
AI-generated English translation (summary, key points, decision summary and full text) for reference only — not an official translation and without legal effect. The Korean original below is authoritative.
AI Easy read — AI summary of this decision
AI-generated summary for reference only — the Korean original below is authoritative.

This case involved a union member who was dismissed for distributing flyers and submitting a written inquiry as part of legitimate labor union activities. The Supreme Court ruled that the disciplinary dismissal (징계해고) was invalid because the employer failed to properly guarantee the union representative's right to participate in the disciplinary appeal (재심) process, as required under the collective bargaining agreement (단체협약).

Key takeaways
  • CaseA union member was dismissed after distributing flyers and submitting a written inquiry in connection with union business.
  • OutcomeThe Court ruled the activities were legitimate union conduct, and since the union representative's participation right in the appeal process was not honored, the dismissal was invalid.
  • LessonFailing to guarantee the union's participation rights in disciplinary appeal procedures as required by a collective bargaining agreement can render the entire disciplinary action void, even if the underlying conduct might otherwise justify discipline.
Issues
  • The scope of 'legitimate activities for union business' under Article 39(1) of the former Trade Union Act (노동조합법)
  • The importance of guaranteeing the union's participation rights in disciplinary appeal procedures and the legal effect of procedural defects on the validity of disciplinary action
Key reasoning

The Court held that the union member's distribution of flyers and written inquiry constituted legitimate activities conducted for union business, which are protected under Article 39(1) of the former Trade Union Act (노동조합법). The collective bargaining agreement guaranteed the union's right to have its representative participate in the disciplinary appeal (재심) procedure. Since this participation right was not properly honored during the appeal process, the Court found this to be a serious procedural defect. Such a fundamental procedural violation was sufficient to invalidate the entire disciplinary action, regardless of whether the underlying conduct might otherwise have justified discipline.

Summary of Decision (English, AI translation)

[1] "Legitimate acts for the business of a labor union" as provided in Article 39, Subparagraph 1 of the Labor Union Act (노동조합법) generally refers to legitimate activities of a labor union; however, even if an act by a union member is not, in itself, an organizational activity of the labor union conducted pursuant to a resolution or specific instruction of the union, if such act may be deemed, by its nature, to be an activity of the labor union, or may be deemed to have received the implicit authorization or approval of the labor union, such act of the union member should be regarded as an act for the business of the labor union.

[2] The reexamination procedure for a disciplinary action constitutes, together with the original disciplinary procedure, a single unified disciplinary process, serving as a remedy for, and a means of finalizing, the disciplinary action; accordingly, the legitimacy of the procedure must be judged with regard to the entire disciplinary process. Therefore, even if the original disciplinary action satisfied all of its requirements, if the reexamination procedure was not conducted at all, or if there existed a material defect in the reexamination procedure such that the effect of the reexamination cannot be recognized, the disciplinary action becomes void.

[3] Where a collective agreement (단체협약) provision guarantees the labor union's right to participate when a union member who has been dismissed for disciplinary reasons requests a reexamination, but the reexamination is conducted without ensuring such right, and the disciplinary dismissal is thereby finalized, such disciplinary action, in principle, must be deemed void due to a material defect in the procedure. However, where there exist special circumstances, such as the labor union itself having voluntarily waived its right to participate in such reexamination, or a labor union that has lost its function as a labor union having directly notified the company of its intention to cease union business in the future, with all of the union officers constituting the union's executive body having resigned, thereby completely ceasing labor union activities, then even if the resolution on reexamination was made without ensuring the participation of a union representative, this cannot be deemed to constitute a material defect in the reexamination procedure that would render the disciplinary action itself void.

Full text (English, AI translation) 16,531 chars

[Plaintiff, Appellee]

[Defendant, Appellant] Pohang Iron and Steel Co., Ltd. (POSCO) (Attorney Son Jin-gon, counsel for the defendant)
[Judgment Below] Daegu High Court Decision 94Na713 decided February 8, 1995

[Order]

The appeal is dismissed. The costs of the appeal are to be borne by the Defendant.

[Reasoning]

The grounds of appeal, together with the portion of the supplementary brief on grounds of appeal filed after the statutory period that supplements the grounds of appeal, are examined together.

1. As to Ground 1
"Legitimate acts for the business of a trade union" under Article 39, Subparagraph 1 of the Trade Union Act (노동조합법) generally refers to legitimate activities of a trade union; however, even where an act of a union member is not itself an organizational activity of the trade union carried out pursuant to a resolution or specific instruction of the union, if the act, by its nature, may be regarded as an activity of the trade union, or may be deemed to have received the implied authorization or approval of the trade union, such act of the union member must be regarded as an act for the business of the trade union (see Supreme Court Decision 91Nu4164 decided November 12, 1991; Supreme Court Decision 95Da1323 decided June 13, 1995, etc.).

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below found, based on the evidence cited, as follows. As to the circumstances under which the Plaintiff came to be involved in preparing and distributing leaflets: at a time when the number of union members of the Defendant company's trade union, which had once numbered approximately 20,000, had drastically decreased to only a few dozen, the then trade union, whose regularly elected executive body including the chairman had resigned, was being run under an acting system; against the move by those in the acting leadership to amend the union's bylaws through a yes-or-no vote without discussion among union members, the Plaintiff and several other union members, believing this to be unjust, prepared leaflets mainly addressing the content of the proposed amendment and the problems in the amendment procedure, and distributed them to the Defendant company's employees on the commuter bus on the morning of the scheduled voting day. As to the circumstances under which the written inquiry was made to the Defendant company's top management: at that time, a considerable number of the Defendant company's union members were asserting that they had been pressured by the Defendant company to withdraw from the union and had in fact withdrawn, and, as noted above, the number of union members had drastically decreased and union activities had sharply diminished; when the Defendant company, through its in-house bulletin "Nomu Sosik" (Labor Affairs News), publicized to employees that there were impure elements such as the Sanomaeng (Socialist Workers' League) within the company, the Plaintiff and several other union members who were enthusiastic about union activities regarded this as suppression of the minority union members, and accordingly made a written inquiry stating, "If there is a Sanomaeng organization within the company, disclose its substance and stop the suppression of the minority union members." Having found these facts, the court below determined that, in light of the circumstances of the Plaintiff's distribution of the leaflets, the content of the leaflets, the timing and place of distribution, and the circumstances and content of the written inquiry made to the Defendant company's top management, each of these acts, by their nature, must be regarded as "acts for the business of a trade union" under Article 39, Subparagraph 1 of the Trade Union Act.

Examining the relevant evidence in light of the above Supreme Court decision, the above findings and determination of the court below are all acceptable, and there is no illegality therein, as argued in the grounds of appeal, in the form of a violation of the rules of evidence or a misunderstanding of the legal principles concerning Article 39, Subparagraph 1 of the Trade Union Act.

This ground of appeal is without merit in its entirety.

2. As to Ground 2
The court below determined as follows. Under Article 25, Subparagraph 3 of the collective agreement concluded between the Defendant company and the Defendant company's trade union, in connection with Article 39, Subparagraphs 1 and 5 of the Trade Union Act, where a union member is to be subjected to a severe disciplinary action of dismissal or greater, if the union member requests a re-examination (jaesim), three representatives designated by the union must be appointed as members of the personnel committee. Since, among the grounds for disciplinary action against the Plaintiff, the acts of distributing the leaflets and making the written inquiry as found in the judgment constitute, by their nature, "acts for the business of a trade union" under Article 39, Subparagraph 1 of the Trade Union Act, in order for the personnel committee conducting the re-examination to treat the Plaintiff's above acts as grounds for disciplinary action, three union representatives should have been seated as committee members; nevertheless, the Defendant company failed to do so, and this constitutes a procedural defect. Having so determined, the court below rejected the Defendant's argument that, at the time of the re-examination procedure concerning the Plaintiff's disciplinary action, the trade union was in fact dormant and conducted no activities whatsoever, such that even if the Defendant company had notified the union side of the re-examination procedure, it would have been impossible for the union to elect and seat three representatives, and that, even if three union representatives had participated as committee members, since there were ten company-side members on the re-examination committee, the company could have reached its intended re-examination decision regardless, so that even if the Defendant rendered the re-examination decision without notifying the trade union of the re-examination, this would not amount to a procedural defect serious enough to infringe upon the procedural fairness of the disciplinary dismissal in this case. In rejecting this argument, the court below found, based on the relevant evidence, that at the time the re-examination personnel committee was convened, 37 union members remained; that on July 29, 1992, Non-party 1, the acting chairman of the trade union, resigned from the position of acting chairman effective August 1 of the same year, and, pursuant to a resolution of the executive standing committee, delegated to Non-party 2, a union member, matters concerning the union fund, equipment, office, the status of union members, receipt of documents, and general administrative management, such that the said Non-party 2 (Lee Sang-jun) was in charge of the trade union's document receipt and general administrative affairs. On this basis, the court below concluded that it could not be concluded that, even if the Defendant company had notified the said Lee Sang-jun of the holding of the re-examination personnel committee, the union side would have been unable to elect and seat three representatives, and on this and other grounds rejected all of the Defendant's above arguments.

The re-examination procedure for a disciplinary action is, as a remedial or confirmatory procedure with respect to the disciplinary action, together with the original disciplinary procedure, a single unified disciplinary process, the legitimacy of which must be judged with respect to the entirety of the disciplinary process; therefore, even where the original disciplinary action satisfies all its requirements, if the re-examination procedure is not conducted at all, or if there is a material defect in the re-examination procedure such that the effect of the re-examination cannot be recognized, the disciplinary action shall be void (see Supreme Court Decision 92Da49935 decided October 22, 1993; Supreme Court Decision 93Da29662 decided January 24, 1995, etc.). Accordingly, where Article 25, Subparagraph 3 of the Defendant company's collective agreement guarantees the trade union's right to participate when a union member disciplinarily dismissed requests a re-examination, but the re-examination is nevertheless conducted without guaranteeing such right and the disciplinary dismissal is thereby finalized, the disciplinary action must, in principle, be deemed void due to a material procedural defect. However, if there are special circumstances such that the trade union itself voluntarily waived its right to participate in such re-examination (see Supreme Court Decision 92Da32074 decided December 8, 1992; Supreme Court Decision 94Da46753 decided March 28, 1995, etc.), or where a trade union that has lost its function as a trade union has directly notified the company of its intention to suspend union business going forward, and all of the union officers constituting the union's executive body have resigned, such that the union's activities have completely ceased, then even if the re-examination resolution was made without guaranteeing the participation of union representatives, this cannot be deemed to constitute a material defect in the re-examination procedure rendering the disciplinary action itself void (see Supreme Court Decision 95Da1323 decided June 13, 1995).

Examining the record, the following facts are found: the Defendant company's trade union once had approximately 19,000 members, but by the time the Plaintiff requested re-examination, the number of union members had fallen to only 37, such that the union had in fact lost its function as a trade union; on July 23, 1992, all of the union's officers and executives (7 persons) resigned from the executive body, and requested the company side to release them from full-time union duty effective August 1; and in a letter of cooperation request sent to the company by the trade union on July 25 of the same year, it was stated that: Non-party 2 had been appointed as manager of the union fund in order to preserve and maintain the union fund and assets while the performance of union business was suspended going forward; that, in order to prevent misappropriation of the union fund and to preserve it, it had been decided that the fund would be managed jointly, in the co-names of a manager appointed by the union side and a manager appointed by the company side, and cooperation was requested so that the union fund would be managed in accordance with the attached joint fund management rules; that, beginning with the wages for August 1992, union dues should not be deducted from union members' wages; and that, since the union's business operations were being suspended, it was expected that the operation of the labor-management council would become impossible going forward, and the company side was requested to operate in an appropriate manner so as to be able to gather the opinions of employees. It was also found that, under the joint fund management rules prepared by the trade union, the trade union delegated to the said fund manager, Lee Sang-jun, only matters concerning the management of the union fund, the custody of the union's assets and equipment supported by the company, and the maintenance of the status of union members and the receipt and organization of external official documents. Under these circumstances, it must be concluded that the Defendant company's trade union not only lacked an executive body and was thus unable to perform the trade union's original business, but had also declared to the outside world its abandonment of union activities and had notified the company side of this fact. Accordingly, even under these circumstances, it cannot be said that the Defendant company was under an obligation to request the trade union side to select three personnel committee members for the re-examination.

If so, the judgment below, premised on a different view and holding that there was a material procedural defect in the re-examination procedure, contains an illegality in erring in its determination of the lawfulness of the disciplinary procedure; therefore, this ground of appeal pointing this out has merit, at least to that extent.

3. As to Ground 3
The court below, on the premise that, with respect to the acts among the grounds for disciplinary action against the Plaintiff related to Article 39, Subparagraph 1 of the Trade Union Act, a procedural defect existed in that the Defendant company failed to comply with Article 25, Subparagraph 3 of the collective agreement, held that the legitimacy of the disciplinary dismissal should be judged based only on the remaining grounds for disciplinary action free of such procedural defect. The court below then found that, among the remaining grounds for disciplinary action excluding the above ground, those grounds found in the judgment which occurred more than six months prior to the commencement date of the disciplinary procedure and of which the Defendant company was aware, pursuant to Article 45, Paragraph 3 of the Defendant company's rules on rewards and punishments, could not be used as grounds for the disciplinary dismissal in this case (though they could be considered as mitigating or aggravating circumstances in judging the legitimacy of the disciplinary dismissal); and that, excluding also those grounds found in the judgment that could not be regarded as legitimate disciplinary grounds because they could not be seen as based on legitimate directives concerning duties, even considering comprehensively all of the remaining grounds for disciplinary action found in the judgment together with the above circumstances to be considered, in light of the Defendant company's prescribed sentencing standards by type of misconduct as found in the judgment, the Defendant's imposition upon the Plaintiff of disciplinary dismissal, the heaviest type of sanction among disciplinary measures, exceeded the limits of the disciplinary authority and could not be said to have justifiable grounds, and therefore the disciplinary action was void.

However, as discussed above in connection with Ground 2 of the grounds of appeal, it cannot be said that the Defendant company committed a procedural illegality in failing to comply with Article 25, Subparagraph 3 of the collective agreement. Accordingly, it was erroneous for the court below to exclude the grounds for disciplinary action related to Article 39, Subparagraph 1 of the Trade Union Act from the grounds for disciplinary action on the basis of a violation of Article 25, Subparagraph 3 of the collective agreement, and to judge the legitimacy of the disciplinary action based only on the remaining grounds. On the other hand, examining the record, it appears that the grounds for disciplinary action related to Article 39, Subparagraph 1 of the Trade Union Act all constitute legitimate acts for the business of the trade union and thus likewise cannot be used as grounds for disciplinary action; moreover, even comprehensively considering all of the grounds for disciplinary action against the Plaintiff that were lawfully found by the court below, it cannot be said that the Defendant's choice of the heaviest disciplinary measure of dismissal against the Plaintiff constitutes a legitimate exercise of disciplinary authority. Therefore, the court below's determination that the disciplinary action against the Plaintiff was void due to abuse of the disciplinary authority is, in its result, justified, and there is no illegality in the judgment below in the form of a misunderstanding of the legal principles concerning "justifiable grounds" for dismissal under Article 27 of the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법), or a misapprehension of facts due to a violation of the rules of evidence.

Ultimately, this ground of appeal is without merit.

4. The Defendant also filed an appeal with respect to the portion of the judgment ordering payment of wages; however, no grounds of appeal have been presented with respect to this portion, nor is there any statement thereof in the petition of appeal.

5. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of the appeal are to be borne by the losing party. It is so decided as stated in the Order, by the unanimous opinion of the Justices participating in the decision.

Presiding Justice Ahn Yong-deuk
Justice Cheon Kyung-song
Justice Ji Chang-gwon
Justice Shin Seong-taek (Presiding/Reporting Justice)

【판결요지】

[1] 노동조합법 제39조 제1호 소정의 '노동조합의 업무를 위한 정당한 행위'란 일반적으로는 노동조합의 정당한 활동을 가리키나, 조합원이 조합의 결의나 구체적인 지시에 따라서 한 노동조합의 조직적인 활동 그 자체가 아닐지라도 그 행위의 성질상 노동조합의 활동으로 볼 수 있거나 노동조합의 묵시적인 수권 혹은 승인을 받았다고 볼 수 있을 때에는 그 조합원의 행위를 노동조합의 업무를 위한 행위로 보아야 한다.

[2] 징계처분에 대한 재심절차는 징계처분에 대한 구제 내지 확정절차로서 원래의 징계절차와 함께 전부가 하나의 징계처분절차를 이루는 것으로서 그 절차의 정당성도 징계과정 전부에 관하여 판단되어야 하므로, 원래의 징계처분이 그 요건을 모두 갖추었다 하더라도 재심절차를 전혀 이행하지 않거나 재심절차에 중대한 하자가 있어 재심의 효력을 인정할 수 없는 경우에는 그 징계처분은 무효로 된다.

[3] 단체협약 규정에 징계면직된 조합원이 재심을 청구할 경우 노동조합의 참여권을 보장하고 있음에도 불구하고 이를 보장하지 아니한 채 재심이 행하여져 징계면직처분이 확정되었다면, 그 징계처분은 절차에 중대한 하자가 있어 원칙적으로 무효라고 보아야 하지만, 만약 노동조합측에서 스스로 그러한 재심에의 참여권을 포기하였다거나, 또는 노동조합으로서의 기능을 상실한 노동조합이 앞으로 조합의 업무를 중단하겠다는 뜻을 직접 회사에게 통보하고 조합의 업무집행기구를 구성하는 조합 간부 전원이 사퇴하여 노동조합활동을 완전히 중단하였다는 등의 특별한 사정이 있는 경우에는, 조합측 대표의 참여를 보장하지 아니한 채 재심의결이 행하여졌다고 하더라도 그로 인하여 재심절차에 중대한 하자가 있는 것으로 되어 징계처분 자체가 무효로 된다고 볼 수는 없다.

【참조조문】

[1] 노동조합법 제39조 제1호

[2] 근로기준법 제27조 제1항

[3] 근로기준법 제27조 제1항

【참조판례】

[1][2][3] 대법원 1995. 6. 13. 선고 95다1323 판결(공1995하, 2394) /[1] 대법원 1991. 9. 24. 선고 91누124 판결(공1991, 2631), 대법원 1991. 11. 12. 선고 91누4164 판결(공1992, 139), 대법원 1992. 9. 25. 선고 92다18542 판결(공1992, 2993) /[2] 대법원 1993. 10. 22. 선고 92다49935 판결(공1993하, 3151), 대법원 1995. 1. 24. 선고 93다29662 판결(공1995상, 1119) /[3] 대법원 1992. 12. 8. 선고 92다32074 판결(공1993상, 435), 대법원 1995. 3. 28. 선고 94다46763 판결(공1995상, 1744)

【주문】·【이유】 전문 5,923자 · 펼쳐 보기

【원고,피상고인】

【피고,상고인】 포항종합제철 주식회사 (소송대리인 변호사 손진곤)

【원심판결】 대구고법 1995. 2. 8. 선고 94나713 판결

【주문】

상고를 기각한다. 상고비용은 피고의 부담으로 한다.

【이유】상고이유와 기간이 지난 후에 제출된 상고이유보충서 기재 중 상고이유를 보충하는 부분을 함께 본다.

1. 제1점에 대하여

노동조합법 제39조 제1호 소정의 '노동조합의 업무를 위한 정당한 행위'란 일반적으로는 노동조합의 정당한 활동을 가리킨다고 할 것이나, 조합원이 조합의 결의나 구체적인 지시에 따라서 한 노동조합의 조직적인 활동 그 자체가 아닐지라도 그 행위의 성질상 노동조합의 활동으로 볼 수 있거나 노동조합의 묵시적인 수권 혹은 승인을 받았다고 볼 수 있을 때에는 그 조합원의 행위를 노동조합의 업무를 위한 행위로 보아야 할 것이다 ( 대법원 1991. 11. 12. 선고 91누4164 판결, 1995. 6. 13. 선고 95다1323 판결 등 참조).

원심판결 이유에 의하면, 원심은 거시 증거에 의하여, 원고가, 유인물 작성·배포에 관여하게 된 경위는, 2만 명 가량 되던 피고 회사 노동조합원의 수가 급격히 줄어들어 몇 십 명에 불과한 상황에서 당시 노동조합은 위원장 등 정상적으로 선출된 집행부가 사퇴하고 대행체제에 의하여 운영되고 있었는데 그들의 주도로 조합규약을 조합원의 토론 없이 찬반투표로 개정하려는 움직임에 대하여 원고와 몇몇 조합원들이 이를 부당하다고 생각하고 그 개정안의 내용 및 개정 절차상의 문제점을 주된 내용으로 한 유인물을 작성하여 투표예정일 아침 출근버스 안에서 피고 회사 근로자들에게 배포한 사실, 피고 회사 최고경영층에 서면질의하게 된 경위는, 당시 피고 회사 노동조합원들 중 상당수가 피고 회사로부터 노동조합 탈퇴를 종용받아 조합을 탈퇴하였다고 주장하고 있고, 실제로 위와 같이 조합원 수가 급격히 줄어들어 노동조합 활동이 급격히 위축되는 상황인데, 피고 회사가 홍보지인 노무소식을 통하여 회사 내에 사노맹 등 불순세력이 있다는 등의 내용을 근로자들에게 홍보하자 원고를 비롯하여 노동조합 활동에 열성적인 몇몇 조합원들이 이를 소수 조합원들에 대한 탄압이라 여겨 "사노맹 조직이 회사 내에 있다면 그 실체를 밝히고 소수 조합원에 대한 탄압을 중지하라."는 내용의 서면질의를 하게 된 사실을 인정한 다음, 원고가 위 유인물을 배포한 경위와 유인물의 내용·배포의 시기와 장소 및 피고 회사 최고 경영층에 대하여 서면질의를 하게 된 경위와 그 내용 등에 비추어 볼 때, 위 각 행위는 그 행위의 성질상 노동조합법 제39조 제1호 소정의 '노동조합의 업무를 위한 행위'라고 보아야 한다고 판단하였다.

관계 증거 및 위 대법원 판결에 비추어 살펴보면, 원심의 위 인정과 판단은 모두 수긍이 가고, 거기에 소론과 같은 채증법칙 위배나 노동조합법 제39조 제1호에 관한 법리를 오해한 위법이 있다고 할 수 없다.

논지는 모두 이유 없다.

2. 제2점에 대하여

원심은, 피고 회사와 피고 회사 노동조합과의 사이에 체결된 단체협약 제25조 제3호에 의하면, 노동조합법 제39조 제1호 및 제5호와 관련하여 조합원을 면직 이상의 중징계를 할 경우 조합원이 재심을 청구하면 조합측 대표자 3인을 인사위원회 위원으로 선임하여야 한다고 규정하고 있는데, 원고에 대한 징계사유들 중의 하나인 판시 유인물배포 행위 및 서면질의 행위는 그 행위의 성질상 노동조합법 제39조 제1호 소정의 '노동조합의 업무를 위한 행위'에 해당하므로, 재심을 위한 인사위원회에서 원고의 위 행위를 징계사유로 삼기 위하여는 조합측 대표 3인을 위원으로 참석시켜야 할 것임에도 불구하고, 피고 회사는 이를 이행하지 아니한 절차상의 하자가 있다고 판단한 후, 피고의 다음과 같은 주장, 즉 원고에 대한 위 징계재심절차 당시 노동조합은 사실상 휴면화되어 아무런 활동도 하지 않고 있어서 피고 회사가 노동조합측에 위 재심절차를 통보하였더라도 조합측에서 3인 대표를 선출, 참석시키는 것이 불가능하였고, 조합측 대표 3인이 위원으로 참석하였더라도 재심위원회의 회사측 위원이 10인이어서 회사측 의사대로 재심결정을 내릴 수 있었으므로, 피고가 노동조합에 재심에 관한 통지를 하지 아니한 채 재심결정을 하였다 하더라도 이 사건 징계해고의 절차적 정의를 침해할 정도의 절차상의 하자라고 볼 수 없다는 주장에 대하여는 관계 증거에 의하면 재심 인사위원회 개최 당시 노조원이 37인 남아 있었고, 1992. 7. 29. 노동조합 위원장 직무대행이던 소외 1이 같은 해 8. 1.자로 노동조합 위원장 직무대행직을 사임하고 상무집행위원회의 결의에 따라 조합원인 소외 2에게 조합기금, 비품, 사무실, 조합원의 현황, 문서의 접수, 일반행정관리 등을 위임함으로써 위 이상준이 노동조합의 문서접수 및 일반행정관리 등의 업무를 관장하고 있었던 사실을 인정할 수 있으므로, 피고 회사가 위 이상준에게 재심 인사위원회의 개최 사실을 통지하였더라도 조합측에서 대표 3인을 선출하여 참석시킬 수 없었다고는 단정할 수 없다는 이유 등으로 피고의 위 주장을 모두 배척하였다.

징계처분에 대한 재심절차는 징계처분에 대한 구제 내지 확정절차로서 원래의 징계절차와 함께 전부가 하나의 징계처분절차를 이루는 것으로서 그 절차의 정당성도 징계과정 전부에 관하여 판단되어야 하므로, 원래의 징계처분이 그 요건을 모두 갖추었다 하더라도 재심절차를 전혀 이행하지 않거나 재심절차에 중대한 하자가 있어 재심의 효력을 인정할 수 없는 경우에는 그 징계처분은 무효로 된다고 할 것이므로( 대법원 1993. 10. 22. 선고 92다49935 판결, 1995. 1. 24. 선고 93다29662 판결 등 참조), 피고 회사 단체협약 제25조 제3호의 규정에 징계면직된 조합원이 재심을 청구할 경우 노동조합의 참여권을 보장하고 있음에도 불구하고 이를 보장하지 아니한 채 재심이 행하여져 징계면직처분이 확정되었다면, 그 징계처분은 절차에 중대한 하자가 있어 원칙적으로 무효라고 보아야 할 것이지만, 만약 노동조합측에서 스스로 그러한 재심에의 참여권을 포기하였다거나( 대법원 1992. 12. 8. 선고 92다32074 판결, 1995. 3. 28. 선고 94다46753 판결 등 참조), 또는 노동조합으로서의 기능을 상실한 노동조합이 앞으로 조합의 업무를 중단하겠다는 뜻을 직접 회사에게 통보하고 조합의 업무집행기구를 구성하는 조합 간부 전원이 사퇴하여 노동조합 활동을 완전히 중단하였다는 등의 특별한 사정이 있는 경우에는, 조합측 대표의 참여를 보장하지 아니한 채 재심의결이 행하여졌다고 하더라도 그로 인하여 재심절차에 중대한 하자가 있는 것으로 되어 징계처분 자체가 무효로 된다고 볼 수는 없을 것이다( 대법원 1995. 6. 13. 선고 95다1323 판결 참조).

그런데, 기록에 의하여 살펴보면, 피고 회사의 노동조합은 한 때 조합원이 1만 9천여 명에 이르렀으나 원고가 재심을 청구할 무렵에는 조합원의 숫자가 37명밖에 되지 않아 사실상 노동조합으로서의 기능을 상실하였던 사실, 노동조합에서는 1992. 7. 23.을 기하여 노동조합 임원 및 간부 전원(7명)이 집행부에서 사퇴하고 회사측에게 8. 1.자로 전임근무를 해제하여 줄 것을 요청하였는데, 노동조합이 같은 해 7. 25.자로 회사에 대하여 발송한 협조요청서에는, 향후 조합업무 수행이 정지된 상태에서 조합기금과 자산 등의 보존 및 유지를 위하여 소외 2를 조합기금관리인으로 선임하였다는 것, 조합기금의 유용 방지와 보존을 위하여 조합측에서 선임한 관리인과 회사측에서 선임한 관리인으로 하여금 공동명의로 조합기금을 관리케 하기로 하였으므로 첨부된 조합기금공동관리준칙에 의거 조합기금이 관리되도록 협조를 바란다는 것, 1992. 8.분 급여부터는 조합원의 급여에서 조합비를 공제하지 말라는 것, 조합의 업무수행이 정지됨에 따라 향후 노사협의회 운영이 불가능할 것으로 판단되므로 회사측에서 직원들의 의견을 수렴할 수 있도록 적정한 방법으로 운영하여 주기 바란다는 것 등의 내용이 담겨져 있고, 또 노동조합이 마련한 조합기금공동관리준칙에 의하면, 노동조합은 조합기금관리인인 위 이상준에게, "조합기금의 관리에 관한 사항, 조합의 자산과 회사가 지원한 비품 등의 보관에 관한 사항, 조합원의 현황 유지 및 외부공문의 접수, 정리에 관한 사항" 등만을 위임한 것으로 되어 있는 사실 등이 각 인정되는바, 위와 같은 사정 아래서라면 피고 회사의 노동조합은 업무집행기구가 구성되어 있지 아니하여 노동조합 본래의 업무수행이 불가능하게 되었을 뿐만 아니라 대외적으로 조합활동의 포기를 선언하고 회사측에도 그와 같은 사실을 통보하였다고 보아야 할 것이므로, 위와 같은 경우에도 피고 회사에게 노동조합측에 대하여 재심 인사위원 3인을 선발하여 줄 것을 요청할 의무가 있다고는 할 수 없을 것이다.

그렇다면, 이와 다른 견해를 전제로 하여 재심절차에 중대한 절차상의 하자가 있다고 본 원심판결에는 징계절차의 적법성에 대한 판단을 그르친 위법이 있다고 할 것이므로, 이 점을 지적하는 논지는 일단 이유가 있다.

3. 제3점에 대하여

원심은, 원고에 대한 징계사유 중 노동조합법 제39조 제1호와 관련된 행위에 관하여는 피고 회사가 단체협약 제25조 제3호를 준수하지 아니한 절차상의 하자가 개재되어 있으므로, 절차상의 하자가 없는 나머지 징계사유만으로 징계면직처분에 정당한 이유가 있는지를 판단하여야 한다고 전제한 다음, 위 징계사유를 제외한 나머지 징계사유 중 피고 회사 상벌규정 제45조 제3항에 따라 징계절차 착수일로부터 6개월 이전에 발생하여 피고 회사가 인지한 판시 징계사유들은 이 사건 징계면직사유로 삼을 수 없고(징계면직처분의 정당성을 판단함에 있어서 참작사유로는 삼을 수 있다), 정당한 직무상 명령이라고 볼 수 없어 적법한 징계사유로 볼 수 없는 판시 징계사유 등을 제외한 나머지 판시 징계사유들에 위와 같은 참작사유 등 제반 사정을 모두 종합하더라도, 판시 피고 회사 소정의 비위유형별 양정기준에 비추어 볼 때, 피고가 원고에 대하여 징계면직이라는 징계의 종류 중 가장 무거운 제재를 가하는 것은 징계권의 한계를 일탈한 것으로서 정당한 사유가 있다고 할 수 없어, 그 징계처분은 무효라고 판단하였다.

그런데, 피고 회사가 단체협약 제25조 제3호를 준수하지 아니한 절차상의 위법을 저질렀다고 볼 수 없다는 점은 위 상고이유 제2점에 관한 판단에서 본 바와 같으므로, 원심이 노동조합법 제39조 제1호와 관련된 징계사유를 단체협약 제25조 제3호의 위반을 이유로 하여 징계사유에서 제외하고 나머지 징계사유만으로 징계의 정당성을 판단한 것은 잘못이라고 할 것이나, 한편 기록에 의하여 살펴보면, 노동조합법 제39조 제1호와 관련된 징계사유가 모두 노동조합의 업무를 위한 정당한 행위에 해당하여 역시 징계사유로 삼을 수 없다고 보여질 뿐만 아니라, 원심이 적법하게 인정한 원고에 대한 모든 징계사유들을 종합적으로 판단하더라도 피고가 원고에게 가장 무거운 징계면직처분을 선택한 것은 정당한 징계권의 행사라고 볼 수 없다고 할 것이므로, 원고에 대한 징계가 징계권을 남용하여 무효라고 본 원심의 판단은 결과적으로 정당하다고 할 것이고, 원심판결에 근로기준법 제27조의 해고의 정당한 이유에 관한 법리오해의 위법이나 채증법칙 위배로 인한 사실오인의 위법이 있다고 할 수 없다.

결국, 논지는 이유 없다.

4. 피고는 임금지급을 명한 부분에 관하여도 상고를 제기하였으나, 이 부분에 관하여는 아무런 상고이유를 개진하고 있지 아니하고, 또한 상고장에도 그 기재가 없다.

5. 그러므로 상고를 기각하고, 상고비용은 패소자의 부담으로 하기로 하여 관여 법관의 일치된 의견으로 주문과 같이 판결한다.

대법관 안용득(재판장) 천경송 지창권 신성택(주심)

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